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The article deals with the formation of value orientations of citizens under conditions of ambivalent public rhetoric. The system of values of civic culture, characterized by the motivation to create certain values, namely the attitude of the individual to himself as the subject of civil society, critical thinking, optimism, positive attitude to social reality, the need for active participation in social processes and significant changes.The theoretical factual paper describes the scientific approach to the definition of conceptual and categorical apparatus. The author examines the concept of "civic culture" as a special subsystem of general culture, from theperspective of evolutionism and functionality. Exploring the structure of culture the author isolates its relationship with modality, the maturity of society, thoughts and actions, characteristic of a society, social dependency, behavioral patterns, values and ideas that reflect the relationship of features that is specifically taken from society.Special attention is focused on the author's definition and characteristics under the concept of "value". The author argues that it is the value of organizing knowledge, motivating behavior and activities of the individual, makinghuman life filled with meaning.Summarizing scientific approaches to the definition of the concept the author identifies two main groups of values which are important in the formation of human beings, namely, material and spiritual, and concludes that valuesare ideas, norms, processes, relations material and spiritual order, having a positive objective value and are able to meet the specific needs of people. Human values is the link that connects its public and private life.Based on the scientific analysis of the author defines defines the value system of modern trends of Ukrainian state.The author believes that things that happened in Ukraine are caused by a break of certain social consciousnessof citizens, determined the transition from traditional society to an innovative type of paternalism to civic participation, from authoritarianism to democracy. This process is accompanied by the transformation of value systems that formed the basis of society and state.The author believes that Ukrainian society has undergone fundamental structural changes due to the destruction of the existing value system for decades. Social transformation led not only to changes in economic, political and cultural institutions, but also become a source of instability social environment caused blurring objects identification values. There is a contradictory process radical reassessment of the totality of values, which leads to difficulties inadapting to the individual requirements of modern times, strengthens the processes of social anomie.The author believes that the important form of expression of civic culture is law and morality. The law and morality form the model and the value-normative standards of society orientations.In the process of historical development of civic culture the ideals and norms of rationality have been absorbed.This active, rational-activist culture in my opinion, is today a prerequisite of social and cultural development of many Western countries. That culture directs people to actively mastering social reality in all its spheres.According to the author in the structure of civic culture stand stable values not subject to the passage of time, we can say, classic, universal primary function is to convert the objective imperatives of social activity in the subjectivegoals, motives actions and deeds. Civic values is to strengthen the existing system, they meet the criterion of generalsignificance and that is objectively serve the integrity of society by rationing behavior of the person.In conclusion, the author distinguishes four important basic components, namely cognitive, as the basis of sociopsychological, economic, political, legal, cultural and historical knowledge; axiological as important values, an ideal position; reflexive, as a special ability to think critically, the ability to explore and discuss the nature of events, using various sources of information, etc.; behavioral, as a way of socially transformative activities based on sustainable values.Characteristic features of civic culture is its autonomy, rationality, and rational-critical attitude to reality, democracy, tolerance and pluralism. The ability to exercise their rights, freedoms, availability of high responsibilitytowards society and the state, patriotism . Those are valuable principles on which is formed a high level of civic culture.The author argues that the purpose of civic culture is to build value orientations of members of civil society, aswell as symbolic and normative mediation of their interaction with each other. Without civic culture, understood as the capacity for dialogue, consensus and co-operation in general civil purposes, the company is doomed to collapse. ; В статье рассмотрены ценностные аспекты формирования гражданской культуры как базового условия развития гражданського общества и демократического управления, осуществлено структурный анализ гражданской культуры с позиций аксиологического похода, проанализированы особенности ценностных процессов современного украинского общества. ; У статті розглянуто ціннісні аспекти формування громадянської культури як базової умови розвитку громадянського суспільства та демократичного врядування, здійснено структурний аналіз громадянської культури з позицій аксіологічного підходу, проаналізовано особливості ціннісних процесів сучасного українського суспільства.

