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The theory that Wallace's 1968 support was based on racism & populism is examined in its applicability to the 1968 Tex election. The concern is with the aggregate Wallace support rather than individual, & the methods used are r analysis & factor analysis. The 254 counties of Tex were selected as the prime variable units of analyses, & political & demographic variables were also examined. The data support the existence of the relationship between race & electoral behavior known as the "contextual effect." The strongest relationship identified is between % black & % voting for Wallace. The data do not support the populist explanation of the Wallace vote in the traditional meaning of populism, but a negative relationship between the vote & the population % which is farm-Ru. A positive relationship is shown between the Wallace vote & % in manufacturing. The Wallace vote in Tex tapped 2 sources: that associated mainly with industrialization (especially in East Tex) & a large number presumably alienated from the traditional mainstream of Tex politics. 9 Tables. S. Coler.

A new form of populism, combining broad-based benefits for urban workers with export promotion, emerged in Argentina under Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007). This article argues that changes in agricultural production created the conditions for this 'export-oriented populism.' Historically, Argentina's main exports, beef and wheat, were also the primary consumption goods of urban workers. Scholars such as Guillermo O'Donnell have argued that this linkage increased rural-urban conflict, resulting in shifting coalitions and recurring crises. Today, soybeans have replaced beef and wheat as the country's leading export. Because soybeans are not consumed by the working class, Kirchner could both promote and tax their export, generating fiscal revenue for populist programs while not harming the effective purchasing power of urban workers or provoking a balance-of-payments crisis. Export orientation thus provided the basis for a new variant of Argentine populism. This study offers a new argument within the classic research tradition on the interaction between politics and various types of export growth. It likewise provides an additional basis for arguing that populism, as a form of politics, can arise in diverse economic circumstances. Furthermore, this article contends that, rather than uniformly promoting political stability, the effect of export booms is conditioned by the nature of economic linkages between the export sector and the domestic economy. Adapted from the source document.

The political, ideological and economic context of Trumpism -- Populism -- Trumpism -- Trump voters -- Perfect storm -- Inequality -- Select domestic public policies of the Trump Administration -- Labor policy -- Health care policy -- Social welfare, education and tax policies -- Voter suppression -- Trumpism: race, class, and police policy.

In problematic ways, populism has become a catch-all formula used with discretion to capture all kinds of discontent with democratic politics today. Populism is not only an essentially contested, but also an unavoidably blurred concept. Its recurrent use as a weapon to discredit all kinds of projects that challenge contemporary liberal democracies has led to a situation in which protest movements that aim at democratic renewal end up being conflated with opposite tendencies whose objective is a reactionary scaling down of democracy. Against this background, this article argues that both for political and for analytical purposes, the key point for distinguishing between "progressive" and "regressive" projects that address the crisis of democracy is to determine how such projects conceive of the identity of the people. Invoking the people is not per se an attribute of populism, but ultimately a feature of all kinds of democratic politics. What does make for a critical difference, though, is how peoplehood is articulated in the process of collective mobilization. The distinction becomes particularly relevant with regard to current debates on how to tackle the issue of diversity and democratic integration in Europe and North America. To substantiate this relevance, the article introduces the concept of popular republicanism, which is fleshed out by discussing two recent examples: Catalan sovereignism and the Kurdish-Turkish HDP.

Joko Widodo's victory in the 2012 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election could be seen as a populist phenomenon. An outsider to Jakarta politics, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) beat the incumbent, Fauzi Bowo (Foke), who had received strong support from political parties. Using populism as an analytical tool, this paper argues that the following four factors enabled Jokowi to emerge as an alternative leader in Indonesia's capital: (1) social breakdown and declining capability of the government; (2) corrupt, draining political traditions and a negative image of political parties; (3) societal changes; and (4) the emergence of forms of political representation outside of traditional political institutions. Those situations led Jakarta voters to more easily accept Jokowi's offer - 'New Jakarta' (Jakarta Baru) - as a new identity against the established regime. Populism can help explain Jokowi's victory in the election, but also the leadership of his administration after he was elected. Adapted from the source document.

The rise of authoritarian, nationalist forms of populism and the implications for rural actors and settings is one of the most crucial foci for critical agrarian studies today, with many consequences for political action. Authoritarian Populism and the Rural World reflects on the rural origins and consequences of the emergence of authoritarian and populist leaders across the world, as well as on the rise of multi-class mobilisation and resistance, alongside wider counter-movements and alternative practices, which together confront authoritarianism and nationalist populism. The book includes 20 chapters written by contributors to the Emancipatory Rural Politics Initiative (ERPI), a global network of academics and activists committed to both reflective analysis and political engagement. Debates about 'populism', 'nationalism', 'authoritarianism' and more have exploded recently, but relatively little of this has focused on the rural dimensions. Yet, wherever one looks, the rural aspects are key – not just in electoral calculus, but in understanding underlying drivers of authoritarianism and populism, and potential counter-movements to these. Whether because of land grabs, voracious extractivism, infrastructural neglect or lack of services, rural peoples' disillusionment with the status quo has had deeply troubling consequences and occasionally hopeful ones, as the chapters in this book show. The chapters in this book were originally published in The Journal of Peasant Studies.

