Suchergebnisse

The crisis of authority in the U.S.S.R. (1988 - July 1991).
After a preliminary reference to the ideological options open to Mikhail Gorbachev, initiator of the break-up of Stalinism, and the mistrust which be inspires, both among some of his opponents as well as among right-wing conservatives, the author considers the recent evolution of the Soviet Union, from the monopoly of Party rule to the difficult birth of a pluralistic regime.
He first raises the question of the Party's attitude to perestroika. Article 6 of the Constitution of 1977, which aknowledges the leading role of the Party, was reluctantly annulled by Gorbachev, but annuled it was, thus leaving the way open for pluralism. Condemnation of factionalism within the body of the Party has not prevented the emergence of various "tendencies" (particularly the democratic Platform and the marxist Platform) which find official expression. Similarly, political and social groupings, independent of authority, began to proliferate : from groupings moved by a common principle, for example tne Safeguarding of the national heritage, or the defense of the environment, they rapidly became popular fronts, lending the system a de facto pluralism which would only later enjoy a de jure existence.
This spontaneous development took shape first of all in the Baltic countries, and then with increasing momentum spread to all the republics. In parallel with this, the communist Party leadership initiated a reform of the political system, which found expression in the semi-free elections of March 1989, marked by the defeat of various party and State notables. This was the beginning of a multi-party system, there having been two major opposing tendencies during the campaign for the regional elections in the spring of 1990 : the democratic Russia bloc (liberal) and the patriotic Russian bloc (conservative), surrounded by a multiplicity of organizations of the most diverse and constantly evolving tendencies. The charge levelled against them is that they have no autonomous ideas or initiative, and have only one single programme : mass rejection of the Party apparatus. Some observers are of the opinion that a deep schism will develop within the CPSU, and that this will give rise to a real multi-party system. The first stage of this development has just begun, with the movement for democratic reforms, which was launched in July 1991 by frontline reformers.
The other major problem which arises is that of the preservation or the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The authority of the Center is in question, and already six republics have decided to leave the union, proclaiming their sovereignty loud and long (the three Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia and Moldavia). But although the right of scission is officially acknowledged, its implementation is a vast battleground (see the law of 3rd April 1990). The upsurge of centrifugal forces has led the republics, one after the other,
to proclame their sovereignty (primacy of republican laws over federal laws, economic autonomy, ownership of the soil and mineral deposits, etc.) or their outright indépendance. Autonomous Republics and territories followed suit, opposing the authorities of the republics to which they belonged. Inter-ethnic conflict broke out all over.
The dispute over federal authority led to a "way over laws", setting the Centre at odd with republics resolved to insist on recognition of their rights (ownership of all the ressources found on their territory, freedom to exploit these resources, etc.). In this context, the question of finance and the budget had pride of place, together with that of material and technological supplies. The entire supply system was disorganized, with the republics refusing to carry out the orders of the State, or to deliver consumers' goods outside of their frontiers, in order to avoid a worsening of their own shortages. The Soviet government tried to combat the supply problems, at least in part, by setting up commodity markets. A series of economic programms was worked out, including V. Pavlov's anti-crisis plan (April 1991) which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, but it is not entirely clear how the economic responsabilities will be apportioned among the Central authorities, the republics and the lower-rank administrative bodies, and what will be the share of the state and private sectors. Also, it is not known how he proposes to overcome the present crisis, and how long this will take.
Another major source of discord is the army and the police. The republics demand the right to raise armed forces, and to assume the responsability for maintaning order within their territory. Certain of them, who have been the victims of attacks by the special forces of the Ministry of Interior, the OMON, have organized militias and defense groups, wich are virtually republican armies in embryo.
In the end, there was an overriding necessity for redefining the Union, and the first version of the new Union Treaty was adopted by referendum on the 17th March 1991. A slightly modified version of it was published on the 19th June, but neither the one nor the other gives a very clear idea of the respective areas of competence and the common areas of competence of the Centre and the constituent republics of the Union (and still less of the fate in store for secessionist republics). On the other hand, one can be sure that the Treaty will be the source of innumerable controversies and disputes, especially on the particularly explosive issue of the budget, taxation and the distribution of ressources. In the final part, the author ventures some thoughts on the future. He sets perestroika in the continuing context of the history of the Russian empire, recalling that the demands made (individual freedoms and democracy, self-determination and decolonization) were already those of the protagonists of the Russian democratic revolution of February-March 1917, which was "taken over" by the Bolshevik coup d'Etat. Now that the empire has fallen victim to its contradictions and weaknesses, and finally disintegrated, what will take its place ? The cure prescribed by the Union Treaty seems ill-adapted to the task, and several outcomes are possible : a resolute commitment to the way of democracy and decolonization, a return to an authoritarian régime but one establishing a market economy, the option of passivity while waiting for a solution "which will come of itself, or a return to thorough-going, tough dictatorship accompanied by a blood bath. If Gorbachev does not once more take his courage in both hands, and proceeds to decolonize the empire, however slow and piecemeal the process, others will do it for him. And in that case, we may fear the worst.

