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I develop a systematic argument about the politics of the 1997–98 Asian economic crisis. I focus on institutions—specifically, the connection linking the institutional framework of national politics, the policy environment, and investment. I seek to resolve the tension between the literatures on credible policy commitment and policy flexibility, arguing that if either is severely undersupplied, the risk associated with the policy environment rises rapidly for investors. Building on a veto player framework, I develop a simple model of a U-shaped relationship between the number of veto players in a political system and policy risk to investors. Institutional vetoes on executive authority lower policy risk for investors but only up to a point, after which additional veto players promote unwelcome policy rigidity. I illustrate this using four cases: Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the four main Southeast Asian countries involved in the financial crisis. I argue that the institutional framework of national politics had a powerful and predictable influence on policy responses and investor reactions.

THE AUTHOR ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN THE NATURE OF DECLINING VOTER TURNOUT IN AMERICA SINCE THE 1960'S. EXAMINING ELECTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION DATA, IT IS ARGUED THAT THE DECLINE IN TURNOUT IS NOT A RESULT OF DECLINES IN POLITICAL INTEREST OR INVOLVEMENT, OR IN DECREASING FEELINGS OF POLITICAL EFFICACY. NO CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES OF TRUST AND THE DECISION TO VOTE CAN BE FOUND.

This thesis consists of three self-contained essays dealing with different aspects of macroeconomics and political Economy. The Relative Price of Investment Goods and Sectoral Contract Dependence I develop a quantitative model to explain the relationship between TFPs at the aggregate and sector levels and contracting institutions across countries. The incomplete contract enforcement induces distortions in the production process which come from the "hold up" problem between a final goods firm and its suppliers. Because investment goods sector is more contract dependent, its productivity suffers more from the distortion. In turn, countries endowed with weaker contract enforcement institutions face higher relative prices of investment goods. A Ricardian Model of the Labor Market with Directed Search I analyze how search friction affects the allocation in a Ricardian model of the labor market. The equilibrium shows that the matching pattern is partially mixed: Some tasks are only performed by skilled workers; some are only performed by unskilled workers; the remaining tasks are performed by both skilled and unskilled workers. The mixed matching pattern implies a mismatch in equilibrium. It turns out that the reason for the mismatch has its roots in search friction. In addition, I show labor market institutions have interesting implications for the unemployment rate and mismatch. A Dynamic Analysis of the Free-rider Problem I argue that special interest groups overcome their free-rider problem thanks to distorted government policy. As policy confers monopoly privileges on a group, it can also preserve and promote group's organization. The key to sustaining the organization of the group is a dynamic incentive: when distorted policy generates rents for a group, each member of the group wish to make contributions not just to raise their rents today; they want to sustain their cooperation so that they will be able to influence policy in the future.

Theorists from John Stuart Mill to Robert Nozick have argued that citizens can gain insight into the demands of justice by experimenting with diverse forms of political life. I consider the rationality of such experimentation, arguing for three distinct but related claims. First, rational citizens will not be highly incentivized to conduct experiments in living. Here I develop an account of what I call the 'prudential rationality constraint' (PRC). The PRC implies that rational citizens will be undermotivated from the standpoint of social value to conduct experiments in living. Second, despite the success of various radical political experiments (e.g., democracy after 1648), citizens generally ought to engage in moderate rather than radical political experimentation. The latter will nearly always be prudentially irrational to conduct, hard to learn from, and quite possibly harmful to participants and third parties. Finally, there are important but overlooked ways, including through entrepreneurship, in which institutions can incentivize citizens to engage in socially valuable political experimentation.

This paper empirically investigates the effects of environmental policy, institutions, political orientation, and lobbying on energy innovation and finds that they significantly affect the incentives to innovate and create cleaner energy efficient technologies. We conclude that political economy factors may act as barriers even in the presence of stringent environmental policy, implying that, to move towards a greener economy, countries should combine environmental policy with a general strengthening of institutional quality, consider the influence of government's political orientation on environmental policies, and the implications of the size of energy intensive sectors in the economy.

