Suchergebnisse

After the 2008/9 recession the coalition government famously adopted a set of contractionary fiscal policies with the aim to reduce national debt. Elements of this austerity programme included significant cuts to government spending, public sector job reductions, and changes to welfare programs. Various Keynesian economists claimed that such policies would be detrimental to the British economy, including Nobel prize winners Paul Krugman, and Joseph Stiglitz. In some sense they were right, but for all the wrong reasons. Austerity in the UK was harmful due to the impact which it had on total expenditure. The reduction in government expenditure caused a reduction in public sector employment, which had a knock on effect in the private sector as lower total spending in the economy led firms to layoff workers. Primarily through these mechanisms austerity policy led to rising unemployment, and a general reduction in standards of living. However, this is not inevitable. Following the recession the US adopted a very similar set of austerity policies to the UK, if anything they were slightly more radical. Just as economists did in the UK, a letter signed by 350 Keynesian economists suggested that this might push the US economy into recession. The US budget deficit was then reduced from roughly $1,050 billion in 2012 to $550 billion in 2013. Despite this, there was never an equivalent 'double dip' recession, as was experienced in the UK and EU.This is because the Federal Reserve adopted sufficiently expansionary monetary policy to offset the impact of the reduction in government expenditure on NGDP (total expenditure). While government expenditure fell, this was negated by the increase in private sector expenditure, meaning there was no significant increase in unemployment. Had the Bank of England adopted similar monetary policy, the country undoubtedly would have fared far better during the austerity period. Austerity in the UK was not harmful because government expenditure fell, as many will often suggest, but instead because inappropriate monetary policy allowed total expenditure to fall. 

Purpose
Using a fiscal sentiment indicator, this study aims to verify whether fiscal sentiment affects the yield curve in Brazil. Since policymakers highlight the coordination between monetary and fiscal policies and the importance of fiscal policy to the expectations formation process in inflation targeting regimes, the authors also explore the transmission mechanism through inflation expectations. Hence, the study also analyzes the effect of fiscal sentiment on interest rate swap spreads through the inflation expectations channel.


Design/methodology/approach
Based on information obtained from official communiqués about fiscal policies issued by the Central Bank of Brazil and the Brazilian Ministry of Finance, the study builds a fiscal sentiment indicator. The econometric strategy to verify whether fiscal sentiment is related to the short tail of the yield curve is based on time series analysis through ordinary least squares and generalized method of moments estimates. In turn, to estimate the transmission mechanism through inflation expectations, the model uses interaction terms between fiscal sentiment and inflation expectations.


Findings
The results suggest a more optimistic (pessimistic) fiscal sentiment reduces (increases) swap spreads. The findings reveal that improvements in fiscal credibility and a more optimistic fiscal sentiment are able to reduce the positive marginal effect that inflation expectations variations have on interest rate swap spreads.


Originality/value
This study contributes to the literature, as, to the best of authors' knowledge, it is the first to analyze the content of the communiqués related to fiscal policy, and based on this content, it extracts the sentiment related to the fiscal environment and analyzes the effect of this sentiment on the yield curve. Besides, different from existing studies that analyze the effect of fiscal backward-looking aspects (such as public debt, budget balance, taxes and public spending) on the yield curve, this study investigates forward-looking aspects related to fiscal policy (such as fiscal credibility and fiscal sentiment).

It has been argued that the evaluation of the effectiveness of Ukrainian national security is the activities of authorized entities carried out in the prescribed manner, which aims to establish the extent to which measures implemented by the state in the relevant direction, as well as related financial, material technical and human costs, meet the goal. It has been performed the classification of the relevant criteria, which is most appropriate to divide into the following groups: 1) financial and economic, which include: the level of shadowing of the economy; the level of GDP per capita; the ratio of public debt to GDP; the average level of wages in the state; 2) socio-cultural, in particular: the demographic situation in the country (depopulation rate); the level of legal consciousness of society and cultural development; national consent and unity; a sense of personal security; the level of support of the population of the state; 3) political: stability and effectiveness of public policy (domestic political stability); resilience to ensure a high level of readiness of society and the state to respond to a wide range of threats; the level of democracy, the formation and effectiveness of the legal framework of the rule of law; 4) indicators of combat readiness of the army: the state of the armed forces, their combat capability and combat readiness; logistical, financial support of troops; adequacy of staffing. Emphasis has been placed on the fact that the list of these criteria is not exhaustive, as they can be expanded by a number of indicators that depend directly on the direction of national security. These criteria are an objective reflection of how effective the legislator is in this area. In addition, the implementation of appropriate evaluation requires the use of various methods: surveys, mathematical modeling, forecasting and more. ; Статья посвящена проблемам оптимизации критериев оценки эффективности обеспечения национальной безопасности государства. На основе анализа научных взглядов ученых и норм ...

