Suchergebnisse

The permanent settlement of immigrants of foreignorigin, and the subsequent formation of the second and thirdgenerations, has long contributed to re-launching the debate onthe content and limits of the institution of citizenship, bringinginto question the close connection with the national States. The increasing number and the growing diversity of the legal statusof foreigners residing in the territory of sovereign States blurs thedividing lines between insiders and outsiders. Therefore this raisesquestions about the criteria and ways of participation of residents inthe community of citizens, with all the obligations and benefi ts thatderive from it. In parallel, various forms of political participationof migrants across borders are developing, especially in terms ofthe countries of origin. The article examines the implications andmeanings that derive, in the current context, from what can bedefi ned as transnational reconfi gurations in the democratic sphere. After having considered the citizenship «from above», that is interms of the type of rights granted to foreign residents, their extent,timing and modes of access, the article presents a more recent branch of studies that start «from below», i.e. from the point ofview of actual practices to access and use, reinterpretations andnegotiations of the contents of citizenship: processes in which migrants and refugees take active roles at various levels and indifferent ways, both individual and collective. ; El asentamiento permanente de inmigrantes de origen extranjero y la formación de segundas y terceras generaciones, ha contribuido mucho a relanzar el debate sobre el contenido y los límites de la institución de la ciudadanía, poniendo en tela de juicio la estrecha relación con los Estados nacionales. El aumento del número y la creciente diversidad de la condición jurídica de los extranjeros que residen en el territorio de los Estados soberanos difuminan las líneas divisorias entre los de adentro y los de afuera. Por tanto, emergen interrogantes acerca de los criterios y formas de participación de los residentes extranjeros como ciudadanos, con las obligaciones y beneficios que de ello se derivan. En paralelo, diversas formas de participación política de los migrantes se están desarrollando a través de las fronteras, especialmente con los paísesde origen. El artículo examina las implicaciones y significados que se derivan, en el contexto actual, de lo que puede definirse como reconfiguraciones transnacionales en las sociedades democráticas.Tras haber examinado la ciudadanía "desde arriba", en términos del tipo de derechos concedidos a los residentes extranjeros, su alcance, tiempos y modos de acceso, el artículo presenta una perspectiva más reciente de los estudios, que mira "desde abajo",es decir, desde el punto de vista de las prácticas reales de acceso y uso, reinterpretaciones y renegociaciones de los contenidos de ciudadanía: procesos en que los migrantes y los refugiados participanactivamente en diversos niveles tanto de forma individual como colectiva.

학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 국제학과(국제지역학전공), 2012. 2. 문우식. ; With the rising inflow of North Korean refugees into South Korean society, different social issues related to the adjustment of North Korean defectors are emerging, asking simultaneously for the necessity to help a successful adaptation of the defectors in South Korean society. In case of German unification, the lack of inner integration after the achievement of political unification has resulted—to a large extent—from the four decades of different political socialization process based on distinctive cultural and political ideals in the East and West German societies. Since a significant degree of political socialization is accomplished by education, the role of education, particularly political and moral education, in promoting social integration by cultivating mature democratic civic qualities among the members of society to respect social values and order becomes critical. In this regard, the function of political and citizenship education in Germany throughout the unification process, especially in bridging the psychological gap between the East and West Germans, provides valuable lessons to be deliberated in preparing for the unification of Korea. Besides, as South Korean society has become more multicultural, the direction of political and unification education needs to contemplate and incorporate the issues of multiculturalism. Concerning these aspects, this study analyzes the characteristics of political and citizenship education in Germany before and after the unification in comparison to political education in the context of unification education in South and North Korea with some related problems and challenges. In addition, the investigation of the adjustment of North Korean defectors offers a meaningful guidance in preparing for different social issues which might occur throughout the unification process of the South and the North. ; 남한 사회로 유입되는 북한이탈주민의 수가 증가함에 따라 탈북자들의 성공적인 남한 사회 정착을 위한 지원이 요구되고 있으며, 이와 동시에 이들의 적응에 관련한 다양한 사회적 쟁점들이 새로이 대두되고 있다. 독일의 경우, 정치적 통일의 성취 이후에 나타난 내적 통합의 부족은 대개 동독과 서독 사회의 특유한 정치•문화적 사상에 기반한 지난 40년간의 상이한 정치사회화 과정에서 기인한 것이다. 정치사회화의 상당한 부분이 교육에 의하여 이루어지기 때문에 교육의 역할, 특별히 사회 구성원간에 사회적 가치와 질서를 존중하는 성숙된 민주 시민의 자질을 배양함으로써 사회적 통합을 촉진하는 정치와 도덕교육의 역할이 더욱 강조되고 있다. 이러한 관점에서, 독일의 민주시민 교육은 통일과정 전반에 걸쳐 동•서독인 상호 간의 심리적 거리감을 메워주는 역할을 함으로써 한국의 통일을 준비함에 있어서 숙고해야 할 중요한 교훈을 제시하고 있다. 그 뿐만이 아니라, 남한 사회가 더욱 다문화 되어감에 따라서 정치와 통일 교육의 방향을 설정할 때 다문화주의에 대한 논의도 함께 다루어져야 한다. 이러한 점을 고려하여, 본 연구는 통일 전후 독일 민주시민 교육의 특성을 남•북한 통일교육의 맥락에서 정치교육이 당면한 문제 및 과제와 함께 비교하여 분석한다. 이와 더불어서, 탈북자들의 적응 현황에 대한 조사는 남•북한 통일과정에서 일어날 수 있는 다양한 사회적 쟁점을 대비하는데 있어서 의미 있는 지침을 제공하여 준다. ; Master

Представлена биография примечательной личности деятеля революции и Гражданской войны, организатора красного террора в Крыму и Закавказье, советского и хозяйственного деятеля, одного из организаторов авиационной промышленности. И. Данишевский был сыном жестокого и героического времени, искренне верившим в непогрешимость руководства партии и идеи коммунизма. Участник репрессий, сам репрессированный, он ни в чем не раскаялся и ни о чем не пожалел. Стихи С. Гудзенко «нас не надо жалеть, ведь и мы б никого не жалели» сложены о таких, как он. ; The article, which is mainly based on archival documents, is the first attempt to compile a biography of an outstanding person in Soviet history Ivan Mikhailovich Danishevsky. The Party profile and 1938 Novosibirsk NKVD investigation profile on Danishevsky, his own memoirs and works allow you to see a portrait of a man whose life was marked by active participation in the tumultuous events of the 20th century. Coming from a middle-class Jewish family, he was born in Warsaw in 1897 and received a secondary education. Danishevsky revolutionary activities began in 1916 in the Ukraine in the Socialist Revolutionary Party; he was in the Red Guard in Kharkiv, fought with the white troops. In the middle of the Civil War, he was quickly promoted to major posts in the Soviet political police and joined the Bolshevik Party. Danishevsky was a prominent figure in the military counter-intelligence service in the central office of the Cheka (the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Speculation, and Sabotage), head of the special department of the Cheka of the 13th Army, the organizer of the merciless Red Terror in the Crimea and the Caucasus. In late 1920 early 1921 Danishevsky headed a special Cheka three in the Crimea and shot at least 2000 people, white officers and refugees, without trial. In 1921 Danishevsky transferred to the economic department. In the 1920s he worked in the handicraft industry, banking system and foreign trade. In 1930 the CPSU sent Danishevsky to train at the Air Force Academy. With a degree in engine building, Danishevsky worked in the Urals and Novosibirsk till 1938, having become a prominent organizer of the aviation industry. In 1937-1938 Danishevsky headed a large aircraft plant in Novosibirsk. But in the climate of political repression Danishevsky was accused of sabotage and sentenced to 20 years in prison. He was sent to the concentration camps of Kolyma, where he stayed for 14 years. In 1955 Danishevsky was rehabilitated and returned to Moscow and until his death was actively engaged in literary work. He wrote memoirs and collections of memoirs of the heroic pages of Soviet history. It must be admitted that his letters to government authorities show him as a man of extremely dogmatic beliefs. But people who knew Danishevsky draw a portrait of an attractive person, always ready to help others. Danishevsky died in the second half of 1970 in Moscow and was quickly forgotten. A typical old Bolshevik, Danishevsky lived a life of a man, convinced in the correctness of the ideas he believed in. In his eventful biography there still are many unknowns pages.

