Migration contributes to the circulation of goods, knowledge, and ideas. Using community and individual-level data from Moldova, we show that the emigration wave that started in the late 1990s strongly affected electoral outcomes and political preferences in Moldova during the following decade, eventually contributing to the fall of the last Communist government in Europe. Our results are suggestive of information transmission and cultural diffusion channels. Identification relies on the quasiexperimental context and on the differential effects arising from the fact that emigration was directed both to more democratic Western Europe and to less democratic Russia.
Migration contributes to the circulation of goods, knowledge, and ideas. Using community and individual-level data from Moldova, we show that the emigration episode that started in the late 1990s strongly affected political preferences and electoral outcomes in Moldova during the following decade and was eventually instrumental in bringing down the last ruling Communist government in Europe. Our results are suggestive of information transmission and cultural diffusion channels. Identification relies on the quasi-experimental context studied and on the differential effects arising from the fact that emigration was directed both to more democratic Western Europe and to less democratic Russia.
Migration contributes to the circulation of goods, knowledge, and ideas. Using community and individual-level data from Moldova, we show that the emigration wave that started in the late 1990s strongly affected electoral outcomes and political preferences in Moldova during the following decade and was eventually instrumental in bringing down the last ruling Communist government in Europe. Our results are suggestive of information transmission and cultural diffusion channels. Identification relies on the quasi-experimental context studied and on the differential effects arising from the fact that emigration was directed both to more democratic Western Europe and to less democratic Russia.
Migration contributes to the circulation of goods, knowledge, and ideas. Using community and individual-level data from Moldova, we show that the Emigration episode that started in the late 1990s strongly affected political preferences and electoral outcomes in Moldova during the following decade and was eventually instrumental in bringing down the last ruling Communist government in Europe. Our results are suggestive of information transmission and cultural diffusion channels. Identification relies on the quasi-experimental context studied and on the differential effects arising from the fact that emigration was directed both to more democratic Western Europe and to less democratic Russia.
Migration contributes to the circulation of goods, knowledge, and ideas. Using community and individual-level data from Moldova, we show that the emigration episode that started in the late 1990s strongly affected political preferences and electoral outcomes in Moldova during the following decade and was eventually instrumental in bringing down the last ruling Communist government in Europe. Our results are suggestive of information transmission and cultural diffusion channels. Identification relies on the quasi-experimental context studied and on the differential effects arising from the fact that emigration was directed both to more democratic Western Europe and to less democratic Russia.
Abstract China is the world's largest official creditor, but we lack basic facts about the terms and conditions of its lending. Very few contracts between Chinese lenders and their government borrowers have ever been published or studied. This paper is the first systematic analysis of the legal terms of China's foreign lending. We collect and analyse 100 contracts between Chinese state-owned entities and government borrowers in 24 developing countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Oceania, and compare them with those of other bilateral, multilateral and commercial creditors. Three main insights emerge. First, the Chinese contracts contain unusual confidentiality clauses that bar borrowers from revealing the terms or even the existence of the debt. Second, Chinese lenders seek advantage over other creditors, using collateral arrangements such as lender-controlled revenue accounts and promises to keep the debt out of collective restructuring ('no Paris Club' clauses). Third, cancellation, acceleration and stabilization clauses in Chinese contracts potentially allow the lenders to influence debtors' domestic and foreign policies. Even if these terms were unenforceable in court, the mix of confidentiality, seniority and policy influence could limit the sovereign debtor's crisis management options and complicate debt renegotiation. Overall, the contracts use creative design to manage credit risks and overcome enforcement hurdles, presenting China as a muscular and commercially savvy lender to the developing world.
