Suchergebnisse

India is a rapidly growing democratic naval power. Moreover, its features such as the strong and fast-growing economy, newest military technologies and nuclear weapon make a big impression. Considering the other major powers, it seems that the world is becoming multipolar where India could have a significant role and become one of the major poles. It has been a subject for discussions among journalists and academics for a log time. On the other hand, there are a lot of discussions about India's "friendly and mild" foreign policy; also, it is sometimes named the non-ambitious passive player in the international arena. The optimism with doubts: the paradoxical situation composed of the history of the impressive imperial civilization, modern-day economic growth, huge progress in technologies versus the major internal problems and "soft" state image. Here emerges the problem: why India's foreign policy, despite its power growth, is still passive/neutral on the international arena? The hypotheses to answering this question are: 1. India's role and status are restricted by its lack of power. 2. India's role on the international arena is restricted by its ideological and neutrality traditions, which provide ontological security to India. The aim of this article is to ascertain and explore India's status (regional or global) and to ascertain India's role (self-identification) on the international arena by using the ontological security theory.The theoretical background of this essay is ontological security theory which ten years ago was absorbed from sociology and is quite new in the international relations and security studies. Its main arguments are: ontological security is the security of being; in addition to physical security, states also seek ontological security (security of the self); ontological security is achieved by routinizing relationships with significant others, after all players become attached to those relationships, even if they are dangerous to their physical security. This theory is strongly bound with the identity that India always gives the self culture prominence in its discourse and its friendly discourse in the Ministry of Defence annual reports. This is the reason why the ontological security theory was chosen to help understand and explain India's foreign policy. First, links between ontological and traditional security are discussed in the first part of this work. There is a broad analysis of the assumptions of the ontological security theory in the same paragraph. Second, there is a short criticism of the ontological security. Finally, the ontological security theory as the India's foreign policy explanation tool is discussed; the discourse analysis is introduced as a methodological instrument of the work, and the model of analysis of the second part of the work, is defined. The second part of the work contains the content analysis of experts' articles and official documents of India's Foreign Ministry, using the model defined in the previous part and ontological security for the results' explanation.The analysis made in the second part of the work has shown that the ontological security theory is able to explain India's foreign policy and does it. The first hypothesis (India's role and status are restricted by its lack of power) was denied. This means that India can be a major global power. The second hypothesis (India's role in the international arena is restricted by its ideological and neutrality traditions, which provide ontological security to India) was approved. Strictly, it means that India does not want to be a major power because of it self-identity and ontological security. India does not expose itself as a major power but thinks that is worth to be such. On the other hand, if India has absorbed the international politics routine form the British Empire, this could mean that India's identity is to be a global power, but it does not want to publicise it yet.The study has shown that it is hard to regard India in the international community as a major power without special observation or using just the realism theory tools. Consequently, the ontological security theory has shown that it has the tools that can be used in countries' foreign policy explanation.

Walter Benjamin publica en 1921 un artículo titulado "Para la crítica de la violencia" (Zür Kritik der Gewalt). Según anuncia en las primeras líneas, en este trabajo el autor busca dilucidar "si la violencia en general, como principio, es moral". Para entender el planteo en su profundidad y problematicidad es necesario, no obstante, tener en cuenta diversas consideraciones. A lo largo del presente artículo intento llevar adelante una formulación crítica de las mismas, sirviéndome de otros textos de Benjamin y de autores posteriores que lo han trabajado. Intento recuperar, además, una dimensión del texto que, en ocasiones, quedó opacada por los desarrollos en torno al nexo violencia/derecho (y conceptos aledaños: vida desnuda, violencia mítica, etc.). Se trata de la relación que Benjamin busca establecer entre violencia (poder) y justicia. Desarrollo, por tanto, una lectura del ensayo a través de esa clave: según el movimiento de una doble desarticulación, entre violencia y derecho, pero también entre derecho y justicia, el carácter esencialmente injusto de todo derecho, y el pensamiento de una posible inscripción del poder en un contexto no jurídico como condición de justicia. La crítica de la violencia, a través de la filosofía de su historia, busca asegurar la posibilidad de una verdadera nueva era histórica, la posibilidad de la revolución; pensarla para demostrarla posible. ; Walter Benjamin published in 1921 an article entitled "Critique of violence" (Zür Kritik der Gewalt). As the author announces in the first lines, in this work he seeks to elucidate "if violence in general, as a principle, is moral". To understand the approach in its theoretical depth, it is necessary, however, to take into account various considerations. Throughout this paper I pesent a critical formulation of them, using other texts by Benjamin and later authors who have worked on it. I try to recover, in addition, a dimension of the text that, at times, was overshadowed by the developments around the nexus violence / law (and neighboring concepts: naked life, mythical violence, etc.). This dimension is the relationship that Benjamin seeks to establish between violence (power) and justice. I develop, therefore, a reading of the essay through that lecture key: according to the movement of a double disarticulation, between violence and law, but also between law and justice, the essentially unfair character of Law, and the thought of a possible inscription of power in a non-legal context as a condition of justice. The critique of violence, through the philosophy of its history, will seek to ensure the possibility of a true new historical era, the possibility of revolution; think it to prove it possible. ; Walter Benjamin publicou em 1921 um artigo intitulado "Para a crítica da violência" (Zür Kritik der Gewalt). Como ele anuncia nas primeiras linhas, neste trabalho o autor procura elucidar "se a violência em geral, como princípio, é moral". Para entender a abordagem em sua profundidade teórica, é necessário, no entanto, levar em conta várias considerações. Ao longo deste artigo, tentarei levar adiante uma formulação crítica deles, usando outros textos de Benjamin e autores posteriores que trabalharam nele. Tentarei recuperar, além disso, uma dimensão do texto que, por vezes, foi ofuscada pelos desenvolvimentos em torno do nexo violência / direito (e conceitos vizinhos: vida nua, violência mítica, etc.). É sobre a relação que Benjamin procura estabelecer entre violência (poder) e justiça. Desenvolvo, portanto, uma leitura do ensaio através dessa chave: de acordo com o movimento de uma desarticulação dupla entre violência e direito, mas também entre lei e justiça, o caráter essencialmente injusto da toda lei, eo pensamento de um possível registro do poder em um contexto não legal como condição de justiça. A crítica da violência, através da filosofia da sua história, procurará assegurar a possibilidade de uma verdadeira nova era histórica, a possibilidade da revolução. ; Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación

