AbstractAt least 1 million people died during the Mozambican civil war (1976/7‐92). Unfolding after gaining independence from Portugal (1975) and alongside experiments with Afro‐socialism in the 1980s, the war, despite its brutality, has not been subjected to global templates of reconciliation processes. Thus it comprises a unique case to probe what irreconciliation might mean – both as a political horizon and as an analytical concept. This text juxtaposes ethnographic material from rural, central Mozambique from the late 1990s and early 2000s emphasizing reconciliation with material from the same spaces from the 2010s onwards, where I identify what I term a 'politics of irreconciliation'. I will make three arguments. First, informed by Hannah Arendt, I approach irreconciliation as fundamentally about the rejection of a world of violence in search of a world shared in common. Second, drawing on recent anthropological theorizing about temporal regimes and chronopolitics, I argue for the salience of a non‐linear understanding of the politics of irreconciliation to grapple with the fact that civil war violence is understood as dangerously uncontained rather than nominally past. Third, within the context of Mozambique, forgiveness and its other, irreconciliation, are not only intimately tied to the temporally past or present; they are also, as I show, produced by a tangible and intense absence of a productive future.
What (and who) is a victim? In contemporary violent conflicts, the construction of grievance-based identity is a fundamentally contested process as the lines between victim and perpetrator are blurred by ongoing cycles of belligerence and retribution. As victims are incorporated into broader political campaigns, it becomes nearly impossible to separate the victim from the politics. The ubiquity of victims in international politics is a serious challenge to International Relations theory as categories of victim and perpetrator are generally treated as 'prior or external to analysis' instead of as propositions for further inquiry. This article formulates a political theory of victimhood driven by a distinction between victimisation as an act of harm perpetrated against a person or group, and victimhood as a form of collective identity based on that harm. It proposes a sequence of five stages that victims experience from the act of victimisation to the recognition of victim-based identity: (1) structural conduciveness, (2) political consciousness, (3) ideological concurrence, (4) political mobilisation and (5) political recognition. The article explores the stages with concrete examples and offers three main challenges for future research. First, as an identity, victimhood is more prominent in societies that recognise justice. Second, victimhood accompanies struggles for recognition. Third, victim rivalries obfuscate straightforward analysis of victimhood in conflict zones.
Michael Haneke's film Caché (Hidden) (2005) explores the psychological and social effects of the intrusion of the immigrant Other into privileged Western capitalist society. Caché allegorises the intrusion of the immigrant Other through a series of intrusive and threatening non-diegetic surveillance tapes delivered to a wealthy Parisian family's home, the subject of the surveillance. Haneke's film undertakes a significant critique of the increasing right-wing anti-immigrant sentiment driving neo-liberal politics and ideology in the capitalist West. Here, Caché confronts the viewer with their complicity in the disavowal and subjugation of the immigrant Other within their own social edifice. The significance of Caché is the film's potential to facilitate the viewers' confrontation with the disavowed and repressed truth of the social edifice. This confrontation enables the viewer to assume an emancipatory subjectivity which extends beyond Caché's cinematic frame into the viewers' own social edifice. I argue that Haneke's film has the potential to radically alter the way viewers relate to the diegetic reality and, through the figuration of cinema, to their own social edifice. Ultimately, Caché brings to the fore the disavowed truth of both capitalist society and of privileged subjectivities, demanding a new politics based on the excluded immigrant Other.
Lavrentii Beria built up one of the most powerful patronage networks in Soviet history. Its success represents a unique case in Soviet history in which a regionally based secret police patron-client network, comprised primarily of representatives of ethnic minorities, took control first of the civilian leadership of one of the major regions of the Union, and then of the most powerful institution in the USSR, the national secret police, and subsequently became one of the main competing factions in the "crypto-politics" of the late-Stalin era. The fact that the Beria network emerged from the secret police gave it certain advantages in the political struggles of the period, but it also held weaknesses that played a role in Beria's final undoing. The evolution and political struggles of Beria's network also shed light on the inner workings of the competition among informal networks that made up the crypto-politics of the period. Using recent memoirs, new archival sources and interviews, this article will examine how Beria developed, managed and advanced his informal network, giving particular attention to the specific and unique outcomes that resulted from the rooting of this network in the secret police, at five critical junctures in Beria's career.
The widespread violence in Mexico by state and nonstate actors since the government launched a military strategy against drug cartels in 2006 has generated demands for justice, including spaces of mourning and commemoration that recognize hundreds of thousands of Mexican nationals and migrants from other countries who have been killed or disappeared. Creating memorial spaces for ongoing forms of violence whose perpetrators and victims are hard to define has proven difficult from a bureaucratic, political, and aesthetic perspective. This article examines and contrasts three commemorative and transformative memorial interventions to show that in a context that lacks a clear transition and access to justice, memory activists respond to the state in a playing field that is not simply concerned with a politics of memory—who gets to decide how to remember the past—but with delineating the past from both the present and the future in the first place: a politics of time.
