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Contemporary political scientists argue that citizens of established democracies engage in the activities of political participation more actively than the ones of new democracies. However, little is known about the extent of such a difference, therefore, the paper attempts to quantify it by comparing the activeness of political participation in a new democracy – Lithuania, and in an established one – Germany. The margin of the difference presumed is determined by utilizing a descriptive statistical analysis method while comparing three forms of political participation in the analyzed countries: voting, protests, and membership in political parties. The article finishes by putting the differences in the activity of political participation in concrete numbers, and is concluded with the following statement: Germans are voting more often, however, Lithuanian citizens protest more frequently, and join political parties more actively than the German ones.

Contemporary political scientists argue that citizens of established democracies engage in the activities of political participation more actively than the ones of new democracies. However, little is known about the extent of such a difference, therefore, the paper attempts to quantify it by comparing the activeness of political participation in a new democracy – Lithuania, and in an established one – Germany. The margin of the difference presumed is determined by utilizing a descriptive statistical analysis method while comparing three forms of political participation in the analyzed countries: voting, protests, and membership in political parties. The article finishes by putting the differences in the activity of political participation in concrete numbers, and is concluded with the following statement: Germans are voting more often, however, Lithuanian citizens protest more frequently, and join political parties more actively than the German ones.

Political corruption is one of the globe's most pressing yet seemingly permanent problems. It is a root cause of low growth and inequality, and plagues numerous nations throughout the world to varying degrees. This book examines corruption levels in sixty-four developing democracies over a twenty-year period

One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autocracies, almost never fight each other. Recent empirical findings show that binding term limits invalidate this result: democratic dyads in which at least one country imposes term limits on the executive are as conflict prone as autocratic and mixed dyads. Moreover, in democracies with two-term limits conflicts are more likely during the executive's second term. To rationalize these findings, we model international relations as a repeated prisoners' dilemma. We show that the fear of losing office makes democratic leaders less willing to start costly conflicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can run for re-election. Term limits thus make it harder to sustain peaceful relations.

The origins and immediate vitality of the left/right divide which emerged in French revolutionary politics from 1789 can only be understood against the background of a much older classification dynamic based on the primacy of the right hand, first described by Robert Hertz in 1909. This dynamic infused political thinking first in Versailles and since 1815 in democracies throughout the world. In the process, the classical left/right polarity acquired a new dimension: the complementary notions of 'accepting' and 'questioning' the existing social order. An essential feature of both the age-old classical polarity and the ensuing political polarity is that they are intimately bound up with local and evolving social contexts: there is no single content-based definition of left and right. As long as the majority of us are predisposed to use our right hand when acting in the world, 'left versus right' will remain the most important political antithesis in western-type democracies. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

The origins and immediate vitality of the left/right divide which emerged in French revolutionary politics from 1789 can only be understood against the background of a much older classification dynamic based on the primacy of the right hand, first described by Robert Hertz in 1909. This dynamic infused political thinking first in Versailles and since 1815 in democracies throughout the world. In the process, the classical left/right polarity acquired a new dimension: the complementary notions of 'accepting' and 'questioning' the existing social order. An essential feature of both the age-old classical polarity and the ensuing political polarity is that they are intimately bound up with local and evolving social contexts: there is no single content-based definition of left and right. As long as the majority of us are predisposed to use our right hand when acting in the world, 'left versus right' will remain the most important political antithesis in western-type democracies.

AbstractUntil the early 1990s, the Italian political system was regarded as anomalous among advanced democracies because of its failure to achieve alternation in government. Since then, that problem has been overcome, but Italy has been popularly viewed as continuing to be different to other democracies because it is 'in transition' between regimes. However, this position itself is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain because of the length of time of this so-called transition. Rather than focus on what is rather an abstract debate, it may be more fruitful to analyse what, in substance, is distinctive about Italian politics in this period: the manner in which a debate over fundamental institutional (including electoral) reform has become entangled in day-to-day politics. This can best be exemplified through an analysis of two key electoral consultations held in 2006: the national elections and the referendum on radically revising the Italian Constitution.

"August, 1997." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 125-129). ; Mode of access: Internet.

