Suchergebnisse

Auf hohem theoretischen Niveau unter Nutzung zahlreicher wirtschaftshistorischer und politiktheoretischer Literatur erläutert der Autor den Wandel der Rolle der Migration als Form politischer Unzufriedenheit in Afrika südlich der Sahara. Da im Lauf der Zeit nutzbringende Alternativen zur Migration über Staatsgrenzen abnahmen, ventilierte die Unzufriedenheit zunächst in Sezessionsbestrebungen und dann in die Bildung von Parallelstrukturen zum Staat (informeller Sektor). In einer weiteren Stufe der Unzufriedenheit entwickelt sich offener politischer Protest, dessen Unterdrückung nur vorübergehend wirkungsvoll sein kann. (DÜI-Sth)

Philippinische Auslandsverschuldung 1971-1983, Verlauf und Gründe der Entwicklung bis 1983. Die weitere Entwicklung seit dem 1. Moratorium 1983. Philippinische Verbindlichkeiten gegenüber dem Ausland per 30.9.1986. Restrukturierung fällig gewordener Schulden. Zunehmende Verschuldung bis 1992. Eingriffe in die Wirtschaft- und Finanzpolitik. Das "Debt-to-equity"-Programm und Schuldtitel-Rabatt. Die Schuldendienstrate. Ausblick. (HWWA-Inst. f. Wirtschaftsforschung)

U.S. efforts to cobble together an international coalition to protect the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea against attacks by the Yemeni Houthi militias who demand an immediate ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war are stoking tensions with European allies.On January 8, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Brown called his Spanish counterpart Teodoro Lopez Calderon to, according to the official U.S. readout, discuss the "ongoing illegal Houthi attacks on commercial vessels operating in international waters in the Red Sea." Pointedly, Brown "reiterated the U.S. desire to work with all nations who share an interest in upholding the principle of freedom of navigation and ensuring safe passage for global shipping."But according to recent reporting by veteran Spanish journalist Ignacio Cembrero, Washington has been pushing Spain a bit harder. U.S. Navy Secretary Carlos del Toro recently called the Spanish ambassador in Washington Santiago Cabanas to urge his government to join the U.S.-led anti-Houthi coalition, Operation Guardian Prosperity, and, according to Cembrero's reporting, even went so far as issuing a deadline to Madrid to deliver an answer by January 11. So far Madrid has refused to join the U.S.-led coalition and put its soldiers and ships under the command of Pentagon's CENTCOM in the Red Sea. During an announcement of the coalition's formation last month, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said Spain was among the members without, apparently, consulting with the Spanish government, causing considerable irritation in Madrid.To smooth the friction, President Biden called Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez to emphasize the Houthi threat. If his intention was to nudge Madrid closer to the U.S. position, it clearly failed: Spain refused to join the U.S. and a number of allies in the joint statement they issued on January 3 warning the Houthis about the consequences of their continued attacks on the maritime freedom.The Spanish government's position did not go unnoticed in Sana'a: the Houthi vice minister for foreign affairs Hussein Al-Ezzi expressed appreciation for Madrid's "distancing from American and British lies on the freedom of navigation." Cembrero also reported that one unexpected collateral benefit of the Spanish government's stance was the release by Iran, the Houthis' chief external backer, of a Spanish citizen kept in captivity in Tehran for 15 months.Although the Spanish government never explained the precise motives of its refusal to join "Prosperity Guardian," Madrid, while having unequivocally condemned Hamas's attack on Israel, has also been vocal in denouncing Israel's "indiscriminate killings" in Gaza, which even provoked a diplomatic crisis between Spain and Israel. The protection of the maritime freedom in the Red Sea is indeed a legitimate concern: nearly 12% of the global trade and $1 trillion worth of goods each year passes through it. The disruption of this route forces the shipping companies to divert their itineraries which causes delays and adds costs. Yet the Houthis also made it clear that their attacks will end when Israel's halts its bombing campaign in Gaza. Indeed, there were no Houthi attacks on the international shipping prior to October 7, 2023.In this context, the Spanish government seems to have calculated that joining the anti-Houthi coalition would rather mean fighting the symptoms, and not the root cause of the worsening conflict in the Middle East, namely, Israel's pursuit of