ObjectivesThis article investigates the impact of racial politics on White House visits by professional sports teams. Given increasing political polarization and varying racial compositions of major sports leagues, we hypothesize increased visits and objections over time while the prevalence of nonwhite players in a league detrimentally affects visits with Republican presidents and objections to visiting with them.MethodsUtilizing an original data set, we employ binary logistic regression to examine White House visits and objections by champions of six major professional sports leagues between 1993 and 2019.ResultsWe find (1) increased visits and objections over time; (2) a negative relationship between a league's nonwhite composition and the likelihood of a White House visit; and (3) a positive relationship between a league's nonwhite composition and objections to visits with Republican presidents.ConclusionsThis research provides a more nuanced understanding of how racial politics influences the relationship between the American presidency, society, and culture.
This paper investigates how political elites make policy choices that have bearing on an authoritarian regime's economy, from the perspective of factional politics. A local leader makes policies primarily to secure his political survival, which is contingent on the support from either his higher-level patrons or his local grassroots constituents. Using a simple model, we show that a local politician with close factional ties to high-level patrons will invest more in sending loyalty signals to the latter to receive their protections, while a poorly-connected politician will make more effort to spur a broad-based economic growth that economically benefits his local constituents. Using a unique county level data on the factional politics of Zhejiang Province, China, we find that counties with weaker (closer) factional ties have lower (higher) tax burdens per capita, while spending more (less) on local public goods provision. The results are stable after various robustness tests.
How does the new institutional ecology of city politics structure opportunities for urban growth? We draw on policy agendas theory to explore two central aspects of this question: the process by which urban actors attempt to reach development policy goals by "shopping" for alternative institutional venues and the conditions under which extraurban institutions—such as state and special-purpose governments—provide favorable alternative decision settings. We conduct a comparative case study of two prominent megaprojects—Chicago's new Comiskey Park (1986-1991) and Seattle's Safeco Field (1994-1995)—in which policy-making authority shifted from city government to extraurban venues. Our analyses illustrate how the interplay of several factors, including the resources and capacity of relevant coalitions and the issue politics that surround the project, shape venue-shopping opportunities for urban megaprojects. In advancing these arguments, this research underscores the more general significance of venue shopping in urban growth policy processes.
Arabic names are a component of a changing Islamic discourse in Java. If Arabic names in Java undergo change and growth, then this has implications for changes in Javanese Islam. This research demonstrates the validity of an approach that uses names as a window into Javanese culture. Drawing on a dataset of 3.7 million names analyzed diachronically across 100 years, and using a quantitative method sharpened by ethnography, the analysis of names offers a new way to investigate trends that were previously often difficult to document systematically. In the past, Javanese names usually reflected social classification: santri, abangan, priyayi, or lower and upper class. However, towards the end of the twentieth century, names with class connotations were increasingly abandoned (see Kuipers and Askuri 2017). In this paper we explore further the connection between the decline of class marked names, and the rise of Arabic names. Drawing on data from Askuri (2018), we argue that although the decline of class marked names precedes the sharp rise in the use of Arabic names, the former does not seem to have caused the latter in a simple way. Our data show that in the 20th century, there were two important stages in the Arabisation of Javanese names; 1) an initial "synthetic" stage of one-word blended Javanese Arab names, popular from roughly 1930-1960; 2) a later stage, beginning in 1980, of 2 and 3 word names, one of which was a purified Arabic name . The conclusions have implications for an understanding of the role of hybridity and purification in Javanese Islamic modernity. [Nama-nama Arab merupakan salah satu komponen dari wacana Islam yang dinamis di Jawa. Jika nama-nama Arab di Jawa mengalami perubahan dan pertumbuhan, maka hal ini memiliki implikasi perubahan dalam masyarakat Islam di Jawa. Penelitian ini menunjukkan validitas pendekatan yang menggunakan nama sebagai jendela ke dalam budaya Jawa. Berdasarkan pada dataset 3,7 juta nama yang dianalisis secara diakronis sepanjang 100 tahun, dan menggunakan metode kuantitatif yang dipertajam dengan etnografi, analisis nama menawarkan cara baru untuk menyelidiki trend yang sebelumnya sering sulit untuk didokumentasikan secara sistematis.Di masa lalu, nama-nama Jawa biasanya mencerminkan klasifikasi sosial: santri, abangan, priyayi, atau kelas bawah dan atas. Namun, menjelang akhir abad ke-20, nama-nama dengan konotasi kelas semakin ditinggalkan. Dalam makalah ini kami mengeksplorasi lebih lanjut hubungan antara penurunan nama-nama yang berkonotasi kelas rendah yang ditandai dengan dan munculnya nama-nama Arab. Berdasarkan data dari Askuri (2018), kami berpendapat bahwa meskipun penurunan nama yang berkonotasi kelas rendah mendahului kenaikan yang tajam dalam penggunaan nama-nama Arab, yang pertama tampaknya tidak menyebabkan yang terakhir dengan cara yang sederhana. Data kami menunjukkan bahwa pada abad ke-20, ada dua tahapan penting dalam Arabisasi nama-nama di Jawa; 1) tahap awal "sintesis" dari nama campuran Jawa-Arab dalam satu kata, yang populer dari sekitar 1930-1960; 2) tahap selanjutnya, dimulai pada tahun 1980, yang tersusun dari 2 atau 3 kata, dimana salah satunya ialah nama Arab yang dimurnikan (purified Arabic names). Kesimpulan ini memiliki implikasi dalam pemahaman tentang peran hibriditas dan pemurnian dalam modernitas Islam di Jawa.]
