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This review essay critically assesses Esen Kirdiş' The Rise of Islamic Political Movements and Parties, Frederic Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars' Salafism in the Maghreb, and Mohamed-Ali Adraoui's Salafism Goes Global: From the Gulf to the French Banlieues in light of the post-Islamism hypothesis. In Asef Bayat's formulation, post-Islamism refers to a shift in discourse among Islamist movements de-emphasising a complete societal Islamisation and centring issues of civil liberties and democracy. These three works complicate this picture through introducing greater varieties of movements within local religio-political fields. Adopting a comparative approach, Kirdiş explores how Islamic movements respond to opportunities and threats to employ strategies of party formation or non-participation in formal politics. Wehrey and Boukhars demonstrate Salafism's local embeddedness within the Maghreb, which conditions how Salafi actors react to local circumstances to justify different modes of action which transcend strict categorisations of moderation and radicalisation. Finally, Adraoui's sociological approach to Salafism in France confronts whether French quietist Salafis represent a manifestation of post-Islamism through exhibiting a disillusionment with Islamist politics and the consequent formation of a Salafi counter-hegemonic sphere. Altogether, these studies amount to a more nuanced understanding of the political and apolitical beyond participation in formal politics.

This brief analyses Salafism as an urban phenomenon, with an emphasis on the contentious period following the Syrian uprising turned civil war (2011–present). To understand Salafism's popular appeal, it is necessary to examine the pathways of resistance in specific urban contexts. In Lebanon, Salafism expanded from its Tripoli centre to secondary towns and cities such as Sidon, where Sheikh Ahmad Assir's neo-Salafism became a political force and can be classified as a "new social movement". Neo-Salafism, is not built on religious credentials and authority, but combines populism with sectarianism. This also accounts for its popular appeal, especially after 2011, when the Syrian conflict stoked Sunni-Shia tensions and anti-Hizbollah rhetoric. The erosion of Sunni political pre-eminence ("Sunnism") and the crises in the Sunni religious (Dar al-Fatwa) and political establishment (Future Movement), prompted a temporary shift from "Harirism" to "Sheikism" that transferred the moral leadership of the Sunni community from the political elite to the lay town preacher; Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir. This also involved a shift in the locus of contentious politics from the capital Beirut to secondary cities such as Sidon and a strategic shift from electoral politics to grassroots' protests, sit-ins and rallies. Ultimately this led to an armed confrontation that crushed the Assir-movement, eroded its popular support and was followed by an electoral defeat that made political elites reassert control. HYRES – Hybrid Pathways to Resistance in the Islamic World HYRES studies the interaction between Islamist movements and the state in the cases of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Mali, and is designed to answer the following question: Why do some Islamist groups pursue their political and religious project within the state to which they belong – while other Islamist groups refuse to accept these borders, seeking instead to establish new polities, such as restoring the Islamic Caliphate? HYRES is funded by the Norwegian Research Council. For further information about HYRES see https://www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/About-NUPI/Projects-centres-and-programmes/Hybrid-paths-to-resistance-in-the-Muslim-world-Iraq-Lebanon-Libya-and-Mali. ; Sunnism, Salafism, Sheikism: Urban Pathways of Resistance in Sidon, Lebanon ; publishedVersion

List of illustrations -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Note on transliteration and translations -- The clash within Islam: a sampling of representative quotes -- Introduction: Wasaṭī Islamism -- 1. Wasaṭiyya, an innovating Salafism: reform (iṣlāḥ) and renewal (tajdīd) -- 2. The Wasaṭiyya school as shaped by Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī: from the Muslim Brotherhood to Wasaṭiyya -- 3. al-Qaraḍāwī, al-Azhar, and the Muslim Brotherhood -- 4. Wasaṭiyya: between the Muslim Brotherhood and Jihadi Salafism -- 5. The conception of jihad: Wasaṭ apologetics, Jihadi Salafī selective reading, and liberal claims of distorted interpretation -- 6. Principles of Wasaṭ judicial decisions: Salafī and Wasaṭ dogmatism versus liberal openness to reform -- Conclusion: Islam at a crossroads -- Appendix A. Fundamental principles of the Wasaṭiyya and renewal movement -- Appendix B. The neoliberal platform by Shākir al-Nābulsī -- Glossary -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Au-delà de la violence du terrorisme et du djihadisme qui caractérisent certaines parties du Sahel, la région tout entière est confrontée à ce que nous désignons ici comme « la question de l'islam », c'est-à-dire les rapports tendus entre un État basé sur des principes démocratiques et séculiers, et une société où l'hégémonie culturelle de l'islam s'est affirmée, en particulier depuis les années 1990. Cette tension, soutient l'article, a servi de terreau propice à l'émergence d'une idéologie politique particulière, le salafisme politique. L'article illustre cette évolution en se servant du cas du Niger, pays central du Sahel qui paraît relativement épargné par la violence qui frappe ses voisins, mais dans lequel le salafisme politique a marqué des points contre son ennemi idéologique, le sécularisme. L'article montre également que les succès salafistes sont tempérés par les conditions – historiques, sociologiques, économiques – propres à ce contexte sahélien.

