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Most research on right-wing populism focuses on the construction of 'the people'. Conversely, I ask how the other side of the populist conflict line – 'the elite' – is discursively constructed. To this end "I examine the debates of the far-right Institut für Staatspolitik (IfS) using Robert Entman's framing analysis. Subsequently, I contextualize the results within the elite discourse of the German New Right. Summing up the results, the IfS states that starting from the student protests in the 1960s and 1970s the elite has become leftist or 'multiculturalist'. Through the elite's hegemony in the media, it exerts a pressure of conformity. While the IfS constructs the elite negatively, it is not anti-elite. By labeling its political enemies as elites, the IfS tries to speak in the name of 'the people'. At the same time, it is elitist argues even for a right-wing elite. In pointing out this paradoxical construction, it becomes clear that the framing of right-wing actors should not be confused with the actual reality. Notably, the IfS's discursive strategy reflects a metapolitical or hegemony theoretical approach that is paradigmatic for the New Right.

AbstractThe Maldives commenced its transition to democracy after its first multiparty elections in 2008. This was challenging due to the Maldives being a Muslim nation, its authoritarian legacy of monarchical rule before independence, and by dictatorship after independence. This article analyzes the postindependence rule periods of Ibrahim Nasir and Maumoom Abdul Gayoom, which were akin to one‐man dictatorships. The third autocratic president postindependence, Abdulla Yameen, was an electoral authoritarian as he implemented authoritarian measures in a multi‐party context. I assess if religion provided political legitimacy to these authoritarian leaders or if religion was exploited by leaders to gain political support and civic spaces. Theories of authoritarianism, religious populism, electoral authoritarianism, as well as concepts of the ulema‐state alliance and the rentier state are utilized. In addition to their authoritarian legacy, democratic presidents like Mohamed Nasheed and Mohamed Solih had grappled with politicians' manipulation of religion through political Islam, Islamic nationalism, and fundamentalism to derail democracy by equating it to Westernization. These events resonate with Samuel Huntington's description of the conflict between the West and Islam as a clash of civilizations. Crimes against liberal thinkers by Islamic extremists are an added challenge. There is a real danger of another authoritarian reversal in the Maldives.

Populist politicians frequently employ anti-establishment appeals in their discourse by targeting an imagined or real power elite. Do such appeals have a mobilizing effect among voters? What role do the emotional responses of voters play in this process? We address these questions using a vignette experiment embedded into a nationally representative survey fielded in Turkey, a country where a populist party has long been in power. Our research design enables us to assess whether voters respond more positively to a populist framing of a call for mobilization on an issue compared to a non-populist framing, and whether their emotional responses act as mediators. We find that populist rhetoric indeed does have a mobilizing effect, though only for a low-cost form of political participation (signing a petition) and only among the constituency of the populist party. Turning to the role of emotions, we find that the populist framing of the issue led voters to report more discontent, despair, and anxiety, and these emotions mediate the positive influence of the populist message on mobilization. Thus, our study contributes to research on populism by highlighting the role of emotions in the mobilizing effect of populist discourse.

Abstract
This article explores sanctuary in Wales, focusing on the Welsh Government's recent declaration to become a Nation of Sanctuary (NoS), and identifying how the national scale provides an alternative locus for progressive sanctuary measures. In revealing the nation's emergence as another crucial site of sanctuary, the work reconceptualizes the nation's place in sanctuary policies and practices in two ways: (i) it locates sanctuary through a national scale, thus moving beyond the city/state dichotomy that has dominated explanations of sanctuary, and (ii) it shows the importance of decoupling the nation-state compound while simultaneously integrating the nation(al) into discussions on sanctuary without being bound to the state or xenophobic populism. In showing how "nations against the state" can participate in sanctuary measures, we expand the current understanding of where sanctuary can be found, and capture the various forms of national belonging and identities that exist within plurinational states, including alternative, progressive forms of civic belonging. This is particularly significant in light of the tightening of state immigration policies, greater regulation of immigrant entry at state borders, and continuation of restrictive citizenship policies witnessed in recent years, which have ignited sanctuary measures aimed at creating safe spaces beyond the reach of state measures.

The article analyzes the populist attitudes in a society that has experienced full-scale external aggression under the conditions of populist rule and the "rally around the flag" effect. Typically, in countries where populists are in power, there is a decline in anti-elitist sentiment and a rise in support for anti-democratic orientations. However, after the landslide victory of populists in Ukraine in 2019 and even during the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, citizens demonstrated an increased level of support for populist ideas. In particular, most Ukrainians agree with populist ideas of people-centrism. Public opinion is still dominated by anti-establishment and anti-elitist orientations, despite national unity during the war and support for the current government. On the other hand, while advocating the absolute primacy of popular sovereignty, citizens are divided on whether they want to be represented in politics by an ordinary citizen rather than an experienced politician. Moreover, most Ukrainians do not agree with the expediency of violating the law to achieve a political result. Support for populism in Ukraine is concentrated primarily among economically disadvantaged people living in small towns, less educated, older people, and those with financial problems. At the same time, the populist orientations of Ukrainians during the war were not determined by regional or ethnolinguistic distinctions.