La presente investigación demuestra que el infante, como individuo distintivo con necesidades y capacidades propias y en su condición de sujeto cívico, político, social y cultural, puede pensar históricamente a partir de una de las formas de expresión humana más potentes para organizar, comprender y valorar la realidad: el pensamiento narrativo. Se revela a la vez, la necesidad de que niños y niñas adquieran representaciones históricas, a través de las cuales aprenderían el acervo de experiencias humanas ajenas o sociales que posibilitan la imaginación y en consecuencia la creación. Hasta hoy es visible la ausencia de elaboración de representaciones históricas en la primera y segunda infancia, lo cual dificultad la creación de relatos propios y desaprovecha el potencial narrativo que se ha cultivado en los primeros años de vida. Enmarcada en una perspectiva histórico-cultural del aprendizaje, esta investigación reflexiona sobre la forma en que el individuo debería construir tales representaciones y el modo cómo éstas aportan en el desarrollo integral del individuo. Entre sus objetivos se encuentran: explorar y analizar las posibilidades narrativas relacionadas con la construcción de pensamiento histórico en niños y niñas entre los 5 y 7 años, que les permiten valorar la realidad, conocerla y transformarla en beneficio suyo, de la sociedad y del entorno. Además de ahondar a nivel teórico, se obtuvo evidencia empírica en el aula que permite sustentar, entre otras, las siguientes formulaciones: 1. Al igual que todos los individuos, los niños y niñas son sujetos y no objetos históricos, esto significa que deben y pueden hacer la historia participando en la conformación de su propio destino, reconociéndose como ciudadanos de la aldea mundial. 2. El conocimiento que se adquiere en el ámbito escolar no puede fundamentarse solamente en el desarrollo de destrezas, se requieren dominios cognitivos 3. Desde muy temprana edad se dispone de las herramientas conceptuales para construir pensamiento histórico, pero aún existe predominio de prácticas educativas que minimizan este aprendizaje bajo el supuesto de que aún no es tiempo de adquirirlo. / Abstract. This research shows that the infant, as distinctive individual needs and capacities and their status as subjects in civic, political, social and cultural, can think historically from one form of human expression more powerful for organizing, understanding and assess the reality: the narrative thought. It reveals both the need for children to achieve historical representations through which learn the stock of human experiences that enable others or social imagination and consequently creation. So today is the lack of visible development of historical representations in infancy and childhood, which accounts difficulty creating their own and misses the narrative potential that has been cultivated in the early years of life. Framed in a historical-cultural perspective of learning, this research reflects on how the individual should build such representations and the way how they contribute to the development of the individual. Among its objectives are: to explore and analyze narrative possibilities related to the construction of historical thinking in children between 5 and 7 years, allowing them to assess the reality, to know and transform their benefit, society and environment. In addition to deepen a theoretical, empirical evidence was obtained in the classroom that can support, among others, the following formulations: 1. Like all individuals, children are subject and historical objects, this means that should and can make history by participating in shaping their own destiny, recognized as citizens of the global village. 2. The knowledge acquired at school can not be based only on the development of skills, cognitive domains are required 3. From an early age provides the conceptual tools to build historical thinking, but there is still a predominance of educational practices that minimize this learning under the assumption that it is not yet time to buy. ; Maestría

Die komplexe sozialistische Rekonstruktion von Wohnbaugebieten im ehemaligen Ost-Berlin ist ein städtebauliches und architektonisches Phänomen der letzten zwei Dekaden der DDR Geschichte. 1971 leitete die SED eine Neuordnung in der Wohnungsbaupolitik ein und deklarierte die Lösung der Wohnungsfrage durch ein umfangreiches Wohnungsbauprogramm. Die Problematik der Woh-nungsversorgung konnte nicht nur durch die Errichtung von Neubauten gelöst werden, demzufolge waren die erhaltungswürdigen Altbauten zu rekonstruieren. Eine Wende in der Städtebaupolitik wurde damit eingeleitet. Es begann eine stärkere Orientierung auf Bauen und Wohnen in den in-nerstädtischen Bereichen gegenüber dem Neubaukomplex an der Peripherie. Es war der Beginn der Rekonstruktionsmaßnahmen auf mehreren innerstädtischen Bereichen als Alternative zu aus-gedehnten Stadterweiterungen. Rekonstruktion im Zusammenhang mit dem Wohnungsbau ist ein typisches Vokabular der DDR. Diese bezeichnet bauliche Maßnahmen zur Instandsetzung und Modernisierung der Wohngebäude in Altbaugebieten zur Erhöhung des Wohnkomforts und der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse. Dabei wurden sowohl konventionelle wie auch serielle Methoden der Bauproduktion eingesetzt. Die Zielsetzung der komplexen sozialistischen Rekonstruktion war die Schaffung sozialistischer Lebensbedingungen. Diese beschränkten sich nicht nur auf das Gebäude, sie beinhalten auch die Verbesserung der städtebaulichen und strukturellen Struktur des Gebietes durch Erhaltung bzw. Ausbau von sozialen und gesellschaftlichen Einrichtungen sowie Sport- und Erholungsanlagen und die Gestaltung des öffentlichen Raumes. Die Bauaktivitäten der DDR konzentrierten sich seit den 1980er Jahren im Vorfeld der 750-Jahrfeier von Berlin 1987 zunehmend auf ihre Hauptstadt. Die Rekonstruktion kulminierte vor die-sem Hintergrund in ihrer Endphase zu einer Maßnahme, die durch Prestige und Präsentation ge-prägt war. Bei der Betrachtung der Entwicklung der Rekonstruktion wurde festgestellt, dass die städtebauliche Konzeption in den Hintergrund trat und sich den politischen quantitativen Vorgaben zur Woh-nungsversorgung sowie den qualitativen wirtschaftlichen Forderungen unterordnen musste. Für das Jahr 1990 war die Lösung der Wohnungsfrage vorgesehen. Das Zusammenfassende Er-gebnis der Untersuchung ist, dass die deklarierten und faktischen Ergebnisse jedoch enorm vonei-nander abwichen und das Ziel der Rekonstruktion nicht erreicht wurde. Die Bürger der DDR führten auch aus diesem Grund Ende 1989 die friedliche Revolution in der DDR durch. Diese Untersuchung zieht über 20 Jahren nach der Vereinigung beider deutscher Staaten eine Bilanz auf der Grundlage einer aus den Quellen ermittelten Übersicht und der exemplarischen Un-tersuchung einzelner Quartiere und Bauten. Dabei werden sowohl die Überformung des Altbe-standes wie auch die Errichtung von Neubauten thematisiert. Im Fokus stehen die Gegenüberstel-lungen der unterschiedlichen Konzepte sowie der Ergebnisse der einzelnen Projekte vor dem Hin-tergrund der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Faktoren, die den Ablauf beeinflussten. ; The complex socialist reconstruction of residential areas in former East Berlin is an urban and architectural phenomenon of the last two decades in the history of East Germany. In 1971 the SED initiated a reorganization in the housing policy and declared the solution of the housing problem through an extensive housing program. The problem of the supply of residential housing could not be solved only by the construction of new buildings. Old buildings worth preserving were to be reconstructed. A change in urban policy has been initiated with it. A greater emphasis grew on building and living in the inner city areas compared to building new complexes in the periphery. It was the beginning of reconstruction measures in several inner city areas as an alternative to extensive urban expansion. Reconstruction in connection with housing is a typical vocabulary of the GDR. This means structural measures for the repair and modernization of residential buildings in the old building areas to increase the living standard and the social circumstances. Both conventional and serial methods were used in construction. The purpose of the complex socialist reconstruction was the creation of socialist living conditions. These requirements were not limited to the building; they also included the improvement of urban planning and structural structure of the area by preservation or expansion of social and community facilities as well as sports and recreational facilities and the design of public spaces. Since the 1980s the construction activities of the GDR focused – ahead of the 750th anniversary of Berlin in 1987 – on their capital. Against this background – in its final stage - the reconstruction culminated to a measure that was shaped by prestige and presentation. Considering the development of the reconstruction, it was found out,that the urban planning concept faded into the background and was subordinated to the political quantitative guidelines concerning the residential housing and the qualitative economic demands. The solution of the housing problem was scheduled for 1990. The summarizing result of the investigation shows, that the declared and the actual results however differed greatly from one another and the goal of the reconstruction was not achieved. Also for this reason the citizens of the GDR led the peaceful revolution in the GDR at the end of 1989. Throughout more than 20 years after the unification of the two German states this study draws a balance based on the investigated summary and the exemplary analysis of individual neighborhoods and buildings. Both, the transformation of old buildings as well as the construction of new buildings will be discussed. The focus lies on the comparison of the different concepts and the results of each project, considering the background of the political and economic factors that affected the process.

