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International audience ; Many regard France as a nation with a distinctive and world-renown cuisine. However, the common hamburger became the center of a public dialog in 2009e2010 as the nation grappled with the meaning of fast-food processed by halal standards. Using content analysis of national newspapers, we analyze how the French media framed the introduction of a halal hamburger onto the menu of fast-food restaurant Quick. Media framing was unsettled and contentious. We explore this discursive contest and show that the framing of responses ranged from those supporting acceptance of the halal menu based on free-market logic or cultural diversity, while most constructed arguments that the menu was a threat to the very essence of French republican ideals. Such interpretative disputes hold valuable insights for furthering our understanding of food boundaries and the 'othering' of populations as a strategy to reinforce national identities. We show how, in their efforts to construct meaning around halal hamburgers , the media constructed a defensive gastronationalism which served as a political tool to reinforce French identity within national borders, using everyday foods, and, in this way, drew boundaries around who was French.

A review essay covering books 1) Nicholas A. Lambert, Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War (2012), 2) Gregory D. Miller, The Shadow of the Past: Reputation and Military Alliances Before the First World War (2011) and 3) Michael S. Neiberg, Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I (2011).

AbstractSomeEuropean law proposals are subject to scrutiny by national parliaments while others go unchecked. The analysis in this article indicates that the opposition scrutinisesEuropean Union law to gather information on the proceedings inside the Council of Ministers and theEuropean Parliament. Yet whereas strong opposition parties scrutinise highly politicised law proposals, weak opposition parties tend to scrutinise those proposals that are negotiated under the non‐transparent fast‐track procedure. In addition, there is ample evidence that the leading minister initiates scrutiny in order to strengthen his or her intergovernmental bargaining leverage. Yet, this Schelling Conjecture presumes that the party of the minister is located between the expected bargaining position in the Council and the coalition partner. Any other domestic interest constellation could lead to scrutiny motivated by whistle blowing. However, an issue's salience helps us to separate the whistle blowing from the Schelling Conjecture.