[EN] Assessing traumatic experiences experienced by victims of political violence has drawn the attention of the international scientific community in order to create appropriate models of intervention. The Inventory of Traumatic Experiences Questionnaire to assess traumatization Harvard refugees and created by Richard Mollica and his research team in 1992, was applied to 124 American, coming from different countries who were treated at the Treatment Center for Torture Victims School of Medicine, University of Health Sciences at Oregon (Torture Treatment Center at Oregon Health and Science University). The objectives of this study were to explore gender differences attributable to the traumatic experiences suffered by Latin American victims of political violence and to check the type of clinical diagnosis associated with these experiences. The results of the Traumatic Experiences Inventory were compared with clinical diagnosis as well as the gender of the clinical group which conducted the study. The results show that both men and women who have been exposed to traumatic experiences, there is a high incidence of posttraumatic stress disorder, there were no gender differences attributable to scale performance assessment of traumatic experiences in the total count the questionnaire but to make an item by item analysis. Results are discussed considering the theoretical model chosen and identifies the theoretical and clinical implications of the study. ; [ES] Evaluar las experiencias traumáticas vivenciadas por víctimas de violencia política ha llamado la atención de la comunidad científica internacional con el propósito de crear modelos de intervención apropiados. El Inventario de Experiencias Traumáticas del Cuestionario Harvard para evaluar traumatización en refugiados y creado por Richard Mollica y su equipo de investigación en 1992, fue aplicado a 124 latinoamericanos, provenientes de diferentes países, que fueron atendidos en el Centro de Tratamiento para Víctimas de Tortura de la Escuela de Medicina de la Universidad de Ciencias de la Salud de Oregón (Torture Treatment Center at Oregón Health and Science University). Los objetivos de este trabajo fueron explorar diferencias atribuibles al género en las experiencias traumáticas experimentadas por Latino Americanos víctimas de violencia política y revisar en el tipo de diagnóstico clínico asociado a esas propias experiencias. Los resultados del Inventario de Experiencias Traumáticas se confrontaron con el diagnóstico clínico así como con el género del grupo clínico con el que se efectuó el estudio. Los resultados muestran que, tanto en hombres como mujeres que han estado expuestos a experiencias traumáticas, existe una alta incidencia de Trastorno por Estrés Postraumático, no se aprecian diferencias atribuibles al género en el desempeño en la escala de evaluación de experiencias traumáticas en el cómputo total del cuestionario pero sí al efectuar un análisis ítem por ítem. Se discuten los resultados contemplando el modelo teórico elegido y se señalan las implicancias teóricas y clínicas del estudio.

Рассматриваются правила, согласно которым в СССР признавалось иностранное гражданство осевших в стране иностранцев (бывших военнопленных, оптантов, беженцев, репатриантов и т.п.). Исследованы «Положения о гражданстве» 1924, 1930, 1931 и 1938 гг., нормативные акты регулирующих органов ОГПУ, НКВД, МВД, извлечённые из архивов Российской Федерации, и дипломатические документы из Политического архива МИД Германии ; The article reviews the rules according to which foreign citizenship was granted to foreigners living in the USSR (former prisoners of war, refugees, repatriates, and others). Regulations about citizenship of 1924, 1930, 1938 and legal acts of regulative bodiesOGPU, NKVD and MVD, which were taken out of record-keeping office of the Russian Federation, as well as diplomatic documents from the Political recording-office of German Ministry of Foreign Affairs were investigated. According to the Act of the USSR citizenship of 1924, foreigners living in the USSR having proved their foreign citizenship got the legal permission to live as a foreigner (Form № 1). People, who did not have such proofs, got the legal permission as a person claiming to have a foreign citizenship (Form № 2). All other persons were declared soviet citizens. In 1932 during the registration of foreigners, legal permission for living Form № 2 was cancelled. Foreigners became either holders of unified legal permission for living (people who had national passports with visas of soviet plenipotentiaries and marks about crossing the border) or were declared soviet citizens. It was the subject for criticism for the foreign Embassies and Missions, who condemned the declaration of soviet citizenship for people being indubitably foreign citizens. Regulations of the order of proof of foreign citizenship which were approved by OGPU-NKVD in 1933-1934 defined the categories of individuals who did not have the right to claim a foreign citizenship. They were persons who were born by soviet citizens and former Russian subjects; people who had received soviet passports; who had been abroad with Russian passports; former emigrants returning in the USSR; people who served in the Red Army; former prisoners of war and some others. The adoption of the USSR Constitution of 1936 demanded new amendments to the Law about citizenship. Regulations of 1930 introduced the institution of individuals without citizenship and all mentioned above categories of people became eupatrids. Regulations caused by people's dissatisfaction were settled down only after the Great Patriotic war. According to the Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR On individuals living in the territory of the USSR for a long time without an official registration of their soviet citizenship made effective in December 1954, they were declared citizens of the USSR. Only political emigrants who arrived in the USSR during 1920-1935 got legal permission for living without citizenship, and they could get soviet citizenship only by to their personal petitions

AbstractThis paper represents an effort to explore the use of Stafford Beer's Viable System Model (VSM) to design human communities that foster adaptation to criteria of sustainability in our natural and social environments. With the projected rise in sea level and other changes that accompany warming temperatures, it seems probable that many communities, even some large cities, will have to be abandoned and their populations relocated. This difficult circumstance could create tens of millions of climate change refugees. It could be met with the failure and incompetence that characterized and still characterizes the response to Hurricane Katrina or it could provide an opportunity to rebuild in a manner that combines a low impact on the environment without sacrificing quality of life. Using the framework of the VSM, three levels of recursion will be explored: the household, the neighbourhood and the city. It will be possible to draw upon lessons learned about building and maintaining cities in different climates and under different conditions over the centuries and from the construction of 'new towns' in the past 50 years. It has been characteristic of communities that regularly endured environmental challenges to have fostered means of collaboration and co‐operation to address them and to constrain competition within bounds that did not threaten their common survival. There is no shortage of ideas and designs that could be applied but there is not yet either the political or social infrastructure to integrate and implement them. Steps taken in this direction might help to coalesce the necessary political will. The following are proposed as guidelines for design