The urban space is, at least in our ac­tual conception, the natural habitat for modern civilization. Most of the problems suffered nowadays by society are rela­ted with its urban condition, does not matters whether they are economical, technological or mainly political. The city itself has become nowadays in a natural conflict scenario for the collective imagi­nation, at least in the same way that is considered the most creative environ­ment or the main commercial emporium. But there is a deep reality beyond this symbolic icon; History is very expressive about the issue of the relation between security and safety and the city evolution. But this is not only subject of interest for several scholars, it is also recognized as a huge problem by the United Nations and other international institutions. The general perception about urban safety is not, indeed, like a question of scientific interest, but as a deep root of everyday anxiety. There is a diffuse feeling in con­temporary culture that links the future of social sustainability to a matter of asocial behavior control in urban environment. Of course, that feeling in based in fears and can open the door to very dangerous system based in surveillance technolo­gies. Just for this reason, is very neces­sary a reflection about the reasons becau­se the cities are failing with the function of providing security or merely a safety sensation to their inhabitants. Trying to make this analysis, we can find at least an obvious influence factor in the urban environment: urban physical structure. And there are a couple of domains rela­ted with urban structure: the urban plan­ning and the urban design. The purpose of this paper is to describe some cases of the contribution of these domains to the urban lack of safety, taking examples from the past to understand our present, and perhaps our future. ; El espacio urbano es, al menos en nuestra concepción actual, el hábitat natural de la civilización moderna. La mayoría de los problemas sufridos por la sociedad hoy en día están relacionados con su condición urbana, no importa si son económicos, tecnológicos o de naturaleza política. La ciudad se ha convertido hoy en un escenario de conflicto natural para el imaginario colectivo, al menos en la misma forma que se considera el medio más creativo o el emporio comercial principal. Pero hay una realidad profunda más allá de este icono simbólico: la historia es muy expresiva sobre el tema de la relación entre la seguridad, la sensación de seguridad y la evolución de la ciudad. Esto no es sólo asunto de interés para planteamientos académicos ligados a la investigación, es también reconocido como un gran problema por las Naciones Unidas y otras instituciones internacionales. La percepción general sobre la seguridad urbana no es, de hecho, una cuestión de interés científico, sino una raíz profunda de la ansiedad cotidiana. Hay una sensación difusa en la cultura contemporánea que vincula el futuro de la sostenibilidad social a una cuestión de control de la conducta antisocial en el entorno urbano. Por supuesto, esa sensación se fundamenta en el temor y puede abrir la puerta a un sistema muy peligroso basado en las tecnologías de vigilancia. Sólo por esta razón, es muy necesaria una reflexión acerca de las razones de porqué las ciudades no están cumpliendo con la función de garantizar la seguridad, o simplemente de proporcionar una sensación de seguridad de sus habitantes. Tratando de hacer este análisis, podemos encontrar por lo menos un factor de influencia obvia en el medio ambiente urbano: la estructura física de la ciudad. Y hay un par de disciplinas relacionadas con la estructura urbana: la planificación urbana y el diseño urbano. El propósito de este trabajo es describir algunos casos de la contribución de estas disciplinas a la falta de seguridad urbana, tomando ejemplos del pasado para comprender nuestro presente, y quizá nuestro futuro.