In 2014, groups claiming to be part of the Islamic State were reported in several Afghan provinces, particularly Helmand and along the Afghan-Pakistan border. How is one to understand the emergence of this organization in Afghanistan? Is the affiliation of these groups fundamentally symbolic or do they amount to an extension of the Iraqi-Syrian movement? On the basis of interviews conducted in Kabul and Jalalabad in August and September 2015 with Afghans presently or formerly living in districts controlled by the Islamic state, we offer an initial interpretation of this phenomenon. In Afghanistan, more than three decades of civil war have transformed the Afghan religious field into a social and ideological terrain favorable to the establishment of jihadist Salafism. What's more, the perverse effects of Afghan and Pakistani policies in the country's eastern border regions have allowed the movement to establish itself on the Afghan-Pakistan border. In the end, the emergence of groups claiming to follow the Islamic State in Afghanistan is not an extension of the Iraqi model but rather a sign that a new social and political revolution is underway.

Salafism appeared in Yemen around Muqbil al-Wâdi'î of Dammâj, north Yemen, in the early 1980s. Since then it has spread throughout the country in various teaching centres and mosques. Dominant political and academic narratives often regard the salafi movement as the offspring of a Saudi religious proselytism that aims at spreading its own model, and this in order to manipulate the loyalty of Yemeni citizens and to satisfy its own national interest. In that framework, religion and transnational actors (migrants, business men or students) are seen as simple instruments of domination and state power. Explaining the rise of salafism in Yemen in terms of imperialism and confrontation of power appears superficial. In the Yemeni context, this political and religious movement develops less because of centralised policies than because of various local, global and translocal social dynamics witnessed in the contemporary Arabian Peninsula. These processes mix individual migratory trajectories, recompositions of religious and political identities in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and in Muslim societies and the effects of the "global war against terror". The trajectory of salafism in the Yemeni environment is affected by domestic structures and institutions. For individuals at grass-roots level, this religious practice does not bear the same meaning in Yemeni society as it does in Saudi Arabia's. It is mainly for this reason that the state, even when it is dominant, does not control the ideological evolution of salafism and of its entrepreneurs and advocates. ; Apparu au début des années 1980 autour de la figure de Muqbil al-Wâdi'î, le mouvement salafi yéménite a depuis connu un développement rapide et remarqué. Les discours médiatiques et académiques dominants réduisent fréquemment l'émergence du salafisme à une politique prosélyte de l'Arabie Saoudite visant à diffuser son propre modèle religieux afin d'orienter en sa faveur l'allégeance de la population yéménite et de satisfaire un hypothétique intérêt national. Dans ce cadre, la ...

Salafism appeared in Yemen around Muqbil al-Wâdi'î of Dammâj, north Yemen, in the early 1980s. Since then it has spread throughout the country in various teaching centres and mosques. Dominant political and academic narratives often regard the salafi movement as the offspring of a Saudi religious proselytism that aims at spreading its own model, and this in order to manipulate the loyalty of Yemeni citizens and to satisfy its own national interest. In that framework, religion and transnational actors (migrants, business men or students) are seen as simple instruments of domination and state power. Explaining the rise of salafism in Yemen in terms of imperialism and confrontation of power appears superficial. In the Yemeni context, this political and religious movement develops less because of centralised policies than because of various local, global and translocal social dynamics witnessed in the contemporary Arabian Peninsula. These processes mix individual migratory trajectories, recompositions of religious and political identities in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and in Muslim societies and the effects of the "global war against terror". The trajectory of salafism in the Yemeni environment is affected by domestic structures and institutions. For individuals at grass-roots level, this religious practice does not bear the same meaning in Yemeni society as it does in Saudi Arabia's. It is mainly for this reason that the state, even when it is dominant, does not control the ideological evolution of salafism and of its entrepreneurs and advocates. ; Apparu au début des années 1980 autour de la figure de Muqbil al-Wâdi'î, le mouvement salafi yéménite a depuis connu un développement rapide et remarqué. Les discours médiatiques et académiques dominants réduisent fréquemment l'émergence du salafisme à une politique prosélyte de l'Arabie Saoudite visant à diffuser son propre modèle religieux afin d'orienter en sa faveur l'allégeance de la population yéménite et de satisfaire un hypothétique intérêt national. Dans ce cadre, la ...