using the VSM. The community and the city's external relationships with the surrounding natural, social and economic environments should be such that they can support themselves while avoiding endangering their own survival and well being or that of their surrounding environments. Their internal operations should be such that an adequate quality of life is available to everyone from the most dependent members of its society to the most productive. They should pursue these ends with a view to maintaining a balance between collaboration/symbiosis and competition and with the fewest restrictions on the autonomy of members consistent with the other guidelines. The VSM can be both a template for design and a framework for discussion of what sustainable communities in a time of climate change might look like. Such discussions would be facilitated by Beer's Team Syntegrity process that he invented as a companion to the VSM. The process provides a whole system, high variety structure that gives equivalent status to each participant and viewpoint. This high level of communication will help to provide the cohesiveness that is needed when choices must be made and hardship shared in order to achieve a new equilibrium with the environment. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Нагорно-карабахскому конфликту посвящено достаточно много исследованийсовременности. Начиная с момента актуализации точек противостояния вовторой половине 1980-х гг. в этом традиционно этнополитическом конфликтеXX века различные авторы обращались к теме нагорно-карабахского конфликта.Несмотря на наличие большого количества научных публикаций в сфереэтнополитической конфликтологии и менее значительного количества науч-ных публикаций, посвященных нагорно-карабахскому конфликту, прихо-диться констатировать незначительность системных научно-теоретическихразработок в отношении проблематики защиты прав человека в конфликтныйи постконфликтный периоды этнополитического противостояния. В отноше-нии же непосредственно тематики нагорно-карабахского конфликта в светезащиты прав человека системная научно-теоретическая работа не проводи-лась ни зарубежными, ни армянскими или азербайджанскими авторами.В статье делается попытка этнополитической идентификации нагорно-карабахского конфликта и выявления его политических, конституционно-правовых и социально-экономических причин. Целостность определения ианализа причин нагорно-карабахского конфликта в свете защиты прав человека,их рассмотрение в контексте нарушений прав человека политического, право-вого, социального и экономического характера способствуют более реальномупониманию источников конфликта и возможных путей их устранения. ; The very specify of Nagono-Karabakh conflict, which is the mixture of political,legal, social-economic reasons of ethnopolitical confrontation of the states,which, in their turn have mass and rude violation of human rights as a fundamentalbasis, has brought to the present situation of unsettlement conflict and vaguenessof its perspective for its future settlement.It is revealed that at present one of the basic obstacles of the parties in conflictin their joint efforts to come to any terms in basic principles of the conflict settlementis the humanitarian issue of Nagorni-Karabakh problems. The matter concernsthe disability of the countries to make any serious decision on the refugees'and internally displaced people's return to their pre-conflict place of inhabitance.Some consequential importance is attributed to the principle of humanright protection on the present stage of conflict settlement which is concentratedaround superficial approach to overcoming the conflict after-effects, without takinginto consideration the most fundamental reasons of ethnopolitical confrontationover Nagorno Karabakh. Mass and gross derangements of the state formingethnos on the territory of the former Soviet Azerbaijan, which have up till nowmade the basis of setting up and maintaining the claim of the Armenian populationon Nagorni Karabakh about impossibility of their being under political-legalinfluence of Azerbaijan's state authority in any format, should be ascribed to thelatter ones. Such a comprehension of the matter, causative basis of conflict to berisen, its transformation in the certain stage of armed confrontation and remainingunsettled for one and a half years may contribute to balancing the efforts ofthe parties over overcoming the humanitarian after-effects of the confrontationand mutually acceptable decision making.The conflict subjects and intermediary institutions should pay as much attentionto the issue of overcoming the conflict's humanitarian consequences withrespect to the Armenian refugees of Soviet Azerbaijan as to the Azerbaijani refugeesand the displaned persons from the zone of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Researches conducted so far within the project Spinning out of control: rhetoric and violent conflict. Representations of 'self' - 'other' in the Yugoslav successor states focused on exploring the relations towards the Other in a state of conflict. Moreover: most of the author's and coauthors' contributions were oriented towards discourse analysis in the context of violence. Except for the peaceful dismemberment of Montenegro and Serbia, proclamation of independence of other Yugoslav states did not go without violence, to a greater or lesser extent. The Other in these situations was predominantly the ethnic Other, and usually treated as enemy. For that reason, the greater part of our past work was oriented towards analysing media reports of the most stiking war events. Also, some of the contributions intentionally targeted media reportings of tense situations and those bearing the unpredictable outcomes, such as referenda or meetings discussing war and peace matters; or, we focused our inquiries on radical standpoints expressed by certain media or political parties - all that in order to explore the essencial forms of constructing and manifesting the Otherness on a rhetoric level. From a broader perspective, the analysed period, marked by the wars of ex - Yugoslavia in the last decade of 20th century, could be comprehended as the preiod of a state of emergency, where the old order had been brutally and radically destroyed and the new one was installed. In such a process, as it was shown, the relation towards the Other was also usually extreme and ethnically motivated. Now, after the constitution of seven new states where once former Yugoslavia was, new questions emerge. We are interested, as we were before, in the identity constructions, especially in the relations toward the Other, and Otherness in general, now in the period of transition and normalization of mutual relationships that these societies are undergoing. Along with the theories of ethnicity and identity construction, the key perspective remains discursive analysis. Our main question is What is happening with the phenomenon of Otherness in public discourse, in the peaceful times, or in the post conflict state? Do the ways of representing Others from the conflict times disappear, or do they 'freeze', that is to say, remain the same, or get manifested on some other levels and by different rhetorical tools? In short, what is happening with the Others in discourses that do not 'spin out of control'? Are the Others stable, mutable or flexible category and where are the imagological boundaries of Otherness? Who are the Others now? Are there any Others among us in ethnical sense? What is the nature of relation towards the common Yugoslav past, in other words, has the common past also become the Otherness for the people of former Yugoslavia? Are the 'refugees', 'cast-outs', 'displaced persons', 'returnees'... only the new names for the old display of Otherness? .