maximalist military goals in Gaza and its seeming attempts to expand the war to Lebanon.By any reasonable estimation, taking the fight to the Houthis would not result in a quick, swift military victory. The movement only emerged stronger after the nine years-long war Saudi Arabia and the Arab coalition it led waged against it, with a lavish military, diplomatic and intelligence support from the U.S., UK and other Western nations. The Iran-backed Houthis have also developed considerable home-made drone and missile capabilities, with a proven capacity to hit Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Israel and Western military assets in the region. No war on the Houthis would, thus, be limited to some surgical strikes. With a predictable failure of such strikes to "neutralize" the militia, there is a high probability of a mission creep that would lead the coalition to attack targets onshore in Yemen, and that, in turn, could lead to an indirect collision with Iran. The Spanish government's reluctance to assume the risks of being embroiled in a likely pointless war against Houthis and their Iranian backers is understandable, particularly given that Madrid also wants a ceasefire in Gaza.While Spain may have been the most explicit in its reluctance to join the U.S.-led coalition against the Houthis, it is by no means the only U.S. ally harboring reservations. Notably, France, the EU's militarily most capable state, refused to join the White House-led January 3 statement. Italy, although signed that statement, is not committing itself to fighting under the U.S. command. Other NATO allies, like Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, only agreed to send token military personnel. In the end, the whole project looks more like a U.S.–UK undertaking than a real coalition of allies and like-minded partners.Instead of causing division and stoking tensions with its allies over the prospects of a highly questionable (to say the least) military operation, the Biden administration should deploy its leverage to get Israel to agree to an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and abandonment of any temptation to expand the war to Lebanon. If the Houthis continue their attacks in the Red Sea after a ceasefire, then the U.S. and its allies will have full legitimacy to strike back. For now, however, alienating allies like Spain and France by pandering to the most extreme Israeli government in history certainly isn't a price worth paying.

It is known that intellectual trends revolve around the basic Association is the axis that make up all their views and perceptions and ideas. These currents exceeding four forms: - either a national trend to make national issue is altered or a national trend to make the national question or modified stream socialist make the issue of caste case or make religious stream of the religious issue axis views and perceptions. Iraqi Islamic Party from the recent trend, it is Islamist political stream its members who belong to the Sunni sect, if not all belonging to him from this community. However, the rules of procedure nor shall it preclude affiliation other denominations him but did not actually prove it and it is a religious party Sunni politician, adopted approach of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded by Sheikh Hassan al-Banna in 1928 in Egypt and then spread to the rest of the Arab countries and Islamic countries, has become so After that a global organization with branches in most of the Arab and Islamic countries, and the Iraqi Islamic Party is declared branch in Iraq, which was adopted from the political process his slogan. Islamic Party permission is one of the branches of this group, if not its political wing in return for the military wing of the group (the Islamic Resistance national in Iraq) and in accordance with this every researcher on the same highlight placed the party through the study of the organization and the ideas and attitudes to find the appropriate answer to the questions raised about the nature of the subject under study and these questions are when Iraqi Islamic Party began his political activity in Iraq? Does he was exercising his political overt or covert manner? What is the nature of the organizational structure of this party? What is the political project before? What is the most important political positions towards the most important issues related to the interests of the Iraqi state and the Iraqi people?, Try this search verification of the hypothesis that "the Iraqi Islamic Party, was found at the beginning of the matter in a confidential manner and through associations and cultural forums and Islamic then began his