Cuba est une île tropicale située à 150 kilomètres en ligne droiteau Sud des États-Unis. Sa surface est environ le 1/5 (le celle dela France et sa population, environ le 1/6. Jusqu'à ce jour, elle avécu presque exclusivement de ses. exportations de sucre dont plusde la moitié était acceptée à un de faveur par les Etats-Unis.Le déséquilibre entraîné par cette monoculture de la canne à sucreet ce commerce spécialisé à l'extrême, était tel que Cuba importait,alors qu'elle aurait pu les produire, les biens les plus élémentaires(légumes, fruits, viandes, cigarettes) sans parler bien entendit desproduits industriels et forestiers.En outre, cette monoculture et ce commerce du sucre étaiententre les mains d'une très faible minorité dont la moitié était denationalité étrangère. Plus de 50 % de la terre appartenait ft moinsde 1 % de la population et 894 propriétés occupaient 36,1 % de laterre.Autrefois riches et vastes, les forêts de Cuba avaient souffert,plus que toute autre richesse, de la monoculture de la canne à sucre:on en avait défriché une grande partie en vue de la culture,tandis que le reste, dont le sol était peu fertile, avait été épuisé sansqu'on sc préoccupe de sa conservation. On préférait en effet exporterdu sucre et importer, fût-.e à des prix exhorbitants, les produitsforestiers. Cuba importait donc 80 % des produits forestiers qu'elleconsommait (bois de feu et charbon de bois exclus).Le résultat de tous ces abus est qu'actuellement la forêt ne remplità Cuba que de façon très imparfaite les fonctions de production etde protection qui, normalement. devraient lui revenir.Le régime du Docteur Fidel CASTRO qui s'est installé le 1er janvier1959, est conscient de la gravité du problème forestier à Cuba.Sa politique forestière entre dans le cadre de sa politique économiquegénérale qui tend it diversifier la production dans tous lesdomaines et à industrialiser le pays. Les moyens de caractère politiqueou économique employés pour y arriver sont fondamentalement:la réforme agraire et l'organisation de la production sur unebase collectiviste, caractérisée par un étroit contrôle de l'État.Du point de vue forestier, en particulier, tout est actuellementréalisé par l'Etat sur les terres expropriées au titre de la réformeagraire. Pour faire face aux exigences d'un programme économique ambitieuxet en raison de la rareté des devises, le Gouvernement cubains'achemine malheureusement vers l'épuisement des rares forêts quiexistent encore. C'est l'aspect négatif, regrettable mais peut-êtreinévitable, de cette politique forestière. Mais elle a aussi son aspectpositif, représenté par l'énorme et spectaculaire programme de plantationsartificielles considérées un peu comme des cultures d'arbres.En 1960, par exemple, on a planté à Cuba, avec labour préalableet emploi d'engrais, plus de 12 000 hectares d'eucalyptus et il estprobable qu'en 1961 on en aura planté le double.Bien que jusqu'alors on ait principalement utilisé Eucalyptus saligna,on s'oriente de plus en plus vers la plantation de Pijius caribaoaqui présente bien plus d'avantages.En réalité, avec ses bonnes terres, son climat chaud et humide,Cuba présente des conditions extraordinairement favorables pourtoutes les cultures tropicales ou subtropicales et pour la forêt.Si la politique ainsi esquissée est mise en oeuvre de façon méthodiqueet selon un plan coordonné, il est probable que Cuba pourra,d'ici 10 à 20 ans, produire une grande partie des matières premièresforestières qu'elle consomme et qui sont nécessaires, en particulier,à la fabrication de sciages, de pâte et de papier, de rayonne, de»anneaux, etc.En même temps, elle économiserait une grande quantité de deviseset donnerait du travail à une population dont une grandepartie n'est active que durant les 100 jours annuels représentés parla durée de la récolte de la canne à sucre et rendrait productifs desterrains qui, actuellement, ne le sont pas. ; Cuba is a tropical island lying 1 50 kilometres on a straight linefrom the South of the United States. It extends over an area onefifth of that of France and its population is about one sixth ofthat of France. Up to now it has lived almost exclusively on itssugar exports, more than half of which were accepted by the UnitedStates at a specially favourable rate. The lack of economic balancecaused by this sugar-cane single crop and this over-specializedtrade, was such that Cuba, instead ofproducing the mostelementary goods (viz, vegetables, fruit, meat, cigarettes), withouteven mentioning industrial and forest products, had to import them.Besides, this single culture and sugar trade were in the hands ofa small minority of owners, half of which were of foreign origin.More than 50 fir, of the land belonged to less than 1 % of the populationand 894 holdings covered 36,1 % of the land.The forests of Cuba formerly large and rich, had suffered morethan any other natural resource from this sugar-cane single culture.Most of them had been cleared up with a view to cultivation whilethe remainder growing on rather poor soil, had been depleted withoutany regard to its conservation. As a matter of fact, exportingsugar and importing forest products, even at prohibitive prices, wasdeemed preferable. Therefore, Cuba imported 80 Jo of the forestproducts it consumed (firewood and charcoal excepted).As a result of these abuses, forests in Cuba, serve but imperfectlythe double purpose of production and protection which shouldnormally fall to it.Dr Fidel Castro's regime which was settled on January 1st 1959,is aware of the seriousness of forest problems in Cuba. Its forestpolicy is part of its general economic policy which aims at diversifyingthe production in every field and industrializing the country.The basic political or economic means used to reach that aim are:an agrarian reform, the organization of production on a colectivebasis, under strict state supervision.As far as forestry is concerned, in particular, everything is atpresent carried out by the State on land expropriated in compliancewith the agrarian reform.To meet the requirements of an ambitious economic .program andowing to the scarcity of foreign exchange stock, the Cuban Government is unfortunately on its way towards the depletion of its.few remaining forests. Here is the negative aspect of this forestpolicy, which must be deplored, but cannot perhaps be avoided. Butit has also its positive aspect, represented by an extensive and spectacularprogram of artificial plantations considered in a way as treeculture.In 1960, for example, more than 12 000 ha have been planted witheucalypts, after preliminary ploughing and fertilization, and it is likelythat in 1961 an area twice as large will be planted. Though upto now the main species has been Eucalyptus saligna, there is atendency to ;plant Pinos caribaea, more and more, because it is muchmore suitable.As a matter of fact, Cuba, with its rich soil, its warm and moistclimate, offers conditions extremely favourable to tropical and subtropicalcultures and to forests.If the policy outlined here is carried into effect systematically andaccording to a coordinated plan, in 10 to 20 years hence, Cuba islikely to be able to produce a large portion of the forest raw materialsnecessary to its consumption and to the manufacture of sawn timber,pulp. and paper, artificial silk, fiber and particle boards, etc.At the same time, it would spare a large amount of foreign exchangestock and would provide work for a population, most ofwhich has no activity beyond the 100 clays per year which correspondto the period of sugar-cane crop, and would derive profits fromnow unproductive land.

