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International audience ; What bioeconomy means? What types of agriculture will it lead to in the Champagne Ardenne region ? These are the questions at the origin of the BIOCA Project. While the bioeconomy is usually presented as an ongoing ecological transition, BIOCA has shown that it actually covers a diversity of economic development projects that are both competing and seeking compromises, which do not necessarily meet the challenges of sustainability. These bioeconomies are based on a diversity of agricultural models present in Champagne Ardenne that do not have the same territorial scope or the same economic, social and environmental impacts. Public policies must take note of this diversity of situations and trajectories in terms of the agricultural bioeconomy and promote it in order to face the uncertainty of the future. The difficulty in establishing ecological accounting also appears to be a major obstacle for farmers who are already engaged in ecological transition thinking and approaches. ; Qu'est-ce que la bioéconomie ? Quels types d'agriculture induit-elle sur le territoire de la Champagne Ardenne, lequel fait figure de leader en matière de bioéconomie ? Telles ont été les questions à l'origine du Projet BIOCA. Alors que la bioéconomie est présentée habituellement comme une transition écologique en cours, BIOCA a permis de montrer qu'elle recouvre en réalité une diversité de projets de développement économique qui sont à la fois en concurrence et à la recherche de compromis, qui ne répondent pas forcément aux enjeux de soutenabilité. Ces bioéconomies s'appuient sur une diversité de modèles agricoles présents en Champagne Ardenne qui n'ont pas la même territorialisation ni les mêmes impacts économiques, sociaux et environnementaux. Les politiques publiques doivent prendre acte de cette diversité de situations et de trajectoires en matière de bioéconomie agricole et la favoriser pour affronter au mieux les incertitudes du futur. La difficulté à établir une comptabilité écologique apparaît aussi comme un verrou majeur pour les agriculteurs qui sont d'ores et déjà engagés dans des réflexions et démarches de transition écologique.

International audience ; What bioeconomy means? What types of agriculture will it lead to in the Champagne Ardenne region ? These are the questions at the origin of the BIOCA Project. While the bioeconomy is usually presented as an ongoing ecological transition, BIOCA has shown that it actually covers a diversity of economic development projects that are both competing and seeking compromises, which do not necessarily meet the challenges of sustainability. These bioeconomies are based on a diversity of agricultural models present in Champagne Ardenne that do not have the same territorial scope or the same economic, social and environmental impacts. Public policies must take note of this diversity of situations and trajectories in terms of the agricultural bioeconomy and promote it in order to face the uncertainty of the future. The difficulty in establishing ecological accounting also appears to be a major obstacle for farmers who are already engaged in ecological transition thinking and approaches. ; Qu'est-ce que la bioéconomie ? Quels types d'agriculture induit-elle sur le territoire de la Champagne Ardenne, lequel fait figure de leader en matière de bioéconomie ? Telles ont été les questions à l'origine du Projet BIOCA. Alors que la bioéconomie est présentée habituellement comme une transition écologique en cours, BIOCA a permis de montrer qu'elle recouvre en réalité une diversité de projets de développement économique qui sont à la fois en concurrence et à la recherche de compromis, qui ne répondent pas forcément aux enjeux de soutenabilité. Ces bioéconomies s'appuient sur une diversité de modèles agricoles présents en Champagne Ardenne qui n'ont pas la même territorialisation ni les mêmes impacts économiques, sociaux et environnementaux. Les politiques publiques doivent prendre acte de cette diversité de situations et de trajectoires en matière de bioéconomie agricole et la favoriser pour affronter au mieux les incertitudes du futur. La difficulté à établir une comptabilité écologique apparaît aussi comme ...

La cátedra Jean Monnet es una cátedra universitaria otorgada por la Comisión Europea en el marco de su plan de acción. Tienen como objetivo reforzar la docencia y la investigación sobre la integración europea en las universidades, tanto de los Estados miembros como de terceros países. Su nombre hace honor a quien fuera un político francés que, como asesor de Robert Schuman, contribuyó decisivamente a poner los cimientos de las entonces Comunidades Europeas. -- La primera etapa de esta publicación concluyó en el año 2018, comenzó una segunda época en el año 2019 con el nombre Revista "Integración Regional y Derechos Humanos". -- Apéndice jurisprudencial.

Cambodia continues to enjoy robust growth, albeit at a slightly slower pace. Real growth in 2014 is estimated to have reached 7.0 percent. The garment sector, together with construction and services, in particular finance and real estate, continues to propel growth. However, there are signs of weaknesses in garment and agricultural production that are slightly slowing growth. Overall macroeconomic management remains appropriate. Fiscal consolidation continues with further improvements in revenue collection resulting from enhanced administration. Poverty continues to fall in Cambodia (poverty headcount rate in 2012 was 17.7 percent) although the pace of poverty reduction has declined significantly. Cambodia's real growth rate is expected to moderate to 6.9 percent in 2015 and 2016, as it confronts stronger competition in garment exports, continued weak agriculture sector growth, and softer growth in the tourism sector. Recent developments include: the garment sector continues to be one of Cambodia's main engines of growth, the external position remains stable, supported by healthy foreign direct investment inflows, underpinning the overall macroeconomic stability, Exchange rate targeting continues to support price stability, inflation has eased significantly with continuing depressed food prices and the recent decline in oil prices, and financial deepening continues, supporting economic expansion as deposit and credit growth accelerated quickly in 2014.

Adaptation to human-induced climate change is currently receiving a lot of attention in international development circles. But throughout human existence, natural resource-dependent people have exploited and coped with the effects of climate variability on the ecosystems from which they derive a living. Learning from this experience can help inform the design of appropriate policies for responding to human-induced climate change. This paper presents the results of a World Bank study which sought to better understand the role of local institutions in supporting adaptation to climate variability and change in Ethiopia, Mali and Yemen. The study raised three questions. First, what strategies have been adopted by rural households in the past to adapt to climate variability? Second, to what extent do institutions of various sorts assist households in adopting adaptation strategies? And third, what are the factors that prevent households from adopting appropriate adaptation strategies? For the purposes of this paper, institutions are defined as structured, formal or informal organizations. The study followed a three-step approach. First, drawing on original data from field surveys, focus group discussions and institutional stakeholder interviews, household vulnerability to climate variability was characterized in terms of its three constituent elements: exposure to climate-related shocks and stresses, and sensitivity and adaptive capacity in the face of such stressors. Sensitivity refers to the degree to which people are affected by climate variability and change. High levels of exposure and sensitivity and low levels of adaptive capacity generally result in high levels of vulnerability. But a high level of exposure need not necessarily result in a high level of vulnerability if the household's adaptive capacity is also high.

