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We use a new dataset on non-resource GDP to examine the impact of commodity price volatility on economic growth in a panel of up to 158 countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding is that commodity price volatility leads to a significant increase in non-resource GDP growth in democracies, but to no significant increase in autocracies. To explain this result, we show that increased commodity price volatility leads to a statistically significant and quantitatively large increase in net national saving in democracies. In autocracies, on the other hand, net national saving decreased significantly. Our results hold true when using indicators capturing the quality of economic institutions in lieu of indicators of political institutions.

This book looks at the link between voters and political party systems in Asian democracies, focusing on India, Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines. It discusses this link in terms of three distinct elements: the formation of voters preferences, the translation of preferences into votes, and the translation of votes into seats. The book goes on to discuss how far the general rules of political party systems and their underlying causal mechanisms such as strategic voting are apparent in these Asian democracies. In particular, it explores the extent to which electoral rules and social structural variables affect the process of transforming preferences into a political party system within the context of Asian politics. The extensive areas covered by the book overcome the traditional sub-regional division of Asia, namely, East, Southeast and South Asia.

Sanctions restrict or terminate economic relations between two or more countries, directly and negatively influencing sanctioned countries' companies. We argue that sanctions are similar to recessions—both reduce economic activity in affected countries. Less economic activity results in a lower accident risk as companies use their productive facilities less. Reduced revenues also force companies to adjust by cutting costs, which includes spending on safety. Hence, accident damage should increase under sanctions. Governments can intervene by enforcing safety regulations, and their incentives to do so are stronger in democracies, where citizens can more easily remove politicians from office. Therefore, accident damage increases only in nondemocratic countries, while democracies succeed in maintaining technological safety and hence sanctions do not affect accident damage.

It is widely accepted that democracies are less conflict prone, if only with other democracies. Debate persists, however, about the causes underlying liberal peace. This article offers a contrarian account based on liberal political economy. Economic development, free markets, and similar interstate interests all anticipate a lessening of militarized disputes or wars. This "capitalist peace" also accounts for the effect commonly attributed to regime type in standard statistical tests of the democratic peace.

Onwumechili provides an exciting perspective on African military coups and reminds us that democracy is not synonymous solely with Western societies. He examines democracies in traditional Africa and shows how these socieites clearly defined and limited the roles of traditional African armies.

Teaching gender politics has been an increasingly contentious topic in established democracies, with instructors encountering a myriad of pedagogical, institutional, and ideological challenges (Butler 2021; Evans 2019).1 Challenges to teaching gender politics are exacerbated in nondemocratic contexts, where academic institutions operate under close regime scrutiny and surveillance, and where patterns of autocratic power structures are prevalent in society and often reproduced in the classroom. While extant studies have shed important light on some of the trends and issues associated with teaching gender politics in established democracies (Bayes 2012; Han and Heldman 2019; Lyle-Gonga 2013), our knowledge remains limited when it comes to teaching gender and politics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in Western institutions as well as within the MENA region. Understanding these challenges is particularly relevant given that the MENA region is diverse and has long been "othered," "racialized," and "orientalized" in Western discourse (Ahmed 1992; Said 1978), with direct implications for teaching gender and politics of the Middle East in local academic institutions as well as in the West.

This article maps important trends that mark a new stage in neoliberal capitalism since 2008, with a focus on class struggle and resistance in the advanced industrial democracies. New forms of collective action have arisen in response to austerity which has been imposed, in different forms, across most of the advanced industrial democracies, in a context in which established solidaristic institutions – trade unions, social democratic parties, welfare states – have already been eroded as a result of the preceding twenty five years of neoliberal reform. The article presents an overview of these trends, highlighting austerity policies and anti-austerity responses. The article accounts for the rise of new forms of resistance and collective action as they have emerged differently in different national contexts, focusing on developments in the UK, US, Spain, Japan and Germany.

The Cocaine War uncovers the geopolitical interests behind the US "War on Drugs" in Latin America, and spells out just what the drug war means: the danger it poses to the political stability of weak democracies, human rights and development, and its envir

This article provides a new explanation for the current democratic crisis by focusing on the growing opposition of citizens to political elites. Modern democracies are basically representative democracies in the sense that citizens are represented by a governing political elite. We argue that democracies are in crisis because this political elite cannot possess the knowledge necessary to manage the complexity of the social order and implement rational choices. They fail in dealing with knowledge and thus cast doubt among citizens on the very legitimacy of democracy. This produces generalized distrust toward elites, who were thought to be able to deal with social complexity. As a result, democracy is considered to be responsible for societal problems while they actually stem from elites' overestimation of their ability to deal with societal complexity.Related ArticlesConsidine, Mark. 2012. "Applying Design Theory to Public Policy." Politics & Policy 40 (4): 704‐724. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00372.xNorman, Emma R., and Rafael Delfin. 2012. "Wizards under Uncertainty: Cognitive Biases, Threat Assessment, and Misjudgments in Policy Making." Politics & Policy 40 (3): 369‐402. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00356.x/abstractRaile, Eric D., Amber N. Raile, Charles T. Salmon, and Lori Ann Post. 2014. "Defining Public Will." Politics & Policy 42 (1): 103‐130. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12063Related MediaA summary of the article will be made in French for readers of the PHEBE site (LE POInt, https://www.lepoint.fr/phebe/) and on the counterpoint site (https://www.contrepoints.org/)

By illuminating the conflict-resolving mechanisms inherent in the relationships between democracies, Bruce Russett explains one of the most promising developments of the modern international system: the striking fact that the democracies that it comprises have almost never fought each other

AbstractThe recent empirical growth literature has proposed three underlying fundamental determinants of economic growth, namely, physical geography, economic integration and institutional quality. This paper unpacks the final determinant into both political‐economic institutions as well as the primarily political institution of democratic development. Using both cross‐sectional and panel datasets, we show that, properly instrumented, there is no evidence that democracies grow faster or slower than non‐democracies. This result is in contrast to much of the more recent literature, which tends to find a weakly positive relationship. Political‐ economic institutions, however, remain positive and significant determinants of economic growth, which corroborates much of the empirical evidence in the existing literature. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

In the early autumn of 2013 large minorities in Italy and the United States fermented crises that badly disrupted the government of the two countries. These cases were widely understood as instances of dysfunction in established democracies that would rarely be replicated elsewhere. However, while all the conditions that generated the crises are unlikely to be evident in other established democracies three important factors that caused the disruptions in the American and Italian political processes are also sources of political conflict in Britain. They are the powers of the second legislative chamber, the weakening links between parties and social groups, and the redrawing of electoral boundaries. All of them present problems for political reform in Britain, and understanding the role they played in the two political crises of 2013 is important for future reform in Britain.

This article investigates the performance determinants of accountability institutions in new democracies. Current scholarship on accountability has identified a distinct mechanism through which the introduction of political competition may affect such institutions: the electoral connection or vertical accountability mechanism. This connection is not expected to be effective in new democracies, because political competition is found to be volatile and nonprogrammatic. Another strand of the literature focuses on the effect of power alternation. Government turnover is expected to generate incentives for the creation and strengthening of autonomous institutions. By exploring a unique data set on 33 state audit institutions, the authors bring together these distinct claims and provide systematic empirical tests for them. They find a negative effect of volatility on their institutional activism and a positive (direct and indirect) influence of power alternation on their levels of autonomy and sanctioning patterns.