Suchergebnisse

In the comparative political economy of rich democracies there is a long tradition of classifying countries into one of a small number of categories based on their economic institutions and policies. The most recent of these is the Varieties of Capitalism project, which posits two major clusters of nations: coordinated and liberal market economies. This classification has generated controversy. We leverage recent advances in mixture model-based clustering to see what the data say on the matter. We find that there is considerable uncertainty around the number of clusters and, barring a few cases, which country should be placed in which cluster. Moreover, when viewed over time, both the number of clusters and country membership change considerably. As a result, arguments about who has the right typology are misplaced. We urge caution in using these country classifications in structuring qualitative inquiry and discourage their usage as indicator variables in quantitative analysis, especially in the context of time-series cross-section data. We argue that the real value of both Esping-Andersen's work and the Varieties of Capitalism project consists of their theoretical contributions and heuristic classification of ideal types. ; In der vergleichenden Politischen Ökonomie reicher Demokratien gibt es eine lange Tradition, Länder aufgrund ihrer unterschiedlichen wirtschaftlichen Institutionen und Policies zu typologisieren. Die jüngste dieser Typologien das Varieties-of-Capitalism-Konzept erfasst zwei Gruppen von Ländern: koordinierte und liberale Marktwirtschaften. Da diese Klassifizierung einige Kontroversen hervorgerufen hat, nutzen die Autoren neueste Fortschritte im mixture model-based clustering, um zu prüfen, welche Erkenntnisse die Daten zu diesem Problem liefern. Die Ergebnisse weisen eine beträchtliche Unsicherheit hinsichtlich der Anzahl der Cluster und, mit wenigen Ausnahmen, der Zuordnung der Länder zu Clustern auf. Betrachtet man größere Zeiträume, variieren darüber hinaus die Anzahl der Cluster und Ländermitgliedschaften erheblich. Als Folge dieser Befunde halten die Autoren Argumentationen über die richtige Typologisierung für unangebracht und raten davon ab, diese Länderklassifizierungen zur Strukturierung qualitativer Studien heranzuziehen oder als Indikatorvariablen in quantitativen Analysen zu nutzen. Dies gilt insbesondere im Kontext von gepoolten Zeitreihen- und Querschnittsdaten. Sie argumentieren, dass der substanzielle Wert sowohl der Forschung von Esping-Andersen als auch des Varieties-of-Capitalism-Ansatzes in den Beiträgen zur Theorie und den heuristischen Klassifizierungen von Idealtypen besteht.

This article analyses how transparency became a buzzword in the European Union (EU) and its predecessors. In order to do so, it examines how the European Parliament (EP), the European Commission, the Court of Justice, and earlier European institutions responded to whistleblowing, between 1957 and 2002. In 2019, the EP agreed to encourage and protect whistleblowers. However, whistleblowing is far from a recent phenomenon. Historical examples include Louis Worms (1957), Stanley Adams (1973), and Paul van Buitenen (1998). Based on policy documents and parliamentary debates, this article studies the attitudes and reactions within European institutions towards whistleblowing. Their responses to unauthorized disclosures show how their views on openness developed from the beginning of European integration. Such cases sparked debate on whether whistleblowers deserved praise for revealing misconduct, or criticism for breaching corporate and political secrecy. In addition, whistleblowing cases urged politicians and officials to discuss how valuable transparency was, and whether the public deserved to be informed. This article adds a historical perspective to the multidisciplinary literature on whistleblowing. Both its focus on the European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, and EU and its focus on changing attitudes towards transparency provide an important contribution to this multidisciplinary field.

We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find that the anticipation of receiving new loan programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.

The aim of this research note is to begin to develop the idea that trade unions are historically constructed as much through considerations of social identity as they are through calculations of economic self-interest, market power, or functional adaptation in the face of changes in the division of labor. By social identity, I mean the desire for group distinction, dignity, and place within historically specific discourses (or frames of understanding) about the character, structure, and boundaries of the polity and the economy. Institutions such as trade unions, in other words, are constituted through and by particular understandings of the structure of the social and political worlds of which they are part. In making this argument, it should be immediately said that I in no way intend to claim that trade unions are only to be understood through the lens of identity or that they do not engage in strategic calculation either in labor markets or in the broader political economy. The point is that action along the latter lines presupposes some kind of commitment on, and even resolution of, issues concerning the former. The discussion below focuses on the emergence of trade union movements in the United States and Germany during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It Attempts first to develope the two cases as constituting a paradox and then, second, explains the paradox with an argument about identity.