This article analyzes the important historical stages of the South Korean historical traditions, from ancient Neolithic times to the present day. Investigated important factors and worldview that took place in the historical formation South Korean society, as a modern leader in world kordynatah development. The role of South Korean society, as custodian of tradition and cultural heritage. An important factor in the development of historical traditions in the Korean peninsula since the Neolithic, is cultural pressure from other countries both East and West. Half a century of colonial rule, the Japanese Empire on the Korean peninsula, despite the violence and repressive policies of the national total for the assimilation of ethnic Koreans, the Japanese failed to destroy the Korean tradition, its vitality dignity has gone through rigorous testing history and showed great maturity Korean people. But that could not do the Mongols and Japanese colonizers managed to make the Communist Korea. National history and many achievements were simply destroyed and then recreated originally given ideological communist regime. In this study, we see that an important mission in preserving historical traditions the Korean people serves society and the state Republic of Korea. Going through difficult times of formation of the South Korean state authoritarianism through military control of South Korea reached the level of a democratic state, showing that their maturity and ability to influence the whole world.February 25, 2008 the President of the Republic of Korea for the next five years was Lee Myung-bak. Its characteristics are: determination, straightforwardness and pragmatic approach to business (founded as saying the «Protestant ethic»). Lee Myung-bak, unlike his predecessors, was the first in the history of Korea's presidency, which made a major breakthrough for its people. Former deacon Protestant churche reached stability and success for their country. The period of his presidency is characterized by important stages, namely: the politics of education. He established the National Scholarship Foundation, which has provided student loans. In addition, the government has maintained a system of «deferred payment» for those hard to pay tuition. Politics in economics «Mbnomics» - a term applied to Lee Myung-bak held macroeconomic policy. The central part of the plan of the Lee Myung-bak's economic recovery plan is his "Korea 7-4-7." Name of the plan consists of goals. Increase GDP by 7% raise per capita income to U.S. $ 40,000, and make Korea the seventh in the list of countries with the most developed economies. Foreign Policy. To resolve the North Korean nuclear issue requires close cooperation between the six-party talks. Strengthening the Union of South Korea and the United States, founded on shared values and mutual benefit, it is important to allow Korea to take appropriate action and have an impact on the situation in North Korea and Northeast Asia.Today inter-Korean relations are transient and tense situation. 2010 - 2012 GG, was busy leading to military conflict between South and North. But overall policy of Lee Myung-bak made a major breakthrough in the history of South Korea and exit to world globalization level.New and modern sixth president of the republic for the first time in the history of South Korea was a woman - Park Hyo KIN. December 19, 2012 she won the election fair and opened a new era in the history and traditional culture is not characteristic of this society, which is based on the Joseon Dynasty. KIN Pak Ho, daughter of the famous President Park Chung Hee, who made a great contribution to the development of the South Korean economy and laid a proper foundation. Pak King He based his economic recovery program has put the country. The process of historical development is irreversible, because in modern South Korea, which is a highly developed industrial country, revive and cultivate the values of traditional culture that emerged in the feudal era, can only artificially, natural way of further development of historical tradition these days is directed toward its deep globalization. The peculiarity of Korean tradition explains the features and patterns of historical development in the Far pockets Confucian civilization. Keeping a creative experience of many generations of Korean people, it is not only his property, but included in the treasury of cultural property of all mankind. ; В статье проанализированы важные исторические этапы формирования южнокорейской исторической традиции, от древнейших времен неолита до наших дней. Исследованы важные факторы и мировоззренческие установки, имевшие место в историческом формировании южнокорейского общества, как современного лидера в мировые координаты развития. Проанализирована роль южнокорейского общества как хранителя традиции и культурного наследия. ; В статті проаналізовано важливі історичні етапи формування південнокорейської історичної традиції, від найдавніших часів неоліту до наших днів. Досліджено важливі чинники та світоглядні настанови які мали місце у історичному формуванні південнокорейського суспільства, як сучасного лідера у світових координатах розвитку. Проаналізовано роль південнокорейського суспільства, як зберігача традиції та культурної спадщини.