In the context of the euro crisis, several member states of the Eurozone were forced to implement so-called Economic Adjustment Programmes. The implementation of these programmes was supervised by a troika consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Fiscal adjustment was one cornerstone of the adjustment programmes. The objective of the programmes was to reduce previously soaring public deficits and to stabilise and reduce public debt in the long term. All programmes primarily aimed at cutting government spending. Increasing government revenues was to play only a secondary role. However, a look at the adjustment programmes for Ireland and Portugal shows a striking difference in the fiscal adjustment strategies. Different Irish governments pursued an adjustment strategy with a strong focus on expenditure cuts. By contrast, Portugal's adjustment strategy changed over the course of the programme and was increasingly driven by increases in revenues. How can we explain these differences? To answer this question, my dissertation provides two in-depth case studies of the adjustment programmes for Ireland and Portugal. I argue that fiscal adjustment strategies are determined by the activity of coalitions of different economic actor groups at the domestic level. These actor groups have different fiscal policy preferences. On the one hand, they differ in terms of their preferred level of redistribution and the economic risks to which they are exposed. On the other hand, sectoral actor groups have different preferences based on their prioritisation of international competitiveness and domestic demand. Actor groups with similar preferences form coalitions to influence the government's policy-choice. Two logics determine which coalitions ultimately prevail. On the one hand, some coalitions are involved in policy-making through social pacts and other institutional arrangements. On the other hand, sectoral coalitions are influential due to their importance for economic ...

The lockdown, social distancing, and increased costs associated with the COVID-19 pandemic have reduced output and employment, increased poverty, and depressed trade transactions; in the absence of a strong response by government, output will be lower over the next decade due to COVID-19. The pandemic-driven rise in the fiscal deficit is increasing public debt, thus exacerbating existing challenges to sustainability and increasing the urgency of shifting from large public investments to human capital development as the main driver of growth. The government's rapid response to the pandemic has succeeded in keeping the population share of new infections and of deaths well below that of most other countries. However, critical health services, particularly childhood immunization and nutrition services, have been disrupted, which is increasing stunting and preventable diseases. The combination of poorer nutrition, limited health services, learning losses from school closures, and the likelihood that some children (particularly adolescent girls and children from poor households) may never return to school will reduce incomes and productivity over the medium term. The government responded rapidly and effectively to the challenges posed by the pandemic, putting in place the Economic Recovery Plan (ERP) to support households and firms, quickly imposing constraints on mobility to limit the spread of the disease, ramping up social protection programs, and setting up remote learning. Key priorities going forward include: (i) improving the government's expenditure allocation, financial management and revenue mobilization; (ii) strengthening the resilience of the health system and preparing for administration of a vaccine; (iii) reducing learning losses (targeting the most vulnerable), improving skills and strengthening accountability in education; and (iv) expanding the flagship social safety net program, building adaptive systems to respond quickly to shocks, improving poverty targeting of safety net programs, and scaling up the use of digital payments.

This research monograph consists of 17 papers under the framework of contemporary economic and business issues which we can structure into several main research fields. These fields relate to the regulation of economic and business activities, especially in the context of digitalization processes, fiscal and monetary issues, dealing with the impact of digitalization and COVID19 pandemics on traditional academic and business debates, as well as on innovation processes in both government and the corporate sector. We can borrow the phrase from one of our papers and confirm that the papers presented show that the innovative market and digital society, as the new global development and technology paradigm of the modern world, together with its capabilities and standards, has changed the character of entrepreneurship and the state/government in terms of their new interactions. Thus, the contributions from the research monograph are made more urgent by the main objective of introspection of the traditional economic and business sectors and activities under the prism of digital transformation. The researchers were particularly interested in the impact of the COVID19 pandemic on the economic and business sectors. Although the conference was held in the midst of the pandemics, researchers were able to present valuable studies showing the extent of the threat posed by COVID 19 to the public health and economic outcomes of EU citizens. Significant pressure was placed on member state spending, particularly in countries with lower fiscal capacity, resulting in a severe temporary deterioration in the fiscal deficit and public debt. It is also noted that the crisis COVID -19 will have an uneven impact on member states and could deepen their divergence. Therefore, new and creative fiscal policies to support investment in digital transformation, green transition and innovation are of utmost importance. This monograph provides some guidance.

