Suchergebnisse

International organizations are involved in the development process in several ways: They transfer real resources, offer technical assistance, give advice on development strategy, and collect and collate information. The specialized agencies and other United Nations bodies do not have a tax base of their own; they must rely on the donations of their members for resources. Most of their subscriptions come from the wealthy nations of the world, and most of their grants benefit the poor nations. The UN system acts as a financial intermediary distributing resources between the developed and the underdeveloped worlds. Human, as well as financial, capital is transferred to the less developed nations (LDC's) by the specialized agencies, which provide skilled personnel or training programs for nationals of the LDC's.

This article introduces the themes and arguments of the special issue. While virtually all polities enjoy uncontested international legal sovereignty, there are wide variations in statehood, that is, the monopoly over the means of violence and the ability of the state to make and implement policies. Areas of limited statehood are not, however, ungoverned spaces where anarchy and chaos prevail. The provision of collective goods and services is possible even under extremely adverse conditions of fragile or failed statehood. We specify the conditions under which external efforts at state‐building and service provision by state and nonstate actors can achieve their goals. We focus on the extent to which external actors enhance the capacity (statehood) of authority structures in weak states, or directly contribute to the provision of collective goods and services, such as public health, clean environment, social security, and infrastructure. We argue that three factors determine success: legitimacy, task complexity, and institutionalization, including the provision of adequate resources.

The estrangement between the US and Pakistan is deepening, and it threatens the interests of both countries. Although Washington continues to acknowledge the importance of the bilateral relationship, it, too, seems to have little appetite left for engaging Islamabad. If the US lets things with Pakistan deteriorate too far, the administration could find itself boxed in, particularly if Pakistan decides to be deliberately uncooperative. To be sure, Washington should not hand Islamabad a free pass. But it should use the window between now and the moment when the US is no longer dependent on the Pakistan-Afghanistan supply line to restructure their bilateral relations. The sorry state of US-Pakistani relations is not the result of communication failures. Pakistani leaders have their own interests. The US cannot change that. What it can change, however, is their behavior. If the US credibly threatens to treat Pakistan as it does Iran, Pakistan's leaders would find it best to cooperate in Afghanistan. Adapted from the source document.