Abstract
We study the financial and real effects of political risk shocks for Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece between 2008 and 2019. We build an instrument for these shocks using the changes of the sovereign yield spread around political and policy dates, and estimate their effects in the context of local projection. We show that adverse political risk shocks have negative effects on domestic financial markets and in some countries generate spillovers on the spreads of other eurozone economies. Moreover, in Italy populism-related political risk shocks have a larger effect on financial markets and they harm the real economy.

This article reflects on the degree of populism present in the single party of Franco's dictatorship, the Spanish Traditionalist Falange and the JONS. It begins with a definition of populism based on classic and recent contributions and then assesses the weight of populism in historical fascism. The specificity of Spanish fascism, however, is that it survived in a democratic environment after 1945. The paper reviews the evolution of Falange, whose members and leaders, in spite of the political power and symbolic presence that the party enjoyed, were aware of the limits that they encountered in the imposition of a project of their own due to the weight of the most conservative and Catholic sectors within the regime. As a result of this contradiction, they produced a discourse articulated around the idea of a «pending revolution» which allowed them to identify themselves fully with Franco and his work, while at the same time developing a critique of some aspects of the regime. They claimed to embody the values of the «people» against sectors such as the Opus Dei, which they regarded as distorting the values of the «national revolution» of July 18 due to spurious interests. This discourse was taken up by the young people who were socialized in the fiery rhetoric of revolutionary Falangism in the fifties and sixties. However, as Francoism was progressively delegitimized, Falangism either became a bunker closed to change, or else was transformed by the blue reformist sectors, which would end up supporting the adoption of democratizing and reconciliation measures that the death of the dictator definitely prompted. ; El articulo intenta reflexionar sobre el grado de populismo presente en el partido único de la dictadura franquista, Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS. Para ello, se parte de una definición sobre populismo a partir de aportes clásicos y recientes para luego ver el peso del populismo en el fascismo histórico. Pero la especificidad del fascismo español es sobrevivir en un entorno democrático ...

Abstract. This study discusses the decline in the vote acquisition of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) in the midst of the Islamic populism movement in the 2019 Election. As an Islamic party, this momentum should be a turning point for PPP to become a party that listens to the aspirations or interests of Muslims, as one of the task of political parties in a democratic country is as an aggregation of interests. This study uses qualitative research methods with primary data from interviews and secondary data from library studies. Based on the reading of these data, it can be seen that the failure of PPP to gain vote incentives from the Islamic populism movement in the 2019 elections is; first, the failure to create a good institutional system. This poor institutionalization is reflected in the PPP's internal conflicts. Second, there is a split in the political orientation of Indonesian Muslims in conservatism and moderatism which is clearly depicted in the 2019 election. Third, there is a change in the political orientation of the Indonesian Islamic community which places religion not as the only foothold in their political choices. People choose political parties not based on who is the most Islamic, pious, or representing the aspirations of Muslims, but based on the performance and work programs offered by the party. Keywords: PPP, Islamic Populism, 2019 Election, Party Institutionalization. Abstrak. Penelitian ini membahas perihal panurunan perolehan suara Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) di tengah gerakan populisme Islam pada Pemilu 2019. Harusnya sebagai partai Islam momentum ini adalah titik balik bagi PPP untuk bisa menjadi partai yang mendengar aspirasi atau kepentingan umat Islam, sebagaimana salah satu tugas partai politik dalam negara demokrasi yakni sebagai agregasi kepentingan. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif dengan data primer dari hasil wawancara dan data sekunder dari hasil kajian Pustaka. Berdasarkan pembacaan terhadap data-data tersebut terlihat bahwa kegagalan PPP meraih insentif suara dari gerakan populisme Islam pada Pemilu 2019 adalah; pertama, kegagalan menciptakan sistem kelembagaan yang baik. Kelembagaan yang tidak baik ini tergambar dari konflik internal PPP. Kedua, adanya keterbelahan orientasi politik umat Islam Indonesia dalam konservatisme dan moderatisme yang tergambar kuat dalam Pemilu 2019. Ketiga, adanya perubahan orientasi politik masyarakat Islam Indonesia yang menempatkan agama bukan sebagai pijakan satu-satunya dalam pilihan politiknya. Masyarakat memilih partai politik bukan berdasarkan siapa yang paling Islam, salih, atau mewakili aspirasi umat Islam, namun berdasarkan kinerja dan program kerja yang ditawarkan partai.Kata Kunci: PPP, Populisme Islam, Pemilu 2019, Pelembagaan Partai Politik.

