Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Sociological Foundations of Computational Social Science -- Chapter 3. Methodological contributions of computational social science to sociology -- Chapter 4. Computational Social Science: A Complex Contagion -- Chapter 5. Model of meaning -- Chapter 6. Sociological Meaning of Contagion -- Chapter 7. Polarization of Opinion -- Chapter 8. Coda.
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The increased polarization in the United States among the political branches and citizenry affects the selection, work, perception, and relative power of state and federal judges, including justices of the US Supreme Court. Polarization in the United States over the last few decades matters to the American judicial system in at least four ways. First, polarization affects judicial selection, whether the selection method is (sometimes partisan-based) elections or appointment by political actors. In times of greater polarization, governors and presidents who nominate judges, legislators who confirm judges, and voters who vote on judicial candidates are more apt to support or oppose judges on the basis of partisan affiliation or cues. Second, driven in part by selection mechanisms, polarization may be reflected in the decisions that judges make, especially on issues that divide people politically, such as abortion, guns, or affirmative action. The Supreme Court, for example, often divides along party and ideological lines in the most prominent and highly contested cases. Those ideological lines now overlap with party as we enter a period in which all the Court liberals have been appointed by Democratic presidents and all the Court conservatives have been appointed by Republican presidents. Third, increasingly polarized judicial decisions appear to be causing the public to view judges and judicial decision making (at least on the US Supreme Court) through a more partisan lens. Fourth, polarization may affect the separation of powers, by empowering courts against polarized legislative bodies sometimes paralyzed by gridlock. The review concludes by considering how increased polarization may interact with the judiciary and judicial branch going forward and by suggesting areas for future research.
Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic brought upon a massive wave of disinformation, exacerbating polarization in the increasingly divided landscape of online discourse. In this context, popular social media users play a major role, as they have the ability to broadcast messages to large audiences and influence public opinion. In this article, we make use of openly available data to study the behavior of popular users discussing the pandemic on Twitter. We tackle the issue from a network perspective, considering users as nodes and following relationships as directed edges. The resulting network structure is modeled by embedding the actors in a latent social space, where users closer to one another have a higher probability of following each other. The results suggest the existence of two distinct communities, which can be interpreted as "generally pro" and "generally against" vaccine mandates, corroborating existing evidence on the pervasiveness of echo chambers on the platform. By focusing on a number of notable users, such as politicians, activists, and news outlets, we further show that the two groups are not entirely homogeneous, and that not just the two poles are represented. To the contrary, the latent space captures an entire spectrum of beliefs between the two extremes, demonstrating that polarization, while present, is not the only driver of the network, and that more moderate, "central" users are key players in the discussion.
AbstractThe alignment between partisan and other social identities has generated a rift between Democrats and Republicans that is deeper than any seen in recent American history. Without the cross-cutting identities that have traditionally stabilized the American two-party system, partisans in the American electorate are now seeing each other through prejudiced and intolerant eyes. In this article, partisan social divisions are examined in the 2016 electorate, with an eye to the co-occurrence between these social divisions and contemporaneous resistance to compromise and intolerance of social outgroups. In particular, as Republicans and Democrats grow more socially distinct, they like outgroups less and privilege victory over the national greater good. This effect is particularly visible among Republicans, whose social makeup is particularly homogeneous, even in comparison with Democrats. Some potential solutions are briefly addressed.
This article examines if the emergence of more partisan media has contributed to political polarization and led Americans to support more partisan policies and candidates. Congress and some newer media outlets have added more partisan messages to a continuing supply of mostly centrist news. Although political attitudes of most Americans have remained fairly moderate, evidence points to some polarization among the politically involved. Proliferation of media choices lowered the share of less interested, less partisan voters and thereby made elections more partisan. But evidence for a causal link between more partisan messages and changing attitudes or behaviors is mixed at best. Measurement problems hold back research on partisan selective exposure and its consequences. Ideologically one-sided news exposure may be largely confined to a small, but highly involved and influential, segment of the population. There is no firm evidence that partisan media are making ordinary Americans more partisan.
Peuplement du logement social : paupérisation et polarisation Cet article descriptif essaie de formaliser certains mécanismes sous-jacents à l'évolution du peuplement des logements sociaux, pour éclairer le phénomène de paupérisation observé depuis une vingtaine d'années. Il propose aussi un modèle de filtration qui, joint au droit au maintien dans les lieux au même loyer quel que soit le revenu, modifie la paupérisation et explique que l'ancienneté des locataires soit corrélée positivement au revenu en hlm , ce qui s'accompagne d'une polarisation de la population hlm . Il apporte des éléments chiffrés sur la paupérisation à partir des enquêtes Logement de l'Insee et montre que les données sont compatibles avec le modèle proposé. Classification JEL : D1, R2
We adapt an axiomatically derived measure of polarization due to Esteban and Ray (1994) to measure polarization of political preferences. Previous work used different measures such as variance, kurtosis, Cronbach's alpha, median distance to median and the mean distance between groups. Yet, none of these measures are theoretically connected to a notion of polarization. Although the initiation of the current one is in the lieu of income inequality measurement, it is conceptually suitable for preferential polarization as well. This paper offers a methodology for that purpose. The second contribution of the paper is that we use the Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling to correct for differential-item functioning in estimating ideal points of the individuals. We use the American National Election Survey Data for years between 1984-2008 to implement the theory offered in the paper. Our findings suggest that there is not a statistically significant increasing trend in polarization in this time period in many issue dimensions but there is an upward trend in the latent ideology dimension which is significant during the 1990s.
We adapt an axiomatically derived measure of polarization due to Esteban and Ray (1994) to measure polarization of political preferences. Previous work used different measures such as variance, kurtosis, Cronbach's alpha, median distance to median and the mean distance between groups. Yet, none of these measures are theoretically connected to a notion of polarization. Although the initiation of the current one is in the lieu of income inequality measurement, it is conceptually suitable for preferential polarization as well. This paper offers a methodology for that purpose. The second contribution of the paper is that we use the Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling to correct for differential-item functioning in estimating ideal points of the individuals. We use the American National Election Survey Data for years between 1984-2008 to implement the theory offered in the paper. Our findings suggest that there is not a statistically significant increasing trend in polarization in this time period in many issue dimensions but there is an upward trend in the latent ideology dimension which is significant during the 1990s.
The network of international environmental agreements (IEAs) has been characterized as a complex adaptive system (CAS) in which the uncoordinated responses of nation states to changes in the conditions addressed by particular agreements may generate seemingly coordinated patterns of behavior at the level of the system. Unfortunately, since the rules governing national responses are ill understood, it is not currently possible to implement a CAS approach. Polarization of both political parties and the electorate has been implicated in a secular decline in national commitment to some IEAs, but the causal mechanisms are not clear. In this paper, we explore the impact of polarization on the rules underpinning national responses. We identify the degree to which responsibility for national decisions is shared across political parties and calculate the electoral cost of party positions as national obligations under an agreement change. We find that polarization typically affects the degree but not the direction of national responses. Whether national commitment to IEAs strengthens or weakens as national obligations increase depends more on the change in national obligations than on polarization per se. Where the rules governing national responses are conditioned by the current political environment, so are the dynamic consequences both for the agreement itself and for the network to which it belongs. Any CAS analysis requires an understanding of such conditioning effects on the rules governing national responses.