Teil I - Völkerrechtliche Grundfragen -- 1. Gerechtigkeitsgehalte im positiven Völkerrecht -- 2. Rights of Nature include Rights of Domestic Animals -- 3. Is Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter still alive? -- 4. Erga omnes-Verpflichtungen vor dem Internationalen Gerichtshof: Ein Kontrapunkt -- 5. The challenged legality of economic coercion -- 6. Diener zweier Herren: Gegenmaßnahmen im unions- und völkerrechtlichen Kontext -- 7. Some Observations on the 1920 & 1921 Expert Reports regarding the Åland Islands Question -- Teil II - Institutionen und Internationale Beziehungen -- 8. Der Internationale Strafgerichtshof nach 20 Jahren -- 9. Der Aufbau investigativer Fähigkeiten in den Sekretariaten der Organisationen des UN-Systems -- 10. International Fact-finding on Human Rights Violations –The Moscow Mechanism of OSCE -- 11. Menschenrechte und multilaterale Außenpolitik – Der deutsche Vorsitz im Europarat 2020/21 -- 12. The High Representative Revisited in 2022 – An Ever More Powerful Institutional Actor in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy -- 13. Whatever Works? Zur Informalisierung der EU-Außenbeziehungen im Bereich Asyl und Einwanderung -- 14. Identity, religion and foreign policy in the land of Islam (Diplomacy between dogma and the reality of international relations) -- Teil III - Menschenrechte -- 15. Human Dignity in International Human Rights Law -- 16. Human Rights as Foundation of Transnational Constitutionalism? How to Respond to "Constitutional Implementation Deficits" -- 17. Menschenrechte in Zeiten des Notstands -- 18. Discrimination Based on "National Origin" and Nationality -- 19. The role of Human Rights Law for the political participation of Indigenous women -- 20. Das allgemeine Petitionsrecht als völkerrechtliches Individualrecht – Gedanken zu einem verloren gegangenen Menschenrecht -- 21. Which Rights Do Have the Astronauts? -- 22. Unterbringung von Piraten an Bord von Kriegsschiffen – Welche Mindeststandards gelten? -- 23. Begriff und Einordnung des Migrationsrechts im nationalen und internationalen Recht -- 24. Thesen zur Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention 1951 -- Teil IV - Schutz von Menschen in bewaffneten Konflikten und Katastrophenfällen -- 25. Compassion and International Humanitarian Law -- 26. Humanitäre Hilfe – ein Beitrag zum Recht der Solidarität -- 27. Die völkerrechtliche Pflicht Syriens, humanitäre Hilfe zu gestatten -- 28. Die völkerrechtliche Regelung des Zivilschutzes -- 29. No-Fly Zones zum Schutz von Zivilpersonen in Kriegszeiten?. Teil V - Minderheitenschutz -- 30. The Blind-Spot in protecting Global Minorities: A Blue-Print for strengthening the normative framework? -- 31. Wie effektiv ist die Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte zum Minderheitenschutz? -- 32. Legitimacy and Efficacy in Monitoring Minority Rights: Bilateralism contra Multilateralism in the Council of Europe and the European Union -- 33. Drafting laws on national minorities. Theoretical and practical reflections -- 34. Minderheitenmedien zwischen medienökonomischen Effizienzanforderungen, Gerechtigkeitspostulaten und Spracherhalt -- 35. Mikrostaaten und der europäische Minderheitenschutz -- 36. The Livs in Latvia and the Law -- 37. Gudmundur Alfredsson and Ineta Ziemele -- 38. Minderheitenidentität(en) – Südtirol, Kärnten und Schleswig-Holstein im Vergleich -- 38. Der Streit um die öffentlich-rechtliche oder privatrechtliche Gestaltung der Minderheitenselbstverwaltung, ausgetragen von den Angehörigen des sorbischen Volkes -- 39. Protection of New Minorities under International Law -- 40. Europäische zivilgesellschaftliche Integration und gemeinsame Werte: Die Erfahrung eines Brettspiels -- Teil VI - Wirtschaftsvölkerrecht -- 41. Interpretation from within? Approaching the decision of the CETA Joint Committee on investment from a public international law perspective -- 42. Protecting Individuals in International Investment Law – Plans for an Investment Court in the Past and Today -- 43. Abaclat v. Argentine Republic: When Investment Arbitration Met Mass Claims -- 44. State Immunity and International Arbitration in Sweden -- 45. When a Violation of Domestic Law is a Breach of Treaty -- 46. EU Law and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facing Complementarity -- 47. How States can justify Economic Sanctions under International Investment Law -- 48. Application of the concept of due diligence in international investment law -- 49. Die Entwicklung des EU-Rechtsrahmens für die Investitionskontrolle Dezentralisierung als vereinigender Faktor -- 50. Mission Impossible? International Investment Law between Property Protection and Climate Action -- 51 Effektiver Rechtsschutz und Eigentumsgarantie im System der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention: Zum Verhältnis und Zusammenspiel von Art. 6 Abs. 1, Art. 13 und Art. 1 ZP-1 EMRK -- 52. Unternehmen und Menschenrechte – Überlegungen zu einer funktionalen Begründung von Rechten und Pflichten -- 53. Vom Ende des "Business as Usual" Aktuelle Entwicklungen und Muster der Regulierung von unternehmerischen Sorgfaltspflichten – 54. Cross-regime Remedies for a State's Failure to comply with the New York Convention -- Teil VII - Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie in Europa -- 55. Grund- und Menschenrechte als Grundlage der Demokratie in Europa -- 56. Die Konstitutionalisierung der EU-Grundrechte. Das österreichische Beispiel -- 57. Neue föderalistische Entwicklungen in der Schweiz und in Europa -- 58. Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der europäischen Gesellschaft -- 59. Still on Constitutional Courts at the rescue of their mandate: The puzzling Spanish case -- 60. The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence: Recent EU Developments and Case Law of the European Court of Justice -- 61. Die unionale (Verfassungs-)identität: Stärkung des Rechtsstaatsprinzips? -- 62. 2022 – Celebration of the Silver Anniversary or Reality Check of the Polish Constitution? -- 63. Rechtsprechung des deutschen Bundesverfassungsgerichts und des Verfassungsgerichtshofs von Polen im Vergleich -- 64. Unabhängige Behörden - gesetzlose Hüter des Binnenmarktes? -- 65. 20+ Years of the EU Non-discrimination Directives: Can a Reflexive Governance Approach Improve their Implementation? -- Teil VIII - Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungsprozessrecht -- 66. Ein Herz für Kinder -- 67. Das verborgene Grundrecht – Ein Beitrag zur Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 19.11.2021 (Bundesnotbremse II) sowie zur Systematik der UN-Kinderrechtskonvention -- 68. Die Dobbs-Entscheidung des U.S. Supreme Court und ihre institutionellen Folgen -- 69. Konvergenz und Divergenz in der Verhältnismäßigkeitsrechtsprechung des BVerfG, des kanadischen Supreme Court und des südafrikanischen Verfassungsgerichts -- 70. Staatliche Parteienfinanzierung als Verfassungsproblem -- 71. Äußerungsbefugnisse von Regierungsmitgliedern -- 72. Stillhalten im Verfassungsprozess - Zum Umgang mit dem Problem der Zwischenzeit in Eilverfahren über Zustimmungsgesetze vor dem Bundesverfassungsgeric -- Teil IX - Ordnung durch Recht in den Bereichen Daseinsvorsorge, öffentliche Güter und Nachhaltigkeit -- 73. Neue alte Entwicklungen für das Verwaltungsrecht: Von Kooperation und Dreiecksverhältnissen zur Konfliktbefriedung und Vertrauensbildung im Wirtschaftsverwaltungs- und Gesundheitsrecht -- 74. Recht in Zeiten der Corona-Pandemie -- 75. Pandemiebewältigung in der Währungspolitik und Rechtsschutz der Individuen -- 76. Nachhaltigkeit und Barrierefreiheit als zwei Seiten einer Medaille: ein Aufruf zur Intelligenz im Europäischen Tourismus -- 77. Verträglichkeitsprüfung und Vorsorgegrundsatz im europäischen Naturschutzrecht -- 78. Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH im deutschen Migrationssozialrecht: Existenzsichernde Leistungen und Kindergeld -- 79. Unionsrechtlicher Reformdruck auf den Flickenteppich des Rechts der Gruppenversicherung.