This article formulates precise questions and 'rules of engagement' designed to advance our understanding of the role populism can and should play in the present political conjuncture, with potentially significant implications for critical management and organization studies and beyond. Drawing on the work of Ernesto Laclau and others working within the post-Marxist discourse-theory tradition, we defend a concept of populism understood as a form of reason that centres around a claim to represent 'the people', discursively constructed as an underdog in opposition to an illegitimate 'elite'. A formal discursive approach to populism brings with it important advantages. For example, it establishes that a populist logic can be invoked to further very different political goals, from radical left to right, or from progressive to regressive. It sharpens too our grasp of important issues that are otherwise conflated and obfuscated. For instance, it helps us separate out the nativist and populist dimensions in the discourses of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Trump or the Front National (FN). Our approach to populism, however, also points to the need to engage with the rhetoric about populism, a largely ignored area of critical research. In approaching populism as a signifier, not only as a concept, we stress the added need to focus on the uses of the term 'populism' itself: how it is invoked, by whom and to what purpose and effect. This, we argue, requires that we pay more systematic attention to anti-populism and 'populist hype', and reflect upon academia's own relation to populism and anti-populism.

The recent rise of populism is a topic that has been widely investigated, particularly in the field of political science (Laclau 2005; Mudde 2017; Müller 2016; Žižek 2006). However, the question arises whether populism should only be considered as a purely political phenomenon, or can also be studied from a cultural perspective: through literature, cinema and visual culture for example. The relationship between populism and culture is normally seen as one of mutual exclusion – populism dismisses culture as a waste of time and money, while culture perceives and represents populism as its disturbing Other. But on the other hand, populism's own active use of culture tends to be underestimated. In this present article, I will illustrate these aspects by analyzing the reception of a controversial novel, namely Soumission by Michel Houellebecq (2015). This text has been widely investigated by scholars (Jones 2016; Rosenthal 2015; Spieser-Landes 2017); at the same time, far less scholarly attention has been paid to the cultural appropriation of the text on the part of populist politicians and media. By mapping the public debate on Soumission through a variety of sources (reviews, newspaper articles, interviews, etc.), I will illustrate how French populists have used Houellebecq's novel to define their political agenda, with particular regard to the alleged 'Islamization' or 'Africanization' of Europe. On the other hand, we will see that these populist interpretations fail to grasp the complexity of the work.

Vera Zasulich's shooting of Trepov, a governor of St Petersburg who had ordered the flogging of a political prisoner, in January 1878, catapulted her to international fame as a revolutionary heroine, a reputation that she put to good use by becoming one of the five 'founding parents' of Russian Marxism that created the 'Group for the Emancipation of Labour' in 1883. But her act of self-sacrifice also triggered, to her dismay, the institutionalisation of individual-terrorist tactics in the Russian Populist movement with the creation of the 'People's Will' (Narodnaya Volya) Party in 1879. The organisation went into decline after the killing of Tsar Alexanderiiin 1881, and Populism itself was increasingly superseded by Marxism as the hegemonic force on the left with the rise of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (rsdlp). But individual-terrorist tactics reappeared with the creation of the Socialist Revolutionary Party in 1902, prompting Zasulich to write an article forDie neue Zeit, the theoretical organ of German Social Democracy, in which she both condemned the Neo-Populist tendency as deleterious to the rising labour movement and supported the organisational plans for thersdlpsponsored by theIskragroup, developed at length by Lenin in his bookWhat Is to Be Done?, published in March 1902. This article provides the background to Vera Zasulich's article 'The Terrorist Tendency in Russia' (December 1902), setting it against the history of the Russian revolutionary movement from 1878 to 1902.

Does populism indicate a radical crisis in Western democratic political systems? Is it a revolt by those who feel they have too little voice in the affairs of state or are otherwise marginalized or oppressed? Or are populist movements part of the democratic process? Bringing together different anthropological experiences of current populist movements, this volume makes a timely contribution to these questions. Contrary to more conventional interpretations of populism as crisis, the authors instead recognize populism as integral to Western democratic systems. In doing so, the volume provides an important critique that exposes the exclusionary essentialisms spread by populist rhetoric while also directing attention to local views of political accountability and historical consciousness that are key to understanding this paradox of democracy