This paper empirically investigates the effects of environmental policy, institutions, political orientation, and lobbying on energy innovation and finds that they significantly affect the incentives to innovate and create cleaner energy efficient technologies. We conclude that political economy factors may act as barriers even in the presence of stringent environmental policy, implying that, to move towards a greener economy, countries should combine environmental policy with a general strengthening of institutional quality, consider the influence of government's political orientation on environmental policies, and the implications of the size of energy intensive sectors in the economy.

This paper explores the link between the political orientation of governments and the restrictiveness of immigration policies. Although it is frequently assumed that left-wing governments are more pro-immigration than right-wing governments, this link is more complex in practice, partly because parties may favour and oppose the migration of different migrant categories and parties may be divided internally. Furthermore, political negotiating, the influence of (particularly business and trade union) lobbies, as well as the international diffusion of policy trends may water down parties' ideological preferences and lead to much more fuzzy policy outcomes at government level. Drawing on the DEMIG POLICY database tracking migration policy changes and two datasets on political institutions, we assess the effect of government party orientation on different dimensions of immigration policy in 21 European and traditional Anglo-Saxon immigration countries between 1975 and 2012. Results consistently indicate that there is no clear association between the political orientation of governments and the restrictiveness of migration policies. Instead, we find that the restrictiveness of migration policies is mainly driven by factors such as economic growth and unemployment, recent immigration levels and political system factors such as electoral systems or the level of federalism.

Characterizes political clientelism in Portugal, 1983-1993, focusing on personnel management policies pursued in three public institutions: the hospital system; Radiotelevisao Portuguesa; & the communication companies Correios, Telegrafos e Telefones, & Telefones de Lisboa e Porto (the latter two under common administration). 22 References. Adapted from the source document.

After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, neoliberal hawks in the Bush administration embraced the goals of liberating the Iraqi people from economic constraints. This fast regime change, however, soon turned into a long quagmire that required a nation-building effort, reflecting the language of modernization theory. Thus, in the case of the Iraq War, two distinct and opposing theories of economic development—neoliberalism and modernization—merged together. What made this possible was the nature of analyzing American history through a lens of exceptionalism, as well as the transformative moment in the post-Cold War 1990s that began to remake the Middle East as the next adversary of the American superpower. This article uses this episode to suggest that intellectual histories of political economy need to reconsider narratives that present dominant theories through rigid periodization, while relying on works from Walt Rostow, David Harvey, Benjamin Barber, Timothy Mitchell, and Michael Latham, as well as rhetoric from George W. Bush and other neoliberal voices around the invasion.

Permanent self-reproduction of crises or getting into so called development traps in underdeveloped countries constitutes one of the most significant world problems. An explanatory hypothesisis that antagonistic relationship between formal and informal institutions makes it impossible to overcome path dependence. The problem is illustrated by the case of Rwanda, which, despite the large-scale foreign aid in the 1960s-early 1990s, failed to resolve the growing socio-political contradictions that eventually led to the 1994 genocide. However, since the 2000s Rwanda has been demonstrating an upward trend especially in governance and control of corruption. In the author's view, success in the post-genocidal period was determined by two factors: first, by the institutional vacuum created by the collapse of competitive rules and practices of the President Habyarimana era; second, by the effective leadership shown by the ruling elite support of informal practices to overcome the crisis. Between the possible reform options the choice was made in favor of formalization of autochthonous practices, introduction of traditional or restored (filled with a new meaning) institutions into the legal sphere, and creation of new rules. Rwanda is therefore an example of successful institutional transformation.

The interaction of oil exports from the Middle East in the 1970s with arms imports to this region has drawn attention from several researchers. The existing literature, however, is seriously flawed for it ignores the large corporate players whose actions synchronize the two flows of income and, thus fails to identify the significance of these corporations for the political economy of armaments. This present paper is the first of a series of four essays that attempt to relate the dynamics of market structures to the escalation of military sales. Here we briefly asses some neo-Marxist and institutional writings that offer insight into the subject of relevant issues. We find them deficient and perhaps outdated in some respects.