In recent decades, Asia has emerged as one of the most contested sites for the increasingly powerful international human rights movement. Most notably, the heavily politicized Asian-values debate called into question the universal pretensions of the international human rights regime. More fundamentally, the experiences of Asian states over the last five decades challenged two widely held if somewhat inconsistent views: first, that democracy was the key to economic growth, or, reversing the causal direction, that economic growth would inevitably lead to political reforms, democratization and better protection of human rights. Many Asian states experienced their periods of rapid growth under authoritarian governments. Moreover, while some Asian states have made the transition to multiple-party, competitive-election democracy, others have not. Still others exist in a limbo state variously described as soft authoritarianism, semi-dictatorships, semi-democracy or nonliberal electoral democracy. Even those states that have most fully embraced democracy continue to interpret and implement human rights in ways that differ in important respects from some Western liberal democracies, thus calling into question the extent to which they should be described as liberal democracies. Past discussions about human rights and values in Asia have been hampered by the lack of reference to empirical studies to back up the strong theoretical, and in some cases polemical, claims being made on both sides about the differences or lack thereof in fundamental values. Numerous multiple-country quantitative studies have demonstrated significant regional effects with respect to democratization, labor rights, women's rights, personal integrity rights, freedom from government intrusions, rule of law and good governance, and cultural values that in turn affect rights performance. Although invaluable in locating Asian countries within a larger comparative context, the studies generally define Asia very broadly and deal with rights in a very general way. They generally do not measure the degree of variance in rights performance within Asia, or attempt to explain the variation within Asia or why Asia as a region might differ from other regions. In Part I, I provide an empirical overview of the performance of twelve Asian countries with respect to physical integrity rights, civil and political rights, social and economic rights and other indicia of quality of life including poverty, infant mortality, life expectancy, primary school enrollment, government expenditures on education, health and military, quality of governance measured in terms of regulatory effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption, and law and order and social stability as reflected in crime rates and the number of drug users, suicides, divorces and young mothers. I also include several other countries from different parts of the world for comparison points. The empirical overview demonstrates a wide variation in Asia with respect to rights performance. At the same time, patterns emerge with respect to lower scores for civil and political freedoms among East Asian countries and higher scores for social and economic rights as well as good governance, law and order, and crime control and social stability. These patterns are consistent with aspects of the "Asian values" platform that emphasize the importance, if not the priority, of social and economic rights relative to civil and political rights. Similarly, the studies suggest that even in Asian democracies the liberal emphasis on the individual will often take a back seat to collective interests and social stability. However, the wide variation within Asia still requires an explanation. Accordingly, Part II examines several possible explanations for the wide variation among Asian countries. Clearly the story is complicated. A number of factors come into play, with some factors more important for different types of rights or playing a different role in different countries or at different times within a country. War, political regime type, the nature and level of development of legal institutions, population size, colonial history, religion and cultural factors all play a role. In several countries, ethnic diversity, religious tensions and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism or separatist movements have had a major impact on rights policies and performances. However, consistent with the empirical evidence globally, in the subtle and complex interplay of economics, politics, culture, law and institutions in determining rights performance, what matters most is wealth. While money may not be able to buy happiness, it does seem to buy a longer life, better education, more health care, and even civil and political rights. The implications are twofold. First, put bluntly if somewhat too simply, if you want better performance across a range of rights and indicators of human well-being, show me the money. Second, given the importance of wealth to rights performance, comparisons are best made between countries in the same income categories. Comparing a lower middle-income country like China to a rich country like the U.S. makes about as much sense as comparing a piano to a duck.

