Suchergebnisse

Over the past half-century there have been over three hundred instances of nation building initiatives, episodes where countries jointly give military and economic aid to a country embroiled in conflict. Despite the prevalence and expense of this foreign policy, little research has explored the potential growth effects from these operations. This project uses a standard growth regression framework to quantify the effects of nation building on GDP per capita growth of the recipient nation. The research considers how the characteristics of conflict zones and the interaction of diverse types of both military and economic aid impact the development process.

Preparing for nation-building -- The military -- The police -- Rule of law -- Humanitarian relief -- Governance -- Economic stabilization -- Democratization -- Development -- Conclusion: the cost of nation building -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the authors

Peer reviewed ; We consider a Gellnerian model to study the transformation of a two-region state into a nation state. Industrialization requires the elites to finance schooling. The implementation of statewide education generates a common national identity, which enables cross-regional production, while regional education does not. We show that statewide education is chosen when cross-regional production opportunities and productivity are high, especially when the same elite holds power at both geographical levels. By contrast, a dominant regional elite might prefer regional schooling, even at the loss of large cross-regional production opportunities if it is statewide dominated. The model is consistent with evidence for five European countries in 1860–1920. This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (grant number SEV-2015-0563), CICYT (grant number ECO2012- 37065), and the government of Catalonia

Die Entkolonialisierung hat Nigeria noch lange keine wirkliche Unabhängigkeit gebracht: Nigerianische Politiker, Großhändler, Bürokraten, Unternehmer und Akademiker gebären sich immer noch als Stellvertreter der ehemaligen Kolonialmacht Großbritannien. Nur eine antiimperialistische Politik, die sich auf Arbeiter, Kleinbauern, fortschrittliche Intellektuelle und soziale Randgruppen stützt, kann dies ändern. (DÜI-Spe)

Can leaders shape identity and legitimize new political orders? I address this question by studying the role of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of modern Turkey, in spreading a new national identity. Using a generalized difference-in-differences design, which exploits time and geographic variation in Kemal's visits to cities, I test whether exposure to a charismatic leader affects citizens' take-up of the new Turkish identity. I find that people living in cities visited are more likely to embrace the common identity, as proxied by the adoption of first names in "Pure Turkish", the new language introduced by the state. I also show that Kemal was more efficient in making people use the new language, compared to Ismet Inonu, the Prime Minister and Kemal's second man, suggesting that he had an idiosyncratic effect. I find that the effect is mostly driven by cities where he met with local elites, rather than the mass, and are not driven by places that had a nationalist club during the Ottoman Empire. Overall, the findings are consistent with the Weberian view that charismatic authority can induce others to follow and legitimize new political orders.

Can leaders shape identity and legitimize new political orders? I address this question by studying the role of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of modern Turkey, in spreading a new national identity. Using a generalized difference-in-differences design, which exploits time and geographic variation in Kemal's visits to cities, I test whether exposure to a charismatic leader affects citizens' take-up of the new Turkish identity. I find that people living in cities visited are more likely to embrace the common identity, as proxied by the adoption of first names in "Pure Turkish", the new language introduced by the state. I also show that Kemal was more efficient in making people use the new language, compared to Ismet Inonu, the Prime Minister and Kemal's second man, suggesting that he had an idiosyncratic effect. I find that the effect is mostly driven by cities where he met with local elites, rather than the mass, and are not driven by places that had a nationalist club during the Ottoman Empire. Overall, the findings are consistent with the Weberian view that charismatic authority can induce others to follow and legitimize new political orders.

Can leaders shape identity and legitimize new political orders? I address this question by studying the role of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of modern Turkey, in spreading a new national identity. Using a generalized difference-in-differences design, which exploits time and geographic variation in Kemal's visits to cities, I test whether exposure to a charismatic leader affects citizens' take-up of the new Turkish identity. I find that people living in cities visited are more likely to embrace the common identity, as proxied by the adoption of first names in "Pure Turkish", the new language introduced by the state. I also show that Kemal was more efficient in making people use the new language, compared to Ismet Inonu, the Prime Minister and Kemal's second man, suggesting that he had an idiosyncratic effect. I find that the effect is mostly driven by cities where he met with local elites, rather than the mass, and are not driven by places that had a nationalist club during the Ottoman Empire. Overall, the findings are consistent with the Weberian view that charismatic authority can induce others to follow and legitimize new political orders.

Can leaders shape identity and legitimize new political orders? I address this question by studying the role of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of modern Turkey, in spreading a new national identity. Using a generalized difference-in-differences design, which exploits time and geographic variation in Kemal's visits to cities, I test whether exposure to a charismatic leader affects citizens' take-up of the new Turkish identity. I find that people living in cities visited are more likely to embrace the common identity, as proxied by the adoption of first names in "Pure Turkish", the new language introduced by the state. I also show that Kemal was more efficient in making people use the new language, compared to Ismet Inonu, the Prime Minister and Kemal's second man, suggesting that he had an idiosyncratic effect. I find that the effect is mostly driven by cities where he met with local elites, rather than the mass, and are not driven by places that had a nationalist club during the Ottoman Empire. Overall, the findings are consistent with the Weberian view that charismatic authority can induce others to follow and legitimize new political orders.

Can leaders shape identity and legitimize new political orders? I address this question by studying the role of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of modern Turkey, in spreading a new national identity. Using a generalized difference-in-differences design, which exploits time and geographic variation in Kemal's visits to cities, I test whether exposure to a charismatic leader affects citizens' take-up of the new Turkish identity. I find that people living in cities visited are more likely to embrace the common identity, as proxied by the adoption of first names in "Pure Turkish", the new language introduced by the state. I also show that Kemal was more efficient in making people use the new language, compared to Ismet Inonu, the Prime Minister and Kemal's second man, suggesting that he had an idiosyncratic effect. I find that the effect is mostly driven by cities where he met with local elites, rather than the mass, and are not driven by places that had a nationalist club during the Ottoman Empire. Overall, the findings are consistent with the Weberian view that charismatic authority can induce others to follow and legitimize new political orders.

Would greater UN involvement have avoided any of the mistakes made by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in administering Iraq? Three of the most egregious errors - failing to provide for emergency law and order, disbanding the Iraqi army and blanket de-Ba'athification - ran counter to lessons from previous operations. But the greatest mistake by US planners may have been the assumption that previous UN nation-building efforts have achieved limited success because of UN incompetence, rather than because of the inherent contradictions in building democracy through foreign military intervention. The United States is now engaged, in Afghanistan and Iraq, in two of the most ambitious nation-building projects in its history. The US took a predominant role in part because of the circumstances in which the two conflicts commenced, but also as an extension of the present administration's more general suspicion of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. This suspicion now undermines the chances of either operation concluding successfully. (Survival / SWP)