Contents: Introduction / Gerald Epstein -- Part I. Finance, macroeconomic policy and central banking: from Volcker to Trump -- 1. 'Domestic stagflation and monetary policy: The Federal Reserve and the hidden election' / in Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers (eds), the hidden election: Politics and economics in the 1980 presidential campaign, New York, NY, USA: Pantheon Books, 1981, 141-95 -- 2. 'Federal Reserve behavior and the limits of monetary policy in the current economic crisis' / in Robert Cherry, Christine d'Onofrio, Cigdem Kurdas, Thomas R. Michl, Fred Moseley and Michele I. Naples (eds), The imperiled economy: Book I: Macroeconomics from a left perspective, chapter 23, New York, NY, USA: The union for radical political economics, 1987, 247-55, references -- 3. 'Trumponomics: Should we just say "no"?', challenge, 60 (2) 2017, 104-21 -- Part II. Capitalists, workers and Wall Street: The fight for the Federal Reserve -- 4. 'Federal Reserve politics and monetary instability' / in Alan Stone and Edward J. Harpham (eds), The political economy of public policy, chapter 9, Beverly Hills, CA, USA: Sage Publications, 1982, 211-40 -- 5. 'The Federal Reserve-treasury accord and the construction of the postwar monetary regime in the United States' / with Juliet B. Schor, social concept, 7 (1), July, 1995, 7-48 -- 6. 'monetary policy, loan liquidation, and industrial conflict: The Federal Reserve and the open market operations of 1932' / with Thomas Ferguson, Journal of economic history, xliv (4), December, 1984, 957-83 -- 7. 'Corporate profitability as a determinant of restrictive monetary policy: Estimates for the postwar United States' / with Juliet B. Schor, in Thomas Mayer (ed.), The political economy of American monetary policy, chapter 4, New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 51-63 -- Part III. The political economy of central banking: Analytical and empirical perspectives -- 8. 'Contested terrain' / in Louis-Philippe Rochon and Sergio Rossi (eds), the Encyclopedia of central banking, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2015, 105-7 -- 9. 'Macropolicy in the rise and fall of the golden age' / with Juliet B. Schor, in Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet B. Schor (eds), The golden age of capitalism: Reinterpreting the postwar experience, chapter 3, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1990, 126-52, references -- 10. 'Political economy and comparative central banking', review of radical political economics, 24 (1), March, 1992, 1-30 -- 11 'A political economy model of comparative central banking' / in Gary Dymski and Robert Pollin (eds), New perspectives in monetary macroeconomics: Explorations in the tradition of Hyman P. Minsky, chapter 9, Ann Arbor, MI, USA: The University of Michigan Press, 1994, 231-77 -- 12. 'Profit squeeze, rentier squeeze and macroeconomic policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates', economies et sociétés, 25 (3), November/December, 1991, 219-57 -- 13. 'The rise of rentier incomes in OECD countries: Financialization, central bank policy and labor solidarity' / with Arjun Jayadev, in Gerald A. Epstein (ed.), Financialization and the world economy, chapter 3, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2005, 46-74 -- Part IV. Inflation targeting vs. Developmental central banking -- 14. 'Financialization, rentier interests and central bank policy', 2002, 1-43 -- 15. 'Central banks as agents of economic development', / Ha-Joon Chang (ed.), Institutional change and economic development, chapter 6, New York, NY, USA: United Nations University Press and London, UK: Anthem Press, 2007, 95-113 -- 16 'Developmental central banking: Winning the future by updating a page from the past', review of Keynesian economics, 1 (3), Autumn, 2013, 273-87 -- 17. 'Achieving coherence between macroeconomic and development objectives' / in Joseph E. Stiglitz and Martin Guzman (eds), contemporary issues in macroeconomics: Lessons from the crisis and beyond, IEA conference volume 155-ii, chapter 11, Basingstoke, UK and New York, NY, USA, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 148-59 -- Part V. The Federal Reserve and the great financial crisis of 2007-2008 -- 18. 'Have large scale asset purchases increased bank profits?' / with Juan Antonio Montecino, Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) working paper no. 5, December, 2014, 1-25 -- 19. 'The political economy of QE and the Fed: Who gained, who lost and why did it end?' / with Juan Antonio Montecino, Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) working paper number 408, November, 2015, 1-25 -- 20. 'The impact of quantitative easing on income inequality in the United States', November, 2018 -- Part VI. Reforming the Federal Reserve -- 21. 'Statement on monetary policy' / testimony prepared for the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, July 19th, 1983, 1-11 -- 22. 'A debate with Robert Pollin: Should Congress control the Federal Reserve?' / with Robert Pollin, Dollars & sense, 136, May, 1988, 12-17, 22 -- 23. 'Reforming the Federal Reserve for the 21st century', 2018 -- Index.