Are citizens in consensus democracies with developed direct democratic institutions more satisfied with their political system than those in majoritarian democracies? In this article, individual-level data from the second wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and an updated version of Lijphart's multivariate measure of consensus and majoritarian democracy covering 24 countries are used to investigate this question. The findings from logistic multilevel models indicate that consensual cabinet types and direct democratic institutions are associated with higher levels of citizens' satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, consensus democracy in these institutions closes the gap in satisfaction with democracy between losers and winners of elections by both comforting losers and reducing the satisfaction of winners. Simultaneously, consensus democracy in terms of electoral rules, the executive-legislative power balance, interest groups and the party system reduces the satisfaction of election winners, but does not enhance that of losers. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractIt can be challenging for a democratic government to effectively make policies that address crucial national problems. While a bulk of literature reports that many democracies have overcome this challenge through centralization of legislative organization, few studies have explained why legislative decentralization that allegedly impairs policymaking performance would take place. Drawing on Taiwan's experience and over 13,000 legislative bills proposed in Taiwan's parliament between 1993 and 2012, this article demonstrates that the legislative decentralization during the onset of Taiwan's democratization slightly revived the policymaking performance of a near-paralysed parliament. Like drinking poison to quench the thirst, myopic politicians may opt for legislative decentralization as an instant remedy to ease severe legislative obstruction, despite the unfavourable consequences that the resulting decentralized legislative organization may eventually bring about. These findings shed new light on the evolution of legislative organization and account for the difficulties in policymaking facing developing democracies.

This article investigates patterns of generalized trust among local political and administrative leaders. It explains the differences therein and studies the impact of such trust on the inclination to involve people in policy-making processes. The research is based on a survey among approximately 16,000 local administrators and politicians in 665 communities in 18 countries. The findings are analyzed using a multi-level model. It is found that generalized trust among local policy-makers, as a form of low-level risk, can be explained by the judgment about past experiences with public participation, the judgment of the abilities of the constituency and the scope of problems in the community. Regarding the impact of trust on the propensity to involve people in the policy-making process, significant differences are found between old, new and newest democracies. In the old democracies there is hardly a relation between the tendency to seek the support of citizens on the one hand and generalized trust on the other hand. The severity of social problems has in these countries a positive effect on involving citizens. In the new and especially the newest democracies, the relation between trust and support-seeking behavior is significantly stronger. When problems become less urgent in those countries and the local policy-maker does show generalized trust,(s)he is significantly more inclined than his/her colleagues to seek the support of the people. This implies that there might exist a paradox, namely that in order to enhance practices of good governance, claiming these are more effective, one already needs a society in which policy-making is relatively effective and that has adequate problem-solving capacity.

Voter turnout levels have been steadily declining in the whole of the world's democracies, for the last decades. This finding is quite consensual among electoral behavior scholars. For example, Blais (2007) looks at 106 democracies throughout around 35 years, concluding that average voter turnout levels have begun to decline in the 1990's, and that the average level of such decline is 8 percentage points. This situation is even more problematic if we take into account that one of the major drivers of such a decline is the demobilization of young citizens, who vote at even lower rates than the rest of the population. Such fact has led some to predict a worsening of this problem in the future (Blais & Rubenson 2013). ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Reports dated October 8-9, 1943. ; At head of title: [No. 37]. ; Caption title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Advocates for economic development often call for greater transparency. But what does transparency really mean? What are its consequences? This breakthrough book demonstrates how information impacts major political phenomena, including mass protest, the survival of dictatorships, democratic stability, as well as economic performance. The book introduces a new measure of a specific facet of transparency: the dissemination of economic data. Analysis shows that democracies make economic data more available than do similarly developed autocracies. Transparency attracts investment and makes democracies more resilient to breakdown. But transparency has a dubious consequence under autocracy: political instability. Mass-unrest becomes more likely, and transparency can facilitate democratic transition - but most often a new despotic regime displaces the old. Autocratic leaders may also turn these threats to their advantage, using the risk of mass-unrest that transparency portends to unify the ruling elite. Policy-makers must recognize the trade-offs transparency entails

How does counter‐terrorism legislation – enacted in democratic states – impact upon charities, intentionally or unintentionally? To address this question, we present a new analytical framework that allows us to compare, across established democracies, how charity legislation and counter‐terrorism legislation are connected, enabling us to assess how charities' legal environments have changed since 9/11. Comparing legislation across six long‐lived democracies (the UK, US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Ireland), we distinguish between three types of legislative connection: overlap, direct intersection and indirect intersection. These categories differ in terms of the visibility of the connection established between the two areas of law. As high‐profile reform exercises, both overlap and direct intersections have been predominantly introduced post‐9/11. But it is through indirect intersections that intensified post‐9/11 which are most vague and difficult to manoeuvre, that the day‐to‐day activities of charities are most likely to be affected, with important empirical and normative repercussions.