Suchergebnisse

Internationally, the border has been presented as a site of unique opportunity for the identification and protection of victims of human trafficking. In the UK, the establishment of specialist safeguarding and anti-trafficking (SAT) units within the border force has raised questions about the challenges for border force officers (BFOs) of balancing the enforcement of strict immigration rules with the protection of victims under anti-trafficking legislation. In this paper we draw on data collected from a study of anti-trafficking initiatives at Heathrow airport to consider a particular area of BFO frustration with SAT work: the collection and use of evidence and intelligence to support investigation and pursuit of potential SAT cases at the border. Our findings focus on the use of intelligence and data to inform initiatives and develop a comprehensive understanding of the trafficking problem; and the scope of BFO powers of evidence-collection on the frontline. The experience of BFOs points to a team often working in isolation as they attempt to traverse gaps in data collection and limits to their powers to gather evidence in pursuit of their duty to identify victims of trafficking at the UK border. We conclude by making proposals for how the border force and central government could improve evidence and intelligence practices in ways that translate into both more coherent anti-trafficking policy and better identification and support for victims.

Internationally, the border has been presented as a site of unique opportunity for the identification and protection of victims of human trafficking. In the UK, the establishment of specialist safeguarding and anti-trafficking (SAT) units within the border force has raised questions about the challenges for border force officers (BFOs) of balancing the enforcement of strict immigration rules with the protection of victims under anti-trafficking legislation. In this paper we draw on data collected from a study of anti-trafficking initiatives at Heathrow airport to consider a particular area of BFO frustration with SAT work: the collection and use of evidence and intelligence to support investigation and pursuit of potential SAT cases at the border. Our findings focus on the use of intelligence and data to inform initiatives and develop a comprehensive understanding of the trafficking problem; and the scope of BFO powers of evidence-collection on the frontline. The experience of BFOs points to a team often working in isolation as they attempt to traverse gaps in data collection and limits to their powers to gather evidence in pursuit of their duty to identify victims of trafficking at the UK border. We conclude by making proposals for how the border force and central government could improve evidence and intelligence practices in ways that translate into both more coherent anti-trafficking policy and better identification and support for victims.

In the context of the fight against Islamist radicalization in France, prison intelligence rapidly developed from 2015 through the gradual creation of a dedicated service and a specific corps of professionals. This professionalization of prison intelligence work has deeply transformed the prison administration. This article aims to describe and analyse these transformations on the basis of an ethnographic study conducted in radicalization assessment units, which are specific units set up to assess prisoners who have committed or are suspected of committing crimes linked to radical Islam. We shall describe how the guards, probation officers, psychologists and educators participating in assessing the prisoners adapt to the new, encroaching presence of the intelligence mission. We shall analyse the forms of collaboration and competition between this staff and the prison intelligence officers. Lastly, we will examine criticism of the intelligence activity in the radicalization assessment units voiced by various professionals. The interpenetration of the assessment work and the intelligence mission – which are formally distinct missions – produces a specific type of knowledge relating to radicalized prisoners: a reproduction of certain representations or 'profiles'.

This article explores the impact of civil-military relations and an unreliable – even disloyal – local population upon intelligence-gathering and counter-espionage in Cyprus, and therefore adds to the existing literature on British Near and Middle East military intelligence during the First World War. Drawing upon archives in Britain and Cyprus, and a range of published primary sources, a fresh contribution to First World War intelligence studies is offered through a focus on British counter-espionage efforts in Cyprus after 1916. The article covers Anglo-French intelligence cooperation on the Syrian and Cilician coast, the wartime loyalties of Cypriots and their value as spies, and insights into Ottoman and German human intelligence activity in the region. The primary focus is on the civil-military relations between the Cyprus colonial government and the military intelligence officers. It is argued that Cyprus acquired some importance as a post for intelligence-gathering and especially counter-espionage, but the problems derived from inadequate civil-military relations, disloyal Cypriot subjects, and the island's status as a backwater hindered its development as a valuable asset in the Near and Middle East theatre.

AbstractThis article argues that there are five major challenges currently facing Western intelligence communities. First – ensuring skills retention for intelligence officers and analysts, while developing knowledgeable managers and customers, all in an increasingly-complex security environment. Second – instituting and inculcating knowledge and expertise in these staff – while addressing an opponent in al-Qaeda which demonstrates increasingly sophisticated use of IT, new media, etc. Third – drawing-in outside expertise from the research and business communities, as is done currently in the US and Canada but in only a very limited manner in the UK. Fourth – overcoming institutional rigidity in dividing the foreign and domestic – alongside rigid sharing and co-operation relationships. Fifth – creating truly collaborative environments that offer genuine socio-cultural incentives to collaboration rather than mere 'IT solutions'.