This paper presents the 'Ukraine Support Tracker', which lists and quantifies military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. This fourth version covers government commitments made between January 24 and June 7, 2022 and has a new detailed overview on weapon deliveries. We track support by 37 governments, including all G7 and European Union member countries, plus by EU institutions (thus including 38 donors). Private donations and aid through non-governmental organizations are not included due to a lack of systematic data, but we do show estimates on government costs of hosting Ukrainian refugees. To value in-kind support like military equipment or foodstuff, we rely on government statements as well as own calculations using market prices. We find significant differences in the scale of support across countries, both in absolute terms and as percent of donor country GDP. In billions of Euros, by far the largest bilateral supporter of Ukraine is the United States, followed by the EU institutions, the United Kingdom, and Germany. In percent of donor GDP, Eastern European countries stand out as particularly generous, and this is even more so once we account for refugee costs. Importantly, we now also document delays in aid delivery. Only about 17% of financial commitments have actually been disbursed to Ukraine. Moreover, some countries, like Germany or the US, have delivered less than half of the weapons they committed. ; This is the fourth version of the paper and database. We are continuously expanding, correcting, and improving this project and welcome any feedback and comments to ukrainetracker@ifw-kiel.de. We are greatly indebted to dozens of readers around the world who have sent us helpful comments and suggestions. ; Fourth Version (June 16, 2022)
This paper introduces the 'Ukraine Support Tracker', which lists and quantifies military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine since Russia's invasion on February 24, 2022. We measure support from Western governments, namely by G7 and European Union member countries. Due to our focus on government-to-government commitments, we do not gather systematic data on private donations or aid by international organizations in this version of the database. To value in-kind support like military equipment or weapons, we use market prices and consider upper bounds to avoid underestimating the true extent of bilateral assistance. We find significant differences in the scale of support across countries, both in absolute terms and as percent of donor GDP. In total amounts, by far the largest supporter of Ukraine is the United States, followed by Poland and the United Kingdom. In percent of donor GDP, small Eastern European countries stand out as particularly generous. Strikingly, the United States alone provides more support to Ukraine than all of the 27 EU member countries taken together, even after adding EU-level support. The gap is particularly large for military support, with the US committing more than twice as much weapons and military equipment than all other countries combined. ; This is the first version of the paper and database. In the coming days and weeks, we plan to continuously expand, correct, and improve this project. We therefore very much welcome any help to improve the tracker. Please send us feedback and comments to ukrainetracker@ifw-kiel.de.
This paper presents the 'Ukraine Support Tracker', which lists and quantifies military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. This second version covers the period January 24 until April 23, 2022. We measure support from Western governments, namely by the G7 and European Union member countries. Private donations, help for refugees outside of Ukraine, or aid through non-governmental organizations are not included due to a lack of systematic data. To value in-kind support like military equipment or weapons, we rely on government statements as well as own calculations using market prices. We find significant differences in the scale of support across countries, both in absolute terms and as percent of donor country GDP. In billions of Euros, by far the largest bilateral supporter of Ukraine is the United States, followed by Poland, the United Kingdom, Canada and Germany. In percent of donor GDP, small Eastern European countries stand out as particularly generous. ; This is the second version of the paper and database. In the coming weeks, we plan to continuously expand, correct, and improve this project. We therefore very much welcome any help to improve the tracker. Please send us feedback and comments to ukrainetracker@ifw-kiel.de. We are greatly indebted to dozens of readers who have sent us helpful comments and suggestions. ; Second Version (May 2, 2022)
This paper presents the 'Ukraine Support Tracker', which lists and quantifies military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. This third version covers government commitments between January 24 and May 10, 2022. We now track support by 37 governments, including all G7 and European Union member countries, plus the support by EU institutions (thus including 38 donors). We also added a section estimating government cost of hosting Ukrainian refugees. Private donations and aid through non-governmental organizations are still not included due to a lack of systematic data. To value in-kind support like military equipment or weapons, we rely on government statements as well as own calculations using market prices. We find significant differences in the scale of support across countries, both in absolute terms and as percent of donor country GDP. In billions of Euros, by far the largest bilateral supporter of Ukraine is the United States, followed by Poland, the United Kingdom, and the EU institutions. In percent of donor GDP, Eastern European countries stand out as particularly generous, and this is even more so once we account for refugee costs. ; This is the third version (May 18, 2022) of the paper and database. In the coming weeks, we plan to continuously expand, correct, and improve this project. We therefore very much welcome any help to improve the tracker. Please send us feedback and comments to ukrainetracker@ifw-kiel.de. We are greatly indebted to dozens of readers who have sent us helpful comments and suggestions. ; Third Version (May 18, 2022)
Die Autoren warnen in ihrem Beitrag vor einem neuen Trend zur Autarkie unter dem Schlagwort "Technologiesouveränität", der die Wohlstandsvorteile der Globalisierung gefährdet. Sie sehen die zurückhaltende Industriepolitik Deutschlands als erfolgreich an. Die deutsche Politik sollte sich für den Ausbau des Europäischen Binnenmarktes einsetzen und sich weiterhin um offene Weltmärkte, faire Regeln und deren Einhaltung bemühen, statt zu einer Schwächung des Multilateralismus beizutragen. Die Autoren weisen darauf hin, dass für den Erhalt und Ausbau des Wohlstands in Deutschland Reformen im Inland die wichtigsten Faktoren sind. ; In their paper, the authors warn of a new trend towards autarky under the catchword of "technology sovereignty", which jeopardizes the benefits of globalization. They consider the reluctant industrial policy of Germany as successful. German policy should promote the development of the EU Internal Market and continue to support open world markets, fair rules and compliance, rather than weakening multilateralism. The authors point out that internal reforms are the most important factors in maintaining and expanding prosperity in Germany.
