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This article examines the specifics of Moscow's soft power strategy. The sources of the Kremlin's interest in the soft power concept are explained. The article discusses how the soft power concept fits in the current Russian foreign policy philosophy. Russia's soft power resources, institutions and instruments are described. Special attention is given to the limitations and constraints of Moscow's soft power strategies. The reasons why these strategies are often being inefficient are explained. The Kremlin's inclination to the combination of the soft and hard power strategies is identified.

Résumé Trop souvent considérée comme un instrument auxiliaire de la puissance nationale, la « diplomatie publique » peut en réalité grandement contribuer aux objectifs de politique étrangère. Le soft power de Joseph Nye offre un concept très utile pour comprendre comment elle fonctionne. Analyser les relations entre diplomatie publique et soft power dans le contexte actuel de la lutte contre le terrorisme et du Moyen-Orient permet de mieux appréhender la légitimité du projet américain.

"[E]ver since the Baron of Rio Branco asserted his theory of symbolic power resources, Brazil's foreign policy has operated under the assumption that the country will attain international standing through the mechanisms of soft power." Fifth in a series on soft power around the world.

Soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country's soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies. A smart power strategy combines hard and soft power resources. Public diplomacy has a long history as a means of promoting a country's soft power and was essential in winning the cold war. The current struggle against transnational terrorism is a struggle to win hearts and minds, and the current overreliance on hard power alone is not the path to success. Public diplomacy is an important tool in the arsenal of smart power, but smart public diplomacy requires an understanding of the roles of credibility, self-criticism, and civil society in generating soft power.

In Cities, Museums and Soft Power, museum planners Gail Lord and Ngaire Blankenberg demonstrate how museums and cities are using their soft power to address some of the most important issues of our time. Soft power is the exercise of influence through attraction, persuasion, and agenda setting rather than military or economic coercion.

This paper aims to describe the relationship between diplomacy andidentity. Can we still talk about soft power in the terms of Joseph Nye?Does Europe use soft power? And if so, does it use it regarding the termof 'collective identity'? Starting from the article of Anthony D. Smith,National identity and the idea of European unity, can we talk about collectivecultural identity? Europe is a continent that knows and accepts lots ofdifferent cultures but does it aim, in terms of definition, to have a single"European culture"? There are lots of questions raised by this article.If the members of UE are searching to have a collective identity, howare the member states reacting to this idea? Eventually, every singlecountry is not going to give up the national culture and what is definingeach other. There is a common destiny that combines continuity andmemory. We can find this at every social level and also regarding thenational diplomacy. Attracting the UE members into having a Europeanculture, and doing this in terms of soft power, can this really work forthe UE? The European identity, as well as the national identity, it is nota natural one but a social one. It is a social construct seen as the resultof historical conditions and cultural relations.

"South Africa's moral authority and willingness to play an active role in the world gave it unique leverage with both the global North and the South." Eighth and final article in a series on soft power around the world.

While positively connoted tangible cultural heritage is widely recognized as an asset to states in their exercise of soft power, the value of sites of 'dark heritage' in the context of soft power strategies has not yet been fully explored. This article offers a theoretical framework for the analysis of the multiple soft power potentialities inherent in the management and presentation of sites of past violence and atrocity, demonstrating how the value of these sites can be developed in terms of place branding, cultural diplomacy and state-level diplomacy. The relationship between dark heritage, soft power and the search for 'ontological security' is also explored, highlighting how difficult pasts can be mobilized in order to frame positive contemporary roles for states in the international system. Drawing on this theoretical framework, the article offers an analysis of the case of the Soča valley in Slovenia and the presentation of the site of the First World War battle of Kobarid in a dedicated museum. Through this case study, the article underlines the particular role of dark heritage for the national self-projection of a new and small state in the context of European integration.

The soft power concept appears to be applicable to Germany's policies toward Russia. In my analysis, I will draw on both written texts and oral presentations at dozens of panel discussions, round tables and conferences held in Germany in 2011-2013, all aimed at forging joint communicative spaces with Russia. Events sponsored by German think tanks and foundations are playgrounds for encounters of dissimilar narratives and storylines, which communicate and intermingle with each other. However, they not necessarily produce shared meanings. My key argument is that the use of soft power is a two-way communicative process. An actor employing soft power as a communicative tool not only opens a space for an exchange of ideas with its respective interlocutors, but also provides legitimacy to their positions. In the case of this analysis, the ramified structure of German-Russian discursive interactions not only illustrates the deep political and normative split between Berlin and Moscow, but also reinforces cleavages within the German domestic discourse on Russia. Adapted from the source document.

[Extract] Thesis I: Entertainment is no substitute for foreign policy, and the soft power of culture industries cannot replace the hard power of arms. Thesis II: The power of the culture industries is no proxy for the power of art. Thesis III: Only serious art that possesses a transcultural power can adequately address the great historical and political questions that confront nations at war or states embroiled in chronic conflict. Distinguishing between art and the output of the culture industries in this way is unfashionable among contemporary intellectuals. So is any regard for the conventional force of arms. Intellectuals are not averse to violence - they habitually romanticize militant political movements with brutal agendas and militia armies - but regular organized military force leaves them cold. They look askance at the hard power of standing armies and navies. This attitude has a number of consequences, one of which is the idealization of the soft power of entertainment industries. Such a viewpoint is a variant of Immanuel Kant's idea that nations that trade together do not go to war with each other (Kant 1970: 93-130). This is not true, and scaling back the thesis to focus on the trade in cultural commodities does not make it any truer. Those who suggest that soft power can replace arms, and that political goals can be achieved by the avuncular influence of culture industries, direct their arguments at the United States in - particular; There is no need, proponents say, for the US to use force to remove bestial dictators or theocratic thugs from power. The same end - the institution of democracy - can be achieved by American entertainment industries: film, television, popular music, games, and so on. These industries have massive foreign markets, and they portray or insinuate attractive lifestyles. These are lifestyles that can only be reproduced under democratic conditions. Teenagers who want to play rap music are not going to be able to do so if tyrannical regimes like the Taliban are in power.

The term "soft power," coined by American scholar J.S. Nye, not only became well known in China but also stirred a debate among Chinese experts about how to adapt this notion to the Chinese context. This debate embraces a wide spectrum of issues - from a linguistic problem (how to properly translate the expression "soft power" in order to reflect its intended meaning), to the very definition of the term, to sources, tools, and other aspects of it. Due to the fact that the practice of China's "soft power" has already been painstakingly described and analyzed, this paper focuses on theoretical assumption of Chinese "soft power," seen from the perspective of Chinese scholars. This discourse contributes to the debate about the PRC's foreign policy and international relations theory with Chinese characteristics. (Asien/GIGA)