The broad historical context : the rise of the Ottoman empire and the formation of Muslim communities in the Balkans as an integral part of the ottomanization of the region -- The rise of the Ottomans, ca. 1300-ca. 1550 : an overview -- The Ottoman transformation from a frontier principality to an imperial bureaucratic regime -- The formation of Muslim communities in the Ottoman Balkans in historiography and memory -- 1.3.1 Major theories of the formation and development of Muslim communities in the Ottoman Balkans -- 1.3.2 Assessment of the theories of the formation of Muslim communities in the Ottoman Balkans -- Colonization, settlement, and faith in the Balkans in the early Ottoman period (ca. 1352 to early 16th century) -- Colonization and settlement in the early Ottoman Balkans : historical and historiographic overview -- The abdals of Rum(eli) and their allies : "heterodox" Islam, Turcoman colonization, and legitimacy (late 14th-early 16th centuries) -- Conquest, colonization, and authority in the early Ottoman Balkans in the light of heterodox hagiographic works : the velayetnames of Seyyid ali Sultan (kızıl deli) and Otman baba -- 2.3.1 Kızıl deli, Rüstem gazi, and the conquest of the Balkans -- 2.3.2. Otman baba -- The northeastern Balkans from the late medieval period to the late fifteenth century : pre-Ottoman Turcoman invasions and migrations, the Ottoman conquest, and the "turbulent" fifteenth century. Deliorman and Gerlovo as a "special case" -- Introduction -- Turcoman involvement in the northeastern Balkans prior to the Ottoman conquest -- 3.2.1. Pontic Turcoman incursions into the Balkans in the pre-Ottoman period -- 3.2.2 The migration of Seljuk Turks to Dobrudja and the role of Sarı Saltık -- The northeastern Ottoman Balkans in the "turbulent" fifteenth century -- 3.3.1 The battle of Ankara and the Ottoman interregnum -- 3.3.2 The revolt of Sheykh Bedreddin -- 3.3.3 The crusade of Varna (1444) and the invasion of Vlad III Tepes south of the Danube (1461-1462) -- Patterns of demographic and socio-economic development in Deliorman and Gerlovo in the late fifteenth century. Deliorman and Gerlovo as a "special case" -- The repopulation of Deliorman and Gerlovo's countryside in the sixteenth century -- The re-population of Deliorman and Gerlovo in the sixteenth century : sürgün and göç, the role of the state and its limits -- Major aspects of rural Deliorman and Gerlovo's demographic transformation in the sixteenth century : Turcoman re-population, conversion to Islam, the rise of Derbend villages, and Christian-Muslim co-existence in the light of Ottoman tax registers -- 4.2.1 The development of the settlement network -- 4.2.2. demographic analysis by settlement size -- 4.2.3 demographic analysis by overall population size and status of taxpayers -- 4.2.4 major agents of Turcoman colonization in the countryside : yürüks and other nomadic or semi-nomadic groups, dervishes, and descendants of the prophet -- 4.2.5 Waqf (pious endowment) villages -- 4.2.6 Derbend villages -- The development of the urban network in sixteenth-century Deliorman. the emergence of Hezargrad and Eski Cuma, the transformation of Shumnu into an Islamic city, and the decline of Chernovi -- Introduction : the Islamic city, the Ottoman city, and the Ottoman Balkan city -- The emergence of Ottoman Hezargrad (mod. Razgrad) -- 5.2.1 Ancient and medieval background -- 5.2.2 The emergence of a new Ottoman town -- 5.2.3 The socio-economic development of Hezargrad -- The growth and transformation of Shumnu (Shumen) into an Ottoman town -- 5.3.1 The socio-economic development of Shumnu -- The decline of Chernovi (Cherven) -- The rise of Eski Cuma (Cuma-i atik, mod. Targovishte) -- Concluding remarks -- Religion, culture, and authority : two case studies -- Introduction -- Demir baba and the abdals of Rum of Otman baba's branch in Deliorman and Gerlovo -- 6.2.1 the abdals of Rum of Otman baba's branch from the death of Otman baba to Demir baba's emergence as "pole of poles" -- 6.2.2 The life of Demir baba as "pole" in the light of his velayetname -- 6.2.2.1 Debate and contest marvels and recognition : Demir baba's image as an axial saint and communal leader -- 6.2.2.2 Demir baba and the community : the saint as an epitome of power, justice, and generosity -- 6.2.2.3 Demir baba as a gazi -- 6.2.2.4 Demir baba and the Ottoman dynasty, state, and political order -- 6.2.2.5 Demir baba and his spiritual and sectarian rivals -- 6.2.2.6 positioning the abdals of Rum (of Otman baba's branch) in the Ottoman sectarian and socio-cultural spectrum -- The foundation of Hezargrad as an assertion of the Ottoman imperial order -- Issues in religion, culture, and authority : conversion to Islam and confessionalization -- Conversion to Islam in Deliorman and Gerlovo -- 7.1.1. conversion to Islam in the countryside : general remarks -- 7.1.2 "Colonizing heterodox dervishes" and conversion to Islam -- 7.1.3 Conversion and converts to Islam in the urban centers : the cases of Hezargrad and Shumnu -- 7.1.3.1 conversion and converts in sixteenth-century Hezargrad -- 7.1.3.2. conversion and converts in Shumnu -- Confessionalization and confession building : insights from Deliorman and Gerlovo