Salafism appeared in Yemen around Muqbil al-Wâdi'î of Dammâj, north Yemen, in the early 1980s. Since then it has spread throughout the country in various teaching centres and mosques. Dominant political and academic narratives often regard the salafi movement as the offspring of a Saudi religious proselytism that aims at spreading its own model, and this in order to manipulate the loyalty of Yemeni citizens and to satisfy its own national interest. In that framework, religion and transnational actors (migrants, business men or students) are seen as simple instruments of domination and state power. Explaining the rise of salafism in Yemen in terms of imperialism and confrontation of power appears superficial. In the Yemeni context, this political and religious movement develops less because of centralised policies than because of various local, global and translocal social dynamics witnessed in the contemporary Arabian Peninsula. These processes mix individual migratory trajectories, recompositions of religious and political identities in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and in Muslim societies and the effects of the "global war against terror". The trajectory of salafism in the Yemeni environment is affected by domestic structures and institutions. For individuals at grass-roots level, this religious practice does not bear the same meaning in Yemeni society as it does in Saudi Arabia's. It is mainly for this reason that the state, even when it is dominant, does not control the ideological evolution of salafism and of its entrepreneurs and advocates. ; Apparu au début des années 1980 autour de la figure de Muqbil al-Wâdi'î, le mouvement salafi yéménite a depuis connu un développement rapide et remarqué. Les discours médiatiques et académiques dominants réduisent fréquemment l'émergence du salafisme à une politique prosélyte de l'Arabie Saoudite visant à diffuser son propre modèle religieux afin d'orienter en sa faveur l'allégeance de la population yéménite et de satisfaire un hypothétique intérêt national. Dans ce cadre, la ...

Salafism appeared in Yemen around Muqbil al-Wâdi'î of Dammâj, north Yemen, in the early 1980s. Since then it has spread throughout the country in various teaching centres and mosques. Dominant political and academic narratives often regard the salafi movement as the offspring of a Saudi religious proselytism that aims at spreading its own model, and this in order to manipulate the loyalty of Yemeni citizens and to satisfy its own national interest. In that framework, religion and transnational actors (migrants, business men or students) are seen as simple instruments of domination and state power. Explaining the rise of salafism in Yemen in terms of imperialism and confrontation of power appears superficial. In the Yemeni context, this political and religious movement develops less because of centralised policies than because of various local, global and translocal social dynamics witnessed in the contemporary Arabian Peninsula. These processes mix individual migratory trajectories, recompositions of religious and political identities in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and in Muslim societies and the effects of the "global war against terror". The trajectory of salafism in the Yemeni environment is affected by domestic structures and institutions. For individuals at grass-roots level, this religious practice does not bear the same meaning in Yemeni society as it does in Saudi Arabia's. It is mainly for this reason that the state, even when it is dominant, does not control the ideological evolution of salafism and of its entrepreneurs and advocates. ; Apparu au début des années 1980 autour de la figure de Muqbil al-Wâdi'î, le mouvement salafi yéménite a depuis connu un développement rapide et remarqué. Les discours médiatiques et académiques dominants réduisent fréquemment l'émergence du salafisme à une politique prosélyte de l'Arabie Saoudite visant à diffuser son propre modèle religieux afin d'orienter en sa faveur l'allégeance de la population yéménite et de satisfaire un hypothétique intérêt national. Dans ce cadre, la ...

