Suchergebnisse

Although recent research has yielded some determining elements to civil war, the influence of politicalfactors on internal conflicts remains disputed. This article presents a critical review of the mostwidely used indices of democracy in civil war studies, and suggests that the competitiveness ofthe executive power can be a useful measure for quantitative conflict research. The paper alsoanalyses, by means of statistical regression, the relationship between the competitiveness in theexecutive recruitment and civil war incidence from 1976 to 2000. The findings indicate that bothsingle-candidate and multi-party elections reduce the incidence of civil war. Furthermore, theresults lend support to the hypotheses put forward by recent literature that ethnic fractionalisation,mountainous terrain, large population and centralised political systems significantly heighten therisk of incidence of civil war, while high GDP per capita and economic growth decrease the likelihoodof internal conflicts.

Although recent research has yielded some determining elements to civil war, the influence of politicalfactors on internal conflicts remains disputed. This article presents a critical review of the mostwidely used indices of democracy in civil war studies, and suggests that the competitiveness ofthe executive power can be a useful measure for quantitative conflict research. The paper alsoanalyses, by means of statistical regression, the relationship between the competitiveness in theexecutive recruitment and civil war incidence from 1976 to 2000. The findings indicate that bothsingle-candidate and multi-party elections reduce the incidence of civil war. Furthermore, theresults lend support to the hypotheses put forward by recent literature that ethnic fractionalisation,mountainous terrain, large population and centralised political systems significantly heighten therisk of incidence of civil war, while high GDP per capita and economic growth decrease the likelihoodof internal conflicts.

Presidential power to recognize foreign nations and governments, exercised since the dawn of the republic, has never been viewed as exclusive. Indeed, Congress has enacted legislation that conferred recognition upon foreign countries. Recently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, asserted for the first time in American history an exclusive presidential power of recognition. This conclusion, built on a flawed historical record and faulty judicial premises stemming from United States v. Curtiss‐Wright Export Corp., exaggerates executive authority and ignores the largely ministerial role assigned to the president in receiving ambassadors and foreign ministers.

This book elaborates a theory of 'semi-parliamentary government', an often neglected form of government that instantiates the principle of the separation of powers, by demonstrating how it reconciles important benefits of both presidential and parliamentary systems.

Attributed to George Rous--National Union Catalog pre-1956 imprints. ; "In this little Pamphlet . " ; Electronic reproduction. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 44

This paper seeks to investigate the behavior presented by the chamber of deputies, with regards to the bills which were presented by the executive power during the 2002-2006 legislative term. The author demonstrates that one of the most relevant reasons that the government of Ricardo Lagos was able to successfully pass the bills it favored, was the high unity of the governmental party and the heterogeneous action of the opposition bloc. Thus, through the use of Roll Call Vote analysis, this article assigns each of the parties and coalitions a percentage point relative to its degree of approval to the Executive's initiatives. This method indicates that the "Renovacion Nacional" was a pivotal party, which fluctuated between supporting the ruling party and maintaining its stance as an opposition party. Adapted from the source document.

1. The turn to civil community in late medieval thought -- 2. Between city and empire, the quest for unity -- 3. Hobbes and the construction of sovereign power -- 4. The precarious balance of the commonwealth -- 5. History and reconciliation : Hegel and the passing of natural law -- 6. Enlightenment : Hegel's theory of state -- 7. A world adrift : from sovereignty to executive power.

Central to the recent argument from the "unitary executive" is the claim that the unitary executive is consistent with the text and history of the Constitution. But because this veracity and importance of this claim is contested, unitarians also argue that the unitary executive is consistent with democratic theory. This article examines that argument by addressing a question in the political thought of Alexander Hamilton. Although Hamilton was an important defender of an energetic executive, and is associated with an expansive interpretation of executive power, he wrote in The Federalist that the president and Senate would share the removal power. In contrast with existing scholarship, which either overlooks Hamilton's statement on removals or dismisses it as a careless error, this article argues that Hamilton's statement limiting presidential removals illuminates his larger argument about executive energy. By showing how "duration" would check "unity," this article clarifies Hamilton's political thought and offers an important critique of the modern argument from the unitary executive.

"Mr. Pendleton, from the Select Committee on the bill (S. 227) to provide that the Principal Officer of each of the Executive Departments may occupy a seat on the floor of the Senate and House of Representatives, submitted the following report, . ; "February 4, 1881. Ordered to be printed." ; Running title: Heads of departments to occupy seats on the floor of Senate and House of Representatives. ; Title from caption. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The British Westminster parliament is frequently dismissed as a weak policy actor, in the face of dominant executive power. But through analysis of 4361 amendments to 12 government bills, and over 120 interviews, we suggest six reasons for doubting the orthodox view. These fall into three groups: overstating government success in making amendments, overstating non-government failure, and overlooking parliamentary influence before and after the formal passage of bills. We demonstrate that Westminster in fact has substantial influence in the policy process, not readily visible through commonly published data. Uncovering influence requires careful tracking of amendments, but also qualitative analysis of actors' motivations and the power of 'anticipated reactions'. Because Westminster is often seen as being at the weak end of a comparative spectrum of parliamentary influence, these results are important for demonstrating both the dynamics of British politics, and of parliamentary systems more broadly.