Suchergebnisse

ASEAN's engagement with human rights culminated in the creation of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2012. The Declaration is fascinating in three ways: Its institutional origins are surprising, it was agreed upon by states with very different positions on the role of human rights domestically, and it both contains commitments far in advance of some members and is at the same time dangerously regressive. The three leading frameworks that currently interrogate the Declaration fail to provide convincing insights into all three of those dimensions. To correct these shortcomings, this article applies the notion of an "incompletely theorized agreement" to the study of the Declaration, arguing that member states understand the Declaration in very different ways and agreed to it for similarly diverse reasons. Further, I argue that the Declaration neither articulates a shared regional identity relating to respect for human rights, nor can it be understood as marking an early point towards the creation of this identity. Instead, the current diversity of regional opinions on human rights and democracy is perceived as legitimate and will endure. The article concludes by considering whether this denudes the Declaration of value, arguing that its importance will vary: The more progressive the member state, the more important the Declaration will be in the future. (JCSA/GIGA)

Weapon systems are becoming increasingly automated and arguably some autonomous military systems have been deployed for years. Recent advances in automated systems and the possibilities they portend have generated interest and anxiety within some militaries and defense ministries, and a movement of non-governmental activists seeking to ban fully autonomous weapons. In May 2014, the High Contracting Parties of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) convened an extensive discussion of the legal and ethical issues that autonomous weapons raise, while recognizing that many of these problems lie at an uncertain point in the future. It is important that normative development regarding autonomous weapon systems head down a path that is coherent and practical. By "autonomous weapon systems," we mean systems "that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator." We draw this definition from a 2012 U.S. Department of Defense policy directive, which remains the most extensive public pronouncement by any State on how it intends to proceed with regard to research, development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems. This paper addresses several questions that are critical to charting such a path. First, are autonomous weapon systems different from other new weapon systems, and, if so, how? Second, to the extent they are different, can and should autonomous weapon systems be regulated within the framework of the existing law of armed conflict? If yes, how should States go about doing so? If not, what alternative regulatory approach is appropriate? We conclude that autonomous weapon systems have special features that pose risks and that create challenges in applying the existing law of armed conflict. Nevertheless, we conclude it is possible to adapt the existing framework to account for the features of autonomous weapons, and that the suggested alternative of prohibiting these systems outright is misguided. Instead, we propose a three-tiered process for regulating the development, deployment and use of autonomous systems.

In der vergleichenden Wohlfahrtsstaatsforschung ist es seit der bahnbrechenden Studie "The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism" von Esping-Andersen (1990) üblich geworden, verschiedene "Regime" oder Typen von Wohlfahrtsstaaten zu unterscheiden. Diese werden meist als Idealtypen definiert durch unterschiedliche Leitbilder und Zielvorstellungen, die konsequenterweise in institutionellen Gestaltungsmerkmalen der wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Programme und Leistungen ihren Ausdruck finden. Es ist jedoch eine offene und bisher wenig erforschte Frage, ob sich auch die Einstellungen der (Wahl-)Bevölkerung zum Wohlfahrtsstaat je nach Regimetyp unterscheiden. Unterschiedliche Vermutungen sind denkbar (vgl. Svallfors 2003, 2012, van Oorschot/Meulemann 2012): Wenn in der öffentlichen Diskussion von einer Legitimations- oder Akzeptanzkrise des Wohlfahrtsstaates die Rede ist, wird eine solche Differenzierung meist nicht vorgenommen. Es wird vielmehr pauschalierend davon ausgegangen, dass Wohlfahrtsstaaten in der Gegenwart mit ökonomischen und demographischen Strukturproblemen konfrontiert sind, denen sie nicht mehr gewachsen sind und die folglich mehr oder weniger zwangsläufig zu Vertrauens- und Akzeptanzverlusten in der Bevölkerung führen. Aus der Logik demokratischer Willensbildungsprozesse ist demgegenüber abzuleiten, dass solche regimespezifischen Einstellungsmuster eher wahrscheinlich sind. In demokratisch verfassten politischen Systemen sollten nämlich die von Regierungen verfolgten Policies den politisch artikulierten Forderungen und Präferenzen der (Mehrheit der) Bevölkerung entsprechen. Unterschiedliche Regimetypen resultieren aus dieser Sicht aus national unterschiedlichen politischen Kräfteverhältnissen und politischen Präferenzen. Im Ergebnis bekämen die Bürger diejenige Version des Wohlfahrtsstaates, die sie mehrheitlich wollten, d. h. die ihren Einstellungen zur sozialpolitischen Verantwortung des Staates entspricht.