Die Geschichte der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sowie die Geschichte der Sonderpädagogik und der Sprachpädagogik/-therapie zeigen einen Wandel in der Zusammenarbeit mit Menschen aus dem globalen Süden als auch mit Menschen mit Behinderung. Die Bedeutung von relationalen Emotionen hat in diesen Kontexten dabei bisher nur wenig Berücksichtigung gefunden. Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die Geschichte der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sowie die Geschichte der Sonderpädagogik und der Sprachpädagogik/-therapie in Hinblick auf Gemeinsamkeiten im Wandel der Zusammenarbeit mit Menschen, die als "anders" und "fremd" wahrgenommen werden. Ziel hierbei ist es die Relationale Theorie, die im Kontext von Mutter-Kind-Interaktion im Bereich der Sprachpädagogik/-therapie ihren Ursprung hat (Lüdtke 2006), auf die Interaktion zwischen Kooperationspartnern in einem interkulturellen Setting zu beziehen und den Ansatz der Relationalen Interkulturellen Zusammenarbeit (RIZ) vorzustellen. Hierfür werden fünf Entwicklungstheorien aus der Geschichte der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit der Geschichte der Sonderpädagogik sowie mit Paradigmen der Sprachpädagogik/-therapie verwoben. Ausgehend davon und ergänzt mit eigenen Erfahrungen aus einem bi-nationalen Forschungsprojekt in Tansania wird in den Ansatz der RIZ übergeleitet.Der Beitrag verdeutlicht die Bedeutung von relationalen Emotionen in der interkulturellen Zusammenarbeit. Die interkulturelle Begegnung verändert stets beide Partner. Abschließende Implikationen für den Entwurf eines Praxiskonzepts zur RIZ untermauern diesen Aspekt.
Inhaltsangabe: Introduction and Course of Work: In 2007, at their meeting in Tanzania, the central bank governors of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) laid out a strategy to strengthen regional integration, containing the development of a common market by 2015, fixed exchange rates by 2016, and, ultimately, a monetary union with a single currency in 2018. In pursuit of this agenda, a free trade area absent of intra-regional tariffs was arranged in August 2008 with a regional customs union to follow this year. The currently fourteen member countries of the SADC committed themselves towards achieving economic convergence and to deepen monetary cooperation. In the 21st century, Africa finds itself increasingly separated from economic developments in the remaining world and fails to prosper from increased globalization. Despite a large abundance in natural resources, many countries have suffered from an extremely poor economic performance, which mainly originated from internal strives and weak and distortionary policies. Inward looking governments, conducting clientele policies, are focused on reaping economic rents rather than on fostering growth. Furthermore, tribal conflicts and civil war have sparked recurring border conflicts with neighboring countries. Although Africa has seen a large number of regional arrangements and trading blocs throughout the continent, the overall success for growth and trade expansion was limited. Against this background, the formation of a monetary union is believed to counteract economic and political weaknesses, to improve regional cooperation and to enhance both the political and economic standing in the world. A monetary union and a common currency entails both gains and losses for its members. On the cost side, countries in a monetary union effectively loose the ability to pursue independent monetary policies and to use the exchange rate as adjustment instrument to stabilize the economy. On the other hand, countries inside a monetary union benefit from reduced transaction costs and the elimination of internal exchange rate volatility. Furthermore, countries which suffer from weak internal stability and high inflation rates benefit by using the fixed exchange rate in a monetary union as external anchor. By transferring the power over monetary policy to a supranational central bank, the risk of homegrown inflation and currency devaluations is banished and economic agents are able to borrow at more favorable interest rates. Both the gains and losses from a monetary union are determined by structural characteristics inside the countries. If, in total, the benefits from a single currency exceed the costs in that the constraints imposed by fixed exchange rates are not harmful to the economy, the countries constitute an optimum currency area. In essence, the theory of optimum currency areas considers the desirability for each country to join a monetary union. The trade off between costs and benefits is affected by three features: First, the degree of intra-country trade influences the gains in efficiency and reduced uncertainty from fixing the exchange rate. Second, the degree of correlation in output fluctuations determines whether a common monetary policy is adequate for all countries. And third, the response to output shocks is eased by several adjustment mechanisms, including price flexibility and factor mobility, which restore the initial equilibrium. The purpose of this study is to evaluate whether a monetary union in Southern Africa is both desirable and feasible from an economic point of view, to discuss institutional challenges and requirements, and to give direction for which countries are best candidates to form a monetary union. Both the motivation and requirements for a successful monetary union are drawn from the theory of optimum currency areas. Unfortunately, the various aspects of the theory have been gradually developed over time and are often confounded and fragmentary in theoretical work. The aim is therefore to first derive a framework that includes relevant benefits and costs, which are subsequently related to country-specific structural criteria. Since economic integration is an important aspect for Africa, emphasis will be put on the endogenous trade effects of monetary integration. Similarly, special attention is given to fiscal distortions and weak institutions, which are sources of high inflation rates and low monetary credibility. Next, the theoretical foundations are applied to the SADC to examine the suitability of countries to form a monetary union. Although a number of studies have discussed monetary integration in various parts of Africa (Masson and Pattillo 2001, Debrun, Masson and Pattillo 2005, and Houssa 2008, for instance, cover monetary unification in West Africa while Kishor and Ssozi 2009 analyze the East