Immigrant(s') children are the purveyors of a family tongue and culture which differ from that of the host country and its education system, when in fact, family culture and the mother-tongue play a major role in harmonious child development and in his/her integration into society. School, which should aim at both enabling the child to establish himself/herself as a subject and finding his/her place in society, conveys a different culture, which is regarded as legitimate. What about the tongues and cultures of immigrant children? Until the 1970s, nothing specific was schemed for immigrant school children. They had to merge with the rest. Family reunification policies brought along the taking into account of these children. Two systems were introduced : childcare facilities for non-francophone children and courses in the culture and language of their country of origin. Yet, if such policies have been a first step towards the taking into account of immigrant children within education systems, they've remained within a pattern of simultaneous assimilation and differentiation. Beyond what these policies intended, the observations made in the « reception and integration » classes and language and cultural courses of Côte d'Or, along with the interviews and surveys carried out with the teachers of the county, have pointed out different practical and human problems in their very functioning. Moreover, the schooling years play an important part in the building up of children and what is taught will leave its mark for long. Thus, the importance given to overseas cultures as well as the image of the other conveyed during that time, particularly through books, constitute the mirror of the way to see the other in the host society on the one hand, and will bear long-time consequences on tomorrow's society on the other hand. The western ethnocentrism which characterizes the teaching of History and Literature leads to the stigmatization of the Other, through the tongues and cultures transmitted to students. ; Les enfants (d') immigrés sont porteurs d'une langue et d'une culture familiales différentes de celles de la société d'arrivée et de son école. Or, la langue et la culture familiales jouent un rôle important dans le développement harmonieux de l'enfant et son « intégration » à la société d'arrivée. L'école qui doit permettre à l'enfant d'une part de se construire en tant qu'individu et d'autre part de trouver sa place dans la société où il vit, véhicule une culture différente, considérée comme légitime. Que fait-elle des langues et cultures familiales des enfants (d') immigrés? Jusque dans les années 1970, rien de particulier n'était prévu pour les enfants (d') immigrés scolarisés. Ils devaient se fondre dans la masse des élèves. Avec la mise en place d'une politique de regroupement familial, l'institution scolaire a commencé à prendre en compte ces enfants. Deux dispositifs ont été institués : des structures d'accueil pour les enfants non francophones et des enseignements de langue et culture d'origine. Cependant, si ces dispositifs constituent un premier pas dans la prise en compte des enfants (d') immigrés dans les écoles, elles restent dans une logique simultanément assimilationniste et différencialiste. Au delà de la conception de ces dispositifs, les observations effectuées dans les classes d'accueil et les cours de langue et culture d'origine de Côte d'Or ainsi que les entretiens et les enquêtes réalisées auprès des enseignants de ce département ont montré différents problèmes matériels, techniques et humains dans leur fonctionnement. Par ailleurs, la période de scolarisation joue un rôle important dans la construction des enfants et ce que l'on y enseigne marque pour longtemps. Ainsi, la place donnée aux cultures extra-occidentales ainsi que l'image de l'autre véhiculée au cours de celle-ci, en particulier par les manuels scolaires, d'une part constituent le miroir de la manière de voir l'autre plus généralement dans la société d'arrivée, et d'autre part emportera des conséquences sur le long terme, sur la société de demain. L'occidentalo-centrisme qui caractérise l'enseignement de l'histoire et de la littérature entraîne une dévalorisation/stigmatisation de l'Autre, de ses langues et de ses cultures qui est transmise aux élèves.

The Italian political unification is a process starting in 1861. The next ten years, until the freeing of Rome, are a period of strong changes because the the new nation starts by heavier backwardness conditions compared to other European nations.The basic conditionings that bound the new nation are summarized in some causes: an underdeveloped economic system where there are areas of industrial development; a significant shortage of mineral and energy resources; and an urban structure that is still that of the sixteenth century, the last brightness period of the Italian cities. The same internal communication system is composed of a basic road network which is still one of Roman origin and of isolated sections of rail network, with few links among the pre-unity nations.Particular attention should be paid on the impact of the economic processes on the cities: they have a strong impact on European cities since the early nineteenth century, but their impact on Italian cities (beginning from the main northern cities, Milan and Turin) is more limited, if compared with the transformations concerning other continental cities.The unification starting from 1861 imposes additional critical elements, because the Italian urban structure is not ready to the event, particularly for the choice of the capital city. A city that can rightfully define itself as capital exists, and it is Turin; but it is peripheral to the rest of the Italian territory. Furthermore there is an in pectore capital city, Rome, that is the symbolic centre of the Italian history. But the city has to wait another ten years to join to the rest of Italy. The solution is to temporarily move the capitol to Florence, even if nobody explicitly says it to Florentines! The step from Turin to Florence, and from Florence to Rome sets in motion a complex organizational mechanism and a significant money's amount, invested in the effort to bring the two cities to the new role.Before Florence, then Rome (two cities that represent a fundamental part of artistic and cultural national heritage) see the opportunity to modernize their urban structure. Urban plans are also formed for this purpose, although the instruments are deficient in relation to their technical capacity and the public administrations have low authority in the driving of the transformations. Instead, private investors and national and international banks will have open hand, facilitated from the new liberal State that will not hinder the freedom of action of private capitals.The paper want to identify the major changes occurred in the three capital cities (Turin, Florence, and Rome) investigating the urban processes and the main events in the period from 1861 to 1900. The unification acts on the three cities in different ways. In 1861 they are very different from each other, with a single similar factor, the number of inhabitants (about 150,000 each). The process of building of the new nation acts on the cities changing even more their characters and extending their differences. ; La costruzione dello stato unitario, avvenuta nell'arco di un decennio (1861-1871) portò alla necessità di spostare la capitale del Regno in un percorso di avvicinamento a Roma. Da Torino la capitale fu prima spostata a Firenze (1865), poi nel suo luogo naturale, Roma (1871). Gli spostamenti non comportarono solo conseguenze di ordine politico. Esse portarono anche alla necessità di intervenire sulla struttura urbana delle città per renderle capaci di accogliere la nuova funzione. Sia Torino che Firenze che, in misura maggiore, Roma, subirono rilevanti trasformazioni urbane, nel solco dei processi trasformativi che interessarono le città Ottocentesche d'Europa.Obiettivo dell'articolo è:- analizzare i caratteri urbanistici delle città al 1861;- individuare le trasformazioni riconducibili al loro status di capitale;- definire gli impatti di tali azioni fino ai giorni nostri- individuare gli influssi causati dall'evoluzione delle infrastrutture di trasporto sulla struttura urbana.

