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Coordination has been one of the major problems in the field of public administration (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984; Peters 1998; Bouckaert, Peters, & Verhoest, 2010). However, as the complexity of policy problems increases and the policy environment changes, coordination is becoming more of a serious challenge to administration than ever before (Peters, 2018; Roberts, 2011). The failure of policy coordination can greatly undermine administrative capacity, so a serious approach to coordination is necessary not only theoretically but also practically. This study reviewed policy coordination theories and analyzed prior studies on current Korean policy coordination. In particular, I focused on the concepts, dimensions, mechanisms, and performance of policy coordination. What I found is that the number and variety of coordination studies in Korea is low. Most prior studies on coordination have focused on coordination between central ministries, and their methodology has primary taken the form of a literature review. Empirical studies on coordination performance have been few and far between. Based on these findings, I suggest several implications.

Coordination is a fundamental principle for economic policy in the EU. There is a consensus that soft coordination (exchange of information, general guidelines for economic policy) is useful. Whether stabilization policies should be coordinated is another matter. Against the background of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) and the literature on macro policies it is discussed whether the conditions for such coordination are met in Europe. Commitments by policymakers are almost impossible, fiscal policies may not be effective, and negative spillovers are unlikely. Therefore, the arguments for an ex ante coordination of macro policies are weak. Nevertheless, economic policies can be successful in achieving the targets even if they are not coordinated.

Strengthening potential output is high on the agenda for economic policy in the European Union. While there is widespread agreement that structural policies have a positive impact on long-term growth, there is a controversial discussion whether coordination of macroeconomic policies can contribute to this goal. Against the background of the new economic conditions in the euro area, we analyze what could be gained from a combination of wage policy and monetary policy. Using a small theoretical macroeconomic model, we show that coordination between wage policy and monetary policy can be beneficial under certain assumptions. A policy of sustained wage moderation results in an increase in employment and potential output. Assuming that expectations are not completely forward-looking and prices are sticky, the upward shift in potential output will not be matched by a similar increase in aggregate demand. To prevent an output gap from emerging, the optimal monetary policy is to lower interest rates. However, a central bank aiming at price stability will only do so when the announcement of a policy of sustained wage moderation is credible. Simulations with a large macroeconometric multicountry model confirm that a coordination of German wage policy and ECB monetary policy would help to realize the beneficial effects of wage moderation somewhat faster, although the quantitative effect is relatively small. The long-run gain in employment would accrue regardless of a coordination with monetary policy. According to the simulations, employment in Germany would increase by about 750,000 persons in the long run if wages increase one percentage point slower than usual over a period of five years. Frequently, countries with a particularly positive economic development are said to have benefited from a coordination of macroeconomic policies. However, only a small part of the growth and employment success in these countries can be accounted for such a coordination. In the case of the United States, it is hard to see any evidence of ex ante policy coordination at all. In the Netherlands and in Ireland, a consensual strategy of wage restraint for improving the competitiveness of the economy and stimulating employment has been a significant factor of the economic success. It was important in both cases that significant supply side reforms were implemented by the governments at the same time, whereas monetary policy played no active role. Coordination of macro policies is severely complicated by the pronounced differences in national wage bargaining systems. The systems would have to be harmonized and centralized to create a single European wage policy. It is, however, unlikely that centrally designed harmonization of labor market institutions in the EU can cope with the differences across Euroland regarding productivity and employment. In the framework of the European Union, the presumed positive effects of policy coordination are stressed over and over again, for example in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. However, clear definitions and mechanisms how such a coordination can be achieved are missing. The fundamental difficulty concerning a coordination between wage policy and monetary policy arises from two facts: First, there is no such thing as "the" wage policy at the European level. Second, the statute of the ECB does not allow a binding commitment by the central bank. This does not mean, however, that the ECB would not take account of what is happening, for example, to wage developments. According to the monetary policy strategy, it should react if there is an increase in the growth rate of potential output as a result of wage moderation. For example: If the social partners in a large country such as Germany give a credible signal that wage increases will be moderate for several years, the ECB could accommodate this change. However, such a strategy cannot be reversed in that the ECB moves first hoping that wage moderation will follow.