African Community), relatively little has been done concerning the SADC in particular. Relevant exceptions are Agbeyegbe, Bayoumi and Ostry, Buigut and Valev, Karras and Khamfula and Huizinga. However, while the studies mentioned typically focus on one aspect of the theory of optimum currency areas, there are very few attempts so far to include all relevant aspects in one framework. Overall, the findings suggest that a monetary union encompassing the whole SADC is infeasible at this stage, and unlikely in the foreseeable future. However, there is evidence for a monetary union consisting of a smaller group of countries, based on the long standing CMA arrangement. In addition to South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, countries proposed for a monetary union are Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. On the other hand, there is little evidence that the remaining countries would benefit from monetary unification in any time soon. Countries in the SADC generally differ much in their economic and political development. While some countries, namely South Africa, feature a relatively advanced economy, other countries like Congo and Zimbabwe experienced economic deterioration and high inflation rates. Especially the findings of low regional trade intensities do not hold much promise of large gains from transaction cost savings. Furthermore, both the comovement of business cycles and the correlation of output disturbances are strikingly low, indicating that a common monetary policy is unsuited for most countries. For a small number of countries with a history of high and volatile inflation rates, a common, stable currency would be however attractive in giving higher price stability and an institutional framework to insulate monetary policy from domestic fiscal pressures. Nevertheless, this path is unrealistic since it will be impossible to merge the interests of undisciplined countries with those of low inflation countries like South Africa. In sum, it is inadvisable to proceed with monetary unification to rashly. A monetary union is far from certain to promote regional integration and should not be seen as substitute for political initiatives to solve regional problems and restraining poor fiscal policies. The analysis is divided into three main sections: Section 2 reviews the theoretical implications from the theory of optimum currency areas. After introducing the benefits and costs from monetary unification, both the traditional and endogenous criteria are described to judge the desirability of a monetary union. Next, two models of monetary policy are presented so as to formalize the concept of monetary cooperation. Section 3 subsequently applies the criteria to the SADC. Special attention is given to the correlation of business cycles and comovement of output shocks. A structural vector autoregression analysis is carried out in order to separate underlying supply and demand shocks from output disturbances. Section 4 evaluates the feasibility of a monetary union in the SADC by drawing lessons from the CMA and EMU. Finally, further challenges in the transition to a monetary union are pointed out. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: List of Figuresiii List of Tablesiii List of Abbreviationsiii 1.Introduction1 2.Theoretical Foundations of the Optimum Currency Area Theory5 2.1Benefits and Costs of Monetary Integration7 2.1.1Benefits of Monetary Integration8 2.1.2Costs of Monetary Integration11 2.2Criteria of Optimum Currency Areas12 2.3Endogenous Effects in Monetary Integration17 2.4Policy Implications20 2.5Fiscal Distortions and Monetary Credibility22 2.6Theoretical Conclusions27 3.Theory and Empirical Evidence in the Southern African Development Community28 3.1The Economic Situation and Convergence in Southern Africa29 3.2Empirical Approaches of the Optimum Currency Area Theory and Evidence in Southern Africa38 3.3Correlation and Structure of Output Shocks and Business Cycles46 3.4Results52 4.Evaluating the feasibility of the SADC as a Monetary Union and future Prospects54 4.1The Experience of the Common Monetary Area56 4.2Lessons from the European Monetary Union58 4.3The role of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Southern Africa60 4.4Challenges and the Path to a Monetary Union62 5.Summary and Conclusion68 AAppendix70 A.1Appendix for Section 2.570 A.2Appendix for Section 3.372Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 3, Theory and Empirical Evidence in the Southern African Development Community: To recapitulate: The main criteria which have been identified in the optimum currency area theory are (i) the correlation of output shocks, (ii) the extent of regional trade and production diversification, (iii) financial integration, (iv) price flexibility and factor mobility, and (v), inflation differentials and fiscal distortions. It is generally accepted that the formation of a monetary union requires participants to first achieve convergence in a variety of criteria. In this respect, fiscal and institutional convergence and low debt burdens are of special interest since both are a measure of sustainable economic policy. Furthermore, a similar level of per capita income indicates that countries have comparable institutional developments and interests. A monetary union that fails to satisfy these preconditions tends to be instable and may lack credibility from the very beginning. Over the last years however, a number countries in the SADC have experienced an increasing rate of divergence. The transition process in the SADC towards a monetary union is supported by a number of preceding arrangements. The Southern African Customs Union between South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland has promoted a certain degree of regional trade. Economic integration has been however limited since the main objective of the customs union was to ease the collection of customs duties rather than industrial cooperation. Regional integration within the SADC advanced in 2008 with the Free Trade Area, which established zero tariffs for 85% of traded goods. However, for goods that have been declared as import-sensitive, most notably food and clothing, liberalization has been deferred. The overall impact on regional trade is therefore uncertain. Despite various efforts for trade liberalization in the past, political commitment has been low so far. Financial relations in the SADC are mainly limited to foreign direct investments. Nevertheless, some recent efforts have been made to harmonize national payment systems. Moreover, the SADC has agreed to work towards full currency convertibility. Since microeconomic data for Africa is scarce, the empirical evidence on optimum currency areas is mainly based on the correlation of output shocks and inflation or exchange rate differentials. Of the other criteria, factor mobility and price flexibility are especially hard to measure and estimates rely on very few observations. Not all of the criteria can therefore be analyzed in similar depth or for the same set of countries. Data was obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators, the United Nations statistics division, the International Monetary Fund and the African Economic Outlook Database. 