public after awarded government Abdulkareem Qasim holiday in practice his public in 1960, "It has been found that party a direct result of the disadvantages of the Iraqi political system at the time and as a result of the repercussions of internal and external all to contribute to the establishment in Iraq has necessitated this study to adopt the historical method and structural analytical Therefore enrolled Find four demands addressed first historical roots of the Iraqi Islamic Party, and take the second requirement study in the rules of procedure and the organizational structure and the third demand dealt with the political project of the Islamic Party The fourth requirement handled the most important political positions of the Iraqi Islamic Party and the evidence Conclusion research summary and conclusions reached by the researcher . By following us march Islamic Party turned out he was working in a confidential manner in Iraq in 1960 as passed officially by the Court of Cassation after rejecting the Interior Ministry initially giving consent to the exercise of his political activity in public, it was the party exercised its activity through gatherings cultural and Islamic , but was soon arrested the leadership of the party and thrown in jail on a warrant criticized the government and the Iraqi regime then led by Abdul Karim Qasim, was frozen party activity in public and left many of its members abroad and exercised their political from there, and after the fall at the hands of American occupiers on 9/4/2003 start his political activism and public consultation with the political parties and movements that have emerged in the Iraqi arena and put his political and clearly between fixed and specific approval of the most important issues that are relevant to the interests of the Iraqi people and the need to re-structure of the state of Iraq and rebuild what has been destroyed by war. But according to our perception of the private, that the Iraqi Islamic Party, has been subjected to a smear campaign by the secular parties aim of the party's political miscarriage in order to achieve this gain political parties and guaranteeing them the public support at the expense of the party that was hugely popular, especially among the sons of the year. The process of defamation political Islamic Party, led by some leaders of secular parties Sunni, so criticized the party as a result of his agreement to enter into a governing council and participation in the interim government, as well as entering the party as an intermediary between the American occupation forces and among the inhabitants of Fallujah in the battle of Fallujah First On 04.12.2004 As a result This campaign indiscriminate been some party headquarters to attack by some armed factions backed by some political parties, and this Maavkd party some of the earlier gains in the crowd great he enjoyed as hamstrung by some leaders advocacy that stretched her hands treachery result of the policy of disinformation that tarnished Image Islamic Party, which was reflected this on the results of the party in the parliamentary elections in 2010 by winning six seats only and this significant decline compared to its findings earlier this push the party to carry out activities advocacy to clarify its position of all the accusations thrown at him and he dismissed some leaders utilitarian that were trying behind the positions do not operate according to the principles which the party pursued

Hui ve Uygur etnik grupları, İslami inançları paylaşan başlıca iki topluluktur. Çin'in tarihi kayıtlarından, Hui'nin atalarının çoğunlukla Orta ve Batı Asya'daki Arap, Farsça ve Türk dili konuşan bölgelerden geldiği kolayca anlaşılabilir. Hui'nin atalarının çoğu, Çin hükümeti ile ticaret yapan tüccarlardı ve Çin'deki işlerinden sonra anavatanlarına geri dönüyorlardı. Yani Tang (MS 618'den 906'ya kadar) ve Song (MS 960'tan 1279'a) hanedanlarında, sadece geçici olarak Çin'de yaşadıkları için kendilerini hala Arap, Fars veya Türk olarak tanımlıyorlar. Yuan (MS 1279'dan 1368'e kadar), Ming (MS 1368'den 1644'e kadar) ve Qing (MS 1644'ten 1912'ye kadar) hanedanlarına gelince, orta ve batı Asya bölgelerinden yeni İmparatorlar ve krallıkların eşlik ettiği bazı köleler İslam'a iman aynı zamanda o bölgelerden getirilmiştir. Ayrıca, Hui'nin atalarının bazı soyları, Çin Han kültürünü de benimseyerek kendilerini 5. veya 6. nesil olarak geliştirdiler. Böylece Hui topluluğu Yuan'dan beri ortaya çıkmaya başladı ve Qing hanedanlığında olgun bir topluluk haline geldi. Huihui ve Hui isimleri de ilk olarak Yuan çevresinde tanıtıldı. İnsanlar kendilerini Çinli Hui veya Çinli Huihui olarak tanımlamaya başladılar, kültürlerinin