Suchergebnisse

AbstractTo be on the receiving end of 'unethical' negotiation tactics is a challenge at any time, but is especially difficult when the other party is from a different culture. A model is presented that demonstrates how culture influences numerous situational variables in a negotiation and, in particular, how culture impacts upon negotiators' ethical decision making. It is posited that culture directly influences the legal environment, organizational code of ethics, organizational goals, and the perception of the other party, and that culture moderates negotiators' understanding of each of these situational variables. The theoretical and practical implications of the model are also discussed.

Although China has been involved in twenty-three territorial disputes with its neighbors since 1949, it has used force in only six of them. The strength of a state's territorial claim, defined as its bargaining power in a dispute, offers one explanation for why and when states escalate territorial disputes to high levels of violence. This bargaining power depends on the amount of contested land that each side controls and on the military power that can be projected over the entire area under dispute. When a state's bargaining power declines relative to that of its adversary, its leaders become more pessimistic about achieving their territorial goals and face strong preventive motivations to seize disputed land or signal resolve through the use of force. Cross-sectional analysis and longitudinal case studies demonstrate that such negative shifts in bargaining power explain the majority of China's uses of force in its territorial disputes. Adapted from the source document.