Official Development Aid as an idea is an implement of assistance, a kind of redistribution of the global income on the governmental level. Nevertheless, it is also a source of influence and as a result peculiarly understood imperialism. The opposition between political vision and reality is the factor which backs up this thesis. Political plans and prospects of the EU aid policy, such as "The European Consensus of Development" or "The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership", are concerned about supporting good governance and providing fair conditions of international trade. On the other hand, introducing this policy often, more or less, increases dependency of poor economies on the rich. It is also not eradicated from the European Union policy, for example in the case of the European Development Bank. However, EU development aid, coming to 49 billions euro, could be named munificent when compared to the United States. U.S. Official Development Aid amounts to only 0,19% of GDP, when the obligations confirmed by the government in a few declarations, among which is the Millennium Declaration of the United Nations, are about 0,7% of GDP. Secondly it is commonly shaped as an interrelated aid, which augment dependency of the recipient country. International institutions established in Bretton Woods, like International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group, have also a huge impact on the way of development of poor countries. There are a lot of groups of interest whose opinions are clear – above-mentioned institutions are the U.S. instruments of imperialism. It is caused by American predominance in these institutions and the line of policy which it supports. In the XXI century imperial aspirations are also present in recently developing countries – like China or Brazil. Changing roles in the system of international relations are now coming, creating a diffusion between clubs of rich North and poor, developing South. Leaders of development from developing countries are trying to build a strong position in relations with recipients of ODA. It is easier for them than for the West, mostly because of the lack of bad, colonial past relations. Their imperialism is not linked with history whatsoever, making their role of foreign relations easier to build up. Despite these cases of using development assistance in order to build up an imperium, there are a lot of non-governmental institutions whose perception of aid is beyond politics and burdens of imperialism. Best example of that is Grameen Bank – an institution founded by M. yunus, a Noble Prize winner. Its way of helping people is mainly intended to being unprofitable. There are a lot of ideas about how to describe development aid – more like a charity or kind of imperialism. Some aspects of business are desirable in ODA, partly because of increasing efficiency. It is economically proved that the return of capital in any way of benefit will strengthen willingness to providing aid. On the other hand, people are naturally liable to help and perform activities which do not give them any interest or gain. What is most interesting – nowadays developing countries are strengthening and they are evaluating theirs powers as equal partners of the rich, developed world. It comprises change in the system of international relations. Moreover United Nations should find a way of enforcing obligations of donors – like 0,7 percent of GDP for ODA to 2015. If the line of politics is steady, similar to current line, this goal will not be reached, so ODA will be more seen as a way of imperialism than help. In general, there are a lot of aspects of development which indicate that ODA is an implement of imperialism. On the other hand – some kind of interest improves the willingness of donors to provide aid. Besides that question – imperial or not – development aid is still increasing the number of people whose conditions of living are better because of ODA.

In an idealized formulation, translation and censorship mark opposite points on the spectrum of signification: if translation works to raze boundaries between text and reader, censorship strives to raise them. In scholarship on fascist Italy, this polarized definition was particularly widespread: censorship was cast exclusively as the tool of the powerful, and translation, as a way for intellectuals to smuggle subversive ideas into a xenophobic society. However, despite their apparently antithetical aims, literary historians have found archival evidence to support a more nuanced view of censorship and translation under fascism, and seminal theoretical contributions by Sigmund Freud, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida have led to wide recognition of a chiastic relationship between "repressive" censorship and "productive" translation. If, today, in light of the numerous fields which take translation and censorship as their objects of study (literature, history, psychoanalysis, cultural studies), it were possible to make a single claim about these processes, it would speak to their ability to destabilize notions of discipline, author and text. This dissertation uses these transgressive, polyvalent phenomena to unsettle a rather stubborn boundary in the postwar Italian literary panorama: "fascist" and "antifascist" literature, specifically as it relates to fictionalized wartime narratives by Curzio Malaparte (1898-1957), Elio Vittorini (1908-1966) and Beppe Fenoglio (1922-1963), intellectuals who are key for different yet convergent reasons: Malaparte, who abandoned fascism in 1931, has been depicted as an unscrupulous chameleon; Vittorini, who became antifascist in 1936, has become a symbol of redemptive conversion; Fenoglio, a partisan in the Resistance, has become synonymous with antifascist literature. In bringing together these texts, traditionally understood as reflections of their authors' politics, my dissertation examines how the rise and fall of fascism is narrativized and suggests that these political conversions—never before considered comparatively—share common anxieties as they attempt to renegotiate boundaries not just between "fascist" and "antifascist" but also between other categories of identity, including race and gender.While my dissertation locates such overlaps in "fascist" and "antifascist" texts, it also identifies a preoccupation with renegotiating boundaries shared by these fascist era texts and their postwar criticism. Perceived as a site for struggle between intellectuals and the regime, censorship and translation maintain their tantamount importance today, as their oppositional definitions—still widely held in the scholarship on Malaparte, Vittorini and Fenoglio—contribute to the reification of the emblematic positions of these intellectuals and their texts. My readings explore the ways in which censorship and translation have shaped perceptions of the texts' production and afterlife, but also how they inform narrative dynamics. After an introduction to my theoretical methods in Chapter One, in Chapter Two, I look at how categories of sexual and political "integrity" and "violation" intertwine in the plots of two novels by Vittorini, Garofano rosso [ The Red Carnation ], a famously censored fascist bildungsroman , and Conversazione in Sicilia [ Conversation in Sicily ], a story of an antifascist awakening, whose stylistic innovations were held to be the result of his experience translating Anglophone literature. As I offer new readings of previously marginalized scenes, I show how the critics' rhetorical emphasis on the censor's "violation" of Garofano and the "integrity" of Conversazione has helped construct Vittorini's emblematic position as a redemptive antifascist convert, obscuring the representations of sexual violence on which the protagonists' conversion depends. In Chapter Three, I focus on Fenoglio's Partigiano Johnny [ Johnny The Partisan ], purportedly born through self-translation from English to Italian, and show how its status as a literary monument to antifascism is predicated upon philological "conversion" efforts to restore the text to its uncensored form and thus tell the "complete" story of the Resistance. I argue that these efforts paradoxically censor a number of suggestive tensions that speak to the trauma of Italy's civil war. In Chapter Four, I turn to Malaparte's La pelle [ The Skin ], a polemical novel still caught in a debate on whether it deserves to be freed of its "cultural censorship." While the critics debate its "fidelity"" to the "truth" of the war, I explore the text's construction of its own truth claims, as it represents moments of "translation" between the Allies and the Italians.