The Spanish Civil war was one of the most tragic tragedies in Europe in the 20th century which strongly marked our collective destiny. Whole Europe, especially France, made the indirect experience of this historical drama by becoming the land of reception of four successive migratory waves between 1936 and 1939. The last of these waves, called "retirada", was followed by the massive banishment of about half a million individuals of all ages and conditions towards the neighbouring country across the Pyrenees in the space of some weeks. Although the question of the Spanish republican exodus and that of banishment are well known today, these continue asking questions, not only about the ultimate causes which originated in this painful episode, but also and especially on the fate which was reserved for the hundreds of thousand men, women and children at their arrival on the soil of France. How can they explain that the French Republic, known worldwide for its traditional hospitality, demonstrates officially only indifference or contempt towards them? How interpret the lack of preparation of the civil and military authorities facing a predictable human flood, the improvisation of the "camps on the beach" and the mortifying treatment inflicted on the Republican soldiers? It is what we would like to recall in this contribution by stressing the attitude of French and German authorities as well regarding the Spanish refugees till the end of World War II. ; La guerre d'Espagne figure en bonne place parmi les tragédies humaines que l'Europe a traversées au cours du 20e siècle et qui ont le plus fortement marqué notre destin collectif. L'Europe entière, en particulier la France, a fait l'expérience indirecte de ce drame historique en devenant la terre d'accueil de quatre vagues migratoires successives entre 1936 et 1939. La dernière de ces vagues, appelée retirada, a entraîné l'exil massif d'environ un demi-million d'individus de tous âges et de toutes conditions vers le pays voisin à travers les Pyrénées en l'espace de quelques semaines. Bien que la question de l'exode républicain espagnol et celle de l'exil soient aujourd'hui bien connues, celles-ci continuent de poser des questions, non seulement sur les causes premières qui ont occasionné cet épisode douloureux, mais aussi et surtout sur le sort qui a été réservé aux centaines de milliers d'hommes, de femmes et d'enfants à leur arrivée sur le sol de France. Comment expliquer que la République française, connue dans le monde entier pour sa traditionnelle hospitalité, n'ait manifesté officiellement qu'indifférence ou mépris à leur égard? Comment interpréter l'impréparation des autorités civiles et militaires face à un déluge humain annoncé, l'improvisation des "camps sur la plage" et le traitement humiliant infligé aux soldats républicains? C'est ce que nous voudrions évoquer dans cette contribution en insistant sur l'attitude des autorités françaises et aussi allemandes à l'égard des réfugiés espagnols jusqu'à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

There are two newspaper articles from The South China Sunday Post-Herald on this item. The article on the right discusses Snowpine Liu's (刘雪松) then-recent promotion to head of the physical education department at Chung Chi College, which was founded five years earlier. In the article, it says Snowpine graduated from Springfield College in 1932, while in fact he was a member of class 1931. The article on the left talks about Sir Alexander Grantham's wish for Britain to invest in Chung Chi College, which is the college that Snowpine was working at. This article is probably from a earlier time when Chung Chi College was still under construction. ; Snowpine Liu (刘雪松) earned his BPE from Scochow University and his MPE from Springfield College (class of 1931). After graduating, he entered the University of Southern California (Los Angeles) and earned his master's degree in 1934. While studying in the United States, Liu had several articles about athletics in China published in the American Physical Education Review. During the 1932 Olympic Games and 1936 Asian Games, he served as an attaché for China. After Liu's return from the United States, he worked as physical director at Hangchow Christian College and the University of Shanghai. Just before World War II, he began serving as dean of the Canton Provincial Physical Training College. In 1949, he moved to the New Territories (one of the three main regions of Hong Kong) as a Nationalist refugee from the mainland and continued to teach physical education. The New Territories were leased from Qing China to the United Kingdom in 1898 for ninety-nine years in the Second Convention of Peking (The Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory). Upon the expiration of the lease, sovereignty was transferred to China. While in the New Territories, Liu took over the fundraising and operations of the Nixon Library, which was dedicated in 1954. During this time, he asked Nixon for help in obtaining a visa to the United States. While there is no known response to that request, Nixon's office corresponded with Liu over the next decade. Sir Alexander William George Herder Grantham, GCMG (葛量洪 1899–1978) was a British colonial administrator who governed Hong Kong and Fiji. Chung Chi College was founded in October 1951 by the representatives of Protestant Churches in Hong Kong to fill the need for a local institution of higher learning that would be both Chinese and Christian. In 1955 it was formally incorporated under an ordinance of the Hong Kong Government. The South China Sunday Post-Herald, now known as the South China Morning Post, was the first English-language Hong Kong newspaper. ; On the paper which the newspaper clips are attached to, there is a stamp says "REC'D SEP 24 1956", probably indicating that the newspapers were received on Sep. 24, 1956.

