Suchergebnisse

Political scientists can be of practical assistance to important segments of the adult population who need training to develop lobbying skills. This is an area in which the subjectmatter expertise and teaching experience of political scientists have direct application outside the traditional classroom setting.A great many citizens' groups, professional associations, public officials, business organizations and private citizens have occasion to contact their representatives on legislative business. Yet many, if not most, of these groups and individuals have little understanding of the process in which they are engaged. In consequence, they may approach lobbying with great trepidation, they may be unable to maximize their influence and they may hold unrealistic expectations of the ability of individual legislators to shape policy.

Lobbying en Suisse : spécificités et diversités = Lobbying in der Schweiz : Eigenheiten und Vielfalt / Gisela Hürlimann -- Lobbying and business power in corporate governance politics / Pepper D. Culpepper -- Solvente Kriegsherren, vernetzte Wirte, empfängliche Politiker : Interessenpolitik auf den eidgenössischen Gewaltmärkten um 1500 / Philippe Rogger -- Famlien-Lobbying in Bern zur Zeit des Dreissigjährigen Kriegs / Andreas Würgler -- Familie, Fürsprache, Frieden? : Überlegungen zur Interessenvertretung in der spätmittelalterlichen Herrschaft der Basler Bischöfe / Isabelle Schürch -- Streitpunkt Konjunktur : die Verhandlung der Stabilisierungspolitik zwischen Bund und Wirtschaftsverbänden (1946-1957) / Marion Ronca -- Verhandelte Referendumsdemokratie : der Kampf zwischen Pharmaindustrie und Krankenkassen um die Patentgesetzrevision von 1954 / Manuel Dür -- Verbandssekretäre und die Bewilligungsgesetze der schweizerischen Schuhwirtschaft : ein Beitrag zu den kommunikativen Vorräumen der Macht / Roman Wild -- Wie der Vorort zum Agrarlobbyisten wurde : die Abstimmungskampagne für das "Schoggigesetz" vom Herbst 1975 / Andrea Franc -- Mit Lobby-Arbeit zum Erfolg? : Chancen und Grenzen einer Handlungsstrategie für die "Soziale Käuferliga der Schweiz" / Anina Eigenmann -- La révision du droit pénal suisse et les débuts d'un lobbyisme homosexuel (1974) / Thierry Delessert, Céline Naef -- Parlement de milice et groupes d'intérêt (1970-2010 : professionnalisation et diversification des liens d'intérêt? (1970-2010) : professionnalisation et diversification des liens d'intérêt? / Steven Eichenberger [and others] -- Die Zürcher Frauenzentrale : ein Beispiel für die Interessenvertretung der bürgerlichen Frauenbewegung / Brigitte Ruckstuhl, Elisabeth Ryter -- L'impact du lobby routier sur le démantèlement des tramways bâlois et genevois dans les années 1950 / Gérard Duc, Olivier Perroux -- Orte der Aushandlung und Instrumente der Einflussnahme : eine akteurszentrierte Annäherung an migrantisches Lobbying in bildungspolitischen Prozessen des Kantons Basel-Stadt 1970er-Jahre) / Flavia Grossmann -- "D'autant plus déterminée qu'elle défend les plus vulnérables de tous" : Les débuts de l'Association genevoise des parents d'enfants infirmes moteurs cérébraux (années 1950-1970) / Mariama Kaba

"Corporate Lobbying in Foreign Policy" published on by Oxford University Press.

Intro -- LOBBYING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: BACKGROUND, ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS -- LOBBYING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: BACKGROUND, ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 LOBBYING CONGRESS: AN OVERVIEW OF LEGAL PROVISIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS RULES -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND -- THE LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1995, AS AMENDED -- Who Is Covered under the Act -- Expenditure/Income Threshold -- Contact and Time Threshold -- Information Disclosed on Registration -- Quarterly Reports -- Semi-Annual Reports -- Oral or Written Identifications to Officials Being Lobbied -- Availability of Registration and Filing Information -- "Bundling" of Campaign Contributions -- Prohibitions on Gifts to Legislators -- Enforcement and Penalties -- FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -- CONTINGENCY FEES FOR LOBBYING -- FEDERAL FUNDS SUBSIDIZING OR REIMBURSING LOBBYING -- POST-EMPLOYMENT LOBBYING BY FEDERAL OFFICIALS -- CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS RULES -- Gifts and Travel -- General Restriction -- Gifts from Lobbyists -- Under-50 De Minimis Exception -- Under-50 De Minimis Exception -- Exception for Gifts from Family and Friends -- Meals, Food, and Refreshments -- Exception for Personal Hospitality -- Exception for Attendance at "Widely Attended" Gatherings -- Exception for Charitable Events -- Exception for Necessary Expenses for "Officially Connected" Travel, "Fact- Finding" Events, and Conferences -- Honoraria, Private Compensation -- Unwritten Standards of Conduct and Propriety -- OTHER STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS -- Campaign Contributions -- Bribery, Illegal Gratuities, and "Honest Services" Fraud -- Further Ethical Considerations for Attorneys -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 LOBBYING REGISTRATION AND DISCLOSURE: BEFORE AND AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE HONEST LEADERSHIP AND OPEN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2007 -- SUMMARY

Thousands of lobbyists lobby decision-makers in Brussels every day, but little is known about their impact on policy. 'Lobbying in the European Union' addresses this research gap and analyses the conditions under which interest groups can successfully lobby the European institutions

Les résultats de l'enquête présentée ici proviennent des recherches coordonnées dans le séminaire de sociologie du lobbying du DESS de Droit de la vie politique de l'université Paris X Nanterre durant l'année 2003-2004.

Les résultats de l'enquête présentée ici proviennent des recherches coordonnées dans le séminaire de sociologie du lobbying du DESS de Droit de la vie politique de l'université Paris X Nanterre durant l'année 2003-2004.

When faced with a regulatory constraint, firms can either comply, bribe the regulator to get around the rule, or lobby the government to relax it. We analyze this choice, and its consequences, in a simple dynamic model. In equilibrium, when the level of development is low, firms are more inclined to bend the rule through bribery but they tend to switch to lobbying when the level of development is sufficiently high. Bribery, however, is associated with holdup problems, which discourage firms from investing. If the holdup problems are severe, firms will never invest enough to make lobbying worthwhile. The country may then be stuck in a poverty trap with bribery forever. The model can account for the common perception that bribery is relatively more common in poor countries, whereas lobbying is relatively more common in rich ones.

The author explains the practice of lobbying offices on the European level. European politicians have become much more professional during the last decades & also lobbying had to professionalize. Democratic transparency is hindered by the commercial interests of the consultancies. For democratic interest representation a plural field of interest organizations would be necessary. Adapted from the source document.

We analyze an informational theory of lobbying in the context of strategic trade policy. A home firm competes with a foreign firm to export to a third country. The home policy‐maker aims to improve the home firm's profit using an export subsidy. The optimal export subsidy depends on the demand conditions in the third country, which are unknown to the policy‐maker. The home firm can convey this information to the policy‐maker via costly lobbying. Surprisingly, the presence of lobbying costs can be advantageous for both: it makes the home firm's lobby effort credible and eases the policy‐maker's information problem. We identify the conditions under which lobbying is beneficial on balance and the conditions under which it is harmful.