Coping with Change: International Differences in the Returns to Skills
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6114
2116405 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6114
SSRN
Working paper
In: Theoretical Economics Letters, Band 2014, Heft 4
SSRN
In: Nebraska Law Review, Forthcoming
SSRN
Working paper
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 10249
SSRN
In: Journalism quarterly: JQ ; devoted to research in journalism and mass communication, Band 45, Heft 2, S. 329-331
ISSN: 0196-3031, 0022-5533
In: The Canadian yearbook of international law: Annuaire canadien de droit international, Band 35, S. 333-339
ISSN: 1925-0169
La globalisation des Marchés financiers oblige des pays comme le Canada à repenser l'exercice de leur souveraineté. Elle met en évidence l'interdépendance entre pays industriels et économies émergentes ainsi que l'importance d'une action concertée au niveau international.En 1996, le Canada a poursuivi, avec ses partenaires du Groupe des Sept, la mise en oeuvre des recommandations formulées au Sommet de Halifax l'année précédente. Celles-ci visaient à favoriser la stabilité du système financier international. Pour ce faire, le Canada a encouragé le renforcement des institutions financières internationales (I) et l'action des organismes de surveillance des institutions financières (II).
In: Reports, 1978/No. 24
World Affairs Online
This paper considers the question under what conditions domestic markets of emission permits would and should merge to become an international market. Emission permits are licenses, and so governments would need to recognize other countries' permits. In a two-county model, we find that it is in both countries' interests to form an international market, and it may even be beneficial to the environment. Three different policy instruments of the importing country are examined, namely a price instrument (tariff) and two quantity instruments (discount and import quota). All instruments restrict trade. The importing country (and regulator) prefers an import tariff and an import quota to a carbon discount. If the exporting country releases additional permits, the importing country should not try to keep total emissions constant, as that would be ineffective if not counterproductive. Instead, the importing country should aim to keep the total import constant; this would impose costs on the exporting country that are independent of the policy instrument; an import quota would be the cheapest option for the importing country. Compliance and liability issues constrain the market further. However, both the importing and the exporting country would prefer that the permit seller is liable in case of non-compliance, as sellers' liability would less constrain the market.
BASE