The development of electoral politics in Banyumas which led to the increasingly strong economic and political domination of Arab business groups influenced the development of Salafism especially in urban areas. This is due to the construction of sites spreading Salafism, such as foundations. Islamic boarding schools, mosques, mosques, schools and hospitals come from donations that they provide from the benefits of doing business in the fields of property construction, furniture, education and health. Banyumas as a "bull pen" gives an illustration that the majority of the population is not too attached to religious primordial ties (abangan). This background fosters the development of kejawen Islam and Christianization. The flourishing of kejawen Islam and Christianization responds to the increasingly rapid spread of Salafism. That is because the main purpose of Salafism is the purification of Islam from heresy, shirk, and khurafat which are closely related to Islam and Christianity. In addition, Banyumas as a "bull pen" shows the strong dominance of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). This region even had a significant impact in winning in Central Java. Therefore, this region has always been the target of winning. However, as Salafism strengthens, the effort to win this time has been challenged by a challenger. Salafism which is included in the line of challengers is trying hard to "whiten" this region. So the use of religious issues in mass mobilization efforts is inevitable. By looking at some of these cases the dynamics of the Banyumas community which has been known as Brayan Urip (living in harmony) in a way of socializing saving time bombs that can lead to conflict due to a struggle for stronger identity and unequal control of economic resources in the implementation of electoral politics in Banyumas.Perkembangan politik elektoral di Banyumas yang mengarah kepada semakin kuatnya dominasi ekonomi-politik kelompok bisnis Arab berpengaruh terhadap perkembangan Salafisme terutama di perkotaan. Hal tersebut karena pembangunan situs-situs penyebaran Salafisme, seperti yayasan. pesantren, masjid, musala, sekolah dan rumah sakit berasal dari donasi yang mereka berikan dari keuntungan menjalankan bisnis di bidang konstruksi properti, furnitur, pendidikan dan kesehatan.Banyumas sebagai "kandang banteng†memberikan ilustrasi bahwa mayoritas penduduknya tidak terlalu terikat dengan ikatan primordial keagamaan (abangan). Latar belakang tersebut menyuburkan perkembangan Islam kejawen dan kristenisasi. Tumbuh suburnya Islam kejawen dan kristenisasi merespon penyebaran Salafisme yang semakin pesat. Hal tersebut karena tujuan utama Salafisme adalah pemurnian Islam dari bid'ah, syirik, dan khurafat yang erat kaitannya dengan Islam kejawen dan kristenisasi. Selain itu, Banyumas sebagai "kandang banteng†menunjukkan kuatnya dominasi Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P). Wilayah ini bahkan memberikan dampak signifikan dalam meraih kemenangan di Jawa Tengah. Oleh karena itu, wilayah ini selalu menjadi target pemenangan. Namun, demikian seiring menguatnya Salafisme, usaha meraih kemenangan tersebut kali ini mendapatkan tantangan cukup kuat dari penantang. Salafisme yang termasuk dalam barisan penantang berusaha sekuat tenaga "memutihkan†wilayah ini. Sehingga penggunaan isu agama dalam upaya mobilisasi masa tidak dapat terelakkan. Dengan melihat beberapa kasus tersebut dinamika masyarakat Banyumas yang selama ini dikenal brayan urip (hidup rukun) dalam cara bergaul menyimpan bom waktu yang dapat menimbulkan konflik karena pergulatan identitas yang semakin menguat dan penguasaan terhadap sumberdaya ekonomi yang tidak merata dalam penyelenggaraan politik elektoral di Banyumas.The development of electoral politics in Banyumas which led to the increasingly strong economic and political domination of Arab business groups influenced the development of Salafism especially in urban areas. This is due to the construction of sites spreading Salafism, such as foundations. Islamic boarding schools, mosques, mosques, schools and hospitals come from donations that they provide from the benefits of doing business in the fields of property construction, furniture, education and health. Banyumas as a "bull pen" gives an illustration that the majority of the population is not too attached to religious primordial ties (abangan). This background fosters the development of kejawen Islam and Christianization. The flourishing of kejawen Islam and Christianization responds to the increasingly rapid spread of Salafism. That is because the main purpose of Salafism is the purification of Islam from heresy, shirk, and khurafat which are closely related to Islam and Christianity. In addition, Banyumas as a "bull pen" shows the strong dominance of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). This region even had a significant impact in winning in Central Java. Therefore, this region has always been the target of winning. However, as Salafism strengthens, the effort to win this time has been challenged by a challenger. Salafism which is included in the line of challengers is trying hard to "whiten" this region. So the use of religious issues in mass mobilization efforts is inevitable. By looking at some of these cases the dynamics of the Banyumas community which has been known as Brayan Urip (living in harmony) in a way of socializing saving time bombs that can lead to conflict due to a struggle for stronger identity and unequal control of economic resources in the implementation of electoral politics in Banyumas.

"The phenomenon of 'global Salafism,' as distinct from 'Islamism,' or 'Political Islam,' was only recognized by Western scholars comparatively recently. Over the last ten years, these scholars have laid the foundations for the study of Salafism as a cohesive ideological movement with members from across the Muslim world. It is now understood that, despite the wide range of political and theological views contained within these, a shared understanding of Muslim history, methodological approaches, and preferred classical scholars characterizes most, if not all Salafi environments, regardless of their geographical locations. Ethnographically detailed, historically sensitive studies on Salafism have now been carried out in several countries. Strangely, despite the strong Salafi presence in Egypt's post-'Arab Spring' political landscape, Egypt is not one of these. At a time when the need to understand the workings of Salafism, in both local and transnational guises, seems increasingly urgent, this article pauses to ask why this process of reflection has taken so long to develop. Several concrete reasons for Western scholarship's apparent myopia in the context of Salafism, both general and specific to Egypt, are here identified. The article concludes by drawing attention to some of the potential benefits of incorporating Salafi ideas and figures into contemporary Western Middle Eastern Studies curriculae and research programs." (author's abstract)