Constitutional law in China
In: The China Law Series
46558 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: The China Law Series
In: The international & comparative law quarterly: ICLQ, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 760-784
ISSN: 1471-6895
In: International affairs
ISSN: 1468-2346
The constitution and constitutional argument -- The courts and judicial review -- Executive power and the separation between executive and congressional power -- The federal system : introduction and basic concepts -- Congress and congressional powers -- The commerce clause -- Commerce and the states : the dormant commerce clause, federal preemption, and the privileges and immunities clause -- Federal regulation of the states -- Liberty and property : the due process,takings and contracts clauses -- Equal protection -- Freedom of speech, press, and assembly -- Government and religious freedom -- Civil rights enforcement -- The State action requirement.
In: https://doi.org/10.7916/D82F7MJD
Pathetic argument, or argument based on pathos, persuades by appealing to the emotions of the reader or listener. In Aristotle's classic treatment, it exists in parallel to logical argument, which appeals to deductive or inductive reasoning, and ethical argument, which appeals to the character of the speaker. Pathetic argument is common in constitutional law, as in other practical discourse--think of "Poor Joshua!"--but existing accounts of constitutional practice do not provide resources for understanding the place of and limitations upon such appeals when they appear in judicial opinions. This Article begins to fill that gap. Pathetic argument is one of the acceptable modes of persuasion that constitutional argument shares with other deliberative domains, though at its best it can be used to amplify arguments within the set of discourses--text, history, structure, precedent, and consequences--that make constitutional law a distinctive form of politics. Normatively, appeals to emotion are most easily justified in opinions that seek to declare rather than apply law; in separate writings; when addressed to accepted subjects of constitutional argument rather than the ultimate outcome in the case; and when they arouse other-regarding rather than self-regarding emotions. A nuanced account of the proper place of pathetic argument in constitutional law is instrumental to understanding what it means to engage, and not to engage, in constitutional discourse.
BASE
In: Proceedings of the annual meeting / American Society of International Law, Band 35, S. 99-106
ISSN: 2169-1118
In: COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011
SSRN
Pathetic argument, or argument based on pathos, persuades by appealing to the emotions of the reader or listener. In Aristotle's classic treatment, it exists in parallel to logical argument, which appeals to deductive or inductive reasoning, and ethical argument, which appeals to the character of the speaker. Pathetic argument is common in constitutional law, as in other practical discourse — think of "Poor Joshua!" — but existing accounts of constitutional practice do not provide resources for understanding the place of and limitations upon such appeals when they appear in judicial opinions. This Article begins to fill that gap. Pathetic argument is one of the acceptable modes of persuasion that constitutional argument shares with other deliberative domains, though at its best it can be used to amplify arguments within the set of discourses — text, history, structure, precedent, and consequences — that make constitutional law a distinctive form of politics. Normatively, appeals to emotion are most easily justified in opinions that seek to declare rather than apply law; in separate writings; when addressed to accepted subjects of constitutional argument rather than the ultimate outcome in the case; and when they arouse other-regarding rather than self-regarding emotions. A nuanced account of the proper place of pathetic argument in constitutional law is instrumental to understanding what it means to engage, and not to engage, in constitutional discourse.
BASE
In: The Core text series