Suchergebnisse

The Black Sea region in its various geopolitical configurations is a zone of priority for the Turkish elite. Prior to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), the Black Sea was regarded as the "Sultan's harem." Being essentially a peninsula between the Mediterranean and Black Sea, Türkiye is interested in maintaining control over the Black Sea space or in sharing it with another strong power having access to it. The authors aim to identify and explore Türkiye's foreign policy strategy in relation to the Black Sea region as one of the key geopolitical spaces for Ankara's national interests. The foreign policy strategy is understood as a long-term mechanism of the subject in relation to objects and competing subjects, which aims to achieve the most favorable spatial position with the help of military and non-military means and appropriate resources, taking into account the timeliness factor. The article solves specific tasks: it identifies the stable characteristics of Turkish foreign policy, shaped by historical experience and geography, which underlie Ankara's foreign policy strategy; it shows and studies the strategic vision of the Turkish elite in relation to the Black Sea region; it reveals the mechanisms of influence of external geopolitical subjects on the region and the combination of these mechanisms with Turkish national interests. The concept of Turkish balance is introduced as mechanism of Türkiye's foreign policy strategy whose main purpose is to integrate stronger powers into the logic and algorithms of foreign policy balances of stronger powers with their mutual opposition and further balancing act, which allows Türkiye to receive maximum geo-economic and geopolitical dividends. The research methodology is represented by systemic, geopolitical and civilizational approaches. Given the role of the Black Sea region in the military-political dynamics since February 2022, the mechanisms of Türkiye's foreign policy strategy in relation to the region are becoming crucial for Russia in various areas of national security. Authors propagate that February 2022 is the inertia of the events of March 2014 and deeper, of the postponed crisis of 1991 caused by the disintegration of the USSR. However, it was the beginning of the special military operation that brought the military and political confrontation at the global and regional levels into the format of open confrontation. Russia has challenged the West and its system of allies.

This research examines how Russian cities can learn from leading European global cities in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign labor migrants. It emphasizes the link between migration and investment flows in global cities specialized in specific services. Global cities play a crucial role in attracting transnational factors of economic growth, with migration being a significant factor. The study analyzes the potential benefits of migration to global cities, including increased trade and capital flows. This benefits both the countries of origin through remittances and the global cities themselves through FDI. European global cities, including London, Paris, Amsterdam, Stockholm, Madrid, Frankfurt, Vienna, Zurich, Dublin, and Berlin, are major centers attracting FDI and labor migrants. Each city has its own specialization and competitive advantages, contributing to the global division of labor. Building on previous research, the study analyzes the attracting factors identified by the City of London for FDI and foreign-born skilled personnel. It aims to identify applicable opportunities for Moscow and St. Petersburg, the leading Russian global cities. While Moscow and St. Petersburg are well-ranked, other Russian cities have limited recognition. The research plans to expand to other Russian global cities, contributing to a comprehensive understanding of global city development. The research explores how Russian cities can leverage the experiences of leading European global cities to attract FDI and foreign labor migrants. By doing so, Russian cities can foster economic growth and enhance their global standing.

-

-

The study is dedicated to the main guidelines of the foreign policy of the State of Israel in the context of the current transformation of the world order. Before the start of the special military operation, despite a fairly strong strategic alliance with the United States, Israel pursued a pragmatic foreign policy and maintained mutually beneficial bilateral relations with the leading powers of the non-Western world - especially Russia, China and India. However, the sharp escalation of the situation in the Palestinian territories in October 2023 put Israel in front of an existential choice under the conditions of the emerging new bipolarity, and this choice was made in favor of the United States and its NATO allies. Now the official rhetoric in Israel has become consonant with the one that prevailed during the period of the severed relations between Russia and Israel. Nevertheless, in formulating policies where Russian and Israeli positions do not coincide, both sides continue to coordinate all actions within the framework of a joint dialogue. The article focuses on the main issues on which Russia and Israel differ: Ukrainian, Iranian, and Palestinian factors. China and India occupy a special place among Israel's foreign policy priorities. The importance of these countries for the Jewish state will be increasing due to the inevitable isolationist tendencies in the region, which are growing against the backdrop of the worsening Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The article examines the main trends in Israel's relations with some Arab countries, China and India.

