IN MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS 1989 WILL NOT BE LIKE 1981 FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NEW PRESIDENT. THE U.S. WILL NOT HAVE THE RELATIVE LUXURY OF ABSTAINING FROM ARAB - ISRAELI PEACEMAKING THAT THE OUTGOING ADMINISTRATION HAD EIGHT YEARS AGO. AMERICA'S INFLUENCE IN ARAB - ISRAELI DIPLOMACY MUST NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. FIVE INITIAL STEPS SHOULD BE ADOPTED AS GENERAL PRINCIPLES: THE U.S. PRESIDENT MUST DEVELOP A SECURE POLITICAL BASE AT HOME; THE U.S. MUST REITERATE THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN IMPOSED PEACE; THE U.S. MUST MAKE CLEAR THAT IT WILL CONTINUE HAVING THE PLEDGE IT GAVE TO ISRAEL IN SEPTEMBER 1975 CONCERNING THE ROLE OF THE PLO; ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC EFFORT MUST BEGIN IN ISRAEL; AND, FINALLY, THE U.S. MUST ESTABLISH ITS CREDIBILITY WITH MODERATE ARAB LEADERS BEGINNING IN EGYPT, JORDAN, AND SAUDI ARABIA.
It is not easy to present a summary of Middle East studies in France. Traditionally located in several important institutions—Collège de France, School of Applied Higher Studies (EPHE), National School of Oriental Languages—they have burst out of these walls over the past two decades. Many courses on the Middle East are now given in the Universities of Paris and the provinces. The new organization of higher education created after the crisis of May 1968 was guided by a spirit of university autonomy and thus makes any general summary even more difficult. Several universities have often been created in the same city and specialists have been split up among them rather than remaining together.
Sonderheft über die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen Kanadas zu Ländern des Vorderen Orients mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Technologiesektors, des Ingenieurwesens, der Berater und der Kontraktoren. (DÜI-Sdt)