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This thesis shall represent the arbitration regime under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in connection with protection mechanism of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). It shall analyse the achievements of ICSID and BITs and their influence of foreign direct investments, investors and the host country. Finally, this thesis will try to assess the achievements in this area and discuss advantages or disadvantages for the involved parties. Individuals and corporations are interested in foreign direct investments (FDI) to exploit new markets, to realize or to sell business ideas, and to raise their market value or personal wealth. Under an economical point of view, money or investments always found its way to the most efficient places on earth which were able to be reached in any century to produce a better or the same product or service for a better price. The raising of profit margins was the driving force to explore new markets; also foreign governments tried to attract investors from all over the world to create new jobs and import new technology for their economies to raise the capacity to compete on an international level. In the early nineteenth century the prevalent form of foreign direct investment was that carried out through loans and government bonds. In contrast, modern foreign investment is more characterized by direct investment on the spot: the building of infrastructure, like railroads or telephone networks, and the establishment of joint-ventures in the car industry, to name but two examples. Investment abroad also means to play in a new and unknown playground. Investors have to place their money in a foreign environment under different laws, different rights and duties, and with unknown future protection of their investments. This makes foreign direct investments an uncertain game, and uncertainty did always keep investors from direct investments in a foreign and unknown country. Furthermore, not only the unknown environment is an investment obstacle, investors also were faced with problems with governments in the foreign market. First foreign governments promoted foreign direct investments to raise their economic power. Large infrastructure projects had an important effect on the countries where they were constructed: they were the basis for a faster growing economy. Later the same governments or new political powers changed government positions regarding foreign investment and they restricted investment related money transfers of investors out of the investment area or they initiated measures and laws to expropriate the property of investors without financial compensation. The big infrastructure investments were seen as a necessity for the welfare of the citizens and as a security of the host state. Many host countries felt that these projects should be controlled by the government and not by foreigners. The treatment of aliens by governments was, and still is, dependent on political theories and influences. A change of the investment climate, the "political risk", can be a huge uncertainty for foreign direct investments. Every investor has to ensure that the investment is lucrative and that he has the possibility to reduce risks and cost in case of changes of the investment climate. In the past foreign investors had no direct way to enforce investments claims against a foreign state for its sovereign acts or for breach of customary international law. Instead, investors had to rely upon their own government taking up the claim on their behalf and try to solve the dispute by diplomatic measures. This dependence on others was inconvenient and unpredictable, and therefore dissatisfying for alien investors. The settlement of foreign investment disputes in the past was a question of political influence and economic power. Individuals or corporations had to influence their governments to take up their case on the state's behalf. This was only possible for very important and influential investors. The investor's state then sent warships to threaten the offending state until reparations were paid. This "gunboat diplomacy" was exercised frequently by European powers until the early twentieth century, for example when faced with Venezuela's default on its sovereign debt in 1902, the governments of Great Britain, Germany and Italy sent warships to the Venezuelan coast to demand reparation for the losses incurred by their nationals. The need for security and predictability for foreign investments was one of the main reasons to establish diplomatic relations with other states. Various ideas from the point of view of money receiving and money spending states were discussed and realized, from the Calvo doctrine - where contracts between the host state and foreign investors included an agreement in which the latter agreed to confine himself to the available local remedies without relying on diplomatic interference of his own state - to the principle of diplomatic protection - where a state espouses the claim of its nationals as a claim on its own behalf. With the Second International Peace Conference of The Hague in 1907, states agreed to a framework for the conclusion of bilateral arbitration treaties which were the basis for independent arbitration tribunals in case of a dispute between two states arising out of particular interests of its national investors. The right of diplomatic protection as mentioned above was still inadequate to promote foreign investments: the Latin American countries relied upon the Calvo Doctrine, which denied the possibility of interference under diplomatic protection principle. Also, the breach of investment treaties by states was still not sanctioned by public international law. Only expropriation was recognised quite early as a possibility for diplomatic protection claims. Furthermore diplomatic protection was only accessible for nationals of the claiming state. Questions arose what happens if transnational corporations claim protection? The obstacle for investors to convince their government to claim diplomatic protection for its nationals was very high and unpredictable to foresee. Also a claim against the home state to exercise diplomatic protection does not exist. Today, in our small world, where businesses are moved from the United States to India, industrial production is transferred from Europe to China, or new infrastructure projects are started in Central Africa, one cannot imagine international business without FDI. Foreign direct investments need security, investors need security. Security is necessary to promote foreign investment which is recognized as one of the driving forces in supporting development in developing and least developed countries. Investors want to know their rights regarding their investments and they want to enforce their rights directly in a fast and cost-effective way. The need for protection is the reason for various measures introduced by governments to secure investments. In the following the system of foreign dispute settlement under the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in combination with Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) shall be highlighted. The ICSID is the result of the investor insecurity mentioned above. ICSID shall also support FDI in the developing countries. The focus shall be on the increased interest for BITs and the therefore increased interest in ICSID arbitrations. Why do states use BITs? Did the establishment of a neutral venue for investment dispute settlement reach its goal to depoliticise disputes? Is it used by investors, and what is protected? Do BITs play an important role in the system of dispute settlement and why? And how do they work together with the ISCID system?

