The international emergence of criminal information law
In: Ius informationis 1
2729319 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Ius informationis 1
In: Verfassung und Recht in Übersee: VRÜ = World comparative law : WCL, Band 40, Heft 2, S. 249-260
ISSN: 0506-7286
In: American journal of international law, Band 98, Heft 3, S. 633-635
ISSN: 0002-9300
International law is a system of rules and principles that regulates behaviour between international actors in the present, but is based on what is expected to happen in the future. This book explores how risk and uncertainty are imagined, articulated, and managed across the various fields of international law.
Es scheint eher paradox, allerdings ist es evident, dass es selbst für Zeiten der Kriegsführung immer einen gewissen Verhaltenskodex gegeben hat. Einen Kodex, der Kombattanten führen soll, indem er diverse Verhaltensregeln aufstellt. Im Mittelalter war es das Prinzip der Ritterlichkeit, das ein Minimum an Anstand und Vertrauen zwischen Gegnern etablieren sollte. Heute ist das Prinzip der Ritterlichkeit unter anderem in dem Perfidieverbot des humanitären Völkerrechtes verankert. Diese Arbeit wird die Entwicklung des Perfidieverbotes über die Jahre analysieren. Dabei wird besonders die Fortentwicklung des Verbotes von rechtshistorischen Werken bis zur heutigen Kodifikation in den Genfer Konventionen durchleuchtet. Die Frage, ob das Überdeterminieren von Normen positive Auswirkungen auf die Anwendung dieser Normen hat wird bearbeitet. Folglich wird der Anwendungsbereich des Perfidieverbotes in der heutigen Zeit untersucht; hierbei werden Grauzonen und Unklarheiten der Regulierung aufgewiesen und letztendlich sein Status als Völkergewohnheitsrecht in Frage gestellt. ; It seems rather paradox that for times of warfare it can be observed that there has always been some kind of code of conduct that is supposed to guide combatants by setting behavioural rules. In medieval times it was the principle of chivalry that was meant to establish a minimum level of decency and trust between adversaries. Nowadays, this code of conduct is inter alia enshrined in the prohibition of perfidy within the Geneva Conventions. This paper will analyse how the prohibition of perfidy has been developed over the years. The prohibitions evolvement from early legal texts to todays codification will be meticulously assessed. Question arising being, whether over stipulation of principles in legal texts might rather be harmful then helpful, as they might narrow the scope of application of the prohibition tremendously. Ultimately, the narrowing of the prohibitions scope of application will lead to the question whether the prohibition of perfidy is still of actual relevance in todays warfare and if it is, whether it can be seen as international customary law. Along the way challenges and ambiguities within the prohibition and arising controversies to it may be disclosed. ; Charlotte Genschel ; Graz, Univ., Dipl.-Arb., 2015 ; (VLID)752876
BASE
In: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs Congress 97, Session 2
World Affairs Online
In: Asian perspective, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 11-72
ISSN: 2288-2871
In: Yearbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford Univ Press, 2020)
SSRN
Working paper
In: Law, conflict and international relations
In: 4 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law (2015)
SSRN
In: International Relations, Band 1, Heft 11, S. 582.1-582
In: Human rights law review, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 436-438
ISSN: 1744-1021
In: Bibliographies and indexes in law and political science 4
World Affairs Online
In: Emory International Law Review, Band 35
SSRN
In: Comparative strategy, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 15-24
ISSN: 0149-5933
THIS ARTICLE SEEKS TO ESTABLISH TWO POINTS WITH REGARD TO CURRENT INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION POLICIES. FIRST IT WILL BE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO USE EXPORT CONTROLS TO STOP NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND MISSILE PROGRAMS WORLDWIDE. SECOND, NONPROLIFERATION TREATIES ARE EITHER UNVERIFIABLE OR THEY HAVE VERIFICATIONS MEASURES THAT PROVIDE LITTLE OR NO CONFIDENCE AGAINST CHEATING. ALSO, NONPROLIFERATION TREATIES AFFORD LITTLE PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISTS OR ROGUE STATES THAT IGNORE OR NONCOMPLY WITH THOSE TREATIES.