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How do citizens respond to campaign events? We explore this question with a unique repeated measures survey design, fielded during the 2000 presidential campaign. We model transitions in support for the major party candidates following the party conventions and presidential debates. In the aggregate, Gore support increases following the conventions (but not the debates), while Bush support increases with the debates (but not the conventions). But there is considerable microlevel variation in the data: responsiveness to campaign events is greatest among Independents, undecided voters, and "mismatched partisans," but exactly how these groups respond differs for each event. Moreover, attitudes toward then President Clinton mediate the effect of the campaign events on voter preferences. Two primary conclusions follow: (1) rich data sets are required to observe the effects of campaign events; (2) the influence of campaign events on vote choice is conditional on previous preferences, partisan dispositions, and political context.

Under the system of presidential appointments of regional governors, which existed in Russia from 2005 to 2012, gubernatorial loyalty to the central government and particularly governors' ability to deliver satisfactory results to the ruling party in national-level elections were crucial to their likelihood of being reappointed to the next term. In this paper, we argue that governors, anticipating the relationship between loyalty and reappointments, attempted to deliver additional votes to the ruling party, and show that those attempts were subject to regional political cycles. Exploiting variation in the starting and expiry dates of Russian regional governors' terms of office, we find that the winning margins for a pro-government party across Russian regions in national-level elections held between 2007 and 2012 were substantially higher when elections were closer to the beginning or to the expiration of a regional governor's term. The effect is driven almost exclusively by the governors serving their first terms. However, for elections held between 1999 and 2004, when governors were subject to direct votes by regional constituencies, no similar effect is found. The results can be explained by, e.g., first impression and recency biases in appointment decisions. We then implement several exercises to identify the sources of the additional votes for the ruling party and demonstrate that governors, while unlikely committing electoral fraud, likely exerted effort to stimulate turnout among ruling party supporters.

RATIONAL CHOICE THEORIES HAVE BEEN FALSIFIED BY EXPERIMENTAL TESTS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND HAVE NOT BEEN SUPPORTED BY ANALYSES OF BEHAVIOR INT HE MARKET. POLITICS IS AN EVEN LESS FERTILE FIELD OF APPLICATION FOR RATIONAL CHOICE THEORIES BECAUSE POLITICS DEALS WITH ENDS AS WELL AS MEANS, THUS PREVENTING ENDS- MEANS RATIONALITY; VOTES HAVE PARTISAN LOYALTIES OFTEN 'FIXED' IN ADOLESCENCE; POLITICAL BENEFITS HAVE NO COMMON UNIT OF MEASUREMENT; 'RATIONAL IGNORANCE' INHIBITS RATIONAL CHOICES; AND THERE IS NO MARKET-LIKE FEEDBACK TO FACILITATE LEARNING. RESEARCH COMPARING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EFFICIENCY DOES NOT SUPPORT RATIONAL CHOICE. IRONICALLY, WHILE LAW AND BUSINESS SCHOOLS ARE NOW EMPLOYING BETTER MICROECONOMIC THEORIES, POLITICAL SCIENTISTS ARE TAKING UP RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY, REGARDLESS OF THE DISCONFIRMING EVIDENCE.

Abstract. Analyses of turnout in British general elections fall broadly into two camps: those based on constituency–level data, and those based on survey data. The former stress the importance of local context, while the latter stress personal characteristics and viewpoints. Underlying both are a range of theories purporting to explain turnout. However, to date, there has been little systematic attempt to analyse turnout in the round. In this paper, we combine survey and constituency data to study the individual and contextual correlates of turnout at the British general election and 1992. Constituency level analyses seem to confirm the importance of local context, though it declined during the 1980s. However, and contrary to analyses which employ constituency data only, while individual electors' decisions on whether or not to turn out are influenced by their personal circumstances, they are not influenced by local context.

This paper studies the association between the risk of automation and vote choice in 11 West European countries. We extend upon labour economics literature on the effects of automation on the labour market by focusing on the political consequences of automation. We also build on existing work relating labour market risks to support for radical right parties. We argue that automation threat is most likely to increase support for radical right parties. We demonstrate that those more inclined to vote for the radical right rather than the average voters are those who are both threatened by automation and are still "just about managing" economically. They are more receptive to the narrative of the radical right, which simultaneously highlights the risk, and proposes protection. Using cross-sectional individual level data drawn from the European Social Survey (rounds 6, 7 and 8), we find that individuals who perceive themselves as "coping on present income" are significantly more likely to vote for radical right parties as risk of automation increases. They are also less likely to vote for major right parties.

This paper studies the association between the risk of automation and vote choice in 11 West European countries. We extend upon labour economics literature on the effects of automation on the labour market by focusing on the political consequences of automation. We also build on existing work relating labour market risks to support for radical right parties. We argue that automation threat is most likely to increase support for radical right parties. We demonstrate that those more inclined to vote for the radical right rather than the average voters are those who are both threatened by automation and are still "just about managing" economically. They are more receptive to the narrative of the radical right, which simultaneously highlights the risk, and proposes protection. Using cross-sectional individual level data drawn from the European Social Survey (rounds 6, 7 and 8), we find that individuals who perceive themselves as "coping on present income" are significantly more likely to vote for radical right parties as risk of automation increases. They are also less likely to vote for major right parties. ; Peer reviewed

EXPLORES REASONS THAT CANDIDATES REPRESENTING THE SAME PARTY RECEIVE DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF VOTES IN MULTI-MEMBER ELECTORAL DIVISIONS, CITING RESULTS OF 1973 ELECTIONS FOR 14 NEW DISTRICT COUNCILS IN LANCASHIRE. ASSESSES UNUSED VOTES AND GROSS-VOTING AS SOURCES OF DIFFERENTIAL PARTY VOTES. FINDS APPLICATION OF "LOW POLITICIZATION" AND "HIGH POLITICIZATION" MODELS EXPLAINS MORE THAN POSITION ON BALLOT DOES.

We examine the magnitude and significance of selection bias in roll call votes. Prior to 2009, all recorded (roll call) votes in the European Parliament had to be requested explicitly by European Political Groups. Since 2009, a roll call vote has been mandatory on all final legislative votes. We exploit that change in the rules and compare differences between final legislative votes, amendment votes and non-legislative votes before and after 2009, using a difference-in-differences approach with extensive controls. Using data from the Sixth (2004–2009) to Seventh (2009–2014) European Parliaments, we fail to find any large differences in voting cohesion for the main political groups. We find even less significance when we control for changes in parliamentary membership between those two periods. The results suggest that selection biases in the European Parliament associated with strategic choices are negligible.

To whom do British Members of Parliament respond when voting in the House of Commons? Using a series of votes on abortion, the revealed preferences of MPs are estimated. The results indicate that constituency characteristics matter, but they also underline the central importance of party. Even when discipline is not imposed, the Members of the three largest parties are distinct from one another. Moreover, there is a noteworthy interaction between constituency & party: the more marginal the seat, the more extreme the position. Members appear to react to electoral threat by reinforcing partisan bona fides with their local party rather than conforming to the median, recognizing the importance of partisanship for electoral success & the role of local party resources. 3 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 60 References. Adapted from the source document.