3.1, The Economic Situation and Convergence in Southern Africa: The SADC is unique among all regional arrangements in Africa due to the dominant role of South Africa. With a share of over 65% in real GDP (USD at 2000 prices) and 18% of the total population, South Africa is by far the largest and most industrialized economy in the region. In comparison, the remaining countries differ remarkably in size, income and economic structure. The Seychelles, the smallest country with little more than 85,000 residents, is the richest country with a real per capita income (in PPP) of over 19,000 USD in 2008 while Congo and Zimbabwe are among the poorest countries in the world with a real per capita income of approximately 290 USD and 185 USD respectively (see table 1). Life expectancy is low for most countries with an average of 53 years (ranging from 44 years in Zimbabwe to 73 years in the Seychelles) which is an indicator for the high poverty rate among the population. Income inequality as measured by the GINI Index varies considerably across contries, where South Africa (58), Angola (58) and Namibia (70) display one of the highest inequalities worldwide. Economic growth was robust for almost all countries since 1990 except in Congo and Zimbabwe and accelerated in Angola, Mauritius, Tanzania and Mozambique in recent years. Average annual GDP growth from 1990-2008 was highest for Angola (6.2%) due to increasing oil export revenues, but also the most volatile with a standard deviation of 10.5. In the four countries of the CMA, the growth performance was driven by the end of Apartheid in South Africa in 1994 and averaged to 3.7% from 1990-2008. The reeintegration of the South African economy in the world market attracted new foreign investors and trade, and more than tripled growth rates in the post-Apartheid period (from 1980-1992 the average was 1.1. On the other hand, Zimbabwe and until recently Congo experienced a drastic fall in income levels. While Congo still suffers from the aftermath of the civil war and political instability, Zimbabwe was run down by the Mugabe regime. Since at the same time these countries also have the lowest per capita income levels, it appears that the economies in the SADC diverge. Figure (4) illustrates the relationship between average per capita growth rates and relative income for 14 SADC members in the period 1990-2008. The results show that most countries with an initially high income level also had the highest average growth rates, which led to a widening of the income gap (striking examples are Botswana and Mauritius). The ambiguous relationship is a sign that positive developments in individual countries were determined by external factors rather than by improved regional cooperation. Production structure and trade: Production and export structures vary to a large extent among the SADC. While South Africa, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Swaziland have a relatively advanced manufacturing sector, most other countries depend on primary goods production (except for Mauritius which is specialized in financial services). In the rural countries Malawi, Tanzania, Congo, Mozambique and Madagascar, agriculture still accounts for a large, although declining production share. Raw materials (mining and oil) are a main income source for Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Congo and Namibia and contribute to a large part of foreign reserves. Accordingly, those countries usually exhibit surpluses in their trade and current account (see table 1). Similar to production structures, the composition of merchandise trade reported in table (2) differs considerably across countries. A higher income level is generally associated with high export shares in manufacturing and primary products, while low income countries tend to export food products and import manufactures. As a result of different production and trade structures, the ratio of intra-industry trade are ineffectual small for all countries except South Africa, reflecting the low degree of industrialization. Regional trade in the SADC is dominated by South Africa, which exports high value manufactures in return for small amounts of raw material imports. Especially countries inside the SACU maintain important trade connections to South Africa. Commodity imports from South Africa represent on average over 44% of total imports in other SADC countries and account for approximately 80% of total imports in Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia and Botswana (see table 3). On the other hand, export shares from the SADC towards South Africa amounts to only 15% on average with Swaziland (38%), Namibia and Lesotho (both 27%) having the strongest trade linkages. As a result, South Africa typically generates substantial regional trade surpluses. In contrast, trade integration among the remaining SADC countries is at very low levels, also because of a shortage in infrastructure. The only substantial trade flows are between neighboring Namibia and Angola (10% of Namibias exports), Zimbabwe and neighboring Zambia (14% of Zimbabwes exports) and landlocked Swaziland and Mozambique (9% of Swazilands exports). Although informal trade is assumed to account for a large proportion of total trade, most of the regional trade flows are negligible. To promote intra-regional trade, various efforts have been started in recent years. Overall trade has been substantially liberalized in the past and import restrictions reduced so that effective tariff protection rates declined in most countries. Accordingly, the average share of regional merchandise exports in percent to total merchandise exports increased from 8% in 1990 to 19% in 2008, and overall merchandise exports have grown on average by 10% per year since 1990.