Çin kültürü ile İslam kültürünün bir bileşimi olduğunu düşünmeye başladılar. Ayrıca, farklı hanedanlarda Hui'ye yönelik farklı politikalar nedeniyle, hükümetler Hui topluluğunu haklarını sınırlayarak zayıflatmaya çalışırken, iç grupların kimlik tanıması giderek daha fazla kabul edildi.Hui, eğitimleri, çalışma fırsatları, sosyal sigortaları vb. Konusunda yüksek baskı altındaydı. Böylece Hui, Çin Han halkıyla olan doğal biyolojik sınırlarının ve farklı dini inançlarının Hui ve Han'ı birbirinden ayırdığı fikrini yavaş yavaş kazandı. Günümüzde Hui, Müslüman olarak adlandırılmak yerine Hui olarak adlandırılmayı tercih etti. Dini cemaatin bir üyesi olmakla karşılaştırıldığında, bir Çinli etnik gruba üyelik daha fazla sosyal ayrıcalığı paylaşabilir, bu nedenle Hui, etnik bir grup olarak kimliklerini kabul etmekten daha memnun. Kuşaktan kuşağa sosyal ve kültürel kimliklerinin bir parçası olarak yaşam alışkanlıkları, normları, dilleri ve diğer yönleriyle ilgili Hui kültürünü benimsediler. Hui geleneklerinin günlük uygulamaları aracılığıyla, Hui'nin sosyal ve kültürel kimlik inşasının hükümet politikalarıyla büyük ölçüde ilişkili olduğunu gördük. Hükümet, Hui'ye yönelik daha esnek politikalar uyguladığında, Hui sosyal hayata katılmayı ve hem Hui hem de Çinli olarak kimlik tanındığını göstermeyi tercih ediyor. Ancak hükümet, Hui'ye karşı olumsuz bir tutum gösterirse, Hui halkı, yaşam alışkanlıklarının kişisel deneyim veya aile geleneğinin dışında olduğunu iddia ederek Hui karakterlerini derinden gizler. Ayrıca, bu süreçte Hui daha bağlantılı ve birleşmiş olacaktı çünkü ezildiklerine dair ortak anılara sahip olduklarını düşünüyorlar. --- Hui and Uygur ethnic groups are the main two communities that share Islamic beliefs. From the historical records of China, it could be inferred easily that the ancestors of Hui are mostly coming from the Arab, Persian, and Turkic language-speaking regions in central and western Asia. Most of the ancestors of Hui were merchants who were doing business trades with the Chinese government and after their business in China, they would go back to their motherland. So at the Tang( from 618 to 906 A.D.) and Song( from 960 to 1279 A.D.) dynasties, they still identify themselves as the Arab, Persian, or Turkic as they were only temporarily living in China. When it comes to the Yuan( from 1279 to 1368 A.D.), Ming( from 1368 to 1644 A.D.), and Qing( from 1644 to 1912 A.D.) dynasties, accompanied by the new Emperors and kingdoms from central and western Asia regions, some slaves believe in Islam were brought from those areas at the same time. Also, some of the descents of the ancestors of Hui developed themselves into the 5th or 6th generation, adopting the Chinese Han culture as well. So the community of Hui started to emerge since Yuan and developed into a mature community in the Qing dynasty. And the name of Huihui and Hui were first introduced around Yuan as well. People started to identify themselves as Chinese Hui or Chinese Huihui, they began to think their culture was a combination of the Chinese culture and Islamic culture. Also, because of the different policies towards Hui in different dynasties, the inner-group recognition of identity was more and more accepted as the governments were trying to weaken the Hui community by limiting its rights,Hui was under high pressure about their education, working opportunities, social insurance, etc. So Hui gradually gained the idea that their natural biological boundaries with Chinese Han people and their different religious beliefs made the Hui and Han separated from each other. Nowadays, instead of being called Muslim, the Hui preferred to be named Hui. Compared with being a member of the religious community, membership of a Chinese ethnic group could share more social privileges, so Hui is more pleased to accept their identity as an ethnic group. They adopted the Hui culture about living habits, norms, languages, and other aspects as part of their social and cultural identity from generation to generation. Through the daily practice of the Hui customs, we found that Hui's social and cultural identity construction are highly related the government policies. When the government takes out more flexible policies towards Hui, Hui prefers to join the social life and show out their identity recognition as both Hui and Chinese. But if the government shows a negative attitude towards Hui, the Hui people would deeply hide their Hui characters, claiming that their living habits are out of personal experience or family tradition. Also, in this process, Hui would be more connected and united, because they think they have the shared memories of being oppressed.