International audience ; Cuba is a tropical island lying 1 50 kilometres on a straight linefrom the South of the United States. It extends over an area onefifth of that of France and its population is about one sixth ofthat of France. Up to now it has lived almost exclusively on itssugar exports, more than half of which were accepted by the UnitedStates at a specially favourable rate. The lack of economic balancecaused by this sugar-cane single crop and this over-specializedtrade, was such that Cuba, instead ofproducing the mostelementary goods (viz, vegetables, fruit, meat, cigarettes), withouteven mentioning industrial and forest products, had to import them.Besides, this single culture and sugar trade were in the hands ofa small minority of owners, half of which were of foreign origin.More than 50 fir, of the land belonged to less than 1 % of the populationand 894 holdings covered 36,1 % of the land.The forests of Cuba formerly large and rich, had suffered morethan any other natural resource from this sugar-cane single culture.Most of them had been cleared up with a view to cultivation whilethe remainder growing on rather poor soil, had been depleted withoutany regard to its conservation. As a matter of fact, exportingsugar and importing forest products, even at prohibitive prices, wasdeemed preferable. Therefore, Cuba imported 80 Jo of the forestproducts it consumed (firewood and charcoal excepted).As a result of these abuses, forests in Cuba, serve but imperfectlythe double purpose of production and protection which shouldnormally fall to it.Dr Fidel Castro's regime which was settled on January 1st 1959,is aware of the seriousness of forest problems in Cuba. Its forestpolicy is part of its general economic policy which aims at diversifyingthe production in every field and industrializing the country.The basic political or economic means used to reach that aim are:an agrarian reform, the organization of production on a colectivebasis, under strict state supervision.As far as forestry is concerned, in particular, everything is atpresent carried out by the State on land expropriated in compliancewith the agrarian reform.To meet the requirements of an ambitious economic .program andowing to the scarcity of foreign exchange stock, the Cuban Government is unfortunately on its way towards the depletion of its.few remaining forests. Here is the negative aspect of this forestpolicy, which must be deplored, but cannot perhaps be avoided. Butit has also its positive aspect, represented by an extensive and spectacularprogram of artificial plantations considered in a way as treeculture.In 1960, for example, more than 12 000 ha have been planted witheucalypts, after preliminary ploughing and fertilization, and it is likelythat in 1961 an area twice as large will be planted. Though upto now the main species has been Eucalyptus saligna, there is atendency to ;plant Pinos caribaea, more and more, because it is muchmore suitable.As a matter of fact, Cuba, with its rich soil, its warm and moistclimate, offers conditions extremely favourable to tropical and subtropicalcultures and to forests.If the policy outlined here is carried into effect systematically andaccording to a coordinated plan, in 10 to 20 years hence, Cuba islikely to be able to produce a large portion of the forest raw materialsnecessary to its consumption and to the manufacture of sawn timber,pulp. and paper, artificial silk, fiber and particle boards, etc.At the same time, it would spare a large amount of foreign exchangestock and would provide work for a population, most ofwhich has no activity beyond the 100 clays per year which correspondto the period of sugar-cane crop, and would derive profits fromnow unproductive land. ; Cuba est une île tropicale située à 150 kilomètres en ligne droiteau Sud des États-Unis. Sa surface est environ le 1/5 (le celle dela France et sa population, environ le 1/6. Jusqu'à ce jour, elle avécu presque exclusivement de ses. exportations de sucre dont plusde la moitié était acceptée à un de faveur par les Etats-Unis.Le déséquilibre entraîné par cette monoculture de la canne à sucreet ce commerce spécialisé à l'extrême, était tel que Cuba importait,alors qu'elle aurait pu les produire, les biens les plus élémentaires(légumes, fruits, viandes, cigarettes) sans parler bien entendit desproduits industriels et forestiers.En outre, cette monoculture et ce commerce du sucre étaiententre les mains d'une très faible minorité dont la moitié était denationalité étrangère. Plus de 50 % de la terre appartenait ft moinsde 1 % de la population et 894 propriétés occupaient 36,1 % de laterre.Autrefois riches et vastes, les forêts de Cuba avaient souffert,plus que toute autre richesse, de la monoculture de la canne à sucre:on en avait défriché une grande partie en vue de la culture,tandis que le reste, dont le sol était peu fertile, avait été épuisé sansqu'on sc préoccupe de sa conservation. On préférait en effet exporterdu sucre et importer, fût-.e à des prix exhorbitants, les produitsforestiers. Cuba importait donc 80 % des produits forestiers qu'elleconsommait (bois de feu et charbon de bois exclus).Le résultat de tous ces abus est qu'actuellement la forêt ne remplità Cuba que de façon très imparfaite les fonctions de production etde protection qui, normalement. devraient lui revenir.Le régime du Docteur Fidel CASTRO qui s'est installé le 1er janvier1959, est conscient de la gravité du problème forestier à Cuba.Sa politique forestière entre dans le cadre de sa politique économiquegénérale qui tend it diversifier la production dans tous lesdomaines et à industrialiser le pays. Les moyens de caractère politiqueou économique employés pour y arriver sont fondamentalement:la réforme agraire et l'organisation de la production sur unebase collectiviste, caractérisée par un étroit contrôle de l'État.Du point de vue forestier, en particulier, tout est actuellementréalisé par l'Etat sur les terres expropriées au titre de la réformeagraire. Pour faire face aux exigences d'un programme économique ambitieuxet en raison de la rareté des devises, le Gouvernement cubains'achemine malheureusement vers l'épuisement des rares forêts quiexistent encore. C'est l'aspect négatif, regrettable mais peut-êtreinévitable, de cette politique forestière. Mais elle a aussi son aspectpositif, représenté par l'énorme et spectaculaire programme de plantationsartificielles considérées un peu comme des cultures d'arbres.En 1960, par exemple, on a planté à Cuba, avec labour préalableet emploi d'engrais, plus de 12 000 hectares d'eucalyptus et il estprobable qu'en 1961 on en aura planté le double.Bien que jusqu'alors on ait principalement utilisé Eucalyptus saligna,on s'oriente de plus en plus vers la plantation de Pijius caribaoaqui présente bien plus d'avantages.En réalité, avec ses bonnes terres, son climat chaud et humide,Cuba présente des conditions extraordinairement favorables pourtoutes les cultures tropicales ou subtropicales et pour la forêt.Si la politique ainsi esquissée est mise en oeuvre de façon méthodiqueet selon un plan coordonné, il est probable que Cuba pourra,d'ici 10 à 20 ans, produire une grande partie des matières premièresforestières qu'elle consomme et qui sont nécessaires, en particulier,à la fabrication de sciages, de pâte et de papier, de rayonne, de»anneaux, etc.En même temps, elle économiserait une grande quantité de deviseset donnerait du travail à une population dont une grandepartie n'est active que durant les 100 jours annuels représentés parla durée de la récolte de la canne à sucre et rendrait productifs desterrains qui, actuellement, ne le sont pas.

