Suchergebnisse

The 25 of July of 2005, the national government presided by Álvaro Uribe Vélez, adopted in the Colombian legal ordering well-known Law 975 of 2005 like "Law of justice and peace"; which must have as a generic aim to order "dispositions for the restoration of members of warrior groups organized to the margin of the law, that contribute in an effective way to the achieve national peace (.)", this law is very controverted and torrid and it has been object of several unconstitutionality demands. These norms were raised as a consequence of the Álvaro Uribe government agreements, with the selves defenses for their dismobility, process that imply to adequate the current legislation to make it easier, due to the inapplicability of Law 782 rom 2002 and Decree 128 of 2003 to committed criminal facts during and with occasion of the permanence in warrior groups, which do not have the amnistiable or indultable qualities. In this matter the adaptation of the accusatory criminal system is marked to those punibles conducts, where the subject on which falls the penalty action is the dismobilized one, no matter if he does in an individual or collective way, situation that evidences one of the multiple missing pieces that are seen at the moment of the execution of the law, due to the individual demobilizations suffer a dissimilar proceeding to the collective one. But from the point of the force that has the international pacts in the Colombian political Constitution, it is evident that this norms goes against the international texts recognized by the legislator and that they are part of the political pact. The law that ratifies the of Rome agreement about the Penal Court and the crimes that this one can judge are taxative in which the crimes of lesa humanity, the war crimes and the genocide are imprescriptibly, they can not be indulted, nor amnestied. The enchained hands which the Colombian government was put under sovereignly is not only for the executive authority, but that it limits also the legislative power and the judicial power when it is to pardon and to judge the people in charge of the atrocious crimes and of lesa humanity. The problem is that by means of a constitutional reform the norms of the Penal Court were incorporated and the law of recognition was approved in the internal order of the Statute of Rome (2002 law 742) and of the competence of the Court was approved too. To unravel the nature, I reach and implications of the law of justice and peace, if in essence is a conducive project to clarify the truth, justice and the integral repair to all the victims, in a process that involves to all the actors, groups and sectors jeopardize in the armed conflict Colombian or on the contrary a directed initiative impunity, the pardon and the forgetfulness of all the crimes of lesa humanity committed by the paramilitary, to establish if it incorporates a directed policy of state to solve two aspects that to our critery are the power stations in the solution of the present Colombian conflict, which they are: the displacement and the fight by the land, centric aspects of the investigation project "Displacement and Land within the framework of the Policy of Justice and Peace", on the critery of which the society, the academy, the university, the students and in individual the right faculties must investigate and debate so controverted law that will affect the past, present and future of our nation, to which it is not possible to be outside of the discussion. The present articule is an investigative advance that about the law 975 of 2005 presents the investigative group from its legal analysis and constitutional control that allowed to interpose a demand of partial unconstitutionality against the articule 5 o that incorporates the victim definition. ; El 25 de julio de 2005 el Gobierno Nacional, presidido por Álvaro Uribe Vélez sancionó, incorporando al ordenamiento jurídico colombiano, la Ley 975 de 2005 conocida como "Ley de Justicia y Paz", la cual tiene como fin genérico dictar "disposiciones para la reincorporación de miembros de grupos armados organizados al margen de la ley, que contribuyan de manera efectiva a la consecución de la paz nacional (.)", ley controvertida y controversial que ha sido objeto de múltiples demandas de inconstitucionalidad.Dicha normatividad, que surge como consecuencia de los acuerdos del gobierno de Álvaro Uribe Vélez con las autodefensas para su desmovilización, proceso que implica adecuar la legislación existente para su facilitación, dada la limitación de la Ley 782 de 2002, prorrogada por la Ley 1106 de 2006 y el Decreto 128 de 2003 a hechos delictivos cometidos durante y con ocasión de la permanencia en grupos armados al margen de la ley, que no revistan las calidades de ser amnistiables o indultables. En ella se marca la adaptación del sistema penal acusatorio a tales conductas punibles, donde el sujeto sobre el cual recae la acción penal es el desmovilizado, independientemente lo haga de forma individual o colectiva, situación que evidencia una de las múltiples falencias que se ven en el momento de ejecución de la ley, en virtud que las desmovilizaciones individuales sufren un trámite disímil al que reciben las colectivas.Pero, a la luz de la fuerza que tienen los pactos internacionales en la Constitución Política colombiana, es evidente que esta normatividad va en contravía con los textos internacionales acogidos por el legislador y que son parte del pacto político. La ley que ratifica el Estatuto de Roma sobre la Corte Penal Internacional y los crímenes que ésta puede juzgar es taxativa en que los crímenes de lesa humanidad, los crímenes de guerra y el genocidio son imprescriptibles, y no pueden ser indultados ni amnistiados.Esa atadura de manos a la que el gobierno colombiano se sometió soberanamente no es sólo para el poder ejecutivo, sino que limita también al poder legislativo y al judicial cuando se trata de perdonar y juzgar a los responsables de los delitos atroces y de lesa humanidad. El problema es que mediante una reforma constitucional se incorporaron las normas de la Corte Penal Internacional y se aprobó seguidamente la ley de reconocimiento en el orden interno del Estatuto de Roma (Ley 742 de 2002) y de la competencia de la Corte.Desentrañar la naturaleza, alcances e implicaciones de la ley de justicia y paz, si en esencia es un proyecto conducente a esclarecer la verdad, la justicia y la reparación integral a todas las victimas, en un proceso que involucre a todos los actores, grupos y sectores comprometidos en el conflicto armado colombiano, o por el contrario una iniciativa dirigida a la impunidad, el perdón y el olvido de todos los crímenes de lesa humanidad cometidos por los paramilitares; establecer si incorpora una política de Estado dirigida a resolver dos aspectos que a nuestro criterio son los centrales en la solución del actual conflicto colombiano, que son: el desplazamiento y la lucha por la tierra, aspectos centrales del proyecto de investigación Desplazamiento y Tierra en el Marco de la Política de Justicia y Paz, sobre el criterio de que la sociedad, la academia, la universidad, los estudiantes y en particular las facultades de derecho deben investigar y debatir tancontrovertida ley que afectará el pasado, presente y futuro de nuestra nación, al cual no se puede ser ajeno.El presente artículo es un avance de investigación que sobre la Ley 975 de 2005 presenta el grupo de investigación a partir de su análisis jurídico y control constitucional, que permitió interponer una demanda de inconstitucionalidad parcial contra el artículo 5o que incorpora la definición de víctima.