Abstract
This article introduces the concept of hegemonic constituent power to argue for a greater role for the people in the process of Irish reunification through the establishment of a constituent assembly. Hegemonic constituent power contends that, ideally, constituent power should be possessed by the people; however, descriptively, this is invariably not the case. Constituent power instead is best understood as the manifestation of hegemony – the dominant power base in a given legal order that legitimates and reinforces this power through institutions, prevailing ideas and culture. Hegemony performs an important function in descriptively explaining legitimacy formation while not necessarily conferring normative legitimacy on existing power structures or those who exercise constituent power. Legitimacy and illegitimacy are both embedded in this notion of hegemonic constituent power. This allows for constituent power to perform a legitimating function and its creative potential to be unleashed while still leaving space for critical contestation over how this power was exercised. In this way, hegemonic constituent power also seeks to address critiques of constituent power as enabling populism. The article then deploys this concept of hegemonic constituent power to argue that fears of invoking the will of the people in debates on Irish reunification are misplaced.

AbstractChild to parent violence (CPV) is a form of family violence that has seen a growth in research attention over the past decade. However, little research has examined how this problem is understood by those outside of academia. This is despite recognition that public understandings of a particular social problem shape the landscape in which that problem plays out. To address this research gap, we analysed data from 463 public comments posted on YouTube in response to four UK news broadcasts that reported on the problem. Using a discourse analytic approach, we examined how posted comments framed the cause of, and solutions to, CPV. While a range of causes were identified, the posts predominantly blamed the parents, mobilizing child development discourses to attribute the cause of CPV to either parental use of violence, or to a lack of parental violence, towards children. The solutions offered reflect a penal populism that supports extremely punitive sanctions against children who engage in CPV. This study suggests that public campaign and education initiatives need to do more than raise public awareness about CPV—they must also inform the public about how broader social policy operates in relation to children, families and the state.

The relevance of the research lies in the observation that, while Ukraine has established formal democratic institutions since its independence, many democratization issues remain unresolved. These formal structures lack effectiveness and support, with informal, often non-democratic political processes and secret agreements continuing to prevail. The study aims to conclude a theoretical study, conceptualization, and generalization of the problems of the existence of informal institutions, as well as a comprehensive analysis of practical technologies of informal institutionalization in modern Ukraine. The authors used such general scientific methods as analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, abstraction, the ascent from the abstract to the concrete. The authors considered such informal institutions that exist in the political reality of Ukraine, such as lobbying, corruption, populism, non-conventional forms of political participation of citizens, party agreements, clientelism, and political bargaining. The effective technologies for the informal institutionalization of modern Ukraine, including technologies for eliminating authoritarian practices, technologies of party structuring, technologies of political participation and technologies for the formation of democratic political consciousness have been proposed. These technologies are aimed at the political modernization of Ukraine, ensuring the institutional functioning of democracy at the proper level and minimizing the negative effects of informal institutions.

In the literature on authoritarian regimes, there is a growing recognition that authoritarianism is not necessarily a transitional phenomenon, but a form of government that is sustained by a multifaceted selection of instruments and therefore able to survive crises. In Belarus, populism and regular welfare deliveries contribute to the tenacity of the country's authoritarianism. The sub-state level of governance is important as Belarusians' welfare primarily is delivered at the local level. However, the local elected bodies play a minimal role, and it is in practice local departments of the central administration that make decisions locally. This manifestation of the centralism of Belarusian authoritarianism is not only challenged by the opposition in the country. Systemic publications also advocate for less central management of local politics and more power for the local, elected councils. This article presents the distinctive features of Belarusian authoritarianism and provides a detailed overview of the local level of governance in the country. The reform debate – both from the side of the regime and the opposition – is presented. The possible importance of the local level for the survival of Belarusian authoritarianism is discussed in the light of the literature on the resilience of authoritarian regimes.

AbstractA common explanation for the success of populists is that they rhetorically shift blame for their followers' hardships toward "elites," therefore creating a culpable outgroup. However, we argue that there are two confounded effects at play here: shifting blame toward an outgroup and shifting blame away from oneself. Therefore, we theorize that above and beyond elite blame, victimization rhetoric heightens leader support because it specifically relieves followers of the pressure of having to take responsibility for negative life outcomes, especially when they subscribe to neoliberal competition ideology. Supporting our predictions, we show via a survey that victim rhetoric increases leader support while controlling for elite blame, especially among people subscribing to neoliberal competition ideology. In a subsequent experiment, we replicate the findings causally and show that the effect works by reducing perceived personal responsibility for negative life outcomes. Our results indicate that populist rhetoric involves shifting blame toward others and away from oneself. This can explain some of the conundrums that have plagued the literature, such as why elites also fall for populist rhetoric. We discuss our findings in relation to cultural differences and differences in left‐ versus right‐wing populism.