At the beginning of the VII century in the political life of the Near and Middle East, fundamental changes have taken place. The Arabs conquered a colossal territory, which included the lands of Iran, North Africa, North-West India, the Asian provinces of Byzantium, most of the former Roman Empire. In the conquered cities of the caliphate, observatories, madaris, libraries were built. At the end of VII century, the first scientific center, an academy, the House of Wisdom, was founded in Baghdad, in which scholars who spoke different languages were assembled. Here the translation and commentary activity were very developed, the main works of ancient thought, such as the writings of Aristotle, Ptolemy were published in the 9th century in the Arabic-speaking world. For two centuries from 750 to 950 years, the works of ancient authors on philosophy, mathematics, medicine, alchemy, and astronomy were translated into Arabic, which indicates the high scientific potential of that time in the East. At the same time, in the XII century, Ibn Rushd composed 38 commentaries on the works of Aristotle, the "Republic" of Plato, the treatise "On the Mind" of Alexander of Aphrodisias, which subsequently had an important influence on the work of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. Thus, this period in the history of Eastern scientific thought is marked by high intellectual potential. To this day, historians of medieval Arabic literature face a sufficient number of difficulties, since the vast majority of manuscripts remain inaccessible to them. The works of many renowned Arab authors of the middle Ages are more than 1000 years old, so it seems obvious that the manuscripts of the vast majority of authors have not survived to this day. The researchers of the history of Azerbaijan and neighboring countries in the middle Ages, with all the variety of available sources on which they rely, still attract little factual material related to the Arabic-language works of the historical and scientific genre. Undoubtedly, a comprehensive study of the entire complex of information of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi on the history of science in Azerbaijan is of great importance. ; На початку VII століття в політичному житті Близького і Середнього Сходу відбулися кардинальні зміни. Араби захопили колосальну територію, до якої увійшли землі Ірану, Північної Африки, Північно-Західної Індії, азіатські провінції Візантії, велика частина колишньої Римської імперії. У завойованих містах халіфату будувалися обсерваторії, медресе, бібліотеки. В кінці VII століття в Багдаді був заснований перший науковий центр ‒ академія ‒ Будинок мудрості, в якому були зібрані вчені, які говорили на різних мовах. Тут була значно розвинена перекладацька і коментаторська діяльність. Протягом двох століть, з 750 по 950 роки, праці античних авторів з філософії, математики, медицини, алхімії і астрономії переводилися на арабську мову, що свідчить про високий науковий потенціал того часу на Сході. Зокрема, Аверроес, який працював в XII столітті склав 38 коментарів до праць Аристотеля, «Республіки» Платона, трактату «Про розум» Олександра Афродізіаса, які згодом дуже вплинули на творчість Насір ад-Діна аль -Тусі. Таким чином, основні праці античної думки, такі як праці Аристотеля, Птолемея, були опубліковані в 9 столітті в арабомовному світі. Таким чином, цей період в історії східної наукової думки відзначений високим інтелектуальним потенціалом. До цього дня історики середньовічної арабської наукової літератури стикаються з труднощами, пов'язаними з тим, що переважна більшість рукописів залишаються для них недоступними. Роботам багатьох відомих арабських авторів середньовіччя більше 1000 років, тому представляється очевидним, що рукописи переважної більшості авторів не збереглися до наших днів. Дослідники історії Азербайджану і сусідніх країн в середні століття, при всій різноманітності джерел, на які вони спираються, все ще залучають мало фактичного матеріалу, пов'язаного з арабомовними творами історичного і наукового характеру. Безсумнівно, велике