The Horn of Africa (HOA) is one of the most underdeveloped regions on earth. It is also one of the most conflict-ridden, insecure regions in the world. While Africa as a whole has enjoyed a trend in recent years toward reduction and termination of many of its civil wars, the HOA is the exception to the rule. Indeed, the region's prolonged armed conflicts have spread, engulfing several neighboring states in warfare and partial state collapse. While aspects of the HOA case are obviously unique, and sensitivity to context and complexity must be privileged in both analysis of and policy toward the Horn, the region's crises are not so distinct that they preclude useful comparative analysis. This paper considers conflict dynamics across the entire Horn of Africa, but devotes special attention to the case of Somalia which, because of the depth, length, and significance of its crisis, is a source of particular international concern. Because Somalia's crisis has been so protracted and has gone through several very distinct phases, it provides an opportunity to compare conflict dynamics in a single country over time.

Diese wissenschaftliche Publikation enthält eine Quellensammlung wichtiger Dokumente (in den Originalsprachen), die im Verlauf des 20. Jahrhunderts zur Sicherung der Menschenrechte international verfasst und vereinbart wurden und zugleich eine Aufarbeitung der Entwicklung, die die Menschenrechtsidee und ihre Durchsetzung in den letzten 100 Jahren genommen haben. Diese Entwicklung ist nicht abgeschlossen, sondern stellt einen ständigen Prozess dar, um den niedergelegten Grundsätzen international Geltung zu verschaffen und deren Verletzung zu sanktionieren. Hierbei konnten in der 2. Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts große Fortschritte erzielt werden. Der Münchner Politologe Opitz bilanziert das Erreichte und benennt auch die zukünftigen Aufgaben. An den Dokumententeil schließt sich ein umfangreiches Literaturverzeichnis an. Die umfassende Darstellung wendet sich vorrangig an Studenten bzw. Experten. (3) (Reinhild Khan)

Republican Gov. Jeff Landry is finding
tricky navigating as he attempts to revolutionize Louisiana government.

Landry came into office on the back of a big
election win and with a healthy supermajority of GOP legislators joining him.
The playbook for chief executives under these conditions calls for striking
while the iron is hot, especially at the start of a term in office.

His ambitious agenda reflected this. A special legislative
session of his calling definitively put his imprint of increased
accountability and responsibility onto criminal justice policy. Now a month
from adjourning, the regular session already has sent to his desk some regulatory
reforms for property insurance, with the issues of high premiums and reduced
availability nagging ratepayers for years, with more on the way.

