Suchergebnisse

The following is intended to suggest a fairly simple contention concerning a number of interconnected propositions made in connection with the debates on modernity and secularism. None of these propositions is particularly novel, nor is this the first time that they have been put forward. Yet the issues raised have remained with us and become all the more pressing; I can see that points that were made, against the flow, more than two decades ago, now stand out more cogently than ever, and are being revisited, rediscovered or simply discovered by many. The simple contention I wish to start with concerns Islamism, often brought out emblematically when secularism and modernity are discussed. Like other self-consciously retrogressive identitarian motifs, ideas, sensibilities, moods and inflections of politics that sustain differentialist culturalism and are sustained by it conceptually, Islamism has come to gain very considerable political and social traction over the past quarter of a century.

This paper discusses the varied perceptions of secularism both in its general meaning and its specific implementation in Turkey -- the first Muslim country that has the principle of secularism in its constitution. Initially giving the various understandings of the concept of secularism in Western academia, this paper contrasts those views with the implementation of Turkish secularism -- laiklik -- specifically in the light of the 2008 case of closure against the conservative ruling party by the staunchly secularist Chief Prosecutor. A close reading of the indictment and the ruling party's defense will be done in order to highlight the differences between each part's perceptions of secularism. Adapted from the source document.

Looking back over the century just ended, it is not easy to assess the status and prospects of secularism and the secular ideal in the United States. As is so often the case in American history, when one sets out in search of the simple and obvious, one soon comes face to face with a crowd of paradoxes. The psychologist Erik Erikson once observed that Americans have a talent for sustaining opposites, and he could hardly have been more right. Such Janus-faced doubleness, or multiplicity, is virtually the Americanspecialité de la maison.

Professor Smith has produced a comprehensive survey1 of the relations between state and religion in India which will be of great value to students of modern Indian government and politics as well as of religion. Moreover, this useful, stimulating and very readable study raises questions of compelling, interest for all who are concerned with problems of "church and state". India, the seat of a civilization renowned for elaboration of religious thought and pervasiveness of religious observance has, even by Professor Smith's rigorous standards, successfully established a secular state. In this volume, Professor Smith has undertaken to explain how this has come about, to analyze the Indian achievement and the problems that accompany it and, finally, to indicate how India may advance to the full realization of that "true secularism" which he so enthusiastically endorses.

Abstract
Russian Orthodoxy and Secularism surveys the ways in which the Russian Orthodox Church has negotiated its relationship with the secular state, with other religions, and with Western modernity from its beginnings until the present. It applies multiple theoretical perspectives and draws on different disciplinary approaches to explain the varied and at times contradictory facets of Russian Orthodoxy as a state church or as a critic of the state, as a lived religion or as a civil religion controlled by the state, as a source of dissidence during Communism or as a reservoir of anti-Western, anti-modernist ideas that celebrate the uniqueness and superiority of the Russian nation. Kristina Stoeckl argues that, three decades after the fall of Communism, the period of post-Soviet transition is over for Russian Orthodoxy and that the Moscow Patriarchate has settled on its role as national church and provider of a new civil religion of traditional values.

In the progress of modernization and Westernization, secularization has been reported in various areas such as politics, among individuals and even religions themselves. Theorizing and explaining such situations, scholars have argued that religious things should be excluded from the public sphere. However, a trend to doubt such secularization theory has recently appeared, which regards society as a "post-secularized" place. This article explores to what extent that the view of "post-secularization" can be adopted to the actual society by focusing on politics in Turkey as one of the examples of "post-secularized" society. While Turkey is known as a country which had experienced a severe secularization in the 1920s by Ataturk, when it comes to the recent political situation, the impacts of Islam cannot be ignored. This article explores the relation between the recent Turkish politics and the "post-secularization" theory, also comparing it with the leading democratic theory argued by Habermas (2008).