The article studies the history of the US foreign policy adaptation to détente that started in the late 1960s. By this time the Americans had strong military and political positions on the Korean peninsula. Washington managed to thwart DPRK attempts in 1966–1969 to destabilize the situation in the South. Americans saw growing inter-Korean contacts as a new challenge. With détente gaining momentum, this led to the obsolescence of some American foreign policy instruments in the region, including the US-controlled UN Commission on the Unification and Rebuilding of Korea. Another challenge for the Americans was the North Koreans' «diplomatic offensive,» which strengthened North Korea's position in the world. It tried to use the accumulated political weight to turn the annual debate on the Korean issue in the UN General Assembly from a formality to something real. At the same time, the military threat posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for example, in the 1973–1975 conflict along the Northern Boundary Line, remained relevant.Nevertheless, in 1968–1973 the Americans succeeded in reshaping their policy toward Korea under conditions of a dramatic improvement in the international situation of the DPRK and settlement of US-Chinese relations. The Americans managed to eliminate the obsolete UN Commission on the Unification and Restoration of Korea with minimal losses. They ensured that the discussion of the Korean question in the United Nations would not have a destructive influence on the internal political life of the South. Under these conditions, the inter-Korean dialogue remained merely a political game of the regimes on the peninsula. Preserving the status quo in the region was the main result of US diplomacy's manipulative techniques. Such approaches are still relevant for the modern US foreign policy – getting rid of international instruments, which have exhausted their purpose.

Will Donald trump international law? Since Trump's Administration took office, this question has haunted almost every issue area of international law. One of our leading international lawyers-a former Legal Adviser of the US State Department, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, and Yale Law Dean-argues that President Trump has thus far enjoyed less success than many believe, because he does not own the pervasive "transnational legal process" that governs these issue areas. This book shows how those opposing Trump's policies during his administration's first two years have successfully triggered that process as part of a collective counter-strategy akin to Muhammad Ali's "rope-a-dope." The book surveys immigration and refugee law, human rights, climate change, denuclearization, trade diplomacy, relations with North Korea, Russia and Ukraine, America's "Forever War" against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, and the ongoing tragedy in Syria. Koh's tour d'horizon illustrates the many techniques that players in the transnational legal process have used to blunt Trump's early initiatives. The high stakes of this struggle, and its broader implications for the future of global governance-now challenged by the rise of populist authoritarians-make this exhausting counter-strategy both worthwhile and necessary.

Diplomatic and consular privileges — Consuls — Immunities — Scope of immunity attaching to consul's acts — Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963 — Interpretation — The law of the United StatesTreaties — Conclusion and operation — Treaty signed but not yet ratified — Effect in municipal law — Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963 — The law of the United statesTreaties — Interpretation — Principles and rules of interpretation — Purpose of treaty — Preparatory work — Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963 — The law of the United StatesJurisdiction — In general — Territorial — Exemptions from and restrictions upon territorial jurisdiction — Foreign States — Contract between foreign State and United States citizen designed to embarrass government friendly to United States — Whether Spanish Government and its representative immune from suit for breach — Scope of immunity attaching to foreign sovereign's acts — The law of the United States

In the early 2020s, the challenges of maintaining a Western presence in the zones of armed conflicts in Asia and Africa increased dramatically. This was most evident in Afghanistan, while notable difficulties were also observed in the Sahara-Sahel region. In trying to understand the reasons for this, the author turned to the situation in Mali, trying to correlate the Germany's actions in Mali with the author's theoretical-practical scheme of participation of an outside actor in the resolution of an armed conflict. Reaching the position of a full-fledged global actor, Germany is especially interested in creating a strategic presence in the instability zones and is sensitive to its loss. At the first stage of the resolution, the key tasks are the bracketing of radical forces, especially terrorist groups, and the reconciliation of the moderate ones, which are interested in preserving the institution of the state as such. The second stage is the time for full-scale international peacekeeping. The third stage is the nationalization of the resolution, i.e. the transfer of control over the process to the authorities and security forces in the country of conflict's origin. The study explores the forms, scale, and geographical features of Germany's use of military tools and diplomatic capabilities in the first two stages of the 2013-2019 resolution. The main "bottlenecks" of the approach are identified, including the persistent delay in applying sufficient efforts and the determinism of this trend. For 2020-2021, two contradictory paths are shown against the background of a new wave of activation of terrorist groups in the south of Mali: an accelerated transition to nationalization with a possible withdrawal of German and French support, and a postponement of the third stage, linked to the preparations for the continued presence of Western countries in Mali.