1 An overview of pneumatic conveying systems and performance -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Why pneumatic conveying? -- 1.3 What can be conveyed? -- 1.4 What constitutes a pneumatic conveying system? -- 1.5 Modes of pneumatic conveying -- 1.6 Basic pneumatic conveying systems -- 1.7 Further classification techniques -- 1.8 Description and operation of a pneumatic conveying system -- 1.9 Putting it all together -- 1.10 An overview -- 1.11 Some useful conversion factors and tables -- References -- 2 Single phase flow in pneumatic conveying systems -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Definitions -- 2.3 Perfect gas laws -- 2.4 Drying of compressed air -- 2.5 The compression process -- 2.6 Gas flow through pipes -- 2.7 Illustrative examples -- References -- 3 Fluid and particle dynamics -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Law of continuity -- 3.3 Drag on a particle -- 3.4 Equations for calculation of relevant properties -- 3.5 Fluidization characteristics of powders -- References -- 4 Fundamentals -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Forces acting on a single particle in an air stream -- 4.3 Particle size -- 4.4 Shape -- 4.5 Dynamic equations -- 4.6 Terminal velocity -- 4.7 Single particle acceleration -- 4.8 Centrifugal flow -- 4.9 Slip velocity in a gravitational field -- 4.10 Multiple particle systems -- 4.11 Voidage and slip velocity -- 4.12 Frictional representations -- 4.13 Acceleration and development regions -- 4.14 Particle distribution in pneumatic conveying -- 4.15 Compressibility effect not negligible -- 4.16 Speed of sound in gas—solid transport -- 4.17 Gas—solid flow with varying cross-sectional area -- 4.18 Branching arrangements -- 4.19 Bend analysis -- 4.20 Downward sloping particle flow -- 4.21 Dense phase transport -- 4.22 Estimation of pressure drop in slugging dense phase conveying -- 4.23 Estimation of pressure drop in non-slugging dense phase conveying -- 4.24 Plug flows -- 4.25 Worked examples -- References -- 5 Flow regimes in vertical and horizontal conveying -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Choking versus non-choking system in vertical flow -- 5.3 Choking system in vertical flow -- 5.4 Non-choking system in vertical flow -- 5.5 Particle segregation in vertical pneumatic transport -- 5.6 Saltation in horizontal conveying -- References -- 6 Principles of pneumatic conveying -- 6.1 Introduction—putting it all together -- 6.2 The state diagram revisited -- 6.3 Methods for scaling-up -- 6.4 Use of theoretical models and definitions -- 6.5 Additional pressure drop factoz (?z) -- 6.6 Pressure drop -- 6.7 Some important functional relationships -- 6.8 Sequence to be followed to obtain the system pressure loss (?p) -- References -- 7 Feeding of pneumatic conveying systems -- 7.1 Introduction and overall design philosophy -- 7.2 Classification of feeding systems -- 7.3 Feeder selection criteria -- 7.4 Low pressure feeding devices -- 7.5 Medium pressure feeding systems -- 7.6 High pressure feeding devices -- 7.7 Conclusions -- References -- 8 Flow in standpipes and gravity conveyors -- 8.1 Introduction—standpipes and gravity conveyors -- 8.2 Classification of standpipe systems -- 8.3 Classification of flow modes in a standpipe -- 8.4 Equations pertaining to each flow mode -- 8.5 Flow through a valve -- 8.6 Stability of standpipe flow -- 8.7 Analysis of industrial standpipes—case studies -- 8.8 Gravity conveyors -- References -- 9 An overview of high pressure systems including long distance and dense phase pneumatic conveying systems -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 High pressure systems -- 9.3 Dense phase flow classification -- 9.4 A description of plug flow and the relationships between plug flow and material characteristics -- 9.5 System selection and product characteristics -- 9.6 Dense phase system design -- 9.7 Long distance pneumatic conveying and pressure loss minimization -- 9.8 Conclusions -- References -- 10 Gas—solids separation -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Selection criteria -- 10.3 Cyclone separators—theory of the separation of particles in the centrifugal field -- 10.4 Fabric filters -- 10.5 Cleaning by sound -- 10.6 Conclusions -- References -- 11 Some comments on: the flow behaviour of solids from silos; wear in pneumatic conveying systems; ancillary equipment -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 The flow of solids from bins -- 11.3 Flow aid devices for silos and hoppers -- 11.4 Wear in pneumatic conveying systems -- 11.5 Ancillary equipment -- 11.6 Conclusions -- References -- 12 Control of pneumatic transport -- 12.1 Basic material flow and control theory -- 12.2 Transport lags -- 12.3 Analysis of gas—solid flow by transfer functions -- 12.4 Stability of pneumatic transfer systems -- 12.5 Stability analysis with Taylor series linearization -- 12.6 Linear stability analysis—Jackson approach -- 12.7 Stability via the Liapunov analysis -- References -- 13 Instrumentation -- 13.1 Standard instrumentation -- 13.2 Transducers -- 13.3 Cross-correlation procedures -- 13.4 A Coriolis force meter -- 13.5 Dielectric meter -- 13.6 Load cells -- 13.7 Particle tagging -- 13.8 Electrostatic based meters -- 13.9 Acoustic measurements -- 13.10 Screw conveyors -- 13.11 Light measuring devices -- 13.12 Other techniques for particle velocities -- 13.13 Instrumentation for industrial applications -- References -- 14 System design and worked examples -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 Moisture content in air -- 14.3 The design of industrial vacuum systems -- 14.4 Dilute phase pneumatic conveying system design (method 1) -- 14.5 Dilute phase pneumatic conveying system design (method 2) -- 14.6 Dilute phase pneumatic conveying system design (method 3) -- 14.7 Dense phase pneumatic conveying system design -- 14.8 Test yourself—dilute phase calculations -- 14.9 Gas—solid flow examples -- 14.10 Conclusions -- References.

The faux outrage over a commonsense bill
illustrates the agenda of Louisiana's political pro-abortion left.

SB 276 by
Republican state Sen. Thomas
Pressly would prohibit coerced abortion by drugs and inhibit that by
making illegal purchase of over-the-counter mifepristone and misoprostol.
While separately the two drugs can address certain ailments, when used together
they can cause a chemical abortion, which is outlawed in Louisiana except for rare
instances. As a result, possession without a prescription would be legal only
for pregnant females, as the bill assumes other people will use these to coerce
an abortion. A pregnant female with these in possession without prescriptions
would not be breaking the law unless she subsequently consumed these to induce
an abortion, under a different statute.