National audience ; The real causes of the euro crisis (2010-2013) are still questioned. For the European authorities, it is mainly due to the imperfection of the national institutions of the affected countries. In response, the policies implemented in these countries were to correct these imperfections by reforming deeply their national institutions in a move towards a balanced budget and improved competitiveness. In this article, it is argued that the origins of the crisis lie in the very functioning of the Single Market. By organizing the European economy according to the principles of free competition and by promoting the circulation of mobile production factors, the Single Market has strengthened the agglomeration mechanisms, which has led to a European industrial polarization. Although this dynamic has been beneficial for the core European countries, it accelerated the deindustrialization of peripheral economies. Moreover, the policies pursued since 2010 in the countries affected by the euro crisis have failed to correct the economic imbalances. It then appears that only a profound reconsideration of the rules that organize the functioning of the European Single Market would be likely to stop the current divergence dynamics of European economies. ; Les causes de la crise de l'euro (2010-2013) ne font toujours pas consensus. Pour les autorités européennes, la crise serait essentiellement due à l'imperfection des institutions nationales des pays touchés. Les politiques engagées dans ces pays pour y répondre ont donc consisté à corriger ces imperfections en réformant profondément leurs institutions nationales dans une marche vers l'équilibre budgétaire et l'amélioration de la compétitivité. Dans cet article, nous soutenons à l'inverse que les origines de la crise sont à trouver dans le fonctionnement même du marché unique. En organisant l'économie européenne autour des principes d'une libre concurrence et en favorisant la circulation des facteurs de productions mobiles, le marché unique a renforcé les ...