ABSTRACTCharges are frequently leveled that the peer-review system is broken, and reviewers are overburdened with requests. But this specific charge has been made in the absence of data about the actual reviewing loads of political scientists. I report the results of a recent survey asking a random sample of about 600 APSA members with PhDs what their reviewing loads are like and what their beliefs are about the value of peer reviewing to them and others. Article reviewing loads correspond to rank, institution, and scholarly productivity in predictable ways. At PhD-granting institutions, assistant professors averaged 5.5, associate professors averaged 7.0, and full professors averaged 8.3 in the past year; everyone else averaged just under 3 reviews a year. To recognize the value we place on peer reviewing, we need a system that collects data on who reviews and presents them in a format usable by scholars and their relevant evaluation bodies.

IFPRI4; CRP2; F Strengthening institutions and governance ; DSGD; PIM ; PR ; CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM)

The article discusses the politics of the labor market reform aimed at employment deregulation and decrease in firing costs. Such reform promises to benefit most of the population and is expected to affect positively job creation and aggregate employment. However, any reforms of labor market institutions are extremely complicated in the political aspect. The author discusses two closely interconnected questions: why these reforms are so difficult for politicians and which measures can help in overcoming the existing political constraints.

In this article, we want to understand the relationship between states and global health financing organizations and how they seek to advance human rights in their grant programs. We therefore ask: to what extent can global financing institutions shape human rights practices at the domestic level? The article uses the case study of the GFATM's experience of adopting human rights as an institutional norm and analyzes the implications for the institution's new role as a human rights actor within states. In particular, we argue that the institutional design of the institution impacts on the ability of the GFATM to substantively enhance human rights agendas within local health governance contexts.

Environmental regulation in middle-income and developing countries is often viewed with high degrees of pessimism. Although many countries have adopted protective laws, violations are widespread and institutions are weak. This paper analyzes the puzzle of shifting patterns of environmental regulation in Argentina, a country with widespread institutional weakness. Most regulators in Argentina take a firefighting approach, acting only when skirmishes emerge between communities and firms. Amidst regulatory chaos, improvements in the environmental performance of firms are few, and noncompliance remains the norm. However, in the province of Tucumán, the pattern of regulation shifted, and officials began to systematically enforce regulations. This paper traces shifts in patterns of enforcement back to broad pressures that provoked industry and environmentalists to support increases in the internal and external components of state regulatory capacity. The analysis uncovers political dynamics that can contribute to strengthening the institutions necessary for sustainable development.

It is becoming difficult to maintain consensus in a period of economic austerity, and this possibly challenges the ability of democratic institutions to take decisions on tough economic questions. In order to find out how political consensus influences fiscal outcomes, this article sets out to analyse the association between political consensus and public expenditure growth. The results show that political consensus is positively associated with both budgeted and actual expenditure growth, but also negatively associated with budget overruns. This indicates that political consensus comes at a cost, while at the same time politicians may be better at sticking to budgets if political consensus exists. The analysis is based on a pooled regression analysis of the local governments in Denmark in the years 2008 and 2009 using a data set combining survey data with administrative data on the local governments. Adapted from the source document.

Intro -- Title Page -- Contributors -- Foreword -- Introduction: Religion, Conflict and Democracy -- Part 1: The Theoretical Perspectives of Religion in Africa -- Chapter 1: Violence and Social Imagination -- Chapter 2: The African Renaissance and Religion -- Chapter 3: Religion, Violence, and Conflict -- Part 2: Religion, Democracy, and Conflict Resolution in East Africa -- Chapter 4: Religion and the Road to Democracy in Kenya -- Chapter 5: Forgiveness -- Chapter 6: Church and State Conflicts in Uganda -- Part 3: Religion and State Formation in the Shadow of Apartheid in South Africa -- Chapter 7: From Apartheid's Christian Hegemony to Religious Pluralism -- Chapter 8: Instruments or Inhibitors of Civil Society? -- Chapter 9: Bahia and Zion -- Part 4: Religious Pluralism and Social Change in West Africa -- Chapter 10: Religion and Social Change in Multi-Ethnic Nigerian Society -- Chapter 11: Shari'a, Democracy, and Civil Society -- Chapter 12: Nigerian Civil Government and the Application of Islamic Law.

Considerable debate exists over the impact of electoral institutions on turnout in U.S. national elections. To address this debate, I exploit the rich variation in electoral rules present throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Using a newly constructed dataset of district-level turnout results for the U.S. House from 1840 to 1940, I find that electoral institutions and political competition jointly provided incentives, and by the turn-of-the-century disincentives, for political leaders to mobilize the electorate. The results demonstrate that changes in electoral institutions and varying levels of political competition help explain congressional turnout across districts and over time. Adapted from the source document.