In a terminally polarized America, it can sometimes seem like there's nothing that diehards of both major parties can agree on. Yet at both the party conventions this year there were signs that Americans are ready for a new U.S. foreign policy — even if they had very different ideas of what that change should be. Speaking to delegates and attendees at the Republican National Convention (RNC), again and again I heard the sentiment that the United States is too involved overseas, and that the treasure being invested in foreign wars should be reinvested back home. "America is overstretched. We're trying to do too much all over the world," Michigan Trump delegate and sheet-metal union worker Ken Crider told me. His friend, James Hooper, agreed about the folly of foreign intervention. "You can't predict what will happen when you involve yourself that way," he said. Shalira Taylor-Jackson, a disillusioned Barack Obama volunteer and an alternate delegate from Cleveland, complained to me about the massive military aid bill passed earlier this year for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. "You sent $100 billion over there," she said. "If you just gave some of that to the inner cities." It was the same thing I heard from another attendee, a convention volunteer who had also once voted for Obama, who felt too much money was being given away to foreign governments."What about our people, our veterans, our health care?" she said. Attendees consistently expressed favorable opinions about the idea of speaking with adversarial states. "You have to talk," said Don Hammell from Dallas, whose daughter-in-law is Ukrainian. When I asked him how he felt about Ukraine potentially having to give up territory as part of a peace deal, he said "that's between them." Stopping by the Turning Point USA stage, Rep. Marjorie Taylor-Greene (R-GA) spread baseless conspiracy theories about Trump's near-assassination, but also expressed skepticism about reports of an Iranian plot on his life. "Is this the next country the Deep State wants to bomb?" she said. "We are not going to accept the weapons of mass destruction explanation fed to us."Later in the week, Sen. Ron Johnson (R-WI) stopped by a "Serbs for Trump" event, receiving a good reception for an anti-war, anti-foreign entanglement message, warning against the "demonization" of foreign people, and urging people to read Dwight Eisenhower's famous farewell address denouncing the growing military-industrial complex. The event's organizer, Sasha Jovicic, said that such messaging resonated with the Serbian-American crowd because conscription had killed so many men in the old country. It was not always a coherent anti-interventionist sentiment. Those who expressed caution about foreign entanglements also praised former President Donald Trump's reckless assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. There was universal disdain for President Joe Biden's withdrawal from Afghanistan. Israel's war in Gaza and U.S. support for it got widespread, enthusiastic support, with Israeli flags rife throughout the convention. Much of this was reflected in the televised programming, with speeches — like those from Trump and J.D. Vance, or Tucker Carlson and David Sacks — that tended to express skepticism about continuing U.S. involvement in Ukraine and praising Trump as a peacemaker. Others, however, consistently emphasized Trump's purported toughness, his support for pouring more money into the military, and making hawkish noises about Iran. It was a different scene at the Democratic National Convention (DNC) this week, where there was far less enthusiasm for Israel's war, but commitment to Ukraine was ironclad. The view that Trump was beholden to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and concern that his win would mean handing Ukraine over to Russia, was widespread throughout the convention. Putin was bent on reconstituting the Soviet Union, Michigan delegate Barry Lepler told me, and the world was in a World War II-like moment that couldn't afford appeasement. "There's always been people in rural areas who are more isolationist," said talk radio host Joel Heitkamp, who had earlier that week appeared on a panel focused on winning back rural Americans. When I asked about the widespread resentment in rural and other parts of the country toward military aid that wasn't being invested in communities back home, he questioned whether it was a necessarily organic view. People opposed further aid to Ukraine because of Trump, he said, not the other way around. This was all consistent with the four nights' speeches, which tended to stress the same themes on foreign policy that Biden had come to lean into the past few years, and which have become familiar Democratic rhetoric now: enthusiasm for NATO, commitment to Ukraine, and a foreign policy based on the idea of defending democracy. At one point, the packed arena waved flags and sang joyfully along to Bruce Springsteen's "Born in the USA," entirely missing the point of the famously bitter anti-war anthem. This reached its apogee with Vice President Kamala Harris' acceptance speech closing out the convention, where she vowed to "ensure America always has the strongest, most lethal fighting force in the world," promised to "take whatever action is necessary" against Iran, assured people she would "stand strong with Ukraine and our NATO allies," and "always stand up for Israel's right to defend itself," while expressing sympathy for the devastation suffered by Gazans as a result of that Israel policy. Coupled with a party platform that expresses remarkably hawkish views on the Middle East, including attacking Trump for being insufficiently hawkish on Iran, the weeks' proceedings were, as Responsible Statecraft's Blaise Malley has pointed out, a major leap backward from the 2020 Biden campaign's denunciation of "forever wars" and promise to craft a "foreign policy for the middle class." But that's not to say there were no signs of change. The biggest foreign policy story of the DNC was the ongoing rift over the Gaza war, and over the Biden administration's policy of unconditional support for Israel to carry out what a growing cohort of experts and informed observers are calling a genocide. But its significance lay not so much in the presence at the convention of 30 "uncommitted" delegates seeking an end to arms transfers to Israel to bring the war to a close, but in the fact that they had widespread support within the party establishment for their goal. Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA) told me that the movement's efforts were having an effect inside the party, and said Harris "should pivot [on the war] like Hubert Humphrey in 1968."Uncommitted delegates, pro-Palestinian activists, and even anti-war protesters consistently told me that they received a friendly reception from Harris delegates and other attendees, and often got words of explicit support to keep up the pressure. They succeeded in getting 300 Harris delegates to sign a petition calling for an arms embargo, in what one of the movement's leaders called "some of the easiest organizing they've had to do." References to a ceasefire were some of the biggest applause lines of the event, with Harris' pro-Palestinian statement getting a raucous ovation. All of this should make undeniably clear, to both Democratic politicians and viewers at home, how mainstream a position ending this war is. "Israel is our partner," Florida delegate William Aristide told me. But 40,000 people had been killed, he said, many of them children. "What did they do to deserve that?" He asked me what the difference was between Israel's actions and what Russia was doing in Ukraine. "We need to cut them off," he concluded. Both parties' views on foreign policy continue to exist along a partisan gulf. But there are signs, as halting and contradictory as they are, that each is looking for a major shift from business as usual in its own particular way.

As hopes for a Gaza ceasefire continue to fade, the threat of a full-blown war between Israel and Hezbollah is now greater than at any time since October 7.
Following the release of a Hezbollah video shot by surveillance drones over various targets in northern Israel, Israeli officials warned of "an all-out war" in which Hezbollah will be destroyed and Lebanon would be sent "back to the Stone Age." Not to be outdone, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah is threatening a war with "no restraint and no rules and no ceilings."
Such a war would be catastrophic for Lebanese and Israeli civilians alike, and risks drawing Iran into wider conflict that engulfs the entire region. It would also instantly unravel what had been one of the Biden administration's few achievements since October 7 — preventing a full-blown regional war.
Even as the Israel-Lebanon front heats up, however, the most serious threats to de-escalation in Lebanon and to prospects for a Gaza ceasefire come from the Biden administration itself.