National audience ; The real causes of the euro crisis (2010-2013) are still questioned. For the European authorities, it is mainly due to the imperfection of the national institutions of the affected countries. In response, the policies implemented in these countries were to correct these imperfections by reforming deeply their national institutions in a move towards a balanced budget and improved competitiveness. In this article, it is argued that the origins of the crisis lie in the very functioning of the Single Market. By organizing the European economy according to the principles of free competition and by promoting the circulation of mobile production factors, the Single Market has strengthened the agglomeration mechanisms, which has led to a European industrial polarization. Although this dynamic has been beneficial for the core European countries, it accelerated the deindustrialization of peripheral economies. Moreover, the policies pursued since 2010 in the countries affected by the euro crisis have failed to correct the economic imbalances. It then appears that only a profound reconsideration of the rules that organize the functioning of the European Single Market would be likely to stop the current divergence dynamics of European economies. ; Les causes de la crise de l'euro (2010-2013) ne font toujours pas consensus. Pour les autorités européennes, la crise serait essentiellement due à l'imperfection des institutions nationales des pays touchés. Les politiques engagées dans ces pays pour y répondre ont donc consisté à corriger ces imperfections en réformant profondément leurs institutions nationales dans une marche vers l'équilibre budgétaire et l'amélioration de la compétitivité. Dans cet article, nous soutenons à l'inverse que les origines de la crise sont à trouver dans le fonctionnement même du marché unique. En organisant l'économie européenne autour des principes d'une libre concurrence et en favorisant la circulation des facteurs de productions mobiles, le marché unique a renforcé les ...

