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The results show that individual countries such as Germany, Switzerland and Liechtenstein are more advanced in terms of the regulatory system for cryptocurrencies. However, these countries are too small and have an insignificant trade volume in relation to China and the USA, after which these countries could play a relevant role on the world market. If the European states do not act as a joint entity with the EU financial authorities on the world market, then international states will have a far lead and shape regulatory measures in the future.

The article analyses the role of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union: co-operation and co-decision (I). We use the legislative history of some 5.000 parliamentary amendments. These procedures have been the subject of a great deal of theoretical debate. According to conventional wisdom the co-decision procedure increases the powers of the European Parliament. Revisionist approaches, however, suggest that the conditional agenda-setting powers accorded to the Parliament by the co-operation procedure are more important than the veto powers ascribed by co-decision. Our analysis demonstrates not only that both claims are correct, but also why. On the aggregate there is a higher success rate of parliamentary amendments under co-decision (I) than under co-operation, just as the data published by the EP indicate. However, controlling for one of the conditions of conditional agenda setting (agreement by the Commission under co-operation), conditional agenda setting empowers the EP more than veto powers. Finally, control of Commission behaviour in both procedures indicates no difference in acceptance rates between co-operation and co-decision. Our analysis explains why all three points above are true. The answer hinges on the activity of the Commission, which was more hostile to parliamentary amendments during the 1989-94 period (more amendments were rejected during this period than during any other period under both co-operation and co-decision). In addition, the power of the Commission has declined under co-decision (because it can be and is more frequently overruled by the other two players, whether its opinion is positive or negative). (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

The marginal involvement of the European Union (EU) in redistributive policies and its limited fiscal resources have led to a notable lack of attention by EU scholars towards the EU budget and its dynamics. Yet the nature of the budgetary data and their high usability for statistical analysis make them an excellent tool for studying and measuring policy change in the EU. In this article, I analyse an original dataset containing yearly data for the main categories of expenditure and how they have changed over the last three decades (1979–2013). Using time-series analysis, I find that the ability to form winning coalitions in the Council, the ideological positioning of the co-legislators and the inclusion of the cohesion countries have played a significant role in driving budget change.

This book traces the practices of migration control and its contestation in the European migration regime in times of intense politicization. The collaboratively written work brings together the perspectives of state agents, NGOs, migrants with precarious legal status, and their support networks, collected through multi-sited fieldwork in eight European states: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden and Switzerland. The book provides knowledge of how European migration law is implemented, used, and challenged by different actors, and of how it lends and constrains power over migrants' journeys and prospects. An ethnography of law in action, the book contributes to socio-legal scholarship on migration control at the margins of the state. Tobias Eule is Professor for the Sociology of Law at the Faculty Law, University of Bern, Switzerland. Lisa Marie Borrelli is Researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Bern, Switzerland. Annika Lindberg is Researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Bern, Switzerland. Anna Wyss is Researcher at Maison d'Analyse Processus Sociaux, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland.--

Intergenerational redistribution is one of the major aims of national welfare states that have to prove their reliability in a world of internationally integrated goods and factor markets. In this paper, we analyse the conditions for the existence of steady-state equilibria and the (Pareto-) optimal structure of national PAYG systems in a two-country model with endogenous fertility. Secondly we demonstrate that there are strategic incentives for national authorities to deviate from the optimal pension scheme even without labor mobility, which is the common source of inefficiencies in models of interregional social competition. They have two sources of strategic behavior in the model: One is an interest externality, the other one is a growth externality. This second externality shows that these incentives exist even with an exogenous interest rate. Policy implications for the European Union are discussed.

The authors attempt to sort out three exogenous factors affecting the domestic societies of European Union (EU) member countries: market globalization, the European single market, and European supranational institutions. They offer a research design to separate the respective manifestations of each factor and apply it to four domestic dimensions: labor market, capital market, electoral competition, and center-local government relations. Although they find systematic evidence in the cases of the labor and capital markets supporting the widely shared claim that the EU is an agent of globalization, the results also point to the importance of the voluntarist component in the electoral and subgovernmental domains.