Pressly has a compelling story to demonstrate need
for such a bill. His sister while pregnant without her knowledge was
manipulated into consuming these drugs. Fortunately, her child survived but with
impairment. That demonstrates the harm from misuse unambiguously. And, if taken
improperly, they can have serious consequences, such as for pregnant females miscarriages,
premature labor, or birth defects, or more generally several life-threatening
conditions.

Leftists didn't mind the bill when it created just
the crime. But they went ballistic when putting in the bill a means to prevent
the crime by making more difficult the otherwise easy obtaining of the two
drugs. This is because shipping the drugs interstate has become a popular
method of getting around prohibitions to abortion except in rare incidences in
states like Louisiana, so this strikes directly at their ideology of abortion
on demand and thwarts whatever pleasure they may receive by trying to put one
over on the state in causing abortions in it despite the law.

Classifying the two as prescription needed,
Schedule IV, will mean some inconvenience to providers and patients. While most
providers already have the proper licensure and facilities to treat the drugs
in this fashion, some may not and would have to arrange for that by the Oct. 1
effective date. Patients who now pick up the drugs off the shelf will have to
arrange this through a pharmacy.

This the left has decried, but their apocalyptic characterization
of the change is way overblown. Minor changes will set up a smooth system of
dispensing, and their non-abortifacient uses – controlling hyperglycemia, treating
certain types of brain tumors, combatting endometriosis or fibroids, preventing
ulcers, inducing labor early – don't require immediate or emergency application
that might be slowed through a prescription regime.

The left also has attempted another hollow
argument against the change, that controlled substances "usually" are addictive
and so therefore somehow this disqualifies the reclassification. That's
irrelevant: if something is casually available and dangerous that can cause
harm to others if surreptitiously introduced, increased regulation is entirely
appropriate to reduce the chances of improper administration, regardless of its
addictive qualities. After all, even as its possession in the U.S. is illegal,
the trade-named Rohypnol
– a relaxant that can so incapacitate people when surreptitiously administered as
to make them vulnerable to physical harm including rape – is not addictive but
legally treated in exactly the same fashion at the federal level.

There's absolute justification to classify these
drugs as harmful enough to make them subject to prescription, which has made
leftist opposition even more shrill to deflect from that. The bill will return
to the Senate with expected concurrence and then signed into law by GOP Gov. Jeff Landry, providing
a rare instance where the state provides positive policy leadership.

On the whole, the law's coming into effect won't
make that much of a difference. Informed users – in tandem, the drugs can do
this until about 10 weeks into a pregnancy – will contract with an out-of-state
provider in states where abortion remains legal in various forms, as pro-abortionist
doctors and special interests already have established networks to accomplish
this, to obtain the pills whether by prescription. Others – or even those wanting
to coerce a chemical abortion – will take a chance through illegal means of
obtaining. There will be some deterrence, but not a whole lot.

Yet the left has gone bonkers about this, precisely
because it closes even slightly the pill pipeline loophole. Most laughably, it disingenuously
claims the different treatment will affect maternal health outcomes which objectively
clearly is highly unlikely, yet doesn't mention at all the threat to children's
health, specifically at nearly a 100 percent fatality rate, through misuse of
the pills that the bill reduces.

But it's never been about health or safety with
that crowd, only about cranking out as many abortions as possible. Which will
have long-term political ramifications not to its liking, as a future post will
show.

Last night Secretary of State Blinken played Neil Young's bitterly ironic protest song, "Rockin' in the Free World" in a Kyiv bar. His speech Tuesday laying out the U.S. plan for a "Free, Secure, and Prosperous Future for Ukraine" was full of ironies as well, although he'd prefer that we be oblivious to those too. After almost two and a half years of war, the speech announced a "stay the course" approach for Washington's Ukraine policy. Rather than use the recent $60 billion aid package to lay the groundwork for a feasible plan to end the conflict, the speech promised continued U.S. support for unconditional victory and continued efforts to bring Ukraine into NATO, one of the issues that helped to trigger the war in the first place. One irony is that Ukraine won't be permitted to join NATO as long as the war continues. The U.S. and other NATO countries — which could bring Ukraine into the alliance today if they wanted to — won't make a defense commitment that requires them to risk nuclear conflict by putting their own troops on the Ukrainian front lines and fighting Russia directly. President Biden began his State of the Union speech a few months ago by comparing the war in Ukraine to World War II and calling it critical to the future of freedom, but immediately afterward hastened to assure the public that "there are no American soldiers at war in Ukraine. And I am determined to keep it that way." Without a massive and risky escalation by outside powers, the best case scenario for Ukraine seems to be a bloody stalemate into the foreseeable future. Ukrainian territorial control has barely budged since their initial advances against the Russian invasion almost two years ago in summer 2022, even as hundreds of thousands of casualties have been incurred by both sides. U.S. officials admit that it won't be possible for Ukraine to even attempt offensive operations until 2025, and even then, there is no guarantee that a new offensive won't just repeat the bloody debacle of Ukraine's 2023 counter-offensive.Blinken tried to paint the picture of a thriving and prosperous Ukraine even as the war continued. But he had to distort the tragic situation on the ground to do it. He touted a 5% growth in Ukraine's economy in 2023, but without mentioning that the Ukrainian economy is still 25% smaller than it was before the war, when it was already one of the poorest countries in Europe. And this economic growth is only achieved by massive infusions of foreign aid — the $115 billion committed by the EU and U.S. to Ukraine so far this year is more than two thirds the size of Ukraine's own GDP. Blinken's speech claimed a sustainable Ukrainian prosperity could be achieved by "the growth of Ukraine's burgeoning defense industry." But Russia is hardly likely to permit Ukraine to become a defense production superpower while the two countries remain at war. Whatever you think of arms sales as the foundation for national prosperity, Ukraine can hardly build a globally competitive arms production industry under the disadvantage of having to shoot down a constant rain of Russian missiles aimed at its industrial plants. The reality is that as long as the war continues Ukraine's future is as a heavily subsidized battleground for a proxy conflict between the U.S. and EU and Russia. The kind of economic opportunities created by that future are grim at best. In a press conference later in the day, Blinken touted his visit to a Ukrainian "company producing world-leading prosthetics." No doubt the company is world class, since it has to supply the demand from fifty thousand Ukrainian amputees (and counting) created by the ongoing conflict.The $60 billion in aid offered by the U.S. is expensive in an absolute sense, but Americans barely notice it against the background of a $27 trillion economy. It's Ukraine that bears the true cost of the war. With elections in Ukraine canceled for the foreseeable future as the conflict continues there are few mechanisms for the Ukrainian public to call for an alternative path.We now know that there were serious Russian-Ukrainian peace talks taking place two years ago, soon after the Russian invasion, when Putin realized that his attempt at regime change in Ukraine had been thwarted. Those talks failed in part because Western powers refused to support the combination of compromises and practical security guarantees that Ukraine needed to make a peace agreement work. If the U.S. truly wants to support Ukraine's future, we need to break from our current policies and champion a practical path to peace today.