Israel, since its declaration of independence, has taken a realist perspective in its foreign policy. Yet, despite the offensive realist nature of its foreign policy, it suffered a near defeat in the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Research shows despite signals of an impending Arab threat at the time, Israel choose inaction because of a combination of external and internal factors. The internal factors were precipitated primarily as a result of the Israel's landslide victory in the Six-Day War in 1967, whereas the external factors mainly focused on themes of secrecy and deception. Uri Bar-Joseph, however, presents new evidence that negates the importance of secrecy and deception as a reason for Israel's intelligence failure. He provides evidence that Israel's inaction in 1973 resulted because of key intelligence specialists psychological shortcomings; Bar‐Joseph uses Kruglanski's Theory of Lay Epistemics to support this observation. This theory examines the judgement process and links it with the need for closure, and Bar-Joseph cites this theory in explanation of the judgment decisions of key intelligence officers.

A veteran of two and a half decades with the Central Intelligence Agency unmasks the culture of lethal lies at its foundation in this devastating exposé, now with a new foreword by David MacMichael Ralph W. McGehee was a patriot, dedicated to the American way of life and the international fight against Communism. Following his graduation with honors from Notre Dame, McGehee was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1952 and quickly became an able and enthusiastic cold warrior. Stationed in Southeast Asia in the mid-1960s, he worked to stem the Communist tide that was sweeping through

Since World War I, Cyprus has played a crucial role in British defence strategy. Panagiotis Dimitrakis here introduces new research which reveals the true role of British intelligence on the island throughout the twentieth century, particularly during World War II, the 1955-59 Archbishop Makarios and EOKA-led revolt and the 1974 Turkish invasion. He sheds fresh light on the stance of both Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan towards Greece and Turkey in the turbulent 1970s, and provides important new perspectives on the 1978 Egyptian hostage crisis at Larnaca Airport and the research is based throughout on primary sources including previously unpublished declassified papers from British diplomats and intelligence officers. This is a valuable study for scholars of contemporary strategy and military history and for those interested in military intelligence and the history of Cyprus.

Cover -- Book Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Dedication -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. Enter Sharpe -- 2. Joe Hooker: The Transformational Man -- 3. The Bureau of Military Information: Stands Up -- 4. First Test: The Chancellorsville Campaign "Sharpe you are the best man I know" -- 5. The Gettysburg Campaign: Movement to Contact -- 6. Gettysburg and Sharpe's Three Golden Gifts To Meade -- 7. "The Period of Inaction" -- 8. Enter Grant -- Plate section -- 9. The Overland Campaign -- 10. Petersburg and Intelligence Overhaul -- 11. The Siege of Petersburg -- 12. Settling with Early in the Valley -- 13. Winter Hiatus -- 14. The End -- 15. A Full Life: Sharpe's Progress -- 16. A Public Life -- 17. The Bugle Echoes -- Appendices -- APPENDIX A: Sharpe's Report of the Conduct of the 120th NY Volunteers at the Battle of Fredericksburg -- APPENDIX B: Members of the Bureau of Military Information (BMI), Army of the Potomac, 1863-65, and The Armies Operating Against Richmond, 1864-65 -- APPENDIX C: Strength of the Bureau of Military Information February 1863-April 1865 -- APPENDIX D: Expenditures of the BMI33 -- APPENDIX E: The BMI's Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) For the Battle of Chancellorsville Roads, Railroads, Fords34 -- APPENDIX F: Fords Across the Rappahannock & Rapidan Rivers -- APPENDIX G: Abstracts from Field Returns of the Army of Northern Virginia* -- APPENDIX H: Regiments/Battalions from which Deserters and Prisoners Were Interrogated by the BMI, Feb-Apr 1863 -- APPENDIX I: Order-of-Battle of Jackson's Corps at Chancellorsville Comparison of Babcock's Estimates -- APPENDIX J: Sharpe's Report Alerting Hooker of Lee's Imminent Invasion of the North that Led to the Gettysburg Campaign -- APPENDIX K: Sharpe's Recommendations on Psychological Warfare Policy to Encourage Confederate Desertions