Suchergebnisse

The challenge the Marshals Service faces is to identify individuals who pose risks to members of the federal judicial family. To this end, each inappropriate communication or contact (IC&C) is consistently processed & systematically analyzed. The basic framework of this process includes the reporting & review of the communication or contact, the analysis of all available information, & the reporting of the analytical results. A broad-based reporting criterion relieves judicial officials from making a determination about the communication while it ensures thorough reporting. This initial review also ensures that further processing does not violate First Amendment rights. The analyses of IC&Cs are systematic & objective, bringing about a rational comparison of one case against others with similar characteristics & known outcomes. The analysis injects an empirical approach to the threat management process. The report helps launch additional investigative action, & it may prompt a review & change of security. 2 Tables, 1 Appendix, 3 References. Adapted from the source document.

Considers (77) H.R. 6444. ; Committee Serial No. 12. Considers legislation to require labor unions and trade associations to identify officers, membership size, and financial condition to Commerce Department at periodic intervals. ; Record is based on bibliographic data in CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index. Reuse except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc. ; Indexed in CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index Part IV ; Considers (77) H.R. 6444. ; Committee Serial No. 12. Considers legislation to require labor unions and trade associations to identify officers, membership size, and financial condition to Commerce Department at periodic intervals. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Considers (76) H.R. 4587. ; Committee Serial No. 12. Considers legislation to expand Supreme Court authority to prescribe rules of criminal procedure in Federal courts. ; Record is based on bibliographic data in CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index. Reuse except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc. ; Indexed in CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index Part IV ; Considers (76) H.R. 4587. ; Committee Serial No. 12. Considers legislation to expand Supreme Court authority to prescribe rules of criminal procedure in Federal courts. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Considers (74) H.R. 2068, (74) H.R. 4027, (74) H.R. 4231, (74) H.R. 4461, (74) H.R. 5054, (74) H.R. 6018, (74) H.R. 6115, (74) H.R. 6677, (74) H.R. 8519. ; Committee Serial No. 4. ; Record is based on bibliographic data in CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index. Reuse except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc. ; Indexed in CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index Part IV ; Considers (74) H.R. 2068, (74) H.R. 4027, (74) H.R. 4231, (74) H.R. 4461, (74) H.R. 5054, (74) H.R. 6018, (74) H.R. 6115, (74) H.R. 6677, (74) H.R. 8519. ; Committee Serial No. 4. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Pt. 1: September 7 and 12, 1989. - 1991. - IV,276 S.; Pt. 2: October 3, 1989. - 1991. - III,134 S.; Pt. 3: October 31, 1989. - 1990. - III,93 S

When the European Union was founded, it was assumed that all Member States admitted as consolidated democracies would maintain their constitutional commitments. In recent years, Hungary and Poland have challenged this premise as elected autocratic governments in those countries have captured independent institutions and threatened long-term democracy. The judiciaries of these countries have been hard hit. In this paper, we trace what has happened to the judiciaries in Hungary and Poland, showing how first the constitutional courts and then the ordinary judiciary have been brought under the control of political forces so that there is no longer a separation of law and politics.We also explore why the European Union has so far not been able to stop this process. In the end, the European judiciary, particularly the Court of Justice, is attempting a rescue of national judiciaries, but the results are so far unclear.

When the European Union was founded, it was assumed that all Member States admitted as consolidated democracies would maintain their constitutional commitments. In recent years, Hungary and Poland have challenged this premise as elected autocratic governments in those countries have captured independent institutions and threatened long-term democracy. The judiciaries of these countries have been hard hit. In this paper, we trace what has happened to the judiciaries in Hungary and Poland, showing how first the constitutional courts and then the ordinary judiciary have been brought under the control of political forces so that there is no longer a separation of law and politics. We also explore why the European Union has so far not been able to stop this process. In the end, the European judiciary, particularly the Court of Justice, is attempting a rescue of national judiciaries, but the results are so far unclear.