The concepts of secularism and religious freedom were significant for the public and leaders both before and after the independence. Among leaders, there were many who belonged to the Indian National Congress (INC), such as Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, B. R. Ambedkar, but also staunch supporters of "Hindu Rashtra": M. S. Golwalkar, Veer Savarkar, and many others. In 1928, the right to freedom of conscience, profession and practice of religion was explicitly included in the Nehru Report in order to prevent a community dominate over another. In its original meaning, secularism denotes anti-theism, but not atheism. It was a philosophical an ethical movement, negatively religious, which introduced science, technology and rationalism in the society and generated the basis of a modern secular state. During this process, it had to oppose and struggle against the clergy and vested forces of society. Therefore, the fundamentalist communal onslaughts are not secularism and secularization. During the struggle for freedom and thereafter, the Indian leaders made secularism the mantra of the nation, though each of them expressed apprehensive views in different manners, representing the aspirations of different social strata. Especially Gandhi and Nehru preferred to keep India secular in the sense that if the Indian state will have no religion, the people will be free to follow any religion of their birth or adoption. Secularism in India meant equal respect for all religions and cultures and non-interference of religion in government affairs. This paper aims to go through the different shades of Indian secularism, as found in the Constitution and the public opinion as well. The transitional phase of socio-political phenomenon and diversities in society have made the situation complex and challenging in this fast-changing global scenario of which India is an essential part.

Pakistan was created in 1947 by leaders of the Muslim minority of the British Raj in order to give them a separate state. Islam was defined by its founder, Jinnah, in the frame of his "two-nation theory," as an identity marker (cultural and territorial). His ideology, therefore, contributed to an original form of secularization, a form that is not taken into account by Charles Taylor in his theory of secularization - that the present text intends to test and supplement. This trajectory of secularization went on a par with a certain form of secularism which, this time, complies with Taylor's definition. As a result, the first two Constitutions of Pakistan did not define Islam as an official religion and recognized important rights to the minorities. However, Jinnah's approach was not shared by the Ulema and the fundamentalist leaders, who were in favor of an islamization policy. The pressures they exerted on the political system made an impact in the 1970s, when Z.A. Bhutto was instrumentalizing Islam. Zia's islamization policy made an even bigger impact on the education system, the judicial system and the fiscal system, at the expense of the minority rights. But Zia pursued a strategy of statization of Islam that had been initiated by Jinnah and Ayub Khan on behalf of different ideologies, which is one more illustration of the existence of an additional form of secularization that has been neglected by Taylor.

Pakistan was created in 1947 by leaders of the Muslim minority of the British Raj in order to give them a separate state. Islam was defined by its founder, Jinnah, in the frame of his "two-nation theory," as an identity marker (cultural and territorial). His ideology, therefore, contributed to an original form of secularization, a form that is not taken into account by Charles Taylor in his theory of secularization - that the present text intends to test and supplement. This trajectory of secularization went on a par with a certain form of secularism which, this time, complies with Taylor's definition. As a result, the first two Constitutions of Pakistan did not define Islam as an official religion and recognized important rights to the minorities. However, Jinnah's approach was not shared by the Ulema and the fundamentalist leaders, who were in favor of an islamization policy. The pressures they exerted on the political system made an impact in the 1970s, when Z.A. Bhutto was instrumentalizing Islam. Zia's islamization policy made an even bigger impact on the education system, the judicial system and the fiscal system, at the expense of the minority rights. But Zia pursued a strategy of statization of Islam that had been initiated by Jinnah and Ayub Khan on behalf of different ideologies, which is one more illustration of the existence of an additional form of secularization that has been neglected by Taylor.

In this paper I analyze Cecile Laborde's conception of justificatory secularism. Laborde points out that in her formulation and defense of the conception of justificatory secularism, she follows Rawls' conception of political liberalism to a certain extent. For that reason, I first provide a sketch of Rawls' conception of political liberalism. Then I focus on justificatory secularism, trying to show to what extent it displays similarities with the conception of political liberalism, but also how it differs. I am interested in whether justificatory secularism represents a better alternative to the conception of political liberalism or whether these two conceptions should be considered complementary.