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Working paper
On the buyability of voting bodies
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 260-288
ISSN: 0951-6298
Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections
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Negative Vote Buying and the Secret Ballot
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Working paper
How Much Is a Dollar Worth? Tipping versus Equilibrium Coexistence on Competing Online Auction Sites
In: Journal of political economy, Band 117, Heft 4, S. 668-700
ISSN: 1537-534X
The Quest for QWERTY
In: American economic review, Band 99, Heft 2, S. 435-440
ISSN: 1944-7981
Diversity in the Workplace
In: American economic review, Band 99, Heft 1, S. 472-485
ISSN: 1944-7981
We study minority representation in the workplace when employers engage in optimal sequential search and minorities convey noisier signals of ability than mainstream job candidates. The greater signal noise makes it harder for minorities to change employers' prior beliefs. When employers are selective, this leads to minority underrepresentation in the workplace. Diversity improves when the cost of interviewing, the average skill level of candidates, or the opportunity cost of not hiring increases. Reducing the cost of firing also increases minority representation. When employers are sufficiently unselective, the rigidity of employers' beliefs leads to overrepresentation of minorities. (JEL D83, J15, J24, J71, M12, M51)
How Much is a Dollar Worth? Tipping versus Equilibrium Coexistence on Competing Online Auction Sites
In: Journal of political economy, Band 117, Heft 4, S. 668-700
ISSN: 0022-3808
Theory models of platform competition predict that prices and buyer-seller ratios should be approximately equal on coexisting auction sites. Using field experiments on eBay and Yahoo Auctions, we find evidence that is inconsistent with equilibrium hypotheses and suggest that the market is tipping. Prices on eBay are consistently 20-70 percent higher than those on Yahoo, and eBay attracts two additional buyers per seller. On Yahoo, prices and bidders counts are unaffected by the auction ending rule. Various differences between the sites cannot account for the magnitude of these disparities. However, a model of imitation dynamics can rationalize our findings. Adapted from the source document.
Contracting for information under imperfect commitment
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 39, Heft 4, S. 905-925
ISSN: 1756-2171
We study optimal contracting under imperfect commitment in a model with an uninformed principal and an informed agent. The principal can commit to pay the agent for his advice but retains decision‐making authority. Under an optimal contract, the principal should (i) never induce the agent to fully reveal what he knows—even though this is feasible—and (ii) never pay the agent for imprecise information. We compare optimal contracts under imperfect commitment to those under full commitment as well as to delegation schemes. We find that gains from contracting are greatest when the divergence in the preferences of the principal and the agent is moderate.
On the Benefits of Costly Voting
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Working paper
Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non) Equivalence in Field Experiments on eBay
In: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Band 6, Heft 2
ISSN: 1935-1682
Many firms divide the price a consumer pays for a good into two pieces---the price for the item itself and the price for shipping and handling. With fully rational customers, the exact division between the two prices is irrelevant---only the total price matters. We test this hypothesis by selling matched pairs of CDs and Xbox games in a series of field experiments on eBay. In theory, the ending auction price should vary inversely with the shipping charge to leave the total price paid constant. Contrary to the theory, we find that charging a high shipping cost and starting the auction at a low opening price leads to higher numbers of bidders and higher revenues when the shipping charge is not excessive. We show that these results can be accounted for by boundedly rational bidding behavior such as loss-aversion with separate mental accounts for different attributes of the price or disregard for shipping costs.
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Corruption, Competition, and Contracts: A Model of Vote Buying
In: IMF Working Paper, S. 1-23
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