значення має комплексне вивчення всього обсягу відомостей, наявних в працях Насір ад-Діна ат-Тусі, з історії науки в Азербайджані. ; В начале VII века в политической жизни Ближнего и Среднего Востока произошли кардинальные изменения. Арабы захватили колоссальную территорию, в которую вошли земли Ирана, Северной Африки, Северо-Западной Индии, азиатские провинции Византии, большая часть бывшей Римской империи. В завоеванных городах халифата строились обсерватории, медресе, библиотеки. В конце VII века в Багдаде был основан первый научный центр ‒ академия ‒ Дом мудрости, в котором были собраны ученые, говорившие на разных языках. Здесь была значительно развита переводческая и комментаторская деятельность. В течение двух столетий, с 750 по 950 годы, труды античных авторов по философии, математике, медицине, алхимии и астрономии переводились на арабский язык, что свидетельствует о высоком научном потенциале того времени на Востоке. В частности, работавший в XII веке Ибн Рушд составил 38 комментариев к трудам Аристотеля, «Республике» Платона, трактату «О разуме» Александра Афродизиаса, которые впоследствии оказали большое влияние на творчество Насир ад-Дина ат-Туси. Таким образом, основные труды античной мысли, такие как труды Аристотеля, Птолемея, были опубликованы в 9 веке в арабоязычном мире. Таким образом, этот период в истории восточной научной мысли отмечен высоким интеллектуальным потенциалом. По сей день историки средневековой арабской научной литературы сталкиваются с трудностями, связанными с тем, что подавляющее большинство рукописей остаются для них недоступными. Работам многих известных арабских авторов средневековья более 1000 лет, поэтому представляется очевидным, что рукописи подавляющего большинства авторов не сохранились до наших дней. Исследователи истории Азербайджана и соседних стран в средние века, при всем разнообразии источников, на которые они опираются, все еще привлекают мало фактического материала, связанного с арабоязычными произведениями исторического и научного характера. Несомненно, большое значение имеет комплексное изучение всего объема сведений, имеющихся в трудах Насир ад-Дина ат-Туси, по истории науки в Азербайджане.

traduction anglaise Travis Bruce ; Governing Empire is a study, accompanied by a re-edition and a French translation, of maǧmūʿ Yaḥyá, the " compendium of Yaḥyá ", manuscript 4752 in the Library ḥasaniyya in Rabat. This little volume, the surviving copy of which dates from the 16th-17th centuries, reproduces a formulary composed in the late 13th century by Yaḥyá al-Ḫaḏūǧ, a man of letters living at the time of the demise of the Almohad Empire in 1269. It contains 77 acts of appointment of provincial officials, governors, military chiefs, chiefs of Arab tribes, tax-collectors and judges, written between 1224 and 1269. Of this total, 73 acts (two of them identical) concern the Almohad Empire, especially the Maghrebian part, and four concern the anti-Almohad principality of Ibn Hūd al-Mutawakkil of Murcia (r. 1228-1238) in the Iberian Peninsula. The acts reproduced by Yaḥyá belong to the highly codified genre of chancery literature. Written most frequently in rhyming prose (saǧʿ) and intended for proclamation in the great mosques of the Empire, they obey rules of composition and follow rhetorical, syntactical and linguistic procedures which place them --as the compiler asserts-- in the sphere of the adab, that is literature, or more generally the culture of the "man of good breeding". Partaking of poetry, sermon, oratory, normative literature and religious discourse, the appointments reproduced there are the expression of a sovereign order, the Almohad imperial order, or the anti-Almohad order of the Hūdi principality of Murcia. Set down in writing and rendered anonymous through the quasi-systematic deletion of proper names, toponyms and dates, these acts were neutralized for the use of successive specialists in the language of power. Performative as they were, they came to be accepted as models and thus were absorbed into the ever-growing thesaurus of reference