Suchergebnisse

Edited by Arthur Howland Buffinton. ; "One thousand copies of this survey have been printed at the Rumford Press, April 1931." ; Mode of access: Internet.

ISRAEL IS MORE SUI GENERIS THAN OTHER POLITICAL SOCIETIES not so much in virtue of the nature of its political arrangements and postures as in virtue of what underlies them. To highlight some basic issues of Israeli politics from this point of view is to take one's cue from the most fundamental question of Jewish existence: To be like or unlike, any other nation? If Zionism prevents Israelis from distinguishing themselves in the manner in which other nations distinguish themselves from each other, a major reason is that Israel's neighbours deny her the right to realize within sovereign boundaries the resurgence of a Jewish state and nation.

"Realism" and "idealism" are both terms which have been used in differing, sometimes opposite, senses in the history of philosophy. They must therefore be employed with great caution. Dr. John H. Herz, in his recent study of the application of these terms to politics, seeks to define the sense in which he uses them. He writes in his preface that the book was in the main finished when the last war was ended and that little which had happened since required modification of his conclusions. To the reviewer it seems that further thought on the concepts employed in a perspective more removed from the disturbing influences of the war period would have been desirable.

This paper provides an empirical appraisal of the influence of politics on the evolution of unemployment rates in 13 industrialized democracies (12 European Union countries & the US) from 1960 to 1999. We conduct new tests of opportunistic & partisan business cycle models, using richer data & more general specifications than previous studies. In contrast to most previous studies, we pay particular attention to the importance of labor market structure in conditioning the influence of politics on unemployment. We also investigate the relationship between political stability & economic stability. The results suggest the existence of partisan effects, with higher unemployment rates prevailing under "Right" parties than "Left" parties. There is more support for "rational" partisan models that embody transient partisan impacts than for models with permanent effects. We find evidence that union power is associated with higher average unemployment rates, but that centralized bargaining institutions tend to lower unemployment rates. The evidence also suggests that more fragmented coalition governments are associated with higher unemployment rates than single-party governments. 8 Tables, 1 Appendix, 22 References. Adapted from the source document.

Private politics are often introduced by market participants in the absence of public regulation. But when is private politics enough, efficient, or better than administratively costly public regulation? We present a novel framework in which we can study the interaction between regulation, self-regulation by the firm, and boycotts by the activists in a dynamic game. Our main results are the following. (i) The possibility to self-regulate saves on administrative costs, it therefore also leads to delays. (ii) The possibility to self-regulate benefits activists but harms the firm without the public regulator in place, the reverse is true with the regulator being present in the game. (iii) Without the public regulator, a boycott raises the likelihood of self-regulation, whereas if the regulator is present, it raises the likelihood of public regulation. (iv) Activism is a strategic complement to self-regulation, but a strategic substitute to public regulation. (v) In addition, the analysis generates a rich set of testable predictions regarding the regulatory outcomes and the duration of boycotts.