One need only look at realities in Gaza, where nearly nine months of war have cost the lives of more than 37,000 Palestinians, the vast majority of them women and children, and reduced most of Gaza to rubble. Despite putting forward a comprehensive ceasefire plan, which now has the backing of the United Nations Security Council, the Biden administration has done little to alter the basic cost-benefit calculations of either side — particularly Israel's.
Despite the massive death and destruction inflicted on Gaza, Hamas's command and control remains intact while Israel still has no signal achievement by which to claim victory. Moreover, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as is widely understood, has a personal interest in prolonging the war for as long as possible in order to maintain his grip on power (and hence also avoid going to jail).
Despite the administration's assertions that only Hamas stands in the way of a ceasefire, even Netanyahu has dropped the pretense, noting that "we are committed to continue the war after the pause in order to achieve the goal of destroying Hamas. I will not give up on this." For its part, Hamas has little incentive to go along with a ceasefire deal that does not actually lead to an end of the war. And despite Biden's pledge to hold Israel to its commitments, the administration's record over the last several months hardly inspires confidence.
Instead of attempting to change the incentive structure of both sides, the Biden administration has consistently worked to absorb, deflect or otherwise offset any potential costs or consequences that Israel could incur by continuing the war, thereby prolonging it. Despite serious and growing differences between the U.S. and Israel over both its conduct and goals of the war, the administration has continued to provide nearly unrestricted military, political and diplomatic support for Israel's military campaign at virtually every stage—regardless of the costs for Palestinians and even when it has strongly disagreed with those actions.
The list of examples is as long as it is disturbing — from the administration's endless, and largely unheeded, pleas for Israel to do more to limit civilian casualties, scale back its "indiscriminate" bombing, allow more humanitarian aid to Gaza's starved population, and lay out a clear post-war endgame for Gaza, to the President's supposed "red line" in Rafah, which Netanyahu has blown through as effortlessly as he did previous ultimatums by the administration.
With the exception of holding up a single shipment of the 2,000 and 500-pound bombs that had already killed thousands of innocents and annihilated most of Gaza's infrastructure, Biden has kept the weapons flowing, despite the administration's own assessment that U.S. weapons were likely used by Israel in violation of international humanitarian law.
Not only has Netanyahu avoided paying a price for his defiance of the U.S., the administration has continued to reward him and his far-right government with virtually unrestricted military, political, and diplomatic support. Even when Netanyahu publicly accused the administration of holding back weapons, the White House rushed to clarify that apart from the one shipment there was no disruption in the flow of weapons.
Congress has only amplified Netanyahu's political impunity with its bipartisan invitation for him to deliver a joint address to Congress this month, a move many Israelis, including former prime minister Ehud Barak, have decried as a "terrible mistake".
In announcing his ceasefire plan, which the U.S. slyly sought to couch as an Israeli proposal, Biden made it a point to declare Hamas no longer had the ability to carry out another October 7 and that it was "time for this war to end," thus offering Netanyahu a victory narrative and a ledge from which to climb down from his impossible perch of "total victory" and destroying Hamas—an offer the Israeli premier has pointedly declined, in large part because he understands there is no price to pay for doing so.
Among other things, this has put the Biden administration in the awkward position of continuing to provide material support for a war that, for all intents and purposes, it no longer supports politically. This fundamental contradiction lies at the core of the repeated ceasefire failures in Gaza as well as the escalation on the Israeli-Lebanese front.
The same muddled message to Israel--"we'd rather you didn't, but we'll still back you up when you do"— which may be the closest thing we've seen yet to a Biden Doctrine — is now being extended to Lebanon. The administration has warned Israel against an all-out invasion of Lebanon or "small regional war," which risks drawing Iran into an even wider and more catastrophic regional conflict, and has intensified its diplomatic efforts to forestall such an outcome.
As Israel and Hezbollah have inched ever closer toward blown-blown war, however, the administration has shifted its messaging, assuring Israeli leaders that the U.S. will continue to back Israel militarily even in the event of a full-scale war while at the same time warning Hezbollah that U.S. cannot prevent Israel from mounting a full-scale invasion.
What better way to undercut U.S. diplomacy than by reinforcing Netanyahu's preference for military solutions over diplomatic ones.
This basic contradiction stems from the administration's belief that differences or difficulties in the U.S.-Israel relationship serve as motivation for Hezbollah, Hamas and other members of the "axis of resistance" to continue and expand the fighting, and thus that the best deterrent is to eliminate any public daylight between the United States and Israel. As the past nine months (if not several decades) have shown, however, precisely the opposite is true — the provision of virtually restricted weapons and diplomatic support reduces the costs of continued military action for Israel and encourages reckless behavior, such as we have seen throughout the Gaza war.
As Israel's chief political enabler and weapons supplier, the United States absolutely has the ability — even a responsibility — to constrain Israel from taking actions that directly harm broader U.S. interests, as both an attack on Lebanon and the lack of a ceasefire in Gaza both do.
But for reasons of both domestic politics and the president's own deeply held personal views, the Biden administration has chosen not to use its substantial leverage.
The Biden administration no doubt understands that the surest way to prevent a further escalation in Lebanon is to end the horrific war in Gaza, though it has failed to grasp its own role in fueling both of these. For the U.S. to bring about an end to the Gaza war and prevent an equally disastrous regional war, this will have to change, including most notably by withholding the political and military support Israel's far-right government needs to sustain the war in Gaza or expanding it to Lebanon.
As long as the U.S. persists in absorbing or deflecting Israel's costs for maintaining the war, not only will the horrors in Gaza continue but may only be a matter of time before extending the devastation to Lebanon as well.

In late April, former President Donald Trump gave a wide-ranging interview to TIME magazine, which had a significant focus on foreign policy issues, particularly the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. The resulting transcript revealed that a second-Trump term would be just as murky foreign policy-wise, as the former president used much of his time contradicting himself, criticizing his successor, and offering few details about how he would approach international issues if elected again.
On Tuesday, it was President Joe Biden's turn to get the same treatment. The outcome was not all that different.
Biden gave a long interview to TIME 's Washington bureau chief Massimo Calabresi and editor-in-chief Sam Jacobs, which centered almost exclusively on the president's foreign policy agenda, looking both back at his first term in office and forward at a possible second.
Biden aggressively defended his record, particularly when it came to his leadership in responding to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Like Trump, Biden was sure to emphasize differences with his opponent, especially in terms of maintaining American global leadership and supporting allies.