In 2020, four Arab states - Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan and Morocco - took their first steps toward normalizing relations with Israel with the active US support. This research is an attempt to identify the main incentives which made the Arab states act the way they did, as well as to analyze the situation of the Palestinians amidst the strengthening of relations between Israel and the Arab world. The author also examines how the conflict between Israel and Hamas, which began on October 7, 2023, has affected the established diplomatic, economic, and military ties between the Jewish state and the Arab countries which signed the Abraham Accords. The study concludes that one of the main incentives for Arab states to normalize relations with Israel is the desire to deepen military and technical cooperation with the U.S. At the same time, it would be far-fetched to consider the normalization of relations between the four states and Israel as a step toward regional stabilization, given the reaction of the Palestinians and other Middle Eastern states to the agreements embraced. The reaction reflects the failure to find a common approach to the Middle East peace process as well as the fact that there is no region-widely shared view on shaping a new regional architecture. In this context, it is worth highlighting the situation of the Palestinians, for whom these agreements were a stab in the back and created unfavorable conditions for the establishment of a full-fledged state of Palestine. The study also emphasizes that the future of the "Abraham Accords" and the possibility of their expansion will depend on the development of the conflict between Israel and Hamas, as well as on the readiness of the parties to reach a long-term peaceful settlement. The continuation of the conflict in Gaza would seriously undermine Israel's image in the Arab world and would certainly undermine the fundamental principles of the Abraham Accords, which would diminish the importance of these agreements. This study offers a valuable perspective on the complex and dynamic relationships in the Middle East region and contributes to understanding the motives and consequences of recent geopolitical changes.

The study examines the key features and areas of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government's policy aimed at boosting the export of weapons, military and special equipment (WMSE) within the broader strategy of reforming the Indian military-industrial complex (MIC). The long-term goal of the Indian government is to achieve "strategic autonomy" in the defence sector. In the short term, Indian arms exports serve as the driving force behind the "Make in India" and "Self-reliant India" programmes - pivotal components of Prime Minister Modi's political agenda. The significant amplification factor for India's export ambitions has been conditioned in part by the escalating border tensions with China since 2017. The export of WMSE is emerging as a crucial tool to strengthen India's bilateral relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region to counterbalance China. Nonetheless, to propel India into the group of the world's leading arms exporters, as well as to gain full "strategic independence," may be hard to achieve even in the long run. Despite systemic reforms in the military-industrial complex, efforts to engage private businesses and attract foreign capital, a number of challenges impede the growth of the defence industry and the export potential of the Indian military-industrial complex. These include the inadequate development of India's manufacturing sector, dependency on foreign technologies, and insufficient funding for military-technical advancements. At the same time, the policy of supporting defence exports and reforming the MIC has been a stable trend in the strategy of the BJP government, playing a crucial role in the fulfillment of its short, medium and long term goals.

Educational programs can be a valuable tool in the cultural diplomacy of modern countries. As a soft power tool, organizations seek to expand their geographic reach by opening educational institutions in different parts of the world in order to spread the influence of their state. In Türkiye, such an organization has long been the Hizmet movement, and in recent years it has been a state-owned the Maarif Foundation . In the study, for the first time in Russian Oriental Studies, an analysis of the activities of the Turkish state Maarif educational foundation in the confrontation with the banned in Türkiye and a number of countries' Hizmet movements is conducted. Since the declaration of this structure as a terrorist organization on the territory of Türkiye, the Maarif Foundation has been reassigning educational institutions around the world. The most important event in this regard is the coup attempt of July 15, 2016, in which Fethullah Gülen, the ideological mastermind of the movement, was accused. As a result, all schools associated with the Hizmet movement were closed in Türkiye. The relevance of the study is determined by the fact that it considers almost the only case in history of confrontation between two organizations, which are instruments of "soft power" of a country. The purpose of the study is to examine the current issues of the Maarif Foundation's activities as part of the confrontation with the Hizmet movement. The work includes a qualitative analysis of the official documents of the Turkish state foundation, the laws of the Republic of Türkiye, as well as a discourse analysis of Hizmet's media products. As a result, it was revealed that despite the rather successful work of the Turkish state educational organization in question, it is not necessary to speak about the complete defeat of Hizmet by the beginning of 2023. By now Maarif state foundation regulates the activity of educational institutions in 49 countries, while according to our calculations the Gülen movement retains a high status in 60 states. It has been revealed that Hizmet's activities directly or indirectly influence Türkiye's interstate relations with those countries where Gülen schools operate. It has been established that the demands of the Turkish side to close the institutions of the movement have led to short-lived diplomatic crises between Ankara and some of the host countries. It has been shown that the emergence of Maarif in a particular country does not necessarily lead to the closure of Gülen institutions.