In the market economy, economic crises succeed one another. With the process of globalization and globalization, tensions are always present in time and space, far from an optimal and benevolent system in the long term proposed by liberal and neoclassical theories. In a crisis situation, the role of the state is always contested; at the same time, the market, except perhaps in the financial sector, is often spared by critics. For a time, the market appeared to be the solution to all evils, but by appealing to frantic individualism, it gradually destroyed the necessary solidarities. In 2020, the violence and the instability of the markets worry, with a continuous development of slag that disfigures the objectives of the commercial world. Income inequalities and growing wealth, tax evasion and optimization, unrestrained challenges to public goods, public and private debt, the dictatorship of a GDP less and less precise and more and more blinding, global warming and increasing pollution are all factors that testify to the explosive nature of future societal life in the world. ; Dans l'économie de marché, les crises économiques se succèdent. Avec le processus de globalisation et de mondialisation, les tensions sont toujours présentes dans le temps et dans l'espace, loin d'un système optimal et bienveillant à terme que proposent les théories libérales et néo-classiques. Le rôle de l'Etat est toujours contesté dans une situation de crise, alors que le marché, sauf peut-être dans le domaine financier, est souvent épargné par les critiques. Pendant un temps, le marché est apparu comme la solution de tous les maux, mais en faisant appel à l'individualisme forcené, il détruit peu à peu les solidarités nécessaires. En 2020, la violence et l'instabilité des marchés inquiètent, avec un développement continu de scories qui défigurent les objectifs du monde marchand. Les inégalités des revenus et des patrimoines croissantes, l'évasion et l'optimisation fiscales, les contestations effrénées des biens publics, l'endettement ...

Congress and federal financial regulators have long prioritized the safety and soundness of banking firms. But at the same time, the directors and officers of banking firms are legally bound to prioritize shareholder wealth maximization, which creates incentives for risk-taking that work against these regulatory goals. This shareholder primacy norm has long been a central feature of corporate governance, but as I describe in this Article its application to banks was not a deliberate policy choice but rather a historical accident. Indeed, banks possess several unique features that make shareholder wealth maximization an inapt governance priority for them. Banks are highly leveraged, which increases the importance of creditor agency costs. Banks also enjoy government guarantees, either explicit or implicit, on their short-term debt, and thus their governance is a matter of public concern. Finally, bank failures result in high negative externalities, and this also creates a strong public interest in bank safety and soundness. This Article argues that a new federal governance regime for banking institutions is appropriate and consistent with the historical purposes of banking regulations and charter oversight in the United States. Furthermore, such a regime would reduce the tensions between the law of state entities and the sprawling federal banking regulatory framework created by Congress, and harmonize the internal governance of banking firms with the broader goals of external banking regulations. Finally, I offer some thoughts on the key principles that should be present in any such federal governance regime for banking. For too long, we have tolerated a "cat-and-mouse" dynamic in banking, one in which regulators have sought to identify and address risky practices while knowing that the directors and officers of banking firms have strong incentives to take on higher risk. By changing this paradigm and realigning the incentives inherent in banking governance, we can take a major step towards ensuring long-term stability in our financial system.

The article examines the concepts of "crisis", "crisis state", "economic crisis", the main characteristics of the crisis, considers the possible options for the behavior of the subject in a crisis state, namely constructive and destructive. The course of the 2008 economic crisis, which manifested itself in a massive drop in production, a drop in demand and prices for raw materials, an increase in unemployment, and a spread to the monetary, fiscal, and social areas, has worsened the social welfare and expectations of businesses and ordinary citizens have been analyzed. The crisis affected not only the economic structures but also all branches of Ukrainian society, social groups, and almost everyone, which significantly affected social relations and the psychological state of people.It should be noted that the crises of economic, political, and social nature inevitably affect public health. Especially strongly such processes determine the emotional and stress response of a person, which is the basis for the formation of pathological processes and in particular diseases associated with mental disorders. Therefore, to avoid negative personal reactions due to the economic crisis, it is important to be able to adapt to a crisis state, to control one's emotions, to have a balanced mental state, a sufficient level of resilience, to use constructive strategies of coping behavior to resist psychological stress without negative consequences and this requires the implementation of specific government programs.It is determined that under the conditions of long-term military aggression, deepening and expansion of negative trends in the economy, low level of confidence in the system of public administration, weak financial discipline, high corruption, unsatisfactory attractiveness of investments, and excessive debt burden, the current economic dynamics of Ukraine are extremely weak, that demonstrates the high risk of crisis recurrence. Therefore, overcoming the risks of new crisis trends, ensuring long-term macroeconomic ...