 

Hundreds
of millions of Indian citizens have begun to vote and they will keep doing it
for six weeks. Indian democratic elections are the most massive human
mobilizations in the world —more than any other election, war, pilgrimage,
migration movement, or world fair. There are more than one million polling
stations and even a team of elephants to carry voting machines to the Himalaya.
Unlike in many other democracies, electoral turnout in India is higher among
the poor than among the rich, among the less educated than among the graduates,
in the villages than in the cities. Since the last elections, five years ago,
women vote (a little) more than men.

The
success of democracy in India has dismissed the pessimistic auguries after the
independence and the first election in 1952. But India is not an isolated case.
Let's see the numbers. A little more than half of the world's population lives
in democracy. Let's consider that "rich" countries are those above the world
average per capita income (in purchasing power, around $ 18,000 per year), and
"poor" are those below that threshold. About half of the world population
living in democracy lives in relatively poor countries (including India, but
also Indonesia, South Africa, and others), while about half of the population
living in dictatorships lives in relatively rich countries (including China,
but also S. Arabia, Russia, and others).

Some
traditional sociologists have been puzzled by the India case because it does
not fit the classical doctrine that economic development must precede democracy:
from Seymour Lipset to Adam Przeworski, who has "repeatedly predict India as a
dictatorship" before 2030. Yet, India is not an exception or an anomaly. The
earliest modern democracies, such as Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
or the United States, had also enforced broad male suffrage for competitive
elections in the nineteenth century when they were fairly poor, as poor as
India was in the mid-twentieth century or as is now.

For
about forty years after independence, when the government was dominated by the
Indian National Congress party, initially led by Jawaharlal Nehru, the
centralized and closed Indian economy grew at an often-mocked annual rate of
1%. But since the early 1990s, when it has liberalized and opened to new
technologies and globalization, India has enjoyed significant benefits from
open trade and capital inflows. Against all expectations, the Indian per capita
income at purchasing power has multiplied by five in thirty years. Precisely
because India was late in adopting more sophisticated institutions and
policies, it has been able to adapt more readily to the global economy. In
contrast to developed countries with old technologies and onerous preexisting
social arrangements, India has not had to dismantle former industrial and
bureaucratic structures that might have obstructed innovation.

Consequently,
the Indian citizens declare to prefer democracy to an authoritarian regime in a
proportion of four to one. In the most recent international poll by the Pew
Research Center, 72% of Indian citizens declare to be satisfied with the way
democracy works in their country --only after Sweden and in contrast with, for
example, 33% in the United States. (Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes
& Trends, 2024).

The Congress
Party, always led by Nehru's descendants Gandhi family, and the current incumbent
People's Party (BJP) led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, have alternated in
government seven times. The electoral system is a copy of the colonial British
tradition of single-member districts by simple plurality rule, which permits a
party with less than 40% of votes to get an absolute majority of seats in the lower
chamber of parliament. Yet, while numerous minor parties run independently, the
two larger parties run in very broad electoral coalitions: in the current
election, the incumbent BJP has formed a National Democratic Alliance with 12 mostly
state-based or ethnic parties, while the opposition Congress is running in an
India National Development Inclusive Alliance (to fit the acronym INDIA) with
23 parties, including several on the far left. Their participation in federal
politics also works as a factor of Indian union.

After
the end of the Cold War, the old Indian foreign policy of "non-alignment" was
initially replaced with one of "strategic autonomy." India remains outside the
United Nations Security Council, despite having become a nuclear power, and
outside the Group of Seven despite being the fourth democratic economy in size.
Nevertheless, India has become more dynamic in supporting the democratization
of its neighboring countries in South Asia, which is still a poorly integrated
region. It is also the oldest and most stable democracy of the so-called BRICS
group, now enlarged to nine members, and it has recently increased its
relations and deals with the United States and the European Union in a world of
fluctuating international coalitions. From a global and historical perspective,
democracy in India is already one of the most remarkable contemporary achievements
of humankind.

 Also in Spanish and Catalan in La Vanguardia:https://www.lavanguardia.com/opinion/20240429/9605408/mayor-fiesta-democratica-mundo.html

