Suchergebnisse

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada's approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person's intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.

The national report for the purpose of the 20th International Congress of Comparative Law Fukuoka 2018 deals with the optional choice of court agreements from the perspective of the Czech law. The report answers the questions if the Czech national legislation allows the parties to conclude the optional choice of court agreements in international cases, what is the character of these clauses and if they are expressly stated in the Czech Private International Law Act. The authors deal also with the asymmetrical choice of court agreements, especially their legal effect. In the end of the report, the authors evaluate the efficiency of the national regulation and propose for the necessary modifications.

A review of Paul Bennett's recent book which presents a comprehensive analysis of Australia's Indigenous sentencing courts.

One of the most vulnerable spheres of life of any individual is his / her private and family life. Therefore, this issue could not slip the attention of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (hereinafter - the Convention) (Council of Europe, 1950). In fact, there have always been some prejudices within this issue, as it is not a secret that accusations of violating an individual's right to privacy often provoke discussion in the public sphere. For example, when the UK Special Forces eliminated three terrorists (who were no longer resisting) on the territory of Gibraltar (Case of McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1995), the media did not particularly intend to protect the right to life of these criminals. On the other hand, quite a few liberal media sources have resonantly responded to the interference with private life, when a group of stockbrokers and bankers were prosecuted for sadomasochism in a private residence. A similar behavior of the press was observed when discussing the mandatory use of seat belts. However, when considering the issues related to the violation of Article 8 of the Convention (Council of Europe, 1950), it is important to find answers to a few rather essential questions: Has there been an interference with private life under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention (Council of Europe, 1950)? If so, then – Is this interference sufficiently justified in the light of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention (Council of Europe, 1950), namely: Was the interference lawful? If yes, then – Did the interference have a lawful purpose? If yes, then – Was the interference necessary for a democratic society (can it be regarded as an adequate response to socially urgent necessity)? In case there arises a question concerning state's positive obligations, it will no longer belong to the jurisdiction of paragraph 2, but will touch upon the analysis of the issue whether state's positive obligation exists at all.

Abstract Understanding that legal categories are created and shaped through a process that is not only juridical, but also social and political, this paper offers an overview of the category 'violence against women' in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. By doing a critical in-depth analysis of the most relevant cases for the category's development, besides relying on information gathered through interviews conducted with the Courts' lawyers, the paper suggests that the category is a translocal one, in the sense that its content has been determined through a complex interaction between transnational formulations and local variables.