The Zambia Mining Investment and Governance Review (MInGov) collects and shares information on mining sector governance, its attractiveness to investors and how its activities affect national development. It reviews sector performance from the perspective of three main stakeholder groups– government, investors in the mining value chain and civil society – and identifies gaps between declared and actual government policy and practice. The review's key findings are: Performance across the value chain is strongest in topics most closely associated with mining and which are related to the content of laws and regulations, though implementation of these is wanting in some instances; Sector development is constrained by a number of bottlenecks; According to investors, a number of areas are constraining mining investment and returns; The three key stakeholder groups agree on a number of topics they believe are particularly important to strengthen sector governance, investment and development impact; Civil society believes there is a number of weaknesses sector governance, including the poor handling of environment and social impacts of mining; problems with human rights associated with the sector; ineffective development planning as it relates to mining; issues concerning land access, compensation and resettlement; and the absence of revenue sharing between national and local government.MInGov's methodology focuses on the status of governance and investment conditions in the mining sector from the perspective of stakeholders, and as reported in primary and secondary sources. However, less-well covered areas include the quality of its infrastructure services, the security of property from theft, the underlying strength of institutions, and ways to enhance mining's contribution to local and national development.This report presents data on mining investment and governance indicators for Zambia that are current as of October 2015.

This guide is designed to ensure that a comprehensive overview of the relevant provisions of the acquis communautaire is available to policymakers, regulators, and other stakeholders in countries with a European vocation or those simply wishing to take the European Union (EU) regulatory model into account when devising their own national approaches. This guide outlines and summarizes the EU legislative framework governing corporate sector accounting and auditing. The guide begins by giving a brief history and overview of the EU, its institutions, and legislative processes in section one. In section two, the guide focuses on the development of the internal market, particularly in the areas of financial market integration and company law harmonization. Section three addresses the harmonization of accounting and auditing in the EU. Section four looks at the most pressing accounting and auditing issues for the EU.

The inability to unlock natural resource wealth for the benefit of developing countries' local populations, a phenomenon popularly known as the 'resource curse' or the 'paradox of plenty', has spawned extensive debate among researchers and policy makers in recent years. There is now a well-established body of literature exploring the links between natural resources and conflict, with some sources estimating that over the past 60 years, 40 percent of civil wars have been associated with natural resources. Following this introduction, Section two provides an overview of interstate tensions in West Africa in order to improve understanding of the drivers of fragility that trigger conflict between countries around extractive industry investment. Here, the discussion is grounded in examples in which interstate tensions have been apparent, including the case of the Mano River Union, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, a region with a history of conflict, and where the exploitation of commercial deposits of high-value resources may continue to have a potentially destabilizing effect. Section three focuses on the decentralization of natural resource revenues, a process that proponents believe can help manage grievances and defuse intrastate tension in areas directly affected by resource extraction, but one that is also not without challenges. Drawing upon the case of Ghana's Mineral Development Fund, the section explores the potential for conflict (and conflict triggers) to arise when the redistribution of extractive industry revenues to subnational regions takes place. In doing so, it becomes apparent that the capture and misuse of revenues from the fund is as much a political issue as it is a policy or technical one. This sets the stage for section four, which focuses in greater detail on extractive industry-related conflict within catchment communities, and how contestation is most often a result of unequal power relationships. Section five, the conclusion, summarizes and reflects upon some of the challenges and struggles over resource management associated with West Africa's recent resource boom, and draws out some of the cross-cutting themes. Here, suitable entry points for future lines of inquiry and engagement are identified.

Traditional measures of trade diversification only take into account contemporaneous export baskets. These measures fail to capture a country's ability to respond to shocks by allocating factors of production into activities for which it has already paid the fixed costs associated with exporting. This paper corrects for the shortcoming of traditional measures of diversification by introducing a novel measure of trade diversification—latent diversification—and proposes a proxy to measure latent diversification, which is calculated by taking into account the entire history of a country's exports. The paper shows that the observed gaps between traditional measures of diversification and the proposed proxy of latent diversification are sizeable; countries hold latent export baskets that are, on average, three times as large as their average contemporaneous export basket, and these gaps are largest for poor and small countries. Moreover, latent diversification is an important determinant of volatility—more diversified latent export baskets are associated with lower terms of trade volatility and, subsequently, lower GDP per capita volatility, even after controlling for the degree of contemporaneous export diversification and other trade and country characteristics. The latter result, together with the disproportionately large latent baskets relative to contemporaneous baskets observed in poor and small countries, suggests that latent diversification is an important vehicle toward stability in countries that face barriers in building diversified contemporaneous export baskets.

