Suchergebnisse

"The first comprehensive study of the nature and scope of the nationhood power, this book brings a fresh perspective to the scholarship on the powers of the executive branch in Australia. The question of when the Federal Executive Government can act without the authorisation of the Parliament is contested and highly topical in Australia. In recent judicial decisions, Australian courts have suggested that statutory authorisation may not be required where the Federal Executive Government is exercising the nationhood power; that is, the implied executive power derived from the character and status of the Commonwealth as the national government. The Federal Executive Government has relied on this power to implement controversial spending programs, respond to national emergencies and exclude non-citizens from Australia. Together, the chapters in this book analyse and evaluate judicial observations about the operation of the nationhood power in these different contexts and its relationship with the other categories of federal executive power in s 61 of the Constitution. While the focus of this book is on the nationhood power, it also addresses broader issues concerning the relationship between the legislative and executive branches in parliamentary systems of government. This book makes an important contribution to the literature on executive power and will appeal to constitutional lawyers, scholars and practitioners and those who are involved in the administration of government."--

The broad use of the "dictatorial" powers granted by the German constitution to the president and the widespread popular demand for constitutional and administrative reform are the two dominant themes of political discussion in Germany today. Both are centered in the problem of what place the executive power occupies, and should occupy, in the German constitutional order. In this age of dictatorship and national concentration, the question is by no means peculiar to Germany. But the German situation contains a number of unusual features which it is the object of this paper to make more vivid and understandable. To this end, I shall first sketch the earlier history of a rather independent executive, then show the place of the executive power in the ordinary parliamentary system of the Weimar constitution, and finally discuss the emergence of a more independent executive under the presidential emergency power.

AbstractAttempts by elected executives to consolidate power have generated alarm and raised concern about democratic backsliding. We study mass attitudes toward the institutional power of the office of the presidency and argue that individuals' democratic values shape views of executive power. Using data from 26 countries in the Americas and 37 countries in Africa, we find support for our perspective. While supporters of the incumbent president express more favorable views toward executive power, we also show that individuals who express stronger commitments to democracy are less supportive of institutional arrangements that favor the executive. Our results demonstrate that attitudes toward the institutions of government are not shaped only by partisanship and other ephemeral political factors, but also by citizens' core commitments to values over governance.

Scholars have debated whether executive power sharing can secure peace in multiethnic states, but concerns about endogeneity due to reverse causation render this a difficult problem for empirical analyses. In the absence of a suitable instrumental variable, I explore an actor-based approach by studying a simple formal model. This highlights the conditions under which governments are likely to share power with a domestic challenger depending on the threat of violence. I then formulate a statistical "strategic selection" model that closely mirrors the theoretical model, thereby directly incorporating endogeneity. Applied to data at the level of ethnic groups, the estimation results indicate that power sharing is indeed enacted strategically by governments in anticipation of the risk of conflict. However, shedding new light on an ongoing debate, I find that the critics have overstated the case against power sharing: rather than spurring it, power sharing robustly reduces civil conflict.

Scholars have debated whether executive power sharing can secure peace in multiethnic states, but concerns about endogeneity due to reverse causation render this a difficult problem for empirical analyses. In the absence of a suitable instrumental variable, I explore an actor-based approach by studying a simple formal model. This highlights the conditions under which governments are likely to share power with a domestic challenger depending on the threat of violence. I then formulate a statistical "strategic selection" model that closely mirrors the theoretical model, thereby directly incorporating endogeneity. Applied to data at the level of ethnic groups, the estimation results indicate that power sharing is indeed enacted strategically by governments in anticipation of the risk of conflict. However, shedding new light on an ongoing debate, I find that the critics have overstated the case against power sharing: rather than spurring it, power sharing robustly reduces civil conflict.

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1 "So Many Unexpected Things": Contingency and Character in Modern Political Thought -- 2 "Without the Prescription of the Law": Virtue and Discretion in Locke's Theory of Prerogative -- 3 "All Was Confusion and Disorder": Regularity and Character in Hume's Political Thought -- 4 "The King Can Do No Wrong": Blackstone on the Executive in Law -- 5 "It Squints towards Monarchy": Constitutional Flexibility and the Powers of the President -- 6 A "Patriotic and Dignifying President": Republican Virtue and the Presidency -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Y.

Reflections on that Twitter dust-up.