Preface With an estimated 5.6 million people living with HIV in 2009, South Africa's epidemic remains the largest in the world (UNAIDS, 2010). It is approximated that 40million South Africans depend on traditional medicine for their primary health care needs and regularly visit Traditional Health Practitioners (THPs). Patients often move freely between traditional and allopathic systems of medicine. In fact, up to 90% of people living with HIV and AIDS first consult THPs before visiting practitioners of allopathic medicine. Thus THPs bear the brunt of the HIV and AIDS epidemic. With this in mind it became necessary to convene a conference where the potential contribution of traditional medicine in the fight against HIV and AIDS could be objectively assessed. It also facilitated learning and sharing experienses from practitioners, researchers, governments and NGOs/or funders that have advanced in integrating traditional medicine in HIV and AIDS. The conference covered four key priority areas in accordance with the National Strategic Plan for HIV and AIDS and STI: prevention; treatment, care and support; research, monitoring and surveillance; and financing. The Conference was titled "Traditional medicine in the era and HIV/AIDS in South Africa" and held at the International Convention Centre, Durban between 28th to 30th July 2010. This historic conference, funded by PEPFAR/CDC South Africa, was attended by more than 1500 delegates from South Africa, Belgium, Botswana, Cameroon, China, Lesotho, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, United States of America, and Zambia. On each day there were 200 high school learners and 200 community members in attendance. In addition there were researchers, CAM practitioners, donors, doctors, nurses, THPs, policy makers, and members of the media. It was organised in partnership with the Department of Science and Technology, the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Government and the University of KwaZulu-Natal and had the support of the Department of Health, the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC) and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) among others. National Parliament was represented by members of the Health and, Science and Technology Portfolio Committees, respectively. National government departments in attendance included Health, Science and Technology, and Trade and Industry. All provinces of South Africa were represented with the exception of Northern and Western Cape provinces. The House of Traditional Leaders and Local Government were represented by Her Majesty, Queen of LinduZulu, local chiefs, Mayors and Councilors. The US Government (PEPFAR) was represented by the Health Attaché in the US Embassy, US Consul General in Durban, PEPFAR Liaison Officer (KZN) and CDC (South Africa). A call for abstracts was published in 3 major national newspapers and on the internet on a number of websites. Abstract themes had to fit within the strategic areas of the National Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS/TB. The conference received more than 70 abstracts, reviewed by a panel of national and international experts. About 50 abstracts were accepted for oral presentation and 12 as posters. Additional speakers from the 7 provincial departments of health and 7 Provincial AIDS Council THP sector representatives informed the conference on their programmes. The Department of Science and Technology and the Technology Innovation Agency shared their plans and strategies for research and development of traditional medicines in South Africa. The conference was primarily abstract-driven. Abstract contents were either research-based data using established scientific methods or demonstrated experience and information from individuals or institutions working in the field in the form of case studies or case presentations. The non-abstract-driven components of the conference addressed a variety of current viewpoints and issues including government programmes, interactive case-based sessions, and satellite symposia. The television and print media broadcasted the proceedings of the conference. Selected speakers and delegates were interviewed live. Highlights The highlights of the conference included the following: 1. South Africa could demonstrate its capacity to carry out world class clinical trials on traditional medicine. 2. Provincial Governments and Provincial AIDS Councils shared their plans and strategies to include traditional medicine in their implementations plans. 3. Traditional Health Practitioners were in full support of integrating HIV Counseling and Testing, Traditional or Medical Male Circumcision, and other national strategies in their practices but required support and capacitation for HIV testing. 4. It is necessary to intensify research on traditional medicines since a number of HIV positive patients who do not qualify for antiretroviral therapy choose them. 5. There were best practice projects promoting collaboration between traditional health practitioners and public health care workers in the fight against HIV/AIDS. 6. The media will continue to report positive and negative aspects of traditional medicine 7. The Department of Science and Technology funds the most research on indigenous knowledge systems including traditional medicines in South Africa. 8. The USA remains the largest foreign funder of HIV research and programmes on traditional medicine. This special edition carries some of the scientific papers presented at the conference. Professor Nceba Gqaleni, Chair of the Traditional Medicine in the Era of HIV and AIDS Conference Dr Vusi Shongwe, Director: Heritage, Office of the Premier, KwaZulu-Natal Government and Professor Yonah Seleti, Chief Director: National Indigenous Knowledge Systems Office, Department of Science and Technology Co-Chairpersons of the Traditional Medicine in the Era of HIV and AIDS Conference.