The study is devoted to the applied analysis of the concept of multi-vector in the foreign policy of Recep Tayyip Erdogan during his presidency from 2014 to 2022. Türkiye's foreign policy is of particular interest to researchers. Ankara is actively involved in regional and world politics. Turkish foreign policy is characterized as multi-vector, but different approaches to the definition of Turkish multi-vector are used in scientific research. The purpose of the study is to identify the main vectors of R.T. Erdogan's personal diplomacy during his presidency. The relevance of the work lies in the application of a quantitative method that allows identifying the main vectors of R.T. Erdogan's foreign policy on the basis of the collected database of his foreign policy contacts. The method is different in that it is free from the influence of the researcher's personal preferences in analyzing foreign policy and the influence of individual high-profile, but isolated events. The database covers the entire period of the presidency of R.T. Erdogan from 2014 to the end of 2022 and includes all foreign policy contacts published on the website of the President of Türkiye. The developed methodology allows not only to see the main vectors of foreign policy, but also to assess their depth on the basis of mathematical calculations. As a result of the analysis, the main macro-regional vectors and countries in each of the vectors were identified, and the depth and quality of contacts with these countries were measured and presented. It was also found that the Turkish President actively interacts with the local level of government. Moreover, he implements the diplomacy of the second track. It covers the main macro-regional vectors from the side of public diplomacy. The database and the method allow us to assert that the policy of the Turkish president is indeed multi-vector, but the multi-vector nature of this policy is much deeper and goes beyond relations with countries. During the work, promising areas for future theoretical and applied research were identified.

Since the second half of the 20th century the Turkish-Israeli relations have developed in an uneven and unstable manner. Depending on the current situation in the conflict-torn Middle East, these relations tended to normalize, or descended into mutual hostility. During the 21st century, we could observe several rounds of confrontation and cooperation between the two states. Thus, the events of 2010 (the Freedom Flotilla incident) and 2017 (the transfer of the capital of Israel to Jerusalem) finally led to a rupture in relations between the two countries. A new round of stabilization has been marked since March 2022 and is associated with the visit of the President of Israel to Ankara at the invitation of the Turkish President R.T. Erdogan. The authors of the article see this step as the beginning of the process of finding agreements on achieving stability in relations between the countries of the Middle East region. The article attempts to analyze the evolution of the modern Turkish-Israeli cooperation, taking into account the patterns of their development since Türkiye has recognized the state of Israel. Using a comparative historical approach, the authors analyze the political problems of the modern bilateral relations, and consider the impact of such factors as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iranian nuclear program, the consequences of the "Arab Spring," the foreign policy activities of the US Democratic and Republican administrations in the Middle East region, as well as the crisis over the status of Jerusalem. The authors underline that despite the pragmatic character of Türkiye's foreign policy, any tension caused by the Palestinian issue will have an impact on Turkish-Israeli relations, which in turn might start a new round of conflict between the two sides. The authors have concluded that Turkish-Israeli relations are characterized by instability, which depends largely on the current balance of power in the Middle East region. It is obvious that the normalization of Turkish-Israeli interaction is a positive factor for the intensification of integration processes in the Middle East region as a whole.

-

-

This study examines the strategic use of soft power as an integral component of Türkiye's foreign policy in the South Caucasus region. The author explores the strategies and mechanisms by which Türkiye projects it's cultural, economic, and diplomatic influence in the region. It also examines Türkiye's purposeful efforts to improve its image, authority and significance in Georgia. Paying special attention to cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges, humanitarian aid and economic partnership, the paper reveals how Türkiye seeks to shape its perceptions, develop cooperation and strengthen its geopolitical position. Methodologically, the study is based on case studies of Turkish soft power in Georgia. In addition, the author analyzes the general framework of Turkish policy in Georgia using the historical-descriptive method. The content analysis of Turkish media and other Turkish cultural agents such as TV shows, films, serials, etc. was used to understand how Ankara uses soft power to promote its cultural and political interests in Georgia. Through empirical analysis, the study examines specific examples of Türkiye's soft power initiatives, including the promotion of the Turkish language and culture, educational scholarships and humanitarian aid. In addition, the study examines the perception of Türkiye's soft power initiatives by the local population and assesses their impact on regional dynamics. The findings emphasize the multifaceted nature of Turkish soft power and the consequences of its use for Georgia. Given Georgia's Christian majority, Türkiye relies on secular instruments of its soft power, while not giving up religious influence on the Muslim communities of Georgia.

Asia is now a central part of world politics, where the interests of a number of global and regional actors have collided, including India, China, Japan, the United States and Russia. With the collapse of the socialist bloc and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. embarked on a new security policy, changed its priorities, promoting a new balance of power and defining a new role for itself in the post-bipolar world. India, on the other hand, has strengthened its position in the Asian region thanks to its rapid economic growth, huge domestic market, modernization of armed forces, and practice of democratization. Given India's transformation and the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean and its maritime transport routes, Washington has become interested in strengthening ties with New Delhi. As a result, India - U.S. relations are moving from the estrangement of the past to the strategic engagement of the present. Since 2004, when the document entitled "Next Step towards Strategic Partnership" was adopted, the two countries have been experiencing a phase of deep strategic convergence. This is particularly true in the area of security and defense. In the present study the author argues that Indo-US defense agreements stimulate India's offensive power, while negatively affecting regional security in South Asia and especially Pakistan's security. In the milieu of research methodology, the author uses the methods of content analysis, event analysis, and problem-chronological method.