In the market economy, economic crises succeed one another. With the process of globalization and globalization, tensions are always present in time and space, far from an optimal and benevolent system in the long term proposed by liberal and neoclassical theories. In a crisis situation, the role of the state is always contested; at the same time, the market, except perhaps in the financial sector, is often spared by critics. For a time, the market appeared to be the solution to all evils, but by appealing to frantic individualism, it gradually destroyed the necessary solidarities. In 2020, the violence and the instability of the markets worry, with a continuous development of slag that disfigures the objectives of the commercial world. Income inequalities and growing wealth, tax evasion and optimization, unrestrained challenges to public goods, public and private debt, the dictatorship of a GDP less and less precise and more and more blinding, global warming and increasing pollution are all factors that testify to the explosive nature of future societal life in the world. ; Dans l'économie de marché, les crises économiques se succèdent. Avec le processus de globalisation et de mondialisation, les tensions sont toujours présentes dans le temps et dans l'espace, loin d'un système optimal et bienveillant à terme que proposent les théories libérales et néo-classiques. Le rôle de l'Etat est toujours contesté dans une situation de crise, alors que le marché, sauf peut-être dans le domaine financier, est souvent épargné par les critiques. Pendant un temps, le marché est apparu comme la solution de tous les maux, mais en faisant appel à l'individualisme forcené, il détruit peu à peu les solidarités nécessaires. En 2020, la violence et l'instabilité des marchés inquiètent, avec un développement continu de scories qui défigurent les objectifs du monde marchand. Les inégalités des revenus et des patrimoines croissantes, l'évasion et l'optimisation fiscales, les contestations effrénées des biens publics, l'endettement ...

The liberal world order has produced immense benefits for Europe and people across the planet. Beginning in the 18th and 19th centuries, liberalism reinforces the natural rights of man to life, liberty and property, and has transformed the world in ways that have improved the material and social circumstances of humankind. But the liberal order that has been in place in Europe since 1945, after two world wars, is showing signs of deterioration. Today, this liberal order is being challenged by a variety of forces. The essence of the European experience is the development of a civilization that considered itself to be a unity and yet was politically decentralized. Former free towns in Italy and the Low Countries became bastions of a self-governing middle class in the Middle Ages. However, with time, states tend to overgrow taking more and more resources, which results in the increase in taxes and public spending, excessive regulation, deficits and public debt. There is a fight between the advocates of two different ideals of the European Union, the non-liberal and the liberal vision. There is a consensus in that the market economy is the system that best produces the most, removing millions of people from poverty. But it is the unequal distribution of the wealth created that is often criticized. We examine the distribution of income, before and after taxes and transfers, concluding that market liberalization does not necessarily lead to increased social inequality. On the other hand, two of the most important threats challenging the liberal order in Europe are populist parties and protectionism. Finally, this paper suggests a way towards a future Europe, deepening the single market and economic integration, but transforming the obsolete and dysfunctional nation-states into other forms of decentralized political units.

The European Union's response to the financial and sovereign debt crisis has been broadly discussed in the literature, but only few contributions acknowledge the importance of the European statistical agency EUROSTAT as an actor within that process. This is surprising, given that the European Government Finance Statistics (GFS) regulatory regime is central when it comes to the implementation of effective fiscal surveillance (Gandrud & Hallerberg, 2016). Fiscal surveillance in the economic and monetary union (EMU) essentially builds on GFS data, which in turn is compiled from accounting information. Because EU member states elaborate their accounting policies independently, heterogeneity in accounting practices arises, which adversely affects GFS data quality (Jesus & Jorge, 2015). In response, EUROSTAT as a directorate of the European Commission has engaged in developing European Public Sector Accounting Standards (EPSAS), aimed at introducing binding accrual based governmental accounting practices across the member states. However, beyond the issuance of consultation and reflection papers, ongoing discussions between government officials, EUROSTAT, practitioners and academia, the EPSAS project did not progress much in recent years. This paper aims to explain this stalemate by drawing on a political economy account of integration. In particular, it argues that electoral incentives at the level of the member states hinder integrative progress in this area. This theory will be tested by analysing publicly available consultation papers, which are used to identify the reasons for the stalling of the supranational harmonization efforts. In contrast to previous research (Aggestam & Brusca, 2016) this paper focusses less on the process and the extent of participation, but rather on the substance of the feedback given. In particular, it deploys discourse network analysis to debunk the main arguments and preferences issued in the consultation process. Reaching beyond previous work on the process of "glocalization" of public sector accounting standards (Baskerville & Grossi, 2018), it provides insights into Europeanization of governmental accounting practices and the dynamics of supranational administrative policy harmonization at the interface of political economy.