Dados los antecedentes históricos del Presidente Robert Mugabe, el mundo entero sabía que las elecciones que se avecinaban serían, casi seguramente, una reedición de las más obscuras prácticas que su régimen siempre utilizó.Pero, esta vez, parecía que había una oposición fuerte y decidida a enfrentar al partido oficial. Es más, la primera vuelta, el 29 de marzo, la había situado con perspectivas auspiciosas de alcanzar la presidencia. A pesar de las brutales presiones del gobierno, Tsvangirai había superado a Mugabe en esos comicios cuyos resultados demoraron semanas en ser conocidos, lo que dio lugar a manifestaciones de protestas populares contra el gobierno.La barbarie se desató a mediados de junio en Zimbabwe. Algunos casos dantescos llegaron a conocimiento de la prensa extranjera. Fueron al menos 86 los militantes del Movimiento por el Cambio Democrático (MDC), la oposición al presidente Mugabe, que fueron asesinados en esas semanas por las milicias vinculadas al partido del presidente, la Unión nacional africana de Zimbabwe – Frente Patriótico. Entre ellos la mujer de un líder local del MDC, que fue quemada viva por la milicia progubernamental, luego de sufrir la tortura con amputación de manos y pies. Se cuentan por miles los lesionados, y por cientos de miles los habitantes desplazados forzosamente en la campaña para evitar que pudieran concurrir a las urnas el día de la elección.Pero la represión también llegó a las principales figuras de la oposición. El número dos del MDC, Tendai Biti, fue preso el 12 de junio cuando volvía de su exilio de África del Sur, acusado de alta traición. Morgan Tsvangirai, el ex sindicalista de 56 años líder del MDC, fue preso en varias oportunidades en plena campaña electoral; en su último acto de campaña, 2.000 partidarios de Mugabe golpearon a los manifestantes pro- MDC con palos y barras de hierro. Frente a la "orgía de violencia", Tsvangirai entendió que no podía pedir a su partido que participara en un acto electoral que ponía en riesgo la vida misma de los electores. Su decisión, cinco días antes de los comicios, fue de renunciar a postularse a la segunda vuelta de la elección presidencial prevista para el 27 de junio. La respuesta oficial fue de beneplácito. "Sólo Dios me puede retirar el poder que me ha dado", había ya alegado el sempiterno presidente Mugabe (84 años). La segunda vuelta lo tuvo como solitario candidato y obtuvo así el 85% de los sufragios, cuando en la primera vuelta había llegado en segundo lugar (a pesar de los masivos fraudes electorales) con el 43,2 % de los votos. Policía y milicias gubernamentales obligaron a los ciudadanos a concurrir a votar el 27 de junio, de forma de alcanzar cierta participación que, según fuentes oficiales, fue del 42% de los habilitados para votar. Las reacciones internacionales no se hicieron esperar. Javier Solana denunció lo que llamó un "simulacro de democracia"; Bernard Kouchner calificó a Mugabe de "asesino" y, Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido, reafirmaron que el gobierno de Mugabe perdió toda legitimidad. Canadá tomó medidas concretas contra las autoridades de Zimbabwe cuyos aviones además, no podrán sobrevolar o aterrizar en territorio canadiense.El tema de las elecciones en Zimbabwe se trató en la reciente sesión ordinaria de la Asamblea de la Organización de la Unidad Africana, que se reunió en Sharm-el-Sheik (Egipto), pero no se llegó a una condena explícita. La Asamblea recibió a un Mugabe decidido a defenderse de cualquier acusación de fraude y violencia política y que encontró aliados entre sus pares. El presidente de Gabón, Omar Bongo Ondimba, en el poder desde hace más de veinte años, afirmó que "los africanos son capaces de decidir por sí mismos. Hemos acogido a Mugabe como a un héroe".La clave es la posición de los países de la región. Zambia, Tanzania y Botswana son críticos del camino emprendido por Mugabe. Pero África del Sur, el actor de peso en África Austral, es el principal sustento de Mugabe. El presidente sudafricano Thabo Mbeki vivió en Zimbabwe parte de su exilio en tiempos del apartheid. Su gobierno ve con buenos ojos una apertura al diálogo entre