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Debates about the sources of presidential power in wartime often turn on constitutional separation of powers questions about where executive authority ends and legislative authority begins. Such legal premises of presidential power are both ambiguous and contested, however, lending credibility to alternative theories of presidential power that hinge on political considerations such as public support, a source of legitimacy rather than legality for particular actions. This article builds on the distinction between legality and legitimacy in presidential power in wartime and develops a legitimacy framework that identifies rational‐legal, traditional, and charismatic sources of legitimacy. An examination of the historical record of American military force from 1798 to the present suggests that executives have often pursued a legal basis for intervention and obtained legislative authorization for the use of force, but have also acted as though sources of legitimacy are viable substitutes for legality. Early in American history, those sources consisted of traditional authority such as Manifest Destiny; in the early half of the twentieth century, they took the form of charismatic authority such as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine; and since 1945, rational‐legal authority through international organizations. Analyzing the argument in light of the historical record shows that the turn to unilateralism is not a new feature of the executive–legislative balance of power, but rather an undercurrent of intervention politics, atop of which rest efforts at legitimation for the use of force.

THE POSITION THAT "STICKS AND STONES WILL BREAK MY BONES BUT WORDS ALONE WON'T HURT ME" MAY NOT HAVE HIGH MORAL STANDING, BUT IT IS SURELY ONE OF THE MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS IN MANY A GOVERNMENT'S INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS. AS PROFESSOR GOLDMAN ARGUES HERE, THE SOVIET UNION FELT FREE TO INVADE AFGHANISTAN IN DECEMBER 1979 BECAUSE IT EXPECTED NO SERIOUS RESISTANCE-BEYOND WORDS AND SYMBOLS OF DISAPPROVALFROM THE UNITED STATES OR ANY OTHER CONCERNED NATION. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE SOVIET LEADERS MAY HAVE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE FOOLISH NOT TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF GAINING PHYSICAL PROXIMITY TO THE PERSIAN GULFREGION WITH ITS VAST OIL RESOURCES, OR NOT TO BOLSTER A NEW CLIENT REGIME IN KABUL IN DANGER OF BEING OVERTHROWN BY ITS DOMESTIC ANTICOMMUNIST OPPONENTS.

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Exploring and Explaining Participation in War Crimes -- Obedience to Orders and International Law -- International Relations -- Internalization and Substate Approaches -- Looking Inside the Military as an Organization -- Socialization -- Subculture and Counterculture -- Explaining Unit Commission of War Crimes -- Understanding the Process of Unit Behavior -- Measuring Socialization and Subculture -- Concentrating on Units -- Examining a Range of Conflicts -- Evidence -- References -- Chapter 3: The Korean War and the Challenge of Civilian Refugees -- A Difficult Beginning for US Forces -- Mass Civilian Refugee Flows -- Common Explanations -- Savagery of Combat -- "State of Shameful Unreadiness" -- Socialization -- Training -- Enforcement -- Subcultures and Countercultures -- Poor Discipline and Bugging Out -- Regimental Identity -- Unit Leadership -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4: Enemies or Friendlies? British Military Behavior Toward Civilians During the Malayan Emergency -- The Challenges of Reoccupation -- The Realities of the "Emergency" -- Killing Bandits and Sympathizers -- Common Explanations -- The Ugliness of the Enemy and Jungle Warfare -- Poor Morale and Inexperience -- Socialization -- Training -- Enforcement -- Subculture and Counterculture -- Discipline -- Regimental Identity -- The Scots Guards -- The Suffolks -- The Role of Unit Leaders -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 5: The Dark Side of Peacekeeping: The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia -- New Internationalism and Canadian Leadership on the World Stage -- The CAR -- Camp Security and Engagement with Civilians -- The Death of Shidane Arone -- Common Explanations -- Base Intrusions and Deterrence -- White Soldiers and Black Bodies -- Frustration and Morale -- Socialization -- Training.

In his recent article on 'The Uganda Coup – class action by the military' in this Journal, x, 1, May 1972, Dr Michael F. Lofchie points to two apparent paradoxes in the military takeover: Why did the army move against a regime to which it had previously been loyal? And why, in doing so, did it ally itself with the Ganda 'civil service and coffee growing elite' towards which it had shown nothing but hostility in the past? The only adequate explanation, we are told, is that these privileged groups were drawn together by a determination to defend their status against the threat implicit in President Obote's commitment to socialism. Confronted by egalitarian pressures they discovered a basis for common action in a class interest which transcended tribal rivalries.