Suchergebnisse

Die Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wer das Risiko von Schäden rechtswidriger Streiks trägt. Die Gewerkschaft haftet gegenüber der Arbeitgeberseite in erster Linie aus vertraglichen Schadensersatzansprüchen. Ergänzend kommt eine deliktische Haftung in Betracht. Das passt auch zu den zivilrechtlichen Wertungen des Vertragsrechts einerseits und des Deliktsrechts andererseits: Gewerkschaft und Arbeitgeberseite stehen sich gerade nicht unverbunden gegenüber, sodass keine typische Konstellation der Jedermann-Haftung vorliegt. -- Für Drittbetroffene gilt: Rechtmäßige wie rechtswidrige Streiks zählen zu ihrem allgemeinen Lebensrisiko. Dritte haben daher auch bei rechtswidrigem Streik keine vertraglichen Schadensersatzansprüche gegen die Gewerkschaft. Dieses Ergebnis fügt sich auch in die gesetzliche Gesamtkonzeption ein: Nach dem Grundsatz der Relativität der Schuldverhältnisse haben sich Dritte an ihren Vertragspartner zu halten. In extremen Fällen sind Dritte ausreichend durch das Deliktsrecht geschützt. Ein darüberhinausgehender deliktischer Schutz, etwa mit Hilfe des ReaG, besteht nicht. -- Die Arbeit wurde mit dem KLIEMT.Arbeitsrecht-Dissertationspreis 2019 ausgezeichnet. / »The Liability of Trade Unions for Damages Caused by Illegal Strikes« -- The thesis addresses the question who carries the risk of illegal strikes. The trade union is liable to the employers' side, in the first instance from contractual liability complemented by tortious liability. Uninvolved third parties don't have contractual claims towards the trade union: both, legal and illegal strikes belong to the ordinary risks of life. This conclusion fits into the overall concept. Under the principle of relativity of obligations third parties have to address their own contractual partner.

Legal economic analysis has traditionally focused on the application of microeconomic theory to questions of legal import. Scholars have generally regarded macroeconomic effects of legal rules as lying beyond the purview of the legal decisiomnaker's jurisdiction. This Article argues that such exclusion of macroeconomic subject matter from legal analysis may rest on a scientifically erroneous view of - the economic process. The conventional understanding of the economic process presumes an unlimited supply of material inputs and an infinite natural capacity to absorb waste outputs. Fundamental scientific principles suggest that this understanding is flawed. The economic process must necessarily be limited in scale by the capacity of the ecological superstructure to sustain it. Thus, in addition td the efficient allocation of resources, legal economic analysis also should be concerned with the sustainable maintenance of scale. Consideration of scale effects by legal decisionmakers cannot be safely ignored in the way that distributive effects have been, given that no political mechanism analogous to the tax and transfer system exists to regulate the scale of the macroeconomy.

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- I. Introductions -- 1. Contemporary Law through the Classical Lens | Kirsten K. Davis and Francis J. Mootz III -- 2. Classical Rhetoric: Then and Now | Brian N. Larson and Kristen K. Tiscione -- II. Back to the Future: The Eclipse and Revival of Rhetoric -- 3. Giambattista Vico: Lamenting the Decline of Classical Rhetoric | Francis J. Mootz III -- 4. Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca: Answering Vico's Lament | David A. Frank -- III. Studies in Classical Rhetoric and Contemporary Law -- 5. Antiphon the Athenian: Probability Arguments in Ancient Greece and Today | Michael Gagarin -- 6. Dissoi Logoi: Speaking on Both Sides of a Question | Elizabeth C. Britt -- 7. Isocrates: Fear of the "Other" in Classical and Modern Times | Nick J. Sciullo and Craig A. Meyer -- 8. Plato: Legal Argument as the Distortion of Reality | Kristen K. Tiscione -- 9. Aristotle: Persuasion and Practical Reason | Eugene Garver -- 10. Aristotle: Aristotle's Topics and U.S. v. Lopez | Catherine L. Langford -- 11. Demosthenes: Founding Principles-The Role of Tradition in Persuasive Argument | Vasileios Adamidis and Laura A. Webb -- 12. Cicero: Legal Stases and the Supreme Court | Brian N. Larson and Susan E. Provenzano -- 13. Quintilian: The Lawyer, Speaking-The Lawyer as "Perfect Orator" | Kirsten K. Davis -- 14. Saint Augustine: The Place of Rhetoric in the Law and Religion Interface | Mark A. Hannah -- Afterword | Brian N. Larson -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Contributors -- Names and Subjects Index -- Legal Materials Index.

Property and inheritance are "quintessential state matters."' In fact, there is no federal intestacy law. There is no federal wills law. There is no federal trust law. And yet. Increasingly, federal law impacts court decisions involving private wealth transfer. Increasingly, federal law is the central consideration in premortem and postmortem planning for private wealth transfer. Despite this, until recently, little scholarly attention has been paid to this phenomenon; the assumption regarding the centrality of state law, quoted above, having gone largely unquestioned. But now that the "sleeping giant" has awakened, the role that federal law plays in private wealth transfer requires serious and comprehensive academic consideration. This symposium issue of the Vanderbilt Law Review is intended to do just that. There are ten articles addressing various facets of the topic. These are set forth in the same order as the order of the presentations made by the distinguished authors at the symposium that took place at Vanderbilt Law School in Nashville, ennessee earlier this year. A number of the articles are followed by comments by other distinguished scholars, who not only address the particular article, but also use the comment as a platform to explore other aspects of the topic The old paradigm is dead. Private wealth transfer law is NOT just state law. Indeed, in some respects, it is now principally federal law. This increasing federalization and even dominance can be expected to continue apace. While the problems and consequences of federalization are not new to many other areas of law and have received considerable and serious scholarly attention, they are new to private wealth transfer. The way in which the state-federal balance is being struck, the consequences for private wealth transfer flowing from federal involvement, and the principles that should guide courts and legislators in determining the proper state-federal allocation, are all examined with considerable analytic care in these pages. Hopefully, this ...