"We are the world power," he said in response to the first question about whether the U.S. could still play the same global role it did during World War II and the Cold War.Israel and GazaThe president was coy about how he would react to Israel's invasion of Rafah, suggesting that revealing his assessment of whether Israel had crossed his "red line" would imperil ongoing discussions with Tel Aviv.
"I'm not going to speak to that now, (...) I'm in the process of talking with the Israelis right now." he said. "If I tell you, you'll write it. It's not time for you to write it."
Biden did offer some mild criticism of Israel and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He said that Israel's war strategy risked repeating American mistakes following 9/11, and could lead to an "endless war;" and that there was "every reason for people to draw" the conclusion that Netanyahu was determined to keep the war going for domestic political purposes. The president also said that his "biggest disagreement" with his Israeli counterpart is that Netanyahu does not share his belief that "there needs to be a two-state solution."
Biden did not offer any ideas of how he plans to square that circle, given his acknowledgement that the Israeli government is not interested in Palestinian statehood. The "roadmap to an enduring ceasefire" that the White House released last week notably had no mention of a path to Palestinian statehood.
Ultimately, however, Biden laid blame for both the start of the war and the inability to end it at the feet of Hamas. When asked whether Israel had violated international law, the president pivoted to discussing atrocities committed by Hamas on October 7. And when asked whether the hold-up to reaching a ceasefire deal was due to Hamas, Israel or both, Biden was quick to blame the former, though his reasoning was unclear.
"Hamas could end this tomorrow," he said, emphasizing that Netanyahu was "prepared to do about anything to get the hostages back." In fact, the Israeli government has said that the war will not end until "the destruction of Hamas military and governing capabilities" was complete, and Israeli officials have disputed Biden's description of the ceasefire proposal.
Biden was also inconclusive about whether Israel had been violating international law, saying that the evidence of whether the IDF had committed war crimes was "uncertain," and that, although they had taken actions that were "inappropriate" he did not believe that Israel was using starvation as a weapon of war.
Prominent NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Oxfam have determined that Israeli assurances that they had not violated international law were "not credible" and had committed a series of violations of customary international humanitarian law. Members of Congress called on Biden to suspend arms transfers to Israel because of its blocking of humanitarian aid to Gaza. One State Department official recently resigned because she said the department's report saying that Israel had not broken the law was "patently false."
If the U.S. did deem that Israel was violating international laws — as some administration officials have hinted — Washington would be required by law to cut off arms supplies, a step that Biden and his team have been wholly unwilling to take.Ukraine, NATO, and RussiaBiden was steadfast in arguing that his administration's approach to the war in Ukraine had been a success, and did not seem interested in facing any criticism about the current state of the war or a strategy to conclude it. He rejected the premise of a question about the dire battlefield situation and whether, at this point, reaching a peace agreement with Russia was the best way out of the war."I don't know why you skip over all that's happened in the meantime [between Russia's invasion and today]," Biden said. "The Russian military has been decimated. You don't write about that. It's been freaking decimated."He similarly dismissed questions about escalation and the possibility of a future NATO-Russia war, saying "we're on a slippery slope for war if we don't do something about Ukraine."Biden did not offer any specifics on what an end to the war would look like or what Washington's plan to get there is, saying only his conception of peace is "making sure Russia never, never, never, never occupies Ukraine. That's what peace looks like."However, he added that an end to the war "doesn't mean NATO, they are part of NATO. It means we have a relationship with them like we do with other countries." "I am not prepared to support the NATOization of Ukraine," Biden elaborated. "I spent a month in Ukraine when I was a Senator and Vice President. There was significant corruption."The president's views on the war seem to be informed by a belief that Russian President Vladimir Putin is motivated by a desire to make Ukraine a part of Russia and to expand Moscow's influence over the continent "He says this is part of reestablishing the Soviet Union," Biden said, referring to a speech Putin gave in 2022. "That's what this is all about. It wasn't just about taking part of—He wanted, he wanted to go back to the, to the days when there was NATO and there was that other outfit that Poland, everybody belonged to. So that's what it was about."Biden also talked up his success in strengthening NATO, emphasizing that two new countries had joined the alliance since his presidency started, and that Europe collectively had spent more money to aid Ukraine than had the U.S. As the TIME fact check showed, while Europe has committed to provide more money to Ukraine in the long-term, the continent has so far spent only $107 billion to Kyiv, compared to $175 billion from the U.S.China and TaiwanBiden said he is "not ruling out using military force" in the case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but added that "[he's] made clear to Xi Jinping that we agree with—we signed on to previous presidents going way back—to the policy of, that, it is we are not seeking independence for Taiwan."
Biden's apparent endorsement of strategic ambiguity , was a slight divergence from an earlier series of claims that Washington would come to Taiwan's defense if Beijing ever invaded.
Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific, the president celebrated Japan's defense spending increase, the formation of the Quad, and other U.S. military investments in the region.
"We are much stronger in the Pacific than we ever were before. China, by the way, China is very concerned about it," he said. "[Xi Jinping] wanted to know why I was doing all these things. I said the simple reason I'm doing those things: to make sure that you don't, that you aren't able to change the status quo any."
In his interview, Biden offered a straightforward defense of American primacy and global leadership, and painted it as the primary difference between himself and Trump. While he was light on the details, it ultimately appeared as if there would be little difference between a first and second Biden term when it comes to U.S. foreign policy.

