Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe development of a polity can be explained by studying the emergence of national identity, not only as the product of conscious elite actions but as the outcome of negotiations (or lack thereof) between opposing visions within elite groups at the national movement stage and at subsequent key historical moments. Polities where effective broadbased negotiations on national identity values and beliefs were conducted among competing elites tend to enjoy a greater degree of medium to long term stability, while those emerging states where negotiations were not conducted and only one identity vision was imposed tend to suffer from identity and political crises in the course of their political development. Morocco and Algeria present two opposing cases: the former, in which broadbased inter-elite negotiations led to a definition of national identity that became widely shared by the population at large, and the latter, where the lack of such negotiations and the violent outcome of the civil war led to the imposition of only one identity vision and to the subsequent identity crisis that has plagued the country since the early 1980s.

Abstract`Ethnic' identity does not just happen. It is processed and developed in a context of identity negotiation by culture brokers acting as self-proclaimed representatives of their respective groups. These brokers have shaped the politics of identity negotiation in Cameroon around two issues: fair access to state resources along presumably ethnic lines and protection by each group of its share of the national pie from more politically aggressive ethnic groups. In this context, identity negotiation follows an integrative approach that provides culture brokers, turned political entrepreneurs, with open options and flexible positions to address the issues. Sometimes, they play the ethnic majority card, using a language couched in terms of kinship ideology to recruit allies from neighboring groups, producing, through a process of incremental expansion, a larger ethnic group that displays a negotiated common cultural identity. In other cases, they withdraw from the larger group to play the alternative card of a minority group, using village and autochthon rhetoric to emphasize their authenticity and claim special treatments. In all cases, the bottom line of the political entrepreneurs is to negotiate with the regime for a share of the national pie.

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AbstractThe intra-state conflict in Mali between 1990–1997 represents a rare case of successful management of an internal violent conflict in Africa in the post-Cold War era. This article examines the conditions that permitted negotiations to yield a lasting peace in Mali. ``Success'' is measured in terms of the ability to arrive at an agreement that is not only signed by all parties, but that can be effectively implemented as well. The case of Mali exemplifies a conflict that was ``ripe for resolution'' at the outset of negotiations and yet required considerable effort to ensure success beyond the initial negotiated agreement. The article presents some lessons learned from the negotiation process and an analysis of why the outcome was durable. In Mali, ripeness was complemented by the ability to build trust and confidence through careful timing, by a flexible mix of informal and formal negotiations at different stages of the conflict, by appropriate third party intervention, and by popular participation from civil society. All of these factors were essential to success.