How does exposure to genocide affect nuptiality and fertility among the surviving population? Genocides in Rwanda and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s caused high levels of population displacement, trauma, and death, along with a dramatic decline in the standard of living. In Rwanda, genocide also reduced the sex ratio of the marriage-aged population, while in Bosnia, despite the high proportion of male casualties, the overall sex ratio of the marriage-age population did not decline substantially. Contrary to the expected delay in first marriage throughout the process of demographic transition, there was clear evidence of a post-genocide marriage boom among younger cohorts in Rwanda. Meanwhile in Bosnia--a country that had already achieved the demographic transition and fairly steady marriage rates more than a decade before the war started--first marriage rates peaked slightly during and after the war and then continued to decrease during the decade after the war ended, never returning to prewar levels. Patterns in fertility echoed this trend, with a small baby boom in Rwanda contrasted with a fall in birth rates in Bosnia.Drawing from a multi-method, multi-site study involving data analysis from nationally representative household surveys, 117 qualitative life-history interviews and 34 interviews with key informants in both countries, I assess the relative importance of several factors on marriage and fertility trends during and immediately after genocide in both countries. By examining the Bosnian and Rwandan cases in tandem, I situate demographic changes due to genocide in a broader social and historical framework. It is difficult to compare the demographic effects of war and genocide in two countries that had widely divergent pre-war nuptial and reproductive contexts. I explore four broad sets of causal factors linking genocide with demographic outcomes: (1) involuntary factors, such as mortality, separation of partners, and survival bias; (2) material and economic factors, including loss of income, changes in employment, and `transactional marriage' during acute periods of crisis; (3) sex ratio and gender role factors, which encompass the change in the marriage market due to differential mortality by sex, changing gender roles during and after wartime, and norms of widowhood remarriage; and (4) psychosocial factors, including the duration and severity of conflict, the effects of rape and post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD] on the surviving population, and the role of political recovery and social cohesion in demographic decisions and outcomes. Whereas many journalists emphasized ethnic hatreds as the motivation behind both genocides, the instrumentalist view of ethnic conflict--which claims that ethnic divisions are exploited by elites during moments of economic and political crisis--has emerged as a powerful counter-narrative in both Bosnia and Rwanda. In areas where it is possible to measure ethnic differences my findings tend to support the instrumentalist view--namely, that economic and situational factors were more salient than ethnic differences in determining the demographic response to genocide. Broadly speaking, the mortality effects of genocide dominated in Rwanda, and this helped fuel an increase in marriages and births after war. Meanwhile in Bosnia the economic effects of genocide and the accompanying transition to a market economy tended to dominate the demographic response to genocide, suppressing marriage and fertility rates during and after the war. To classify the dominant character of these genocides in this way is not to ignore the massive economic collapse in Rwanda, nor the extraordinary death toll in Bosnia, but rather to suggest the relative primacy of economic and mortality effects as mediating channels through which genocide affected demographic outcomes for the majority of the population in each country.I postulate the need for a typology of the demographic effects of crisis. Famine, economic collapse, political instability, natural disaster, and armed conflict each affect population dynamics in different ways. Given the variation and complexity between the Bosnian and Rwandan genocides, it would be difficult to extrapolate directly from these two cases. Yet, when considered in tandem, the Bosnian and Rwandan case studies suggest a need to consider several important axes of variation--factors such as the intensity and duration of the crisis, economic effects, differential age structure effects, displacement, mortality, background conditions, and post-crisis political and social stability--when predicting the effects of future crises on nuptial and reproductive trends.

La investigación se centra en el estudio de la construcción de la representación corporativa y en el armado de la acción corporativa empresaria del gran empresariado a partir del estudio de sus asociaciones representativas. Se pretende analizar la dinámica interna de las organizaciones empresarias considerando la heterogeneidad y fragmentación de intereses presente al interior de las mismas para dar cuenta de los procesos de construcción de la representación corporativa, de la acción corporativa empresaria y de su posterior expresión colectiva. El objetivo de la tesis es analizar el proceso de construcción de la representación y de la acción corporativa empresaria y el accionar colectivo de la Unión Industrial Argentina a partir de la articulación de las dimensiones organizativa-institucional, estructural-económica y políticainstitucional mediatizadas por la lógica de los miembros y la lógica de la influencia en el período 1989-2003. El análisis toma como base de estudio al actor para realizar un análisis desde adentro, desde la organización y dinámicas internas, teniendo en cuenta que en el seno de las organizaciones empresarias se produce una representación heterogénea de intereses y que es allí donde se construye y define la acción corporativa empresaria y los posicionamientos públicos de las asociaciones empresarias. Este análisis incluye el contexto político, económico e institucional que define el escenario histórico donde las asociaciones empresarias surgen, se desarrollan y actúan. La heterogeneidad de intereses es un dato de fundamental importancia para comprender la construcción de la acción corporativa empresaria. La existencia de intereses divergentes y a veces abiertamente opuestos lleva a que la acción colectiva empresaria no surja espontáneamente, sino como resultado de un proceso político donde se definen y establecen intereses y se organiza la acción. Por lo tanto, la indagación acerca de los procesos de construcción y representación internos posibilita comprender cómo la posición externa de la UIA no es un mero reflejo de sus procesos internos, homogéneos y sin grietas, sino que éstos tienen una complejidad, particularidad y dinámica propias. The research focuses on the study of the construction of corporate representation in the assembly of the corporate action of big business entrepreneur from the study of their representative associations. Is to analyze the internal dynamics of business organizations considering the heterogeneity and fragmentation of interests present within them account for the processes of construction of corporate representation, business corporate action and subsequent collective expression. The aim of the thesis is to analyze the process of construction of the representation and corporate action business and collective actions of the Industrial Union of Argentina after the coordination or organizational and institutional dimensions, structral-ecomnomic and political-institutional mediated members logic and the logic of influence in the period 1989-2003. The analysis is based on study to the actor to perform an analysis from within, from the organization and internal dynamics, taking into account that within business organizations there is a diverse representation of interests and that is where it is built and defined business corporate action and public positions of business associations. This analysis includes political, economic and institutional framework that defines the stage of history where business associations arise, develop and operate. The heterogeneity of interests is a fact of fundamental importance for understanding the construction of the corporate action business. The existence of divergent interests and sometimes opnely opposed leads the corporate collective action does not arise spontaneously, but as a result of a political process where interests are defined and established and organized action. Therefore, the inquiry about the construction processes and internal representation possible to understand how the external position of the UIA is not as mere reflection of their internal processes, homogeneous and without cracks, but they have a complexity, uniqueness and dynamism.

