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According to the constructivist theory of liberal democratic peace, intersubjective social realities are often more important in the construction of pacific unions of interstate peace. In order to demonstrate the importance of social construction rather than objective matters as a source of peace, previous studies have discussed cases where democracies appear to have fought one another. This article, instead of showing how objective factors fail to contribute to liberal democratic peace if the intersubjective consensus is lacking, shows how the intersubjective consensus about the common interests, norms, and identity has contributed to the interstate peace among the illiberal non-democracies of Southeast Asia. The long peace among the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1968-94 is compared to the bellicose period of the Malaysian confrontation, when most of the objective bases for the perception of common interests, common commitment to democratic procedures and liberal norms, and institutional restraints on war were arguably stronger than during the long peace. The intention is to show how even the political elite groups of illiberal non-democracies can manipulate the social consciousness for the purpose of creating a pacific union, similar to the one which has been socially constructed by liberal democracies. At the same time the study provides indirect support for the constructivist theory of liberal democratic peace.

Dependent on liberal ideologies , the democratic peace theory assumes that democracies rarely wage war on one another than non- democracies. But critics argue that merely being democratic in nature may not be the main reason for peace between democracies. Throughout the 21st century, we have witnessed the "War on Terrorism" after 9/11, the rise of multipolarity, several buffer zones underpinning major powers' divisive politics and reflection of national leaders' decisions on regional cooperatives and international institutions, etc., which have had varying effects on international politics. Therefore, this study begs a question that whether the implications of democratic peace theory are justified in the 21st century or not. Answering this question required a thorough review of the arguments put forward by democratic peace theorists and detractors. This article examines the justification of democratic peace theory by focusing on the remarkable political phenomena in the 21st century. The method of this study is based on the thematic literature review and in-depth study of the documents and summaries comprised of articles and journals. This study found that authoritarianism, democratic backsliding, the rise of populism, contentious politics, border and regional conflicts, violent annexation, etc. have become critical issues in democracies where neither the values of democracy are protected, nor the liberal ideology is followed in the state mechanisms.
Social Science Review, Vol. 39(1), June 2022 Page 211-229

Proposes a gradual increase in levels of humanitarian intervention in crisis situations in countries with unconsolidated democracies; focus on diplomatic and military intervention in Haiti.

NATO faces multiple challenges in the near future, including the need for Allied democracies to stay united; terrorism and proliferation; relations with Muslim countries; "frozen conflicts" in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria; fragile democracies in Partner countries such as Georgia; and the growing divergence of interests between NATO and Russia's foreign and domestic policies. With Russia's lack of an independent judiciary, attacks on freedom of the press, and growing concerns over energy security, NATO must develop a common strategy on how to promote and support democracy within Russia and its neighbors. Adapted from the source document.

This article explores the relationship between liberal democracy and socioeconomic equality, both on a theoretical and a practical level. It recounts both liberal and non-liberal arguments why democracies should or should not worry about de facto inequality, and then goes through a series of consequentialist arguments about why, alternatively, democracies should either worry about high persistent levels of inequality, or conversely, why attempts to remedy inequality through social policy is likely to have deleterious political or economic effects. Adapted from the source document.

Students of comparative politics have long acknowledged the importance of such institutional factors as electoral systems, parliamentary versus presidential rule, and the strength of parties; but they have either regarded the institutions as given or have explained them entirely in domestic terms (associating proportional representation, for example, with the intensity of social cleavages). In economically advanced democracies, however, these institutional aspects can be plausibly linked to dependence on trade: proportional representation, the parliamentary system, strong parties, and large electoral districts have "survival value" for developed democracies exposed to trade. That the recently revived agitation for proportional representation in the United Kingdom has been cast explicitly in terms of economic necessity and dependence on trade adds force to this argument, and suggests the need for further historical research on other cases of institutional adaptation and change.

This article examines why democratic competition sometimes fails to curb governmental corruption. We argue that in democracies party system competitiveness, which shapes the ability of voters to effectively select and control their politicians through elections, plays a critical role in conditioning the scope for corruption. For voters, governmental corruption is a classical principal-agent problem and its magnitude is mediated by the extent to which the competitiveness of a party system helps to make information and effective choices available to the electorate. Informed voters who can coordinate on credible alternatives to under-performing and corrupt incumbents, we argue, can select politicians who are likely to curb corruption and hold accountable those who do not. We test this argument through a controlled comparative analysis of corruption in 70 democracies around the world and find broad support for our hypotheses. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This article discusses the "quest" of Latin American and Caribbean civilian policymakers to balance democratic civilian control with effectiveness intelligence activities in their countries. Many Latin American countries are new democracies, which transitioned to democracy after horrendous military rules. With the exception of Haiti (1804), many Caribbean nations are new democracies, as well, which transitioned to democracy following the end of colonial rule between 1962 and 1983. Since their transitions to democracy, in their path to consolidation, policymakers in these countries have sought to conduct free and fair elections. guarantee the democratic transfer of political power, develop legitimacy, transform their legal frameworks and economy, and, perhaps, most crucially, bring about democratic civil-military relations (CMR) - that is establishing new security institutions (to include intelligence agencies) that are under democratic civilian control, while also effective.