texts. This pragmatic collection is the last vestige of the most important indigenous authority in the history of the Maghreb. Governing Empire begins by retracing the political history of the Almohad Empire and the stages through which a territory and an authority were built up. It recalls the ideological, political and religious foundations which made Ibn Tūmart possible to unify the Maghreb and al-Andalus in the mid-12th century in the service of a dynasty of Berber origin. ʿAbd al-Mu'min (r. 1130-1162) and his descendants, the Mu'minids, mobilised the strength of the tribes of the time, Berber and Arab, to impose a dogma devised by the greatest of contemporary thinkers. Living witnesses of the islamization and arabization of the Maghreb, this dynasty resolved to reorganize the structures of power and authority to its own advantage. The Almohad sovereigns, who had assumed the title of Caliph in consonance with their pretension to guide all the peoples of Islam (umma), in the manner of the Muʿtazilite in 9th-century Iraq, claimed for themselves the authority to interpret divine law. To that end, jurists and wise men were separated from the interpretative process that the Malikite school had reserved to them since the 9th century, and they were reduced to judicial tasks or enrolled in the chancery services. The literature that the chancery produced, of which the manuscript presented, re-edited and translated here is one of the fundamental examples, plainly reveals this reversal of the relationships of authority between the religious knowledge of the ulemas and the political power of the caliphs. The organization of the "compendium of Yaḥyá", which is presented in the second part, throws light on the original ideological concepts predominating at the close of the Almohad era: thus, military and fiscal functions, which belong to the political order --governors, army generals, admirals of the fleet and tax collectors-- are clearly set apart from the judicial functions pertaining to the judges. Law-making devolved upon the sovereign, the sole authorized interpreter of divine law as embodied in the Qur'an and Tradition. The task of creating positive law thus rested entirely with the Caliph-imām, heir to the founder of the Almohad movement, Ibn Tūmart (d. 1130) -- the guide inspired by God, "impeccable imām and acknowledged Mahdī". The tasks assigned to the appointed functionaries, the counsels and orders given them, and the instructions addressed to subjects, all clearly reflect the organic conception of society and of imperial authority that characterized the Almohad ideology. That ideology was revolutionary inasmuch as it clearly departed from functionalist approaches, like that implicit in the al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya wa l-Wilāyat al-Dīniyya ("The Ordinances of Government") of al-Māwardī (d. 1058). The careful edition and the French translation of Yaḥyá's formulary in the third part of Governing Empire give a good idea of the breadth of literary talent demanded of chancery secretaries, veritable craftsmen of language, simply to produce the decrees of power. The infinite stylistic and lexical variations combine adherence to rigid codes of chancery language with the kind of poetic and rhetorical innovations characteristic of great works of literature. This work on the language of power, at once laborious and skilled, bureaucratic and poetic, puts a voice to a specific authority --the authority of the Almohad caliphs, rooted in a particular time and place: the 13th-century Maghreb. The posthumous compilation of these performative utterances abstracts the language of power and sets Almohad history, dogma and order in the context of the corpus of timeless Islamic authorities. This formulary thus affords a glimpse of the specific nature of and the role played by administrative archives in the mediaeval Muslim world and throws light on the exceptional intricacy of Islamic imperial bureaucracies as exemplified by their chancery, the dīwān al-inšā', literally the "bureau of creation".