The spread of democracy beyond Western Europe to Latin America and the duration of Latin American democracies through one or more elections has revealed a surprising and disturbing trend in Latin America. Many new Latin American electorates have supported rightist and non-democratic candidates who, once elected president, have engaged in auathoritarian behavior, bypassing, corrupting or closing the legislature, undeterminig judicial autonomy, and attempting to extend their terms in office indefinitely. Examples of such presidential behaviour in Latin America include Carlos Menen in Argentina, Alberto Gujimori in Peru, and Arnoldo Aleman in Nicaragua. Within Latin American electorates, it is evident that the rural population is even more likely to support rightist candidates than is the electorate as a whole. Rural rightism is surpring, however, given a largebody of literature from the 1970s and 1980s where peasants and rural dwellers are seen primarily as leftists, such as in Russia, China, Mexico, Cuba and Nicaragua. The presence of rightist rural electoral support in new Latin American democracies leaves a puzzle: are peasants fascists or revolutionaries? To unravel such a puzzle, the essay looks first at four cases of rural support for fascism or authoritarian populism in the early to mid-twentieth century, France, Italy, Germany, and Argentina. It compares factors explaining such rightist rural support with the knowledge we have about rural support for the left in Russia, China, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The essay concludes that two overall sets of factors are at play in explaining rural support and activism of a rightist or leftist nature. These are 1) background factors including the context of economic and social relations and the nature of land tenure and 2) foreground factors including thye nature of political leadership, organizational style and skill and the kind of rhetoric used to attract and motivate rural followers. Based upon these comparisons of rural political activism and scrutiny of the European and Latin American cases, the essay concludes that rural dwellers are neither naturally fascists nor naturalleyrevolutionaries. Rather, their activism and heir electoral support can be moved in either direction depending upon the preexisting social and economic background and upon the skill and style of leaders attempting to win rural support. We need to look carefully at the candidates running for office and at their organizational style and the nature of their rhetoric. Such foreground factors will be more likely to tell us whether or not their electoral support (and their behavior in office, for that matter) willresemble the cases of fascism and rightist authoritarianism of the early and midtwentieth century. ; La expansión de la democracia en América Latina y su extensión en el tiempo ha puesto de manifiesto una tendencia sorprendente y preocupante. Muchos de los nuevos electores latinoamericanos han dado su apoyo a candidatos de derecha y no democráticos que una vez en el poder han atentado de diversas maneras contra la democracia. Dentro del electorado se constata que ese apoyo a las fuerzas antidemocráticas es mayor en la población rural. A la luz de la bibliografía de los años 70 y 80 sobre las revoluciones campesinas de Rusia, China, Cuba o Nicaragua, este derechismo campesino es un rompecabezas: ¿los campesinos son fascistas o revolucionarios? Para descifrar este enigma, el trabajo en primer lugar analiza cuatro casos de apoyo rural al fascismo o al autoritarismo populista en la primera mitad del siglo XX (Francia, Italia, Alemania y Argentina). Compara los factores explicativos que emergen de esa comparación con los resultados obtenidos de la investigación sobre el izquierdismo campesino en China, Rusia, Cuba y Nicaragua. La conclusión del trabajo es que hay dos conjuntos de factores que explican el apoyo de los campesinos a la izquierda o a la derecha. El primer tipo de factores, de transfondo, incluye el contexto económico y las relaciones sociales de propiedad y tenencia de la tierra. El segundo tipo de factores, de primer plano,incluye el tipo de liderazgo, el estilo organizativo y la habilidad política, así como el tipo de retórica que se usa para atraer el voto campesino. La población rural no es por naturaleza ni de derecha ni de izquierda, sino que su apoyo puede llevarse a cualquiera de los dos lados dependiendo del trasfondo económico-social y de la escena política. En América Latina hay que estudiar en detalle los estilos de liderazgo y las retóricas de los candidatos. Estas variables de primera instancia nos van a permitir dictaminar si el apoyo electoral dará lugar a panoramas fascistas o autoritarios como los de la Europa de la primera mitad del siglo XX.

The cream of political scientist in Nigeria met in Lagos under the auspices of the Nigerian Political Science Association in May 1986 to discuss the theme, Alternative Political Futures for Nigeria: 1990 and Beyondas part of the debate towards a new political system. During the deliberations, oneof the major issues that arose was whether there should be a recommendation that Nigeria should return to some form of liberal democratic arrangement in 1990. The Conference resolved not to make any such recommendation. What was important about that decision was that a sizable number of both right wing and left wing protagonists converged on the conclusion that political scientists had no business proposing a liberal democratic framework. For the right wing, the reasoning was straight forward. One of their representatives, Inno Ukaeje argued that if Nigeria wants to develop, it must develop a Garrison‐Managerial State System which means that:
by 1990 the country should adopt a new form of government based mainly and purely on the rule of the armed forces and the police utilising coercionas the proper basis for securing the compliance of citizens with the laws of the polity, (emphasis in the original).
Many of the left wing protagonists at the Conference correctly identified the multiparty liberal democratic form of government as bourgeois but wrongly concluded that socialists had no business struggling for a 'bourgeois form'. Most of them argued that Nigeria should have a popular one party socialist system, some form of corporate system based on representation of popular organisations or at the very least a two party system with a conservative capitalist party face to face with a socialist revolutionary party. This situation they argued would simplify and bring to the fore the ideological struggle and thereby hasten the transition to socialism.