More frequent incidences of violence in Afghanistan, as well as delays in the elections process and cabinet formation, continued to fuel uncertainty and affected investor confidence in 2014 and the first half of 2015. Economic growth slowed to 1.3 percent in 2014, down from 3.7 percent a year earlier. Unlike in previous years, agriculture did not contribute much to growth in 2014. Production levels were high for a third year in a row but did not supersede the strong output in 2013. Growth was mainly driven by services and a slight expansion of industries where an increase in construction activities outweighed lower production in manufacturing. Private investment activities showed strong signs of slowdown in 2014, evidenced by a drop of nearly 50 percent in new firm registrations since 2012. The National Unity Government has embarked on an ambitious reform agenda to revitalize the economy, tackle corruption, and improve investment climate. However, it will take time for these reforms to have an impact, and it is yet unclear how much they will mitigate the high risks stemming from the fragile security environment. Growing trends in security and pension and wage spending over the medium term require immediate attention. Afghanistan faces significant financing shortages for both civilian and security spending. Therefore, securing continued high levels of donor financing over the coming years is of critical importance for fiscal stability in the country. The fragile security environment and financing constraints, compounded by weak governance capacity, pose serious challenges to service delivery in Afghanistan. Any setback in reform implementation would further slowdown the pace of human capital accumulation in Afghanistan and reduce future prospects of growth and poverty reduction.

The state-owned enterprise (SOE) landscape has become increasingly diverse. There used to be some relatively well-defined criteria, but with the growing complexity of state participation in the economy, there is no longer a uniform definition, and especially because the definition of a SOE has always been country-specific. SOE reforms can have major positive impacts not only by reducing fiscal risks by decreasing hidden subsidies, direct transfers, and overstaffing, but also by strengthening competition and developing capital markets. SOE reforms in developing countries began in the 1960s because of the poor performance of many of the SOEs. The reform movement sought to strengthen the internal capacity of SOEs. To enrich the discussion about possible avenues for performance-enhancing SOE reforms, this report presents the main principles of good governance of SOEs with references to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs (OECD 2005). This document is divided into six parts: (1) an effective legal and regulatory framework for SOEs; (2) the state as an owner; (3) equitable treatment of shareholders; (4) relations with stakeholders; (5) transparency and disclosure; and (6) the responsibilities of the boards of SOEs.

Peru's recent robust growth has raised its economic prospects and has been broadly shared. The next step in development - high-income status - is challenging for all middle income countries and requires sustained growth. Raising productivity growth is key to sustaining Peru's high growth rates of income per capita, including in the context of a less favorable external environment. This report looks at Peru's principal challenges and opportunities to maintain strong and inclusive growth through higher productivity. It will require a reduction of inefficiencies by reaping more benefits from international trade and an improved innovation framework. The report has five parts. Part one analyzes the sources of Peru's recent strong growth. Part two examines more closely the dynamics and challenges to Peruvian firms' productivity growth. Part three analyzes elements that will increase the efficiency of Peru's labor and capital resources - regulation, labor markets, and human capital. Part four is focused on further opportunities to reduce misallocation while at the same time speeding up within-firm productivity through expanding Peru's technological possibilities, particularly through innovation and the spillovers from international trade. Part five concludes.

This guide is designed to ensure that a comprehensive overview of the relevant provisions of the acquis communautaire is available to policymakers, regulators, and other stakeholders in countries with a European vocation or those simply wishing to take the European Union (EU) regulatory model into account when devising their own national approaches. This guide outlines and summarizes the EU legislative framework governing corporate sector accounting and auditing. It is primarily intended for an audience with little prior knowledge of the EU. Consequently, rather than delving directly into the issues of accounting and auditing, the guide begins by giving a brief history and overview of the EU, its institutions and legislative processes in section one. In section two, the guide focuses on the development of the internal market, particularly in the areas of financial market integration and company law harmonization. Section three addresses the harmonization of accounting and auditing in the EU. Section four looks at the most pressing accounting and auditing issues for the EU.

Report of the Legislative and Regulatory Advisor ; This report documents the activities and findings the legislative and regulatory advisor during his visits made between 19th October and 17th November 2009 to the Ministry of energy of the Republic of Ghana. The purpose of the visits was to meet the officials of the Ministry of energy in Accra and obtain a first-hand brief of the requirements of the Ministry for their review of their draft legislative and regulatory documents for the Ghana oil and gas industry. In June 2007, Ghana discovered commercial quantities of light crude oil with significant amount of associated natural gas in its offshore area. The discovered oil and gas lies in the Jubilee Field, which straddles the offshore Deepwater Tano and the Deepwater West Cape three Points Block, and is located some 50 kilometres from the Ghanaian coast in water depths of between 1020 to 1720 metres. Associated gas is reported to have been tested at a gas-to-oil ratio of 1,058 standard cubic feet per barrel of oil. Oil production of 120,000 barrels per day would therefore provide produced associated gas production of about 127 million standard cubic feet per day. To optimise the benefit of having indigenous supplies of oil and gas, the Government of Ghana now has to effect an administrative and management transition with respect to its petroleum industry. It has to move from simply encouraging investment in exploration to that of managing petroleum production, the enormous values arising from such, and the wise utilisation of the produced oil and gas to drive economic development.