Twenty years ago this week, the United States government placed Haiti's elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, on a plane sent from Guantanamo Bay and headed for the Central African Republic with a false flight plan. The flight consummated a coup d'état that ended a decade of hard-won democratic progress. It also began two decades of dismantling of democracy by U.S.-backed Haitian regimes. Haiti is "celebrating" the coup anniversary without a single elected official in office and no elections in sight, while most Haitians face catastrophic humanitarian conditions.The U.S. government officially denies a coup took place and claims it did not force Aristide to flee. But the February 29, 2004 coup d'état successfully removed a regional leader who resisted complying with U.S. prescriptions. The following 20 years of supporting governments opposed to Aristide — most of them unelected or elected in flawed elections— have prevented the emergence of other non-compliant Haitian leaders. But as the United States faces its own election this year that President Biden calls an existential threat to our democracy, and struggles with the arrival of Haitians fleeing the horrific conditions that our policies helped generate, it is time to reconsider this approach.The United States actually restored Aristide before it toppled him. In 1994, President Clinton launched Operation Restore Democracy to return Aristide from his exile caused by a 1991 military coup. Aristide left office at the end of his term in 1996, in the first-ever transfer of power from one elected Haitian president to another. He returned to the presidential palace in Haiti's second democratic transfer of presidential power, in 2001.But U.S. leaders did not like the direction Haiti's restored democracy took. They particularly resented President Aristide challenging the United States by trying to raise the minimum wage for workers sewing Americans' clothes, defying "small government" dogma by increasing government investment in education and healthcare, speaking out against the unjust international order, and demanding $21 billion from France as restitution of the "independence debt" that France extorted in 1825.These policies were immensely popular in the areas of Haiti that lay outside the U.S. Embassy compound. In 2000, Haitians voted overwhelmingly for Aristide and his Lavalas party. But the United States used a minor controversy over alleged technical election irregularities as a pretext to impose a development assistance embargo that brought Haiti's economy and its government to its knees. An insurgency led by former soldiers attacked the weakened government from across the border in the Dominican Republic, setting the stage for the U.S. to force Aristide into exile.Haiti has never recovered the level of democracy it had before Aristide's departure. The past 20 years have seen just a single transfer of power from one elected president to another, in 2011. For over half that time, Haiti's parliament has been unable to hold votes, because the failure to run elections left it with too few members. For a quarter of that time there has been no elected president in office.Haiti's last elections were in 2016, and parliament has not held votes since 2019. There has been no president since July 2021, when then-President Jovenel Moise, who had stayed in office five months past the end of his term, was assassinated. Haiti is led by a de facto prime minister, Ariel Henry, who was chosen not by Haitians but by the Core Group, a group of mostly majority-white countries led by the United States. Henry's reign is unconstitutional and faces widespread Haitian opposition. But with the United States propping him up, Henry has been able to serve a longer term than any prime minister in at least 40 years.That persistent support has both seriously weakened promising civil society mobilization toward a broad-based democratic transitional government and removed any incentive for Henry to make meaningful compromise towards fair elections that he and his party cannot win. The U.S. responded to Henry's intransigence by leading the creation of the foreign armed intervention he requested that Haitians say will only further entrench Henry's rule.Meanwhile Haitians face intolerable conditions. Gangs control much of the country, including an estimated 80% of the capital, Port-au-Prince. The economy has had both zero growth and inflation over 15% for three years straight. Children face unprecedented levels of wasting hunger. To spare themselves and their families from this nightmare, hundreds of thousands of Haitians have made the desperate voyage out of Haiti, often arriving at the U.S. border.President Biden's concerns about U.S. democracy should inform his approach to Haiti. His defense of democracy as "America's sacred cause" is weakened when his own administration persistently maintains an illegal Haitian government in power precisely because it will obey the dictates of U.S. presidents over the priorities of Haitian voters. If President Biden is serious about democracy, he would allow Haitian voters the opportunity to choose their leaders.

The conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza are different in kind and require different approaches. But debating the purpose and impact of U.S. arms supplies to Ukraine and Israel could not be more urgent. This is especially true in the case of Israel, given the immense human devastation its attack on Gaza is causing and the real danger of a wider Mideast war.
Yet the Biden administration is striking a common theme in its efforts to persuade Congress to pass a $100 billion-plus emergency package that consists largely of military aid and arms transfers to Ukraine and Israel, as well as Taiwan: U.S. weapons supplies to war zones and regions of tension support U.S. jobs.
President Biden kicked off this line of thinking in his Oval Office speech in which he announced the new emergency aid proposal, referring to the U.S. arms industry as the "arsenal of democracy" and making a not-too-subtle pitch for the economic benefits of U.S. military aid:
"We send Ukraine equipment sitting in our stockpiles. And when we use the money allocated by Congress, we use it to replenish our own stores, our own stockpiles, with new equipment. Equipment that defends America and is made in America. Patriot missiles for air defense batteries, made in Arizona. Artillery shells manufactured in 12 states across the country, in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Texas. And so much more."
As if that were not enough, Politico has reported that administration officials are now circulating talking points in Congress that argue that providing military aid is "good for American jobs."
Using the jobs argument to sell weapons transfers is precisely backwards. Selling arms to combatant nations must be justified on the basis of their security and human rights consequences, not the jobs and profits they generate. Former President Donald Trump used the jobs card in touting arms deals with Saudi Arabia at the height of its brutal war in Yemen, even going so far as hailing the benefits of those sales as a reason not to hold the regime accountable for its murder of the U.S.-resident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. This tactic was wrong then and it's wrong now.
In the case of Ukraine, it is essential to keep supporting its ability to defend itself from Russia's invasion, although sending arms without an accompanying diplomatic strategy runs the risk of enabling a long grinding war that could even lead to escalation to a direct U.S.-Russian confrontation.
Even given these risks, there's a strong argument to be made for supporting Kyiv's military effort. But the suggestion that this support should continue because it creates American jobs is misguided and dangerous. It can be applied to support any kind of conflict or any variety of weapons program, whether it is necessary or not, as indicated by Trump's use of it to enable the Saudi war in Yemen.
Military aid to Israel for its war on Gaza, launched in response to Hamas's horrific attacks on Israeli civilians, is another matter. The assault has resulted in the deaths of 7,000 Gazans so far, including over 2,000 children, mostly due to an unprecedented campaign of air strikes. A ground war would have even more devastating consequences, and would increase the real and growing danger of a wider Mideast war. Providing an emergency arms package in this context while opposing a ceasefire is a far different matter than providing support for Ukraine.
It's not clear that the jobs argument has come into play to the same degree in promoting U.S. policy towards Israel's military campaign in Gaza, given current, widespread support in Congress. But it could well enter the picture as opposition to public support for the slaughter in Gaza continues. A recent poll indicates that roughly two-thirds of Americans support a ceasefire in the Gaza conflict, and those numbers may grow as heart-rending scenes of death and destruction continue to make their way back to America.
While the jobs argument should take a back seat to strategic and human rights concerns, it's worth exploring its validity, since it has been introduced into the debate. There are many ways to create more and better jobs without resorting to increased weapons spending. Virtually any other form of government outlay, or even a tax cut, yields greater employment than military spending.
Forging a less militarized foreign policy and rolling back a Pentagon budget that is soaring towards $1 trillion per year would open the way to building a more peaceful and sustainable economy. But the first priority — especially with respect to Israel/Gaza — must be to stop the killing and end the war, not debate the economic effects of arms spending. The jobs argument should have no place in this hugely consequential discussion.