What Are 'Universalizable Interests'?
In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 8, Heft 4, S. 456-469
ISSN: 0963-8016
Nearly two decades of debate have not resulted in widespread agreement regarding Jurgen Habermas's discourse ethics theory. Perhaps the reason that agreement remains so elusive is that the universalizability (U) aspect of Habermas's formulation of the moral principle continues to be considered. When (U) is considered, it becomes evident that a weaker & a stronger version of the moral principle exist. Though the weaker version is more easily defended, Habermas continues to support the stronger version. If Habermas were to make simple revisions, requiring only minor adjustments to his theory, he would gain a (U) that is less restrictive & more readily accepted by a wider audience. If a simple nuanced account of the (U) of interests were incorporated, the original intent of Habermas's theory -- that of providing a deontological, post-Kantian, universalist moral theory -- would remain intact. K. A. Larsen