Over the last quarter of the century relations between Russia and Poland are balancing between trying to understand the burden of mutual guilt and a desire to construct non-emotional pragmatic relations. Sources of tension vary. In particular, it is the desire of Poland to position itself as a valued player in NATO and the EU and the role distance between the two countries in IR system, which does not allow Russia to maintain an equal political dialogue with Poland. In fact, Poland is not afraid of a direct threat from Russia, but the worst scenario is the one in which Russia without changing the content of its imperial policy can be accepted as a full partner in the international community. The evolution of Russian statehood and national specifics of democracy is largely determined the assessment of the prospects of Russian politics in Poland. The mistake of Polish diplomacy last years was that it took no direct efforts to improve relations with Russia, but only tried to impose the dialogue on Russian authorities. Diplomatic methods were designed to hurt Russian interests and to create a topic for discussion. In response, after 2006 Russia chose the tactic of ignoring Poland. But, ignoring Polish authorities, Russian politicians acted similarly with other political forces. In Poland among influential political forces, there was and there is still no loyalty to Russia. For Russian interests it is no matter who are or will be in power in Poland. However as a rule, it is an important factor that foreign policy decisions are de facto within the competences of the President and the government, as well as experiencing a significant influence of the parliamentary forces. Recent trends show no tangible innovations in bilateral programme. But innovations appear in multilateral and conflict enough issues, such as deployment of US missile defense system in Poland or Polish supervision of "Eastern Partnership" programme. The main problem is low self-sufficiency of bilateral relations and excessive influence of third countries. Any efforts to normalize bilateral relations will be meaningless until the weight of bilateral relations really increases to each of the party.

The Scandinavian states' pursuit of status in world politics is well documented. However, little is known about whether these endeavors have resulted in higher status for these states. In this article, we suggest that the Scandinavian countries represent a useful case to explore whether similar foreign policy profiles and common club membership equalizes or exacerbates the unequal distribution of status recognition in world politics. To measure the status recognition of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, we use a network centrality measure of diplomatic representation and exchange from 1970 to 2010. We also measure how well the states have performed to increase their status recognition given their available status resources (measured by military capabilities and wealth) and their status-seeking effort (measured by relative diplomatic outreach). Our results show that Sweden has received significantly more recognition and performed much better than both Denmark and Norway in the measured period. We offer three explanations for these developments. First, the spoils of seeking status using the Scandinavian brand is akin to a regional zero-sum game in which Sweden, as the most visible state of the three, is the main beneficiary of the status recognition in the direction of the club. Second, status recognition often lags achievements or increases in status resources because the beliefs of foreign policy practitioners are only updated sporadically. This status lag is especially visible when states struggle to convert their resources into status (Norway), or when they succeed in maintaining their status despite experiencing a drop in status resources (Sweden). Third, an increase in status resources will only influence status recognition if it plays into a corresponding narrative. Sweden, in contrast to the nouveau riche Norwegians, has managed to rearticulate its foreign policy in a way that has attracted recognition in world politics.

The Scandinavian states' pursuit of status in world politics is well documented. However, little is known about whether these endeavors have resulted in higher status for these states. In this article, we suggest that the Scandinavian countries represent a useful case to explore whether similar foreign policy profiles and common club membership equalizes or exacerbates the unequal distribution of status recognition in world politics. To measure the status recognition of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, we use a network centrality measure of diplomatic representation and exchange from 1970 to 2010. We also measure how well the states have performed to increase their status recognition given their available status resources (measured by military capabilities and wealth) and their status-seeking effort (measured by relative diplomatic outreach). Our results show that Sweden has received significantly more recognition and performed much better than both Denmark and Norway in the measured period. We offer three explanations for these developments. First, the spoils of seeking status using the Scandinavian brand is akin to a regional zero-sum game in which Sweden, as the most visible state of the three, is the main beneficiary of the status recognition in the direction of the club. Second, status recognition often lags achievements or increases in status resources because the beliefs of foreign policy practitioners are only updated sporadically. This status lag is especially visible when states struggle to convert their resources into status (Norway), or when they succeed in maintaining their status despite experiencing a drop in status resources (Sweden). Third, an increase in status resources will only influence status recognition if it plays into a corresponding narrative. Sweden, in contrast to the nouveau riche Norwegians, has managed to rearticulate its foreign policy in a way that has attracted recognition in world politics.

Report discussing the Algeria's current political and social issues and the effects they have on United States and Algerian relations.

How did North African states depict their nomadic minorities to the US during the War on Terror in the 2000s? How did this shape American policy in the region? Focusing on Malian-American diplomacy and drawing on post-structuralist analytics of identity-formation, this paper first examines how Malian diplomacy represented nomadic minorities in communication with US diplomatic and military envoys during the period 2002–2010. It is found that Mali consistently branded Saharan nomads as lawless subjects that make territory ungovernable, compromise security, and facilitate terrorism. Second, this paper deploys intertextual analysis to measure the success of these strategic communications efforts. It is found that, despite the advice of some American diplomats on the ground, by the end of 2008 Mali's depiction of Saharan nomadism had been absorbed into US diplomacy. This subsumed Northern Malian subjects into the categories of the War on Terror, which privileged military control of subjects and territory over development and reconciliation efforts. This policy shift granted Mali influence over US policy and diplomatic support to ignore nomadic grievances. Analysis reveals the key role of identity-making and name-calling in Mali-US relations and in diplomatic communication more broadly, showcasing the potential of textual analysis methods to evaluate strategic communications outcomes.