The views expressed at the Conference were fairly representative of the general tenor of the present political debate in which liberal democracy is no longer assumed to be part of the desired civic culture and in which authoritarian political forms are being openly propagated as inevitable or even desirable. This is a new development in the Nigerian political psyche that could be a harbinger of the new reassertion of fascism, spearheaded by the Americans and their institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank the world over, the policies and the world views of which are beginning to take root in this country. It is worthy of note that in the 1940s and 1950s, there was an unquestioned linkage between the acquistion of independence and the establishment of a Parliamentary form of bourgeois democracy. The debate that occurred concerned the structure around which this form was to be organised. The crisis generated by the contradictions inherent in the structures and processes chosen led to a collapse of the whole system by 1966 and the entry of the military into politics.
The military were, however, seen and they saw themselves as a transitional team to steer the country until a new democratic form could be arrived at. This is why until the time of the handover of power to the Shagari regime in 1979, the desirability of some form of democratic government for the country was never seriously questioned. The political debate at that time was directed at solving some of the perceived constraints and contradictions of the previous democratic experiment. It is only in the present political debate that there is an orchestrated open campaign against liberal democracy and for some form of authortarian government.
This new tendency started becoming clear in 1982 when the Nigerian ruling class began to articulate the necessity for control and coercion to resolve the country's economic crisis. The inability of president Shehu Shagari and General Muhammadu Buhari to properly 'manage' this control and coercion played a major role in the inability of their regimes to survive. The Babangida administration is learning from their mistakes and striving to surpass them. It is thus not surprising that any political debate conducted under this atmosphere would reflect the state of the nation.
The central political question that arises at this point is that as much as the Nigerian ruling classes are being compelled to move towards fascism, liberals and socialists have a stake in combatting that move. Their survival as well as their capacity to advance their politics might well depend upon being able to block the advance of fascism, hence the need for a liberal intervention in the current political debate. Against this background, left‐wing authoritarianism tends to weaken the much needed anti‐fascist solidarity of socialists and liberals.

Although some scholars have argued that authoritarianism is characteristic only of the right and not of the left, persuasive reasons exist for doubting this claim. Intuitive observation of left-wing and right-wing regimes as well as radical political movements of the left and right reveals striking parallels in their styles of political engagement, their reliance upon force, their disdain for democratic ideals and practices and their violations of civil liberties. In addition, systematic inquiry into the similarities and differences between far-left and far-right radicals in the United States has been hampered by various methodological difficulties. One can list, among these, such problems as the obvious inappropriateness of the F scale (owing to its strong right-wing content) as a measure for identifying left-wing authoritarians; the difficulty of obtaining adequate samples of true believers of the extreme left and right; the self-image of the American left as a persecuted minority which, for reasons of self-interest, spuriously inflates the degree of support expressed by its members for individual rights and liberties; and the exposure of both extreme camps to the liberal democratic values dominating American political culture, which unmistakably colours their political rhetoric.We have reason to think that a similar study conducted in some – perhaps many – European countries would reveal even greater similarities between the far left and far right than we have turned up in the United States. Unlike the United States, which has enjoyed a strong liberal democratic tradition that has served to weaken and soften the intensity of its radical movements, a number of European countries, less wedded to liberal democratic principles, have developed a more vigorous, less diluted tradition of radical politics. These nations have long had to contend with powerful extremist movements actively and significantly engaged in the political struggles of their respective nations. The radical movements of Europe have been more extreme and zealous – more unequivocally revolutionary and reactionary – than the radical movements of the United States. The sustained confrontation of these extremist movements, in our view, is likely to have intensified the authoritarian propensities of each.In the present article, through a series of surveys in which we have tried to idenify, as best we can, supporters of the far left and far right, we have systematically compared the two camps