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From a normative vantage point, post-deliberative opinions should be linked to the quality of arguments presented during discussion. Yet, there is a dearth of research testing this claim. Our study makes a first attempt to overcome this deficiency. By analyzing a European deliberative poll on third country migration, we explore whether statements backed by reason affect opinions, which we term deliberative persuasion. We contrast deliberative persuasion to non-deliberative persuasion, whereby we explore whether the most frequently repeated position influences opinions. We find that with regard to regularization of irregular immigrants, deliberative persuasion took place. In the context of European involvement in immigration affairs, however, opinions are driven by the most frequently repeated position rather than by the quality of argumentation.

"Religion after Deliberative Democracy responds to gaps exposed by the case of religion in deliberative democratic theory. Religion's persistent visibility in political life has called for new solutions for healing deeply divided societies. In response, the author begins with Jeffrey Stout's pragmatist vision of democracy before providing a series of supplements in subsequent chapters. Past legacies are refigured in a rapprochement with Jürgen Habermas's work which is differentiated from the distinctive relevance of Hannah Arendt's Vita Activa. New developments in comparative political theology are complemented by recent systems theory approaches to institutional interactions. Peaceful protest movements are reframed in light of the trust-building capacities of minipublics. The result is reason for renewed confidence in democratic practices attuned to fostering political plurality and capable of responding to persistent religious partisanship. This book fills a crucial space in the literature on religion and democracy and will be of interest to students and scholars of philosophy of religion, theology, pragmatism, and political theory"--

This article explores the role of institutional listening in deliberative democracy, focusing particularly on its contribution to the transmission process between the public sphere and formal institutions. We critique existing accounts of transmission for prioritizing voice over listening and for remaining constrained by an 'aggregative logic' of the flow of ideas and voices in a democracy. We argue that formal institutions have a crucial role to play in ensuring transmission operates according to a more deliberative logic. To substantiate this argument, we focus on two recent examples of institutional listening in two different democracies: Australia's Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse and the United States' Senate Judiciary Committee's confirmation hearing for Supreme Court nominee, Brett Kavanaugh. These cases show that institutional listening can take different forms; it can be purposefully designed or incidental, and it can contribute to the realization of deliberative democracy in various ways. Specifically, institutional listening can help enhance the credibility and visibility of minority groups and perspectives while also empowering these groups to better hold formal political institutions accountable. In these ways, institutional listening helps transmission operate according to a more deliberative logic.

Unter deliberativen Beteiligungsverfahren sind jene Arrangements zu verstehen, die erstens eine wirksame Einbindung der Bürger ermöglichen, zweitens in vorgefassten Settings und damit nicht spontan stattfinden, und drittens zumindest informellen Einfluss auf politische Entscheidungsprozesse ausüben. Die Zahl dieser Verfahren hat seit Ende der neunzehnhundertneunziger Jahre eine starke Verbreitung und Ausdifferenzierung erfahren, wobei mitunter nur technische Details einzelne Verfahren unterscheiden. Gemeinsam ist den Beteiligungsver-fahren, dass sie den Anspruch erheben, wahrgenommene Defiz...

Unter deliberativen Beteiligungsverfahren sind jene Arrangements zu verstehen, die erstens eine wirksame Einbindung der Bürger ermöglichen, zweitens in vorgefassten Settings und damit nicht spontan stattfinden, und drittens zumindest informellen Einfluss auf politische Entscheidungsprozesse ausüben. Die Zahl dieser Verfahren hat seit Ende der neunzehnhundertneunziger Jahre eine starke Verbreitung und Ausdifferenzierung erfahren, wobei mitunter nur technische Details einzelne Verfahren unterscheiden. Gemeinsam ist den Beteiligungsver-fahren, dass sie den Anspruch erheben, wahrgenommene Defiz...

In this paper I will give a short description of deliberative democracy, its advantages over the aggregative model of democracy and its strategies for overcoming the obstacles which the social choice theory puts before the defenders of democracy. I will continue with the argument that the aim of deliberative democracy should not be reaching the consensus or unanimity, but obtaining preference single-peakedness. For, there is a practical impossibility of consensus reaching and the single-peakedness criterion is sufficient for prevention against the 'paradoxes of democracy'. Through the analysis of the given explanations of the ways in which deliberation can lead to the realization of single-peakedness, I will make an attempt to defend the position which holds that acquiring singlepeakedness, in the impartial conditions of deliberation, is a goal that is as equally unreachable as is reaching of the consensus because of the multidimensionality of the alternative evaluation criterion. However, I will show that even if deliberation does not necessarily lead to a preference single-peakedness, which would prevent Condorcet's paradox from happening, in accordance with Arrow's ethical conditions of democratic choice, it nevertheless reveals why these paradoxes are created in the first place, and it is providing us with an insight into how we can redefine the alternatives so that we can obtain a true single-peakedness of our preferences.

AbstractWithin any adversarial rule-governed system, it often takes time for strategically motivated agents to discover effective exploits. Once discovered, these strategies will soon be copied by all other participants. Unless it is possible to adjust the rules to preclude them, the result will be a degradation of the performance of the system. This is essentially what has happened to public political discourse in democratic states. Political actors have discovered, not just that the norm of truth can be violated in specific ways, but that many of the norms governing rational deliberation can also be violated, not just without penalty, but often for significant political gain. As a result, the level of noise (false or misleading communications) has come to drown out the signal (earnest attempts at deliberation). The post-truth political condition is the cumulative result of innovations developed by actors who adopt an essentially strategic orientation toward political communications.