Mugabe y la oposición y una negociación que permita alcanzar "un gobierno de transición". Empresa a todas luces imposible en el Zimbabwe de hoy. Las presiones internacionales europeas y norteamericanas no alcanzaron para revertir la situación de Zimbabwe. Mugabe, por el contrario, apoyado en actores regionales, se ha reafirmado en su camino de barbarie. La responsabilidad de África del Sur es, en este sentido, patente y grave. Entretanto, la catástrofe a la que ha llevado el gobierno de Mugabe se agrava. La inflación no para, la desocupación llega al 80% de la población, la desintegración económica y social se profundiza: en la actualidad, se precisan más de 6 mil millones de dólares zimbabwenses para obtener un dólar de Estados Unidos… El futuro de Zimbabwe es angustiante; las responsabilidades de la barbarie desatada compartidas, entre el sanguinario Mugabe y sus apoyos internacionales. Profesor de Sistema Internacional ContemporáneoLic. en Estudios Internacionales. Universidad ORT - Uruguay
Verteilernetze für die Elektrizitätsversorgung im südlichen Afrika; Brennstoffe, Energiequellen; dominierende Stellung der südafrikanischen Republik hinsichtlich Stromerzeugung und -verbrauch. Länderweiser Überblick über die Entwicklung der Elektrizitätsversorgung in Ostafrika und im südlichen Afrika, derzeitige Ausstattung mit Kraftwerken, Stromkapazitäten, im Bau oder in der Planung befindliche Projekte. (DÜI-Fwr)
Foreword /Peter H. Koehn --A Public Policy Approach to Governance in Africa: An Introduction /Gedion Onyango --Part I: Research, Theory and Teaching African Public Policy --The Social Science Foundations of Public Policy in Africa /Liisa Laakso --Researching and Teaching Public Policy and Governance in Africa /Chris Tapscott --Theorising Public Policy in Africa /Goran Hyden --Public Authority in Africa /Tom Kirk and Tim Allen --The Institutional Logics Perspective and Policymaking in Africa /James Hathaway --Pockets Of Effectiveness (POE) in Africa: A Solution to the Policy Paradox? /Anne Mette Kjær --Part II: Understanding Policy Framing in Africa --Policy Images in Africa /Eric E. Otenyo --Reflections on the Political Economy of Public Policy Analysis in Africa /Michael Kpessa-Whyte and Kafui Tsekpo --The Role and Impact of International Bureaucrats in Policymaking in Africa /Rosina Foli and Frank L.K. Ohemeng --Traditional Chiefs as Institutional Entrepreneurs in Policymaking and Implementation in Africa /Salomey K.G. Afrifa and Frank L.K. Ohemeng --Public Participation and Policymaking in Local Governance in Africa /Emmanuel Botlhale --Framing Political Policy Communications in Africa /Kobby Mensah, Joyce Manyo and Nnamdi O. Madichie --Policy Evaluation in Africa /E. Remi Aiyede and Maryam O. Quadri --Part III: Understanding Policymaking in Africa --Public Policymaking in Africa /Lukamba Muhiya Tshombe and Thekiso Molokwane --Historical Perspectives of Policymaking and Administration in Africa /Felix Kumah-Abiwu, James Korku Agbodzakey and Samuel Kofi Darkwa --The Media and Policymaking in Africa: A Comparative Study of Economic Development Policies in South Africa and Nigeria /TK Pooe and Sysman Motloung --Part IV: Understanding Policy Reforms in Africa --Public-Private Partnership and Public Policy in Africa /Joseph O. Obosi --Rationales for and Policy Implications of Implementing Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities in Sub-Saharan Africa /Matilde Jeppesen --Evolution and Change of Communication Policy in Postcolonial Africa: From Independence to the Present Day /Osée Kamga --Multiculturalism and Policymaking in Africa /John Sunday Ojo and Joanne Clarke --Part V: Understanding Politics And Public Policy In Africa --The Politics of Public Policy in Africa /Michael Kpessa-Whyte --Political Parties, Political Change and Public Policy in Africa: A Comparative Study of Kenya, Tanzania and Ghana /Adams Oloo --Political Transition, Policy Change and Implementation in Zambia /Musole Siachisa --Executive Policymaking During National Crisis: Policy Responses to Covid-19 Pandemic in Uganda /Roberts Kabeba Muriisa --Political Leadership and Public Policy in Africa: Thabo