Considers the effects of uncertainty on the magnitude of prospective welfare gains from international macroeconmic policy coordination. Three different sources of uncertainty are studied: the initial state of the economy; the correct welfare weights to be assigned to policy targets; and the impact on the economy that economic models attribute to policy changes. (Abstract amended)

ABSTRACTThis paper considers the effects of uncertainty on the magnitude of prospective welfare gains from international macroeconomic policy coordination. Three different sources of uncertainty are studied: the initial state of the economy; the correct welfare weights to be assigned to policy targets; and the impact on the economy that economic models attribute to policy changes. Simulation results show that uncertainty about any of the three reduces the likely gains from coordination and creates the possibility of negative effects. The gains from improved economic knowledge can be quite substantial in relation to the gains from coordination. This suggests that the development and exchange of economic information can be an important function of international cooperation.

"Die sektorale und räumliche Koordination von Fachpolitiken ist bereits seit Langem Gegenstand disziplinärer und interdisziplinärer Diskussion. Diese hat ihren Ausgangspunkt in der Erkenntnis, dass ausschließlich autonome Fachpolitik bzw. ausschließlich autonomes Handeln politischer Akteure den Interdependenzen zwischen ihnen nicht gerecht wird. Neuere Entwicklungen in der Forschung, gesellschaftlicher Wandel und immer häufiger zu beobachtendes Koordinationsversagen innerhalb von politischen und bürokratischen Mehrebenensystemen Europas und Deutschlands machen eine erneute Diskussion der Koordinationsproblematik notwendig. Dabei sind die einzelnen Beiträge systematisch auf drei Varianten von Koordinationsproblemen ausgerichtet, wobei grundlegend zwischen vertikaler und horizontaler Koordination unterschieden wird. Es zeigt sich, dass über alle Besonderheiten der erörterten Einzelfälle hinweg Gemeinsamkeiten beobachtbar sind, die sich auf den erfolgreichen Umgang mit Politikinterdependenzen beziehen. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden fachübergreifend Empfehlungen formuliert, wie zum einen der Koordinationsbedarf durch geschickte Aufgabenzuweisung im föderalen System möglichst gering gehalten werden kann. Zum anderen werden Wege aufgezeigt, die verbleibenden Abstimmungsbedarf in Hinblick auf die raumwirksamen Politiken in einer Weise berücksichtigen, die im Ergebnis zu einer höheren Effizienz gegenüber einem unkoordinierten Vorgehen führt." (Autorenreferat)

Gustav Cassel (1866-1945) developed a number of original ideas in the field of international finance, which may prove to be relevant today. These ideas, however, were largely forgotten or remained unnoticed in the second half of the 20th century. To a large extent this is due to the fact that Cassels theoretical framework was fragmented, while one of the key elements of his argumentation - the purchasing power parity concept - was taken out of the context and misinterpreted. The papers aim is to restore and demonstrate Cassels vision of the goals and significance of the international coordination of financial and economic policy as an inherently normative perspective.

The European Semester is a yearly process of the European Union to improve economic policy coordination and ensure the implementation of the EU's economic rules. Each Semester concludes with recommendations for the euro area as a whole and for each EU member state. We show that implementation of recommendations was poor at the beginning of the Semester in 2011, and has deteriorated since. The European Semester is not particularly effective at enforcing even the EU's fiscal and macroeconomic imbalance rules. We find that euro-area recommendations with tangible economic goals are not well reflected in the recommendations issued to member states. Finally, we review various proposals to improve the efficiency of the European Semester and conclude that while certain steps could be helpful, policy coordination will likely continue to have major limitations.