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) epitomizes the potential and the limits of soft law in promoting global migration governance. While being a catalyst of multilateralism, the use of soft law remains highly ambiguous and must thus be approached with caution. At the same time, the GCM operates as a counter-narrative to populism insofar as it proposes a collaborative framework to develop global migration governance. Yet, its implementation record remains disappointing, and the last review carried out within the UN General Assembly signals a return of realpolitik. This calls for a vigilant plea toward a principled implementation of the GCM with due regard to the commitments of states contained therein, as well as to their legal duties under international law. Following this stance, soft law and hard law are not mutually exclusive, but rather mutually reinforcing, provided they are implemented in a cogent and integrated way. The GCM can make a difference on the ground if, and only if, it works in tandem with legally binding norms and instruments. If not, it may eventually become nothing else than a mere smokescreen, if not a masquerade, for the patent violations of migrants' rights.

Scholars connect the rise of populist parties and the growing importance of social media platforms for political communication as the emerging social media logic seems well-suited to populist communication. The following research note presents a novel dataset that connects Facebook accounts to party-level populism data from the POPPA database. Over 600,000 posts from 226 parties between 2017 and 2019 were analysed. The results show that in most European countries, populist parties are more active than non-populist parties on Facebook. However, high variation in the frequency of posts emphasises that country-specific aspects play an important role. Generally, Italian parties are much more active than those from other countries, whereas those in Northern and Western Europe are the least active. The most active party in Europe, the Italian right-wing populist Lega, showed the most extreme level of activity: its daily activity is around 20 times higher than the median. Furthermore, this analysis highlights why researchers should carefully check Facebook data for implausible inactivity and how connecting different data resources can help overcome potential biases resulting from missing data. Future studies analysing any party communication on Facebook will benefit from the insights and the list of party accounts featured herein.

The article is devoted to the study of the ideological heritage of the national non-governmental public thought. In modern historiography, historians have not come to a single definition of narodnichestvo (populism). The Maxist-Leninist methodology and modernisation theory in the study do not allow us to identify the peculiarities of the transformation of state power in Russia. The authors of the article, having studied program documents, letters and memoirs of public figures of Russia, determine the specifics of the development of Russian statehood in the crisis situation of the twentieth century. The Marxist group, in order to seize power in the country, promised to implement the agrarian and political programs of the narodniks (Russian: "Populists"). The development of the Russian state has always been determined by solving the problem of interaction between the state and the people. Political changes in Russian society consistently reproduce the previous principles of governance. However, in the historical process, the vertical relationship between the state and the people is naturally transformed into a horizontal space. The task is to study the historical experience of building interactions between the state, the center of political power and the people.

Each state seeks solidarity and stability by ensuring unity and harmony among the socio-cultural and political segments within its territorial jurisdiction. This study looks at the elite political culture in Pakistan that has been highly criticized for stimulating social complexities by proliferating numerous sorts of political, ethnic, religious/sectarian, or linguistic differences. From 1999 to 2007, when a new class of political elites emerged on the surface of electoral politics as the results of 'Devolution Plan 2000', 'condition of graduation for public representatives' and '17th amendment' under the slogan of "Pakistan First"; some court verdicts and constitutional engineering during PPP's third rule upturned respective fruits by bringing back the former elite political culture or traditional elitism as the biggest opposition to populism, political egalitarianism, and democratic liberalism. Therefore, this study conducts a comparative study of PPP and PML(N) regimes (2008-2013 2013-2018 respectively) to find out the correlation between elite political culture and political system that is directly proportional to cosmopolitanism. This comparison assists the study to investigate the contributions of post-18th amendment elite political culture to the problematics of democracy during an addressed decade in Pakistan.

The article measures the degree of populist elements present in party leaders' discourses delivered as a part of their appearances in TV debates during the run up to the 2020 Slovak parliamentary elections. With the use of the 'holistic grading' approach, we empirically capture the presence and prominence of populist elements in textual transcripts of speeches delivered by 4 opposition party leaders. We start by defining populism as a discourse which can express a set of unique ideas and then follow up with arguments for the use of party leaders' communication as the object of analysis. We then proceed to operationalize the exact coding process of the 'holistic grading' method which is used in our analysis. The measurement results quantitatively represent the degree of populist elements in the communication delivered during the electoral campaign. We note that the 'holistic grading' method was successfully able to capture populist elements in the performances of actors who have been previously labelled populist. We find consistent use of populist discourse in the performances of Boris Kollár, Igor Matovič, and Marián Kotleba, with the latter two producing several extremely populist performances. We then discuss our results and further implications derived from the collected data.