This paper revisits the economic theory of the interest rates and presents some estimation results obtained on annual macroeconomic data for a panel of OECD countries. The conventional macroeconomic theory based on the saving investment balance falls short of producing a consistent picture for the medium-term trends of the interest rates and related variables. The main reason lies in the fact that the usual propensity to save specification does not account for the observed saving behavior, and it turns out that an intertemporal approach works better. Some other extensions of the basic model are also discussed to account for the external influence and the risk premia on public bonds. Based on this theoretical discussion, an econometric relation is estimated on annual data for a panel of 19 OECD countries. The tests confirm the influence of the factors suggested by the theory and, in particular, the link between the fall in the interest rate and the economic slowdown. The role of the inflation expectations, of the real exchange rate and of the risk premia on public debt is also discussed and clarified. ; Cet article revient sur la théorie économique des taux d'intérêt et présente quelques résultats d'estimations économétriques sur données annuelles pour un panel de pays de l'OCDE. La théorie macroéconomique conventionnelle fondée sur l'équilibre épargne-investissement ne rend pas compte de manière cohérente des évolutions à moyen terme des taux d'intérêt et des variables macroéconomiques associées. La principale raison réside dans le fait que la notion keynésienne de propension à épargner ne permet pas de comprendre les comportements d'épargne observés. Pour cela, une approche intertemporelle apparaît mieux appropriée. On discute également d'autres extensions du modèle de base pour tenir compte des influences extérieures et des primes de risque sur les obligations publiques. Sur la base de cette discussion théorique, on estime une relation économétrique sur des données annuelles pour un panel de 19 pays de l'OCDE. ...

Africa, because of its weakness, its failures at many levels, and all the difficulties it faces in meeting the global standards of democracy, has over the years become the ideal receptacle for all kinds of experimentation on the issue of development.And it was only from a public finance crisis, the most emblematic manifestation of which was that of public debt, which had already begun a decade earlier, that Africans referred to structural adjustment policies. Strongly encouraged by international organizations, these countries have adopted decentralization as an effective means of good governance.Despite its adaptation in the various constitutions, decentralization really began only about fifteen years ago in many African countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Cameroon. Decentralization thus appears to be one of the best means of modernizing the centralized state, promoting citizen participation and good governance. It could, together with good governance, shed light on how the incumbent authorities manage state's resources.Seen as a means of economic growth and development, decentralization and good governance, according to the observations of recent years, do not seem to have the same effects in the developing countries, still tribal and especially very poor and plagued by many problems. This model of territorial organization has just become a condition for receiving international assistance.What are the causes of the failure of decentralization in West Africa, and what are the means these countries possess in order to succeed in changing the democratic ideals still locked in ancestral rites and Customs? ; L'Afrique, à cause de sa faiblesse, de ses faillites à plusieurs niveaux, et de toutes les difficultés qu'elle rencontre pour répondre aux critères mondiaux de démocratie, est devenue au fil des années, le réceptacle idéal pour toutes sortes d'expérimentation sur la question du développement. Et ce n'est qu'à partir d'une crise des finances publiques dont la manifestation la plus emblématique fut celle ...

The liberal world order has produced immense benefits for Europe and people across the planet. Beginning in the 18th and 19th centuries, liberalism reinforces the natural rights of man to life, liberty and property, and has transformed the world in ways that have improved the material and social circumstances of humankind. But the liberal order that has been in place in Europe since 1945, after two world wars, is showing signs of deterioration. Today, this liberal order is being challenged by a variety of forces. The essence of the European experience is the development of a civilization that considered itself to be a unity and yet was politically decentralized. Former free towns in Italy and the Low Countries became bastions of a self-governing middle class in the Middle Ages. However, with time, states tend to overgrow taking more and more resources, which results in the increase in taxes and public spending, excessive regulation, deficits and public debt. There is a fight between the advocates of two different ideals of the European Union, the non-liberal and the liberal vision. There is a consensus in that the market economy is the system that best produces the most, removing millions of people from poverty. But it is the unequal distribution of the wealth created that is often criticized. We examine the distribution of income, before and after taxes and transfers, concluding that market liberalization does not necessarily lead to increased social inequality. On the other hand, two of the most important threats challenging the liberal order in Europe are populist parties and protectionism. Finally, this paper suggests a way towards a future Europe, deepening the single market and economic integration, but transforming the obsolete and dysfunctional nation-states into other forms of decentralized political units. ; Peer Reviewed ; Postprint (published version)