The Italian political unification is a process starting in 1861. The next ten years, until the freeing of Rome, are a period of strong changes because the the new nation starts by heavier backwardness conditions compared to other European nations.The basic conditionings that bound the new nation are summarized in some causes: an underdeveloped economic system where there are areas of industrial development; a significant shortage of mineral and energy resources; and an urban structure that is still that of the sixteenth century, the last brightness period of the Italian cities. The same internal communication system is composed of a basic road network which is still one of Roman origin and of isolated sections of rail network, with few links among the pre-unity nations.Particular attention should be paid on the impact of the economic processes on the cities: they have a strong impact on European cities since the early nineteenth century, but their impact on Italian cities (beginning from the main northern cities, Milan and Turin) is more limited, if compared with the transformations concerning other continental cities.The unification starting from 1861 imposes additional critical elements, because the Italian urban structure is not ready to the event, particularly for the choice of the capital city. A city that can rightfully define itself as capital exists, and it is Turin; but it is peripheral to the rest of the Italian territory. Furthermore there is an in pectore capital city, Rome, that is the symbolic centre of the Italian history. But the city has to wait another ten years to join to the rest of Italy. The solution is to temporarily move the capitol to Florence, even if nobody explicitly says it to Florentines! The step from Turin to Florence, and from Florence to Rome sets in motion a complex organizational mechanism and a significant money's amount, invested in the effort to bring the two cities to the new role.Before Florence, then Rome (two cities that represent a fundamental part of artistic and cultural national heritage) see the opportunity to modernize their urban structure. Urban plans are also formed for this purpose, although the instruments are deficient in relation to their technical capacity and the public administrations have low authority in the driving of the transformations. Instead, private investors and national and international banks will have open hand, facilitated from the new liberal State that will not hinder the freedom of action of private capitals.The paper want to identify the major changes occurred in the three capital cities (Turin, Florence, and Rome) investigating the urban processes and the main events in the period from 1861 to 1900. The unification acts on the three cities in different ways. In 1861 they are very different from each other, with a single similar factor, the number of inhabitants (about 150,000 each). The process of building of the new nation acts on the cities changing even more their characters and extending their differences. ; La costruzione dello stato unitario, avvenuta nell'arco di un decennio (1861-1871) portò alla necessità di spostare la capitale del Regno in un percorso di avvicinamento a Roma. Da Torino la capitale fu prima spostata a Firenze (1865), poi nel suo luogo naturale, Roma (1871). Gli spostamenti non comportarono solo conseguenze di ordine politico. Esse portarono anche alla necessità di intervenire sulla struttura urbana delle città per renderle capaci di accogliere la nuova funzione. Sia Torino che Firenze che, in misura maggiore, Roma, subirono rilevanti trasformazioni urbane, nel solco dei processi trasformativi che interessarono le città Ottocentesche d'Europa.Obiettivo dell'articolo è:- analizzare i caratteri urbanistici delle città al 1861;- individuare le trasformazioni riconducibili al loro status di capitale;- definire gli impatti di tali azioni fino ai giorni nostri- individuare gli influssi causati dall'evoluzione delle infrastrutture di trasporto sulla struttura urbana.

Последние десятилетия новейшей Российской истории стали периодом бурных перемени эпохальных инноваций, кардинально изменивших основы социально-экономического и политического устройства страны. В этой связи в статье предпринята попытка ответить на актуальные вопросы: «Как повлияли эти радикальные изменения на повседневную жизнь россиян? Каковы тенденции базовых сдвигов в массовом сознании и социальном поведении людей за прошедшие четверть века? Каков их социальный характер и цивилизационная направленность?The last decades of the modern Russian history can be referred to as the age of radical transformations, which have radically changed the foundation of social, economic and political organization of Russian society. The article is an attempt to analyze these changes and answer the following questions: how have these radical changes affected the everyday life of Russians? What are the tendencies in their changing mass consciousness and social behavior? What is its social character and how does it affect the civilization course? The main methodological instrument for the research is a strategy of comparative study of a single process (way of life) based on a single method and two different samples, which represent Russian population during two alternative social and political systems: the Soviet one and the one of today. The results of comparison show that there has happened a radical decrease in social, moral and working potential of Russian people in the last quarter of a century. It can be described as an inversion of everyday behavior standards and related instrumental values. The author suggests that the innovations which occurred in everyday practices and social perceptions of people are generally regarded as negative. They bring a handful of economic and moral losses to the Russian society, rather than act as positive tendencies in coping with existing economic problems. The labour is regarded in terms of purely instrumental values (i.e. more people regard their work, first of all, as a means of earning money to sustain their lives). Positive motivation to work is very rare among contemporary Russians and it has been steadily reducing during the last quarter of a century. The people are also getting more afraid to lose their jobs and get socially excluded, which leads to a state of forced employment in all sectors of economy. Besides, although the satisfaction of people with their jobs is rather high, there is also an evident tendency towards its decrease. Egocentrism is also becoming a common phenomenon in the everyday life. Highly threatening is the sharp rise of the ethnic non-tolerance, alcoholism, while most healthy processes, which accompany any civilized form of societal development (mutual support, responsiveness, respect, etc.), are gradually fading away. All of this shapes a very hazardous social environment. Similar, but more apparent tendencies can be revealed through the analysis of change in instrumental values. As for the terminal values, their nucleus (family and work) is more or less stable and invariant to the fundamental societal transformation. However, today it features a confidence in future as a most important un-realized value in contemporary Russia. The break in the axiological nucleus of a Soviet way of life gave rise to an antinomical structure of mass consciousness, which is, in turn, a reflection of social and economic reality created by the wild Russian capitalism. At the same time there is an apparent movement towards a social (or even a civilizational one, on a wider scope) pathology: the weakening of rational ethic principles and the dominance of egocentrism (a non-ethical individualism); the actualization and production of numerous social risks (psychological illbeing, anomies, deviant and self-destructive behavior). This is a cumulative result of interrelated factors: a cardinal change in relation of property and sociopolitical organization, and another peculiar phenomenon an invasion of alien norms and values into the Russian culture. The energy of this social decay can only be kept at bay via socially democratic regulation a skilful combination of different norms and values with the domination of those which sustain the development of a free personality, efficient economy and a healthy civil society

Official Development Aid as an idea is an implement of assistance, a kind of redistribution of the global income on the governmental level. Nevertheless, it is also a source of influence and as a result peculiarly understood imperialism. The opposition between political vision and reality is the factor which backs up this thesis. Political plans and prospects of the EU aid policy, such as "The European Consensus of Development" or "The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership", are concerned about supporting good governance and providing fair conditions of international trade. On the other hand, introducing this policy often, more or less, increases dependency of poor economies on the rich. It is also not eradicated from the European Union policy, for example in the case of the European Development Bank. However, EU development aid, coming to 49 billions euro, could be named munificent when compared to the United States. U.S. Official Development Aid amounts to only 0,19% of GDP, when the obligations confirmed by the government in a few declarations, among which is the Millennium Declaration of the United Nations, are about 0,7% of GDP. Secondly it is commonly shaped as an interrelated aid, which augment dependency of the recipient country. International institutions established in Bretton Woods, like International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group, have also a huge impact on the way of development of poor countries. There are a lot of groups of interest whose opinions are clear – above-mentioned institutions are the U.S. instruments of imperialism. It is caused by American predominance in these institutions and the line of policy which it supports. In the XXI century imperial aspirations are also present in recently developing countries – like China or Brazil. Changing roles in the system of international relations are now coming, creating a diffusion between clubs of rich North and poor, developing South. Leaders of development from developing countries are trying to build a strong position in relations with recipients of ODA. It is easier for them than for the West, mostly because of the lack of bad, colonial past relations. Their imperialism is not linked with history whatsoever, making their role of foreign relations easier to build up. Despite these cases of using development assistance in order to build up an imperium, there are a lot of non-governmental institutions whose perception of aid is beyond politics and burdens of imperialism. Best example of that is Grameen Bank – an institution founded by M. yunus, a Noble Prize winner. Its way of helping people is mainly intended to being unprofitable. There are a lot of ideas about how to describe development aid – more like a charity or kind of imperialism. Some aspects of business are desirable in ODA, partly because of increasing efficiency. It is economically proved that the return of capital in any way of benefit will strengthen willingness to providing aid. On the other hand, people are naturally liable to help and perform activities which do not give them any interest or gain. What is most interesting – nowadays developing countries are strengthening and they are evaluating theirs powers as equal partners of the rich, developed world. It comprises change in the system of international relations. Moreover United Nations should find a way of enforcing obligations of donors – like 0,7 percent of GDP for ODA to 2015. If the line of politics is steady, similar to current line, this goal will not be reached, so ODA will be more seen as a way of imperialism than help. In general, there are a lot of aspects of development which indicate that ODA is an implement of imperialism. On the other hand – some kind of interest improves the willingness of donors to provide aid. Besides that question – imperial or not – development aid is still increasing the number of people whose conditions of living are better because of ODA.