traduction anglaise Travis Bruce ; Governing Empire is a study, accompanied by a re-edition and a French translation, of maǧmūʿ Yaḥyá, the " compendium of Yaḥyá ", manuscript 4752 in the Library ḥasaniyya in Rabat. This little volume, the surviving copy of which dates from the 16th-17th centuries, reproduces a formulary composed in the late 13th century by Yaḥyá al-Ḫaḏūǧ, a man of letters living at the time of the demise of the Almohad Empire in 1269. It contains 77 acts of appointment of provincial officials, governors, military chiefs, chiefs of Arab tribes, tax-collectors and judges, written between 1224 and 1269. Of this total, 73 acts (two of them identical) concern the Almohad Empire, especially the Maghrebian part, and four concern the anti-Almohad principality of Ibn Hūd al-Mutawakkil of Murcia (r. 1228-1238) in the Iberian Peninsula. The acts reproduced by Yaḥyá belong to the highly codified genre of chancery literature. Written most frequently in rhyming prose (saǧʿ) and intended for proclamation in the great mosques of the Empire, they obey rules of composition and follow rhetorical, syntactical and linguistic procedures which place them --as the compiler asserts-- in the sphere of the adab, that is literature, or more generally the culture of the "man of good breeding". Partaking of poetry, sermon, oratory, normative literature and religious discourse, the appointments reproduced there are the expression of a sovereign order, the Almohad imperial order, or the anti-Almohad order of the Hūdi principality of Murcia. Set down in writing and rendered anonymous through the quasi-systematic deletion of proper names, toponyms and dates, these acts were neutralized for the use of successive specialists in the language of power. Performative as they were, they came to be accepted as models and thus were absorbed into the ever-growing thesaurus of reference texts. This pragmatic collection is the last vestige of the most important indigenous authority in the history of the Maghreb. Governing Empire begins by retracing the political history of the Almohad Empire and the stages through which a territory and an authority were built up. It recalls the ideological, political and religious foundations which made Ibn Tūmart possible to unify the Maghreb and al-Andalus in the mid-12th century in the service of a dynasty of Berber origin. ʿAbd al-Mu'min (r. 1130-1162) and his descendants, the Mu'minids, mobilised the strength of the tribes of the time, Berber and Arab, to impose a dogma devised by the greatest of contemporary thinkers. Living witnesses of the islamization and arabization of the Maghreb, this dynasty resolved to reorganize the structures of power and authority to its own advantage. The Almohad sovereigns, who had assumed the title of Caliph in consonance with their pretension to guide all the peoples of Islam (umma), in the manner of the Muʿtazilite in 9th-century Iraq, claimed for themselves the authority to interpret divine law. To that end, jurists and wise men were separated from the interpretative process that the Malikite school had reserved to them since the 9th century, and they were reduced to judicial tasks or enrolled in the chancery services. The literature that the chancery produced, of which the manuscript presented, re-edited and translated here is one of the fundamental examples, plainly reveals this reversal of the relationships of authority between the religious knowledge of the ulemas and the political power of the caliphs. The organization of the "compendium of Yaḥyá", which is presented in the second part, throws light on the original ideological concepts predominating at the close of the Almohad era: thus, military and fiscal functions, which belong to the political order --governors, army generals, admirals of the fleet and tax collectors-- are clearly set apart from the judicial functions pertaining to the judges. Law-making devolved upon the sovereign, the sole authorized interpreter of divine law as embodied in the Qur'an and Tradition. The task of creating positive law thus rested entirely with the Caliph-imām, heir to the founder of the Almohad movement, Ibn Tūmart (d. 1130) -- the guide inspired by God, "impeccable imām and acknowledged Mahdī". The tasks assigned to the appointed functionaries, the counsels and orders given them, and the instructions addressed to subjects, all clearly reflect the organic conception of society and of imperial authority that characterized the Almohad ideology. That ideology was revolutionary inasmuch as it clearly departed from functionalist approaches, like that implicit in the al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya wa l-Wilāyat al-Dīniyya ("The Ordinances of Government") of al-Māwardī (d. 1058). The careful edition and the French translation of Yaḥyá's formulary in the third part of Governing Empire give a good idea of the breadth of literary talent demanded of chancery secretaries, veritable craftsmen of language, simply to produce the decrees of power. The infinite stylistic and lexical variations combine adherence to rigid codes of chancery language with the kind of poetic and rhetorical innovations characteristic of great works of literature. This work on the language of power, at once laborious and skilled, bureaucratic and poetic, puts a voice to a specific authority --the authority of the Almohad caliphs, rooted in a particular time and place: the 13th-century Maghreb. The posthumous compilation of these performative utterances abstracts the language of power and sets Almohad history, dogma and order in the context of the corpus of timeless Islamic authorities. This formulary thus affords a glimpse of the specific nature of and the role played by administrative archives in the mediaeval Muslim world and throws light on the exceptional intricacy of Islamic imperial bureaucracies as exemplified by their chancery, the dīwān al-inšā', literally the "bureau of creation".