As one of America's closest allies, Israel has remained heavily dependent on the US —politically, economically, and militarily—since its creation in 1948.US arms supplies, mostly provided gratis, are channeled via US Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Military Assistance Program (MAP) and Excess Defense Articles (EDA).According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the US has provided more foreign assistance to Israel since World War II than to any other country.The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) documented that the United States supplied 79 percent of all weapons transferred to Israel from 2018-2022.No one else was even close – the next closest suppliers were Germany with 20 percent and Italy with just 0.2 percent.A Fact Sheet released October 2023, by the US State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, provides a detailed official breakdown on the unrestrained American security assistance to Israel.Steadfast support for Israel's security has been a cornerstone of American foreign policy for every U.S. Administration since the presidency of Harry S. Truman.Since Israel's founding in 1948, the State Department said, the United States has provided Israel with over $130 billion in bilateral assistance focused on addressing new and complex security threats, bridging Israel's capability gaps through security assistance and cooperation, increasing interoperability through joint exercises, and helping Israel maintain its Qualitative Military Edge (QME).This assistance, says the State Department, has helped transform the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) into "one of the world's most capable, effective militaries and turned the Israeli military industry and technology sector into one of the largest exporters of military capabilities worldwide."In the current war, Israel's overwhelming fire power has resulted in the killings of thousands of Palestinian civilians in Gaza and the destruction of entire cities—mostly with US supplied weapons.Dr. Natalie J. Goldring, a Visiting Professor of the Practice in the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University, told IPS the October 7 Hamas attacks were horrendous acts and should be condemned as such."Even so, the Israeli responses to those attacks have been indiscriminate – intentionally so," she said.Two days after the Hamas attacks, Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant declared that Israel would carry out a "complete siege" of Gaza, including blocking the supply of water, food, and fuel, while also stopping the supply of electricity. And Israeli forces have done so, she pointed out."The US government bears a special responsibility for the continuing Israeli attacks. It has supplied Israel with massive quantities of military aid and weaponry, and Israel has ignored US restrictions on the use of those weapons".This supply of weapons and ammunition allows the Israeli military to continue its indiscriminate attacks in Gaza," said Dr Goldring, who also represents the Acronym Institute at the United Nations, on conventional weapons and arms trade issues."A key first step in reducing the human cost of this war is for the US government to call for an immediate ceasefire. The US government should also halt supplies of weapons and ammunition to Israel, whether from the US itself or from prepositioned stocks elsewhere."Since 1983, the United States and Israel have met regularly via the Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) to promote shared policies, address common threats and concerns, and identify new areas for security cooperation.According to the State Department, Israel is the leading global recipient of Title 22 U.S. security assistance under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. This has been formalized by a 10-year (2019-2028) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).Consistent with the MOU, the United States annually provides $3.3 billion in FMF and $500 million for cooperative programs for missile defense. Since FY 2009, the United States has provided Israel with $3.4 billion in funding for missile defense, including $1.3 billion for Iron Dome support starting in FY 2011.Through FMF, the United States provides Israel with access to some of the most advanced military equipment in the world, including the F-35 Stealth fighter aircraft.Israel is eligible for Cash Flow Financing and is authorized to use its annual FMF allocation to procure defense articles, services, and training through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system, Direct Commercial Contract agreements – which are FMF-funded Direct Commercial Sales procurements – and through Off Shore Procurement (OSP).Via OSP the current MOU allows Israel to spend a portion of its FMF on Israeli-origin rather than U.S.-origin defense articles. This was 25 percent in FY 2019 but is set to phase-out and decrease to zero in FY 2028.Elaborating further Dr Goldring said: "Unfortunately, the situation in Gaza bears similarities to the documented uses of US weapons by the Saudi-led coalition in attacks on civilians in Yemen"She said: "Our response should be the same in both cases. These countries have failed to honor the conditions of US weapons transfers, and should be ineligible for further transfers until they are in compliance.""US arms transfer decision-making gives too much weight to the judgment of government officials and politicians who frequently fail to consider the full human costs of these transfers," she argued."Earlier this year, the Biden Administration released a new Conventional Arms Transfer policy. They claimed that arms transfers would not be approved when their analysis concluded that "it is more likely than not" that the arms transferred would be used to commit or facilitate the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law."The actions of the Israeli and Saudi militaries are examples of ways in which this standard is not being met, declared Dr Goldring.As of October 2023, the United States has 599 active Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, valued at $23.8 billion, with Israel. FMS cases notified to Congress are listed here; priority initiatives include: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft; CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters; KC-46A Aerial Refueling Tankers; and precision-guided munitions.From FY 2018 through FY 2022, the U.S. has also authorized the permanent export of over $5.7billion in defense articles to Israel via the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process.The top categories of DCS to Israel were XIX-Toxicological Agents, including Chemical Agents, Biological Agents, and Associated Equipment (this includes detection equipment ((f)), vaccines ((g)-(h)) and modeling software ((i)); IV- Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, Rockets, Torpedoes, Bombs, and Mines; and VII- Aircraft.Since 1992, the United States has provided Israel with $6.6 billion worth of equipment under the Excess Defense Articles program, including weapons, spare parts, weapons, and simulators.U.S. European Command also maintains in Israel the U.S. War Reserve Stockpile, which can be used to boost Israeli defenses in the case of a significant military emergency.In addition to security assistance and arms sales, the United States participates in a variety of exchanges with Israel, including military exercises like Juniper Oak and Juniper Falcon, as well as joint research, and weapons development.The United States and Israel have signed multiple bilateral defense cooperation agreements, to include: a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1952); a General Security of Information Agreement (1982); a Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (1991); and a Status of Forces Agreement (1994), according to the State Department.Since 2011, the United States has also invested more than $8 million in Conventional Weapons Destruction programs in the West Bank to improve regional and human security through the survey and clearance of undisputed minefields.Following years of negotiations with the Palestinians and Israelis, humanitarian mine action activities began in April 2014 – this represents the first humanitarian clearance of landmine contamination in nearly five decades.Israel has also been designated as a U.S. Major Non-NATO Ally under U.S. law. This status provides foreign partners with certain benefits in the areas of defense trade and security cooperation and is a powerful symbol of their close relationship with the United States.This piece has been republished with permission from Inter Press Service.

Explores the long history of anti-Zionist and non-Zionist American JewsThroughout the twentieth century, American Jewish communal leaders projected a unified position of unconditional support for Israel, cementing it as a cornerstone of American Jewish identity. This unwavering position served to marginalize and label dissenters as antisemitic, systematically limiting the threshold of acceptable criticism. In pursuit of this forced consensus, these leaders entered Cold War alliances, distanced themselves from progressive civil rights and anti-colonial movements, and turned a blind eye to human rights abuses in Israel. In The Threshold of Dissent, Marjorie N. Feld instead shows that today's vociferous arguments among American Jews over Israel and Zionism are but the newest chapter in a fraught history that stretches from the nineteenth century. Drawing on rich archival research and examining wide-ranging intellectual currents—from the Reform movement and the Yiddish left to anti-colonialism and Jewish feminism—Feld explores American Jewish critics of Zionism and Israel from the 1880s to the 1980s. The book argues that the tireless policing of contrary perspectives led each generation of dissenters to believe that it was the first to question unqualified support for Israel. The Threshold of Dissent positions contemporary critics within a century-long debate about the priorities of the American Jewish community, one which holds profound implications for inclusion in American Jewish communal life and for American Jews' participation in coalitions working for justice.At a time when American Jewish support for Israel has been diminishing, The Threshold of Dissent uncovers a deeper—and deeply contested—history of intracommunal debate over Zionism among American Jews