Mbeki, the Consummate Policy Entrepreneur /Ndangwa Noyoo --Public Policy and Election Administration in Africa: A Controlling or Innovative Environment /Michael Amoah --Part VI: Policy Implementation Outcomes in Africa: Country Studies --Democratizing Policy Implementation in Africa: Lessons from Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme /Emmanuel Kofi Ayisi, Justice Nyigmah Bawole and Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah --Competing Interests and Lack of Policy Ownership of the Reform Agenda: A Barrier to Uganda's Reform Success /William Muhumuza --Public Policy in Cameroon: State-Building Programs under the Influence /Alphonse Bernard Amougou Mbarga --The Politics of Decentralisation: Policy Reform Design and Implementation in Malawi /Asiyati Lorraine Chiweza --Indigenization Policy in the Extractive Sector in Zimbabwe: A Critical Reflection /Kennedy Manduna and Davison Muchadenyika --Policy Learning and Policy Failure in Africa: The Case of Electricity Privatization in Ghana /Frank L.K. Ohemeng and Joshua J. Zaato --Part VII: Implementing Education Policies in Africa --Investing in the People? Analysis of Education Policies in Angola /Francisco Miguel Paulo --Public-Private Partnerships as Predictors of Success: Lessons from the Education Sector in Post-War Liberia /Samuel G. Toe --Policy Issues in the Harmonisation of Quality Assurance Systems for Higher Education in Africa /Ngepathimo Kadhila and Eugene Lizazi Libebe --Part VIII: Understanding Health Policies and Disease Control in Africa --Control Programmes for Africa's Parasites: Unrealistic Expectations, Ignored Evidence, and Troubling Outcomes /Tim Allen and Melissa Parker --Between Marketization and Public Interest Discourses in Health Policy Delivery: Debating Solidarity and Universal Health Care in South Africa /Lauren Ela Paremoer --Policy Responses to Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa: Experiences from Sierra Leone /Lawrence Sao Babawo, Ahmed Vandi and Tommy M. Hanson --Confronting Epidemics: The Art of not Knowing and Strategic Ignorance During Ebola Preparedness in Uganda /Grace Akello and Melissa Parker --Part IX: Understanding Food Security And Social Protection Policies --Food and Nutrition Security Policies in Africa /Anne Siebert and Julian May --Public Policy and Social Protection in Africa: The Rise of Cash Transfers /Nathanael Ojong and Logan Cochrane --A Genealogy of Policies on Poor and Vulnerable Children and Youth in Kenya /Elizabeth Ngutuku --Part X: Understanding Women, Gender and Public Policy in Africa --Women in Policymaking in Africa /Emmanuel Botlhale --Gender Mainstreaming in Africa: Local Translations and Institutional Challenges in Ghana, Malawi and South Africa /Diana Højlund Madsen, Amanda Gouws and Asiyati Lorraine Chiweza --Women and Social Policies in South Africa and Sierra Leone /Ina Conradie and Abioseh Bockarie --Women Legislators in Legislative Policymaking in Africa /Chiedo Nwankwor and Adedeji Adebayo --Part XI: Understanding Crisis Management, Migration and Regional Trade --Public Policy and Disaster Management: The Role of Law in International Disaster Assistance in Africa /María Mercedes Martínez Carrizo --Migration Frameworks in Africa: Nature, Dynamics, and Challenges /Alemu Asfaw Nigusie --Evolution of Trade Policy and Regional Integration in Africa /Stephen R. Karangizi and Haruperi R. Mumbengegwi --Part XII: Understanding Emerging Policy Issues And Challenges In Africa --Open Innovation Systems and Public Policy in Africa: Setting New Boundaries Against Wicked Problems /Yeboah-Assiamah Emmanuel, Clement Mensah Damoah and Justice Nyigmah Bawole --Africa's New Megacities: Sustainable Urbanism, Climate Urbanism or Megalopolises of Exclusionary Enclaves /John Sunday Ojo --Environmental Policies in Africa: The State of Regulating E-Waste Management /Japheth Otieno Ondiek and Gedion Onyango --Petroleum Extraction in Africa: A Review of the Local Content Policies for the Oil Industry in Selected Countries /Austin Dziwornu Ablo and William Otchere-Darko --The Unintended Industrial Policy Benefits of the Covid-19 Pandemic in Africa /Julius Kiiza.