Can legacies of fascism threaten democracies with political violence? Democracies aim to peacefully manage incompatible interests in a society. Yet, few democracies avoid violence altogether. Legacies of fascism may re-emerge because local networks can transfer their ideational tenets - supremacist identities and anti-democratism ( know what), violent practices ( know how), and paramilitary networks ( know whom) - to the new generations. Thanks to an original subnational dataset, we study if the Italian fascist movement that emerged in the 1920s affected political violence in the 1970s–1980s. The local strength of the fascist party before the institutionalization of the fascist regime predicts neofascist political violence more than forty years later. New catalysing events facilitate the resurfacing of local fascist legacies: when a Minister of Interior is appointed, we observe higher levels of neofascist violence in provinces where the early presence of the fascist party was stronger.

Существует разрыв между формальными демократическими институтами и культурными, историческими, ценностными традициями, утвердившимися в определенных странах/социуме исторически. Явление демократий, соответствующих формальным, процедурным признакам, но вызывающих сомнение по поводу своей демократической сущности, в совокупности называются «демократии с прилагательными». В статье объясняется концепт «демократии с прилагательными», показано, в каком поле существует данное понятие, описаны основные этапы его становления, обозначены проблемные области, которые затронуты дискурсом о демократии. ; There is a gap between formal democratic institutes and cultural, historical, traditional values in some countries/societies. The fenomenon of democracies that meet the formal and procedural grounds, but raising doubts about its democratic nature, collectively called «democracies with adjectives». The article explaines the concept «democracies with adjectives», indicates in which field exists this concept, describes the main stages of its formation, marks the problem areas that are under consideration by the discourse of democracy.

Structural theories of international peace among democratic regimes have relied on two distinct explanatory logics: democratic institutions may cause a state's foreign policy to tend toward peace by exposing policymaking elites to pressure from ordinary citizens (the popular logic) or to pressure from other governmental agencies (the elite logic). These logics are often conflated in scholarly studies of war and peace, but we attempt to isolate the popular logic for empirical testing by developing a novel measure of institutionalized popular influence, the Institutional Democracy Index (IDI). Whereas previous usage of the Polity index to operationalize democratic structures has succeeded in testing the elite logic more than the popular logic, we use the IDI to analyze long-established democracies' involvement in international conflict between 1961 and 2001. What we find are significant differences within the family of democratic regimes that point to a monadic structural explanation of peace: more popular democracies are less warlike with respect to all other regimes, not just other democracies. By capturing variance among democratic regimes in their structures of inclusion (especially formal rules pertaining to voter access, electoral formulae, and cameral structures), the IDI enables us to observe crucial differences between the conflict propensities of more popular and more elite types of democracy.

This study examines how the politics of coalition government formation affect foreign exchange markets in Western European parliamentary democracies. Existing studies suggest that ex ante uncertainty associated with the formation of coalition governments increases exchange rate volatility. We develop a formal model that places currency traders at the center & examines how traders respond to the uncertainty produced by coalition bargaining in parliamentary democracies. In sharp contrast to the literature, the model shows that traders rationally respond to uncertainty about the potential coalition government that may form & expected policies that will be implemented by the coalition government by reducing the volume of trading they do in that currency & that this, in turn, leads to a decline in the mean & volatility of exchange rates. Estimates from an exchange rate series of 10 Western European parliamentary democracies statistically support the claim that exchange rate volatility is negatively associated with traders' ex ante uncertainty about the potential coalition government that may form. Tables, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

The connection between domestic politics and international cooperation, specifically the relationship between regime type and alliance behavior, is examined to test two central hypotheses: democracies are more likely to ally with each other, and states of any similar regime type are more likely to ally with each other. These hypotheses emerge from three theories: constructivism, economic interdependence, and credible commitments. The authors use a data set of all pairs of states from 1816 to 1992. Results show that states with similar regime type are more likely to ally with each other after 1945, although two democracies are not more likely to ally than two autocracies during this period, and distance, learning, threat, and common culture affect alliance behavior, but trade does not. Results indicate sharp limits to the connection between democracy and international cooperation.

Asylum & asylum-seekers are currently high on the agenda of European governments & the European Union. Controlling the numbers of asylum-seekers arriving in Europe has become a major political issue, as has the 'harmonization' of their reception & treatment. The present debate about asylum generally occurs against a background that presumes that liberal democracies have a long & honorable tradition of granting asylum, & that this generous & discretionary act has, over the last 10 to 15 years, been increasingly exploited by those who are not entitled to the protection of asylum. Yet, in fact, asylum predates liberal democracies by millennia, & the exploitation has usually been carried out by states, including liberal democracies, whose asylum practice has always reflected state interest & only incidentally benefited individuals. Asylum does have a long & contested history & the powers that be have fought over the right to grant & withhold asylum since its inception. It has been adapted in response to different needs over time, in particular the needs of states, with the different forms of asylum receding or coming to dominate, depending on historical & political necessity. 35 References. Adapted from the source document.