Der vorliegende Beitrag versucht, einen ersten umfassenden Überblick über die aktuellen rechtlichen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Probleme des bisher größten Haftungsfalls der japanischen Geschichte – der Nuklearkatastrophe von Fukushima I – zu geben. Neben einer Bestandsaufnahme der einschlägigen Vorschriften des geltenden Atomhaftungsrechts und der Präjudizien aus vorherigen Zwischenfällen werden dabei das einschlägige Schrifttum, Presseberichte sowie Ergebnisse der von der Regierung eingesetzten "Prüfungskommission Atomschadensersatzstreitigkeiten" ausgewertet.Dabei geht der Beitrag u.a. den Fragen nach, wer am Ende tatsächlich für die Schäden der Reaktorkatastrophe, die auf bis zu 86 Mrd. Euro geschätzt werden, aufkommen wird und welche Opfer Ansprüche geltend machen können: z.B. die evakuierte Bevölkerung, betroffene Fischer, Landwirte oder das Kraftwerkspersonal. Hier werden auch Anspruchsgrundlagen außerhalb des Atomrechts, z.B. aus Arbeits- und Sozialrecht, geprüft; insbesondere wird der Frage nachgegangen, ob möglicherweise zusätzlich der Staat wegen mangelnder Atomaufsicht haftbar gemacht werden könnte. Zudem ist zu klären, welche konkreten Schäden unter welchen Voraussetzungen überhaupt ersatzfähig sind, etwa die Kausalitätsanforderungen bei gesundheitlichen Spätfolgen oder unternehmerischen Absatzeinbußen aufgrund bloßer Gerüchte. Trotz vorhandener gesetzlicher Regeln haben Regierung und Justiz eine ganze Reihe praktischer Probleme zu lösen: Das beginnt mit der Frage, ob angesichts des Erdbebens nicht eine "außergewöhnliche Naturkatastrophe" vorliegt, die einen Haftungsausschluss zur Folge hätte. Dazu gehört außerdem, wie die Forderungen zehntausender Evakuierter rasch und gerecht durchgesetzt und abgewickelt werden können und wie die Finanzierung gewährleistet wird, wenn die Mittel des Betreibers aufgebraucht sind.Wenngleich zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt angesichts der noch unvollständigen Faktenlage und im Fluss befindlicher politischer Verhandlungen nicht auf Hypothesen verzichtet werden kann, zeichnet sich im Ergebnis bereits ein außergerichtliches, von hoheitlich angeordneten, vorläufigen Pauschalzahlungen flankiertes Verfahren ab. Auch in materieller Hinsicht scheint die Rechtsfindung und Finanzierung nicht unerheblich von der Politik determiniert zu werden. Trotz der grundsätzlich unbegrenzten Haftung des Betreibers trifft wohl die wirtschaftliche Last über eine Deckungsvorsorge und Unterstützungszahlungen zuvörderst den Fiskus. Zudem sollen nach Kabinettsplänen weitere Stromkonzerne und Banken – freiwillig, d.h. bislang ohne Rechtsgrundlage – über den Haftungsfonds mitbelastet werden. Die vorläufigen Ergebnisse, die sich v.a. als Diskussionsanstoß verstehen, werden schließlich einer kritischen rechtspolitischen und volkswirtschaftlichen Bewertung zugeführt. Dabei werden auch Vergleiche zu verfahrens- und verfassungsrechtlichen Problemen der Bewältigung anderer Krisen, wie der Ölkatastrophe im Golf von Mexiko 2010, oder dem "Atom-Moratorium" in Deutschland angestellt. ; This paper is intended to give a first comprehensive overview of the legal problems and corresponding political implications of the largest liability case in Japanese history – the Fukushima Dai'ichi nuclear disaster. Starting with a survey of the relevant provisions of nuclear liability law, the paper draws upon legal precedents, Japanese legal scholarship and press reports, as well as the first report of the newly established Nuclear Damage Dispute Resolution Panel.Amongst other issues, the paper attempts to establish who is liable by law, who will actually have to carry the burden of the damages estimated to be as high as 86 billion Euro, and which victims of the catastrophe (e.g. the evacuated population, affected fishermen, farmers or the power plant staff) can claim compensation. Other causes of action beyond nuclear liability law, e.g. from labour and social law, are also investigated. In particular, the question is asked whether the state could additionally be made liable because of insufficient nuclear energy supervision. Furthermore, it has to be clarified which damages can be compensated at all, such as loss of profits because of rumours. Despite the existing legal regulations, the government and the judiciary have to resolve a number of practical issues, including whether the earthquake can be considered an "extraordinary natural disaster", which would lead to the exclusion of liability. Another pressing issue is how the claims of the thousands of evacuees can be handled in a swift and just manner and how financial means are found once the funds of the nuclear operator are exhausted.Since the facts are as yet incomplete and political negotiations are still in process, one must currently rely on hypotheses, but even so it is possible to outline an extrajudicial procedure involving government-regulated preliminary compensation payments. Also with regard to material law, the legal solutions seem to be determined by politics to a considerable extent. Despite the unlimited liability of the nuclear operator under the code, the economic burden falls primarily on the treasury, which has entered indemnification agreements and is to pay state aid to the utility. Moreover, according to cabinet plans, electric power companies and financial institutions (as yet without a legal basis) are required to "voluntarily" contribute to a nuclear damage compensation fund established for the victims. The preliminary results, which are above all meant to serve as a stimulus for discussion, are finally assessed through a critical legal and economic lens. This assessment leads to comparisons to procedural and constitutional problems that have occurred during other crises, such as the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 or the moratorium on nuclear energy in Germany.