In: Hagander , L & Leather , A 2019 , ' A realized vision of access to safe, affordable surgical and anaesthesia care ' , British Journal of Surgery , vol. 106 , no. 2 , pp. E24-26 . https://doi.org/10.1002/bjs.11068
Where is the funding? In April 2015, the Lancet Commission on Global Surgery set out a vision for universal access to safe, affordable surgical and anaesthesia care when needed1. Despite policy progress and a global surge of interest in perioperative public health, the Commission blueprint remains an unfinished agenda. This welcome special BJS supplement on global surgery presents an opportunity to reflect on the lessons learned as a surgical community – with a focus on research, engagement, funding and realized vision. The Commission articulated a broad array of research themes, seven of which are found within the breadth of papers in this supplement including: policy2, quality and safety3, 4, training and education5-8, partnership6, 7, 9, information management10-12, care delivery innovation13 and burden14. However, there are four important themes that are not covered, including cost and finance, determinants and barriers, impact of disease and prevention. An even broader interdisciplinary research focus is urgently required to address questions related to the whole health system as well as political, social and economic determinants of health for patients with surgical conditions. The startling evidence that five billion people lack access to safe and affordable surgery and anaesthesia care is perhaps the most quoted of the Commission's key messages1. The healthcare delivery and management group explored patient barriers to surgical care, and promoted three bellwether procedures as signals of a functional surgical ecosystem at the level of district hospitals (caesarean section, emergency laparotomy and open fracture care). The workforce, training and education group proposed a density of at least 20 specialist providers per 100 000 population, and illustrated the dearth and global maldistribution of human resources. The economics and finance group described how surgical patients worldwide are trapped in iatrogenic poverty while needle and thread are as cost‐effective as immunizations, and that return on investments for surgery and anaesthesia would translate into considerable Gross Domestic Product losses averted. The metrics group drew up the six Lancet Commission indicators, designed to capture preparedness, delivery, and the effect of surgical and anaesthesia care with clear time‐bound targets for scale up to 2030. The Commission report concluded with a call for national surgical plans and an appraisal of global surgery research. Overall, the report aligned with health system strengthening and embedded surgery within universal health coverage. Building on the work of many individuals and organizations, the Commission facilitated global surgery progress with multiple partners across more than 100 countries. The escalating emergence of leaders, new networks and changing focus of organizations is encouraging. Key events to highlight include: Denis Mukwege winning the Nobel Prize for humanitarian surgery; Emmanuel Makasa spearheading the unanimously passed World Health Assembly resolution 68.15 on the crucial role of surgery and anaesthesia for universal health coverage15; and John Meara championing national surgical plans through intelligent, collaborative partnership. In addition, media and civil society are maintaining pressure on global surgical issues; guiding institutions such as the World Federation of Societies of Anaesthesiologists and the College of Surgeons in East, Central and Southern Africa have made significant contributions to workforce data; new collaborations, including the Global Initiative for Children's Surgery and InciSioN (the International Student Surgical Network), have been launched; research funders have awarded grants for global surgical research; and regional colleges and specialist associations have supported the Commission's report. The World Health Organization (WHO) has endorsed the Commission indicators and their surgical lead (Walt Johnson) has brought fresh strategic thinking to the organization, and powerful support to the national planning processes16. Despite the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and a reorientation towards health system strengthening, the surgical community has yet to capitalize on global development assistance for health17. Decision‐makers do not necessarily allocate funds proportional to avertable mortality and morbidity, but demand well defined, effective interventions and credible metrics to measure success18. However, the fact that the surgical community now defines better the burden of surgical disease, and has cost‐effective interventions19 and key performance indicators, bodes well for political priority ascendance. In addition, the call for an independent accountability mechanism to track progress from Holmer and colleagues10 in this supplement is also timely and relevant. Sufficient funding from national health budgets as well as international funders should follow the imperatives that, without urgent and accelerated investment in surgical scale‐up, low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMICs) will continue to have immense losses in economic productivity. In comparison, modest scale‐up of costs (1–8 per cent of total annual health expenditure in LMICs) would be sufficient to see returns. Strong advocacy for global surgery funding is required20, and an appropriately funded WHO should be an important starting point. The global surgery community should continue to engage with both humanitarian aid and the wider development sector to disseminate the final Commission messages: that investing in surgical services in LMICs is affordable, saves lives and promotes economic development; and that surgery is part of the health system solution for many disparate health agendas – from maternal health, to trauma, cancer and neonatal mortality. This upstream activity, as is happening in Ethiopia, Zambia, Tanzania and other countries through national surgical planning, should lead to downstream implementation for real change16. However, we must not be fooled: without funding there will be no meaningful implementation of emerging national plans and no access to safe, affordable surgical and anaesthesia care for five billion people.