on a variety of political and psychological characteristics. We find, in keeping with the conventional view, that the far left and the far right stand at opposite end of the familiar left–right continuum on many issues of public policy, political philosophy and personal belief. They hold sharply contrasting views on questions of law and order, foreign policy, social welfare, economic equality, racial equality, women's rights, sexual freedom, patriotism, social conventions, religion, family values and orientations towards business, labour and private enterprise.Nevertheless, while the two camps embrace different programmatic beliefs, both are deeply estranged from certain features of American society and highly critical of what they perceive as the spiritual and moral degeneration of American institutions. Both view American society as dominated by conspiratorial forces that are working to defeat their respective ideological aims.The degree of their alienation is intensified by the zealous and unyielding manner in which they hold their beliefs. Both camps possess an inflexible psychological and political style characterized by the tendency to view social and political affairs in crude, unambiguous and stereotypical terms. They see political life as a conflict between 'us' and 'them', a struggle between good and evil played out on a battleground where compromise amounts to capitulation and the goal is total victory.The far left and the far right also resemble each other in the way they pursue their political goals. Both are disposed to censor their opponents, to deal harshly with enemies, to sacrifice the well-being even of the innocent in order to serve a 'higher purpose', and to use cruel tactics if necessary to 'persuade' society of the wisdom of their objectives. Both tend to support (or oppose) civil liberties in a highly partisan and self-serving fashion, supporting freedom for themselves and for the groups and causes they favour while seeking to withhold it from enemies and advocates of causes they dislike.In sum, when the views of the far left and far right are evaluated against the standard left–right ideological dimension, they can appropriately be classifled at opposite ends of the political spectrum. But when the two camps are evaluated on questions of political and psychological style, the treatment of political opponents, and the tactics that they are willing to employ to achieve their ends, the display many parallels that can rightly be labelled authoritarian.

Este artículo analiza la construcción hegemónica y la eficacia interpelativa del discurso presidencial de Fernando de la Rúa en las jornadas del 19 y 20 de diciembre del 2001. Se concluye que en esta fase final De la Rúa edificó desde su alocución un vínculo de representación política centrado en la defensa neoliberal-conservadora del orden público, como equivalente a la paz social y la gobernabilidad. La frontera de exclusión se delimitaba frente a los hechos de violencia social. Sin embargo, la alteridad constitutiva carecía de agentes concretos e individualizables, por lo que asumía una forma difusa e impersonal. La crisis económica y social también respondía a hechos estructurales producidos externamente, sin causas ni agentes precisos que la encarnaran. Desde el lado enunciativo, el discurso de De la Rúa apeló a una ética de la responsabilidad y la grandeza, a partir de una modalidad deontológica, con el objeto de justificar el Estado de Sitio, la convocatoria a la unidad nacional y el deber de preservar el orden institucional. A través del empleo de una forma verbal antecedida del proceso relacional ?Hay que?, el Presidente subordinaba el componente programático del discurso político y congelaba las demandas opositoras en torno a la modificación del modelo económico y social. Mediante el uso de la voz pasiva y los sustantivos antepuestos a la acción, De la Rúa quitaba responsabilidad política a su figura y a su Gobierno en la crisis, que respondía a circunstancias situadas como ajenas a su voluntad. Al mismo tiempo, reducía la capacidad agentiva para transformar activamente el statu quo del Régimen de Convertibilidad. La apelación a un mandato superyoico de responsabilidad gubernamental y deber institucional y la escenificación de una épica de la grandeza personal, se articulaban con un dispositivo de enunciación desinteresado políticamente. Este dispositivo enunciativo procuraba legitimarse exhibiendo una continuidad biográfica en el accionar presidencial. Desde el análisis de la eficacia hegemónica, a través de las masivas e intensas protestas sociales inmediatamente posteriores a la enunciación presidencial, se evidenció en ambas alocuciones el fracaso interpelativo de De la Rúa en sus pretensiones performativas. La intensa, masiva y persistente resistencia social al autoritarismo oficial contribuyó a la renuncia del Presidente, a la caída de la Alianza y de su modelo de acumulación basado en el ajuste, la precarización laboral y la exclusión social. ; This article analyzes the hegemonic construction and the interpelative efficacy of Fernando de la Rúa´s presidential discourse in the days of December 19 and 20, 2001. It is concluded that in this final phase De la Rúa built from his speech a political representation link focused on the neoliberal-conservative defense of public order, as equivalent to