The experience of building a democratic regime in Afghanistan in the period from 2001 to the conquest of power by the Taliban in August 2021 has been considered. It has been emphasized and highlighted how the traditional foundations of governance of the Afghan society were embodied in the political system, which had a democratic structure established by the Constitution of 2004.

The main traditional power centers in the Afghan territorial communities have been identified, existing independently of state institutions and in parallel with them. The essence and mechanism of action of each of them have been revealed. The importance of informal relations and connections, which form the basis of Afghan society and determine the status of a person in it, has been emphasized. As a result, the population strive not to the ideas, but to strong leaders, which allows them to determine the political and social climate in the country. The logic of the emergence and wide existence of traditional power centers, such as jirgas, khans, maliks, battlefield commanders, based on the perception of them by the population as sources of stability and strength, has been determined.

The impact of traditional institutions and relations on the functioning of the central and local political authorities, their influence on the relationship between the population and state bodies has been shown. The process of development by traditional leaders, as the centers of power, of modern democratic mechanisms and means of control and their use in personal interests has been considered. The combination of traditional management institutions with classical democratic institutions has been noted, which manifests itself both in the use of traditional management forms without changes, and in the transfer of traditional forms of leadership and social relationships to modern political structures, which modifies the essence of democratic institutions. In addition, the existence of informal traditional structures that duplicate the functions of official ones has been noted, indicating the weakness of state institutions.

In the comparative political economy of rich democracies there is a long tradition of classifying countries into one of a small number of categories based on their economic institutions and policies. The most recent of these is the Varieties of Capitalism project, which posits two major clusters of nations: coordinated and liberal market economies. This classification has generated controversy. We leverage recent advances in mixture model-based clustering to see what the data say on the matter. We find that there is considerable uncertainty around the number of clusters and, barring a few cases, which country should be placed in which cluster. Moreover, when viewed over time, both the number of clusters and country membership change considerably. As a result, arguments about who has the right typology are misplaced. We urge caution in using these country classifications in structuring qualitative inquiry and discourage their usage as indicator variables in quantitative analysis, especially in the context of time-series cross-section data. We argue that the real value of both Esping-Andersen's work and the Varieties of Capitalism project consists of their theoretical contributions and heuristic classification of ideal types. ; In der vergleichenden Politischen Ökonomie reicher Demokratien gibt es eine lange Tradition, Länder aufgrund ihrer unterschiedlichen wirtschaftlichen Institutionen und Policies zu typologisieren. Die jüngste dieser Typologien das Varieties-of-Capitalism-Konzept erfasst zwei Gruppen von Ländern: koordinierte und liberale Marktwirtschaften. Da diese Klassifizierung einige Kontroversen hervorgerufen hat, nutzen die Autoren neueste Fortschritte im mixture model-based clustering, um zu prüfen, welche Erkenntnisse die Daten zu diesem Problem liefern. Die Ergebnisse weisen eine beträchtliche Unsicherheit hinsichtlich der Anzahl der Cluster und, mit wenigen Ausnahmen, der Zuordnung der Länder zu Clustern auf. Betrachtet man größere Zeiträume, variieren darüber hinaus die Anzahl der Cluster und Ländermitgliedschaften erheblich. Als Folge dieser Befunde halten die Autoren Argumentationen über die richtige Typologisierung für unangebracht und raten davon ab, diese Länderklassifizierungen zur Strukturierung qualitativer Studien heranzuziehen oder als Indikatorvariablen in quantitativen Analysen zu nutzen. Dies gilt insbesondere im Kontext von gepoolten Zeitreihen- und Querschnittsdaten. Sie argumentieren, dass der substanzielle Wert sowohl der Forschung von Esping-Andersen als auch des Varieties-of-Capitalism-Ansatzes in den Beiträgen zur Theorie und den heuristischen Klassifizierungen von Idealtypen besteht.