PROTEST MOVEMENTS PROVIDE A WEALTH OF MATERIAL FOR SPECULATION FROM MANY THEORETICAL VIEWPOINTS. THIS ARTICLE FOCUSES ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN SOME OF THESE MOVEMENTS & THE GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO IN AN ATTEMPT TO CARRY FORWARD AN INQUIRY DEMANDED BY KALMAN SILVERT.
In: The journal of modern African studies: a quarterly survey of politics, economics & related topics in contemporary Africa, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 57-67
Theterm 'labour aristocracy' first appeared in the literature on African economic development in 1968,1although African wage labour had previously been described as a privileged elite on many occasions. I wish to question the accuracy and relevance of the type of calculation upon which these descriptions are based, and to present the situation which prevails today in Northern Nigeria, using detailed survey data on the earnings of rural farmers, urban workers, and those employed in small-scale enterprises.
As R. H. Tawney once remarked, 'the past reveals to the presenr what the present is capable of seeing'. Present political scientists who are interested in comparing past power structures have been the first observers to reveral methodically the fundaqmental differences between feudalism and oriental despotism. They have shown how the feudal monarchies of Europe, in their ideal form, were restricted by hereditary and independent aristocrats, by institutions representing the estates of the real, and with civil societies with corporate rights, immunities, and inalienable privileges. And they have shown how despots in the East, in their ideal form, ruled through patrimonial bureaucracies, did not contend with estate institutions, could withdraw concessions granted previously, and were unhampered by independent intermediaries between themselves and their subjects.
James Coleman has argued that authoritative institutions that foster organization of the constituency & representation of diverse interests can avert the destructive aspects of rancorous community conflict (COMMUNITY CONFLICT, New York, NY: The Free Press, 1957). Schoolboard governments lack formal mechanisms for channeling conflict. Schoolboards compensate with an informal mechanism for handling conflict which is labeled "receptivity." A study of 82 schoolboards supports the following hypotheses: (1) schoolboards employ a strategy of receptivity when faced with community conflict; (2) receptivity is a mechanism by which the board channels community conflict into opposition to the superintendent; & (3) competitive elections are an institutional mechanism that supports schoolboard receptivity. 4 Tables, 1 Figure. Modified AA.