social peace and governability. The frontier of exclusion was delimited opposite the facts of social violence. However, the constitutive otherness lacked concrete and individualize agents, so it assumed a diffuse and impersonal form. The economic and social crisis also responded to structural events produced externally, without causes or precise agents that embodied it. From the enunciative side, De la Rúa´s discourse appealed to an ethic of responsibility and greatness, based on a deontological modality, in order to justify the State of Siege, the call to national unity and the duty to preserve the institutional order. Through the use of a verbal form preceded by the relational process "Have to" the President subordinated the programmatic component of the political discourse and froze the opposing demands regarding the modification of the economic and social model. Through the use of the passive voice and the nouns placed before the action, De la Rúa took political responsibility to his figure and his Government in the crisis, which responded to circumstances located as beyond his control. At the same time, it reduced the agentive capacity to actively transform the status quo of the Convertibility Regime. The appeal to a superego mandate of governmental responsibility and institutional duty and the staging of an epic of personal greatness, were articulated with a politically disinterested device of enunciation. This enunciative device sought to legitimize itself by exhibiting a biographical continuity in the presidential action. From the analysis of the hegemonic efficacy, through the massive and intense social protests immediately after the presidential enunciation, was evidenced the interpellative failure of De la Rúa in its performative pretensions. The intense, massive and persistent social resistance to official authoritarianism contributed to the resignation of the President, the fall of the Alliance and its accumulation model based on adjustment, labor precariousness and social exclusion. ; Fil: Fair, Hernán. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Quilmes. Departamento de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina

A historical look at the American fascination with Italian fascism during the interwar periodIn the interwar years, the United States grappled with economic volatility and Americans expressed anxieties about a decline in moral values, the erosion of families and communities, and the decay of democracy. These issues prompted a profound ambivalence toward modernity, leading some individuals to turn to Italian fascism as a possible solution for the problems facing the country. The Machine Has a Soul delves into why Americans of all stripes sympathized with Italian fascism, and shows that fascism's appeal rested in the image of Mussolini's regime as "the machine which will run and has a soul"--a seemingly efficient and technologically advanced system that upheld tradition, religion, and family.Katy Hull focuses on four prominent American sympathizers: Richard Washburn Child, a conservative diplomat and Republican operative; Anne O'Hare McCormick, a distinguished New York Times journalist; Generoso Pope, an Italian-American publisher and Democratic political broker; and Herbert Wallace Schneider, a Columbia University professor of moral philosophy. In fascism's violent squads they saw youthful glamour and impeccable manners, in the megalomaniacal Mussolini they perceived someone both current and old-fashioned, and in the corporate state they witnessed a politics that could revive addled minds. They argued that with the right course of action, the United States could use fascism to take the best from modernity while withstanding its harmful effects.Investigating the motivations of American fascist sympathizers, The Machine Has a Soul offers provocative lessons about authoritarianism's appeal during times of intense cultural, social, and economic strain

Mit den "Mitte"-Studien der Universität Leipzig steht eine Langzeitdokumentation zur Verfügung, die insbesondere die antidemokratische, rechtsextreme Einstellung im Zeitverlauf abbildet. Seit 2002 werden alle zwei Jahre Repräsentativerhebungen in Deutschland durchgeführt.

Am Horn von Afrika trifft das Corona-Virus auf Staaten, die ohnehin mit einer Viel­zahl von Problemen konfrontiert sind: Anhaltende bewaffnete Konflikte, Dürre und Unsicherheit haben mehr als acht Millionen Menschen zu Flüchtlingen im eigenen Land gemacht, weitere 3,5 Millionen sind in die Nachbarländer geflohen, wo sie in überfüllten Flüchtlingslagern leben. Alle Staaten der Region befinden sich in einem fragilen Zustand politischer Transformation oder sind durch Krieg und Regierungs­versagen enorm geschwächt. Ihre Kapazitäten reichen weder für die Eindämmung der Covid-Pandemie aus noch für die Abfederung der Folgen, wie Arbeitslosigkeit, Armut und Hunger. Um die Demokratisierung im Sudan und in Äthiopien nicht zu gefährden, ist es notwendig, den Fokus auf soziale Sicherungssysteme zu richten und das Vertrauen der Bevölkerung zu gewinnen. Dazu ist ein Soforthilfepaket aus dem Aus­land erforderlich, das den Staaten das wirtschaftliche Überleben sichert. Langfristige Unterstützung jedoch sollte an die Bedingung geknüpft werden, dass ein Großteil der Investitionen in den Aufbau staatlicher Kapazitäten fließt. (Autorenreferat)