But that's not all, and here he's beginning to
bump up against the limits of power shaped by the realities of the political
environment. Landry had stumped for a huge injection of choice into education
by proposing, over a few years starting next academic year, that the state subsidize
children's education options, except for home schooling, through education
savings accounts. That makes sense since a significant portion of
households with children in school pay into public education, yet because of its
relatively low quality they end up paying again to have their children educated
in nonpublic schools. Pursuing this over the long haul will improve public
education through introducing competition as well as reduce public dollars
going to nonpublic schools eventually as the proportion of children in public
schools increases as a result.

The problem is the costs after phasing in for a
few years would be substantial. While some alarmist numbers nearly twice the anticipated
amount are overblown, it's likely these early costs would be in the $300
million annual range. These would commence not long after a temporary sales tax
increase of 0.45 percent rolls off the books. While both axing the tax increase
and establishing ESAs are necessary to improve the state's fiscal health – both
lower taxes and a better-educated citizenry lead to increased economic
development – in the long term, this makes for a tighter budget in the short
term.

Thus, a state Senate panel has endorsed
an alternative
to a House bill
encapsulating Landry's approach that at present senators sit on. It basically would
punt the matter of designing ESAs to the Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education after a study, but give the Legislature ultimate control over any
rules that BESE could promulgate to establish ESAs by making funding contingent
on an annual appropriation.

A solid BESE majority supports ESAs so whatever
comes from that probably wouldn't look much different than Landry's plan, and
this approach more flexibly can respond to the sales tax hike expiration the
year after next. Still, it risks momentum loss as district school boards and
educrats fear losing power along with special interests wanting to keep things,
so they already are fighting tooth-and-nail to derail the reform.

Fiscal matters also are driving, and threatening,
another huge Landry initiative: putting
the Louisiana Constitution on a diet. He wants in principle to transfer out
from it into law a number of provisions dealing with taxes and spending, making
these easier for legislators to adjust on the fly to respond to the varying
fiscal environment, rather than face constraints and the necessity of a lengthy
process to make changes. The state's basic law locks in certain items most states
have in statute.

Landry hopes to have this shedding done in time
for fall elections as voters would have to approve of this. Approval by then
would be needed in order have more options to tackle the sales tax hike
expiration next year, in addition to creating more efficient government sooner.

However, he has run into skepticism from the
Senate that this can be done on his preferred timeline of the last two weeks of
the regular session, with as much as a month added on, as legislators mainly
would comprise the convention delegates. A better option may be an August
convention, up until the deadline for submitting ballot items for the Nov. 5
election.

Representatives
also have removed some flexibility by proposing to keep from consideration of
removal the state's excessive homestead exemption or siloed Minimum Foundation
Program, out of political pressure. That's not necessary – delegates would
divine that taking these out of the Constitution might cause voter rejection
and so not do that in the first place – and emboldens opposition big government
advocates who understand that the constitutional straitjacket in place
artificially inflates the size of government.

Hopefully, Landry can keep as much on the table as
possible for delegate discussion, and may have to accept a later date for
review – perhaps a relief to legislators who have been in session most of the
time since the first couple of weeks of the year, but which also gives special
interests wishing to retain bloated government more time to rally opposition.
Steering this into fruition from convention to ballot box success would score
him a big policy win and provide better government for the citizenry.

'Durch den Schmuggel von Drogen und anderer Konterbande tangiert die Instabilität in einigen Regionen des GUS-Raums die europäische Sicherheit. Den Hintergrund für den Zusammenhang zwischen Schmuggel und regionaler Instabilität bilden poröse nachsowjetische Staatsgrenzen, schwache und zum Teil korrupte Sicherheitsstrukturen (Grenzschutz, Zoll, Polizei), lokale Gewaltmärkte und ungelöste Regionalkonflikte. Die vorliegende Studie beschäftigt sich mit dem von Afghanistan ausgehenden Schmuggel opiumhaltiger Drogen durch zentralasiatische und südkaukasische Staaten sowie durch Russland. Sie analysiert den Übergang von Transit- zu Konsumräumen für afghanische Opiate entlang der 'neuen Seidenstraße', die damit zusammenhängenden medizinischen und sozialen Probleme wie die Koppelung zwischen Drogenströmen und HIV-Epidemien, die Vernetzung mit anderen Schmuggelaktivitäten (Waffenhandel, Menschenhandel), den Zusammenhang zwischen Schmuggel und schlechter Regierungsführung, Korruption und 'schwacher Staatlichkeit' im GUS-Raum. Daraus werden Empfehlungen an die europäische und internationale Politik auf dem Feld der Drogenbekämpfung in Eurasien abgeleitet.' (Autorenreferat)