International audience ; Au département "idées et philosophie politique" du Monde des Lettres, Joseph de Maistre semble devoir incarner pour longtemps encore le profil illuminé archétype du polémiste contre-révolutionnaire que l'on sait, doublé d'un papiste non moins convaincu. Même si de telles étiquettes, toutes commodes qu'elles soient parfois, dans leur outrance didactique, rendent en réalité fort mal compte du caractère beaucoup plus singulier, de l'essence autrement multiforme d'une proposition intellectuelle que ce qu'en a retenu le sens commun, ainsi que nous le montrent les études récentes, peu à peu dégagées de toute sédimentation polémique partisane, au fur et à mesure que s'éloigne le souvenir, daté, d'une revendication idéologique de la réception de l'œuvre.Mais l'on oublie trop souvent, jusqu'au sein de la pourtant savante corporation des historiens de feu les États de Savoie, combien il fut également, lui, l'enfant de ce duché berceau de la dynastie éponyme, l'un des observateurs majeurs, à la lucidité souvent visionnaire ès qualité d'acteur d'importance, de ce complexe politique en surcis à l'heure dramatique où la Révolution, comme partout ailleurs en Europe, lui inocule le germe d'une modernité institutionnelle bientôt incompatible avec ses organes ancestraux sinon archaïques. Substitut puis Sénateur auprès le Sénat de Savoie, il entretient dans la décennie 1780, à l'approche de la quarantaine, une correspondance administrative nourrie avec le Cabinet turinois prouvant qu'il est sans doute à la veille d'une promotion aux fonctions d'Intendant en Val d'Aoste, à Nice, ou pourquoi pas en Piémont, lorsque les événements révolutionnaires viennent brouiller ces plans de carrière pour le jeter au contraire sur les routes aventureuses de l'exil. Mi attaché d'ambassade, mi espion agitateur dans la Suisse des années 1790, le voilà maintenant auprès de son souverain, au début de la décennie suivante, du fait de l'avancée des troupes napoléoniennes en Gaule cisalpine de jadis. Mettant à profit la retraite forcée de Sardaigne, il s'attaque donc avec l'énergie du désespoir, sur injonction officielle, languissant de revoir un jour les paysages riants des possessions de Terre Ferme, à la réforme jusqu'alors sans cesse différée du système judiciaire comme à la rédaction des coutumes de l'île. Juste le temps, l'espace de deux années, de dresser un état des lieux et de lancer la lourde machine législative avant que l'on ne l'envoie là bas, aux confins de la Chrétienté, jouer les ambassadeurs aussi poudrés que désargentés d'un prince fantomatique, presque deux décennies durant, dans les salons antichambres du palais impérial du Tsar de toutes les Russies, sa Majesté Alexandre. Puis retour à Turin, pour y mourir un rien amer, en parfait romantique, avec le titre cependant flatteur de Régent de la Grande Chancellerie royale, soit à peu de choses près la qualité de nos actuels Ministres de la Justice et Gardes des Sceaux.Personnage atypique, Joseph de Maistre développe ainsi au cours d'une carrière placée sous le signe exclusif de la fidélité indéfectible à ses princes, essentiellement de manière diffuse, en filigrane d'une œuvre épistolaire à part entière, (si l'on excepte la prose des premiers pamphlets contre-révolutionnaires, ou celle des premiers mémoires techniques de l'épisode helvétique, encore marqués par un évident utilitarisme militant), une analyse institutionnelle et politique passionnée de ces États de Savoie. Analyse raisonnée, souvent véhémente à l'encontre d'un autoritarisme tatillon contreproductif, aux constats sévères par conséquent, mais exercice exempt d'aveuglement sentimental envers le système institutionnel de cette Patrie aujourd'hui évanouie envers laquelle son attachement quasi atavique a été souvent si mal compris. N'est-il pas tentant, dès lors, de tenter une reconstitution de cet exposé développé l'espace d'un demi siècle, sur les milliers de feuillets épars d'une correspondance volumineuse, par l'un des témoins majeurs de la difficile